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ABSTRACT 
This is an examination of a neglected class of relations that have become more 
common after the Cold War, those between the United Nations and sub-State 
insurgent groups. This relationship has changed significantly after the end of 
the Cold War, both in the nature and frequency of the United Nations' 
response, and in the character of the insurgents that are addressed. Observing a 
strong influence of realism in both the motivations of insurgent actions and in 
the determinants and constraints of United Nations security initiatives, this 
study hypothesises that the predominant determinant of the effectiveness of 
United Nations-insurgent interactions is an essential concurrence in their 
approaches to the interaction. The research design develops an analytical 
framework of approach indicators to test the validity of this hypothesis across 
a range of United Nations-insurgent interactions. Those interactions chosen 
for analysis are Mediation; Peacekeeping, including Monitoring Ceasefires, 
Humanitarian Peacekeeping; and Disarmament and Demobilisation; and 
Election Monitoring. United Nations interactions with contemporary insurgent 
movements - the FMLN, the Khmer Rouge, the Bosnian Serbs, Renamo, the 
USC-SNA, the Contras, and Unita - are chosen according to their operational 
viability in order to fully test the hypothesised relationship. The general 
support for the hypothesis revealed by the analysis suggests important 
conclusions for the planning and conduct of United Nations initiatives, which 
are increasingly being called on since the Cold War to intervene in civil wars. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
On 3-4 October 1993, a United States Ranger contingent of the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was trapped in a IS-hour frrefight with Somali militias in 
Mogadishu's Bakhara Market. Other United Nations forces arrived to assist in a desperate 
evacuation, saving 70 wounded, but leaving 17 corpses to be mutilated and paraded through the 
streets, and Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant captured, to be exhibited before the world's 
media. Yet these were of the same forces that had sustained just over 1,000 casualties in taking 
100 hours to fulfil a United Nations mandate to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait less than 32 
months previously. The promise and disappointment of the United Nations to police the "new 
world order" has stimulated a vigorous and often emotive media, public and policy debate 
around the world. It has forced academics, preoccupied with searching eagerly for clues to the 
ordering of States and the locations of power in the post-Cold War world, to acknowledge that 
actors other than States were repeatedly rising to prominence in the flow of events. States 
coordinating their action through formal international organisations have become one of the 
defining features of the new international system, while the threats to the system come 
overwhelmingly from forces originating from within States. Not only do these super- and sub-
State actors interact with States, traditionally the defining unit of international relations, they 
have begun to interact with each other. 
The end of the Cold War ushered in not an unprecedented stability; rather its most 
pronounced effect on the international system turned out to be "the liberation of hitherto 
suppressed political forces."l Two of the most prominent of these forces are those of regional 
integration and State fragmentation; such contradictory trends "suggest that sizes and 
distributions of political entities in our era have yet to be determined. ,,2 International politics in 
the final decade of the twentieth century has been characterised by the efforts of States to 
contend with a proliferating array of challenges, opportunities, and stimuli, while under 
I Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. xxx. 
2 Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", in Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism 
and Its Critics, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), pp. 317-8. 
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increasing constraints applied by domestic demands, military cutbacks, and growing 
international uncertainty. Increasingly, States have responded by acting through multilateral 
organisations to address their security concerns, particularly those of State disintegration. Thus 
while the coordination of the Gulf War coalition through the United Nations was hailed as a 
"defIning moment" for the new international system, it has proved to be less characteristic than 
the violent ethnic disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent response to that crisis by the 
international community through the European Union, the United Nations, and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
1.1: Objectives 
This thesis examines the dynamics of the interactions arising from the international 
community's use of the United Nations to confront the threats of various civil wars. It isolates 
from this nexus two of the newly prominent international actors - the United Nations and sub-
State insurgent organisations - and analyses the features, motivations and constraints on their 
relationships. In focussing on this interaction, it seeks to understand the varied outcomes of 
multilateral responses to internal wars. A survey of these involvements begs the question: why 
was a small United Nations force so successful in helping end the long, bitter Salvadoran civil 
war by demobilising the experienced, disciplined and well-armed FMLN, while the biggest, 
most powerful United Nations force ever mounted at that time was humiliated and driven out of 
Somalia by a disordered collection of petty warlords and ragged militias? The analysis asks what 
factors detennine the behaviour of insurgent movements when they are confronted by the 
international community. It examines the nature of the detenninants, limitations and unique 
capabilities borne by the United Nations as it grapples with the belligerents in these civil wars. 
By assessing the outcomes of these determinants on their behaviour and interrelations, this thesis 
attempts to pinpoint the sources of effective and dysfunctional interactions. 
The execution of this study has several rationales. From an academic viewpoint, it is 
desirable to develop a fuller understanding of these new forces and relations that have surfaced 
in international politics. A study of the interaction between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements also begins to fill a gap within the discipline of international relations, which has 
2 
largely ignored this growing class of international interrelations. There are also practical 
justifications for investigating the international community's attempts to deal with civil wars 
multilaterally. As E. H. Carr stated in laying the foundations of the modem discipline, "The 
teleology".of international relations is the desire to prevent war.,,3 In assessing the components 
of effectively addressing contemporary civil wars, this thesis attempts to advance the endeavour 
of dampening threats to international stability. It is also cognisant that it is civil wars that are the 
predominant cause of humanitarian disasters in the modem world. Finally, this thesis arises from 
the conviction that the United Nations is a valuable security instrument whose loss would limit 
the international community's ability to preserve international security. It has been written as a 
growing tide of international public opinion has reacted to its failures and excesses by 
advocating the dismantling of the Organisation. This thesis contends that many of the United 
Nations' failures are due to its ad hoc approach to security threats and its unwillingness to 
maintain a record of its past experiences or base its actions on analysis of previous interactions 
or present challenges.4 As each failure becomes more conspicuous and costly, the viability of 
the Organisation is threatened by declining Member-State commitment, particularly as the 
finance crisis deepens. The United Nations needs to increase its success rate, and such an 
improvement must be grounded in considered responses based on analyses of requirements, 
forces and capabilities in its operating environments. 
1.2: Definition of Terms 
Given the increasing volume of interactions in international politics, it is necessary to 
circumscribe the scope of a study of this nature. A large number of bodies exists under the 
United Nations' aegis, fulfil a myriad functions and maintain extensive international contacts, 
while the number and diversity of sub-State insurgent groups, terrorist organisations and 
pressure groups multiplies by the month. Sartori emphasises the importance in social science of 
both declarative and denotative definitions, which provide a "disambiguation" of the elements 
3 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 8. 
4 See Mats Berda!, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper 281, (London: Brasseys and IISS, October 
1993), p. 51. 
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being examined by establishing the boundaries and membership of the concepts under 
investigation.5 This thesis isolates and concentrates only on those relations between the United 
Nations and insurgent movements that are concerned with disturbances to international security 
and attempting to restore peace and stability. The term "insurgent movement" reflects the 
selection of the least problematical nomenclature to denote the class of sub-State belligerents 
examined in this thesis. The groups selected vary in size, tactics, ideology and goals, and do not 
fit the ideologically-laden "national liberation movements"; neither are all of their tactics 
consistent with the name "guerrillas", or their objectives all sufficiently revolutionary to deserve 
the name "rebels". Thus while "insurgency" implies hostilities against an established 
government, while in many contemporary civil wars no viable government exists, in this study 
an "insurgent movement" will be taken to denote a sovereignty-free, non-territorial, belligerent 
1·· 1 6 po ItlCa group. 
The name "United Nations" is used throughout this study as a convenient shorthand 
when its relations with the insurgent movements are being considered. It does not, however, 
assume that the United Nations is a unitary actor; in fact the interplay of the various forces 
within the organisation will be used to analyse many of its actions and motivations. The United 
Nations is treated as primarily an organisation of States, whose actions are determined by the 
agendas and bargaining between its members. As the most universal international organisation, 
the United Nations is a mirror of the States system and its power distributions; the structure of 
the organisation reflects this, being dominated by the Security Council which in tum is 
dominated by the Great Powers.7 The United Nations' actions must therefore be studied "as a 
pattern of cooperation and of muted conflict whose nature, evolution, effectiveness and 
outcomes cannot be studied apart from the global system. ,,8 This thesis takes into account the 
5 Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis", in Giovanni Sartori (ed), Social Science Concepts: A 
Systematic AnalysiS, (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 29-30. 
6 The characteristics of national liberation movements are discussed in Chapter Two, and the nature of insurgent 
movements are examined in Chapter Three, below. 
7 This relationship is more fully examined in Chapters Two and Three, below. 
8 Stanley Hoffinan, "International Organization and the International System", International Organization, Vol. 
24, No.3, 1970, p. 390. 
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interests of the States instrumental in determining United Nations action to illuminate the 
sources and motivations of those actions. A moderating influence on Member-States' 
determination of United Nations actions is the bureaucratic interpretation of mandates by the 
Secretariat and the operations launched to implement their decisions. The Secretary-General's 
and the Secretariat's inputs are characterised by the conservatism characteristic of most 
executive branches, as they hold a longer-term conception of the Organisation, and are 
motivated to preserve its reputation, effectiveness, influence, and the commitment of its 
Member-States. 
The "interaction" between the insurgent movements and the United Nations that this 
thesis examines is studied as an encounter between two actors, each attempting to advance its 
interests among the potential opportunities and drawbacks it sees as being offered by the 
meeting. The analysis makes use of the term "optimal" as a qualifier for the interaction, using it 
to denote a relationship in which the parties advance towards or obtain their goals to a greater or 
lesser extent. This terminology forestalls the use of absolute measures of success and failure 
which are difficult to quantify without qualification in international relations. United Nations 
security initiatives have always been evaluated in terms of qualified success, and even the least 
satisfactory, such as UNIFIL or UNFICYP, are judged useful in securing secondary objectives: 
forestalling intervention and regional instability, eliminating sources of friction between the 
superpowers, and preventing greater hostilities and suffering. 9 Optimality of interactions 
between the United Nations and insurgent movements is therefore not necessarily balanced or 
absolute, but must be assessed in terms of relational constraints and pressures. The interests that 
they seek to advance during their interactions inevitably involve trade-offs and qualifiers as the 
actors try to optimise the advantages and disadvantages of various options. 10 This study is well 
aware that when the United Nations intervenes in a civil war, insurgent movements are not the 
only actors it interacts with. Rather, it selects and studies relations with certain insurgent 
movements, taking full account of the influences of other insurgent movements, incumbent 
9 Alan James argues persuasively that the United Nations has developed a continuum of peacekeeping responses, 
calculated on the political purpose it intends to advance and the consensus available to it for that mission. See Alan 
James, "Internal Peacekeeping: A Dead End for the UN?", Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No.4, December 1993, pp. 
359-368. 
10 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 19-20. 
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governments, and other actors when these impact in a significant way on the interaction between 
the United Nations and the prominent or difficult group chosen for study. 
1.3: United Nations-Insurgent Relations: A Review of the Literature 
A survey of the writing on the United Nations and insurgent movements reveals a 
conspicuous absence of any analysis of their relations. This can perhaps be attributed partly to 
the recentness of the interactions, and partly to the need to apprehend the new role of the United 
Nations and the recent threats of ethnic belligerents. The majority of the academic literature on 
the United Nations is preoccupied with explaining the organisational dynamics of an 
international organisation, II or examining the internal play of politics and "parliamentary 
diplomacy" within its forum organisations, while substantively ignoring the Organisation's 
actions or initiatives in the international environment. 12 There do exist, however, a variety of 
histories and thematic studies of the United Nations as an international actor promoting peace 
and security, but these inevitably focus primarily on its relations with States during the Cold 
War. 13 More recent works analyse the changes undergone by the United Nations since the end 
II See Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations, (New York: Frederick A. Pnleger, 1960) 
and The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Evan Luard, The United Nations: 
How It Works and What It Does, (London: Macmillan, 1982); Keith S. Petersen, "The Business of the United 
Nations Security Council: History (1946-1963) and Prospects", Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No.4, November 1965, 
pp. 818-838; and A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organisations: Principles and Issues, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1991). 
12 See Sydney D. Bailey, "New Light on Abstentions in the UN Security Council", International Affairs, Vol. 50, 
No.4, October 1974, pp. 554-573, "Some Procedural Problems in the UN General Assembly", The World Today, 
Vol. 31, No.1, January 1975, pp. 24-28, and "The UN Security Council: Evolving Practice", The World Today, 
Vol. 34, No.3, March 1978, pp. 100-106; G. R. Berridge and A. Jennings (eds), Diplomacy at the United Nations, 
(London: Macmillan, 1985); Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson (eds), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision 
Making in International Organization, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Lawrence S. Finkelstein (ed), 
Politics in the United Nations System, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988); Rosemary Foot, "The European 
Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly", Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 17, No.4, June 1979, pp. 350-360; Frederick H. Gareau, "Cold War Cleavages as Seen From the United 
Nations General Assembly, 1947-1967", Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, No.4, 1970, pp. 929-968; Joe D. Hagan, 
"Domestic Political Regime Changes and Third World Voting Realignments in the United Nations, 1964-1984", 
International Organization, Vol. 43, No.3, Summer 1989, pp. 505-541; Robert O. Keohane, "The Study of Political 
Influence in the General Assembly", International Organization, Vol. 21, No.2, 1967; and Jack E. Vincent, 
"National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations", American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 62, No.3, September 1968, pp. 916-931. 
13 See Morris B. Abram, "The United Nations and Human Rights", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No.2, January 
1969, pp. 363-374; Berhanykun Andemichael, Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles of the United 
Nations and the Organization of African Unity, (New York: UNIT AR, 1972); Jack Donnelly, "Recent Trends in UN 
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of the Cold War, but are more concerned with the United Nations' broader international role to 
pay attention to its relations with civil war belligerents. 14 
Similarly, the literature concerned with sub-State belligerents mentions very little of 
either their international personality or their encounters with the United Nations. Much of this 
writing concentrates on the weapons, tactics and trends of sub-State warfare at the expense of 
the political objectives or diplomatic activities of these movements. 15 A recent area of academic 
interest has emerged around the study of ethnic conflict, and some of these writers have analysed 
the links to the international community and the threats posed to regional security by these 
belligerents. 16 Kirisci, after Willetts,17 develops a model for the elevation of a sub-State group's 
Human Rights Activity: Description and Polemic", International Organization, Vol. 35, No.4, Autumn 1981, pp. 
633-655; Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967); K. Venkata Raman, The Ways of the Peacemaker: A Study of the United Nations 
Intermediary Assistance in the Peacefol Settlement of Disputes, (New York: UNITAR, 1975); and N. D. White, The 
United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1990). 
14 See Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); 
Mara R. Bustelo and Philip Alston, Whose New World Order: What Role for the United Nations?, (Sydney: The 
Federation Press, 1991); Lori Fisler Damrosch and David A. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New 
International Order, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim and Saul H. 
Mendlovitz (eds), The United Nations and a Just World Order, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); and 
Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security", Survival, Vol. 35, No.2, Summer 1993, pp. 3-30. 
15 See Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies, (London: Routledge, 
1990); James Elliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War, (Westport: 
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1973); Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political 
Struggle in Latin America, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967); Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla 
Warfare: The Countryside Version, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); Helmut Fredenschuss, "Legal and Political 
Aspects of the Recognition of National Liberation Movements", Millenium, Vol 11, No.2, Summer 1982, pp. 115-
129; Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in 
the Third World, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); and Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Harmonsdworth: Penguin, 
1961). 
16 See Judy S. Bertelsen (ed), Nonstate Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analysis, «new 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1977); David Carment, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, 
Indicators and Theory", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No.2, May 1993, pp. 137-150; Gerard Chaliand, 
Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation States, «London: Pluto Press, 1988); John Chipman, "Managing the Politics 
of Parochialism", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 143-170; Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside 
Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 118-142; K. M. da Silva and R. J. May 
(eds), Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991); Pierre Hassner, "Beyond 
Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order", Survival, Vol. 35, No.2, Summer 1993, pp. 49-65; 
Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement", International Organization, Vol. 44, No.3, 
Summer 1990, pp. 341-378, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, «London: Frank Cass, 
1991), and "The International Dimension of Minority Separatism: An Attempt at Unravelling a Pandora Box", 
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issue of concern to the international agenda in his study of the mobilisation of international 
support for the PLO. IS Schoenberg's polemical study of the PLO's relations with the United 
Nations is less helpful in understanding their interaction, because the author's subjective 
opinions of the motives and role of the United Nations precludes the serious study of one of the 
most crucial dynamics of the relationship.19 Thus United Nations scholars' disregard of its 
relations with insurgent movements is largely matched by insurgents scholars' neglect of their 
relations with the United Nations. 
The few examinations of United Nations operations' relations with sub-State belligerents 
can be found within the ambit of literature on peacekeeping. United Nations peacekeeping 
operations in civil wars have produced a plethora of histories and accounts, usually by 
participants in those operations which offer important situational insights on relations between 
the peacekeepers and the insurgents.2o These are helpful for the understanding of each operation 
and conflict, but it is problematical as to whether such subjective reports of contact with 
insurgent movements can be generalised to other, similar situations, or indeed to the whole class 
of analogous relations. Skogmo's history of UNIFIL attempts a more conceptual treatment, 
examining the various political factors and perceptions that influenced PLO behaviour towards 
UNIFIL.21 Other thematic treatments22 examine and critique various peacekeeping operations, 
Paradigms, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 1992, pp. 117-139; and Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism", 
Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 48-62. 
17 Peter Willetts (ed), Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Trans-National Relations of Issue-Oriented 
Non-Governmental Organisations, (London: Frances Pinter, 1982). 
18 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilisation of Support for the Palestinian Cause, 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1986). 
19 Harris Okun Schoenberg, A Mandatefor Terror: The United Nations and the PLO, (New York: Sharpolinsky 
Publishers Inc., 1989). 
20 See for example Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Michael 
A. Attalides (ed), Cyprus Reviewed, (Nicosia: The Jus Cypri Association, 1977); Thomas Kanza, Conflict in the 
Congo, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); and Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, (London: Hutchinson, 
1962). 
21 Bjorn Skogmo, UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1989), pp. 10; 17-18; 20-1; 45. 
22 See William J. Durch (ed), The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative 
Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1994); Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations 
Authority and Multinational Force, (Boulder: Westview Press: 1987), Gustav Haaglund, "Peacekeeping in a 
8 
approaches and methods, appraising their effectiveness in addressing a number of concerns, 
including relations with belligerents. Alan James' work on peacekeeping provides the closest 
treatment of the relations between the United Nations and insurgent movements. His analyses 
proceed from a variety of angles, and his consideration of the point of view of the disputants 
concludes that for the belligerents, the prospect of accepting peacekeepers as part of the conflict 
termination process is highly problematical and generally less than desirable. 23 His work 
concentrating on the problems confronting peacekeeping in civil wars throws into relief the 
unique complexity and the pitfalls of internal peacekeeping,24 as well as emphasising the 
delicacy of peacekeeper's position, and the primacy of insurgents as actors in the peace 
process.25 A combination of the specific insights of case studies and the general conclusions of 
peacekeeping methodologies, however, provides but a few tantalising clues to a more 
comprehensive understanding of United Nations-insurgent relations. This can only be provided 
by an analysis exclusively devoted to the investigation of United Nations-insurgent relations. 
A class of literature that obliquely addresses the United Nations' relations with insurgent 
movements is that generated by the normative debate on the desired abilities of the United 
Nations in securing the "new world order". Without ever grappling with the subject directly, this 
debate contains serious implications for the United Nations' relations with insurgent movements 
as it intervenes in civil wars. Any such speculation and debate indirectly comments on the 
organisation's present and prospective relations with insurgent movements, while impacting 
significantly on United Nations policy towards insurgent movement. The debate originated with 
An Agenda for Peace, published in June 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 
response to a request by the Security Council to prepare a report on strengthening the United 
Modem War Zone", Survival, Vol. 32, No.3, May/June 1990, pp. 233-240, and Paul F. Diehl, "The Conditions for 
Success in Peacekeeping Operations", in Paul F. Diehl (ed), The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns 
and Insights, (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989), pp. 173-188. 
23. Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
24 Alan James, ""Internal Peacekeeping: A Dead End for the UN?", Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No.4, December 
1993, pp. 359-368. 
25 Alan James, "The Problems of Internal Peacekeeping", Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 5, No.1, March 1994, 
pp.21-46. 
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Nations security machinery?6 Reaffinning the State's position as the "foundation-stone" of the 
international system, whose" ... fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
international progress,,,27 Agenda for Peace observed its "cohesion .. .is threatened by brutal 
ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. ,,28 In addressing its responsibility to arrest 
this trend through 
... agreements ending civil strife [which] may include disarming the previously 
warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction 
of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security 
personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, 
reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting fonnal and 
infonnal processes of political participation,29 
Boutros-Ghali observed that peacekeepers had encountered problems with insurgent 
movements: 
Increasingly, United Nations peacekeeping forces are being established in 
situations where the success of the operation depends on the cooperation of non-
governmental entities or irregular groups. This presents the organisation with a 
whole new set of problems, such as the lack of a unified or single chain of 
command, and difficulty in identifying the real source of authority and 
establishing direct dialogue with the real as opposed to the fonnal leadership of 
these movements, factors which in turn may result in agreements not being 
honoured at lower levels. Frequently, these entities or groups, lacking 
international recognition, encounter obstacles in obtaining participation in peace 
conferences or intergovernmental consultations and have thus not always been 
parties to the political agreements underpinning the establishment of a 
peacekeeping force. It is also not uncommon for the leadership of these groups to 
be located in geographically remote areas lacking an established liaison with the 
United Nations Force Commander. Their very nature may lead them in turn to a 
generally mistrustful view of the outside world and of the intergovernmental 
26 This request was issued by the first ever convening of the Security Council at the heads of government level in 
January 1992. See "Note by the President of the Security Council", Security Council Official Records, S/23500, 31 
January 1992, p. 3. 
27 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council 
on 31 January 1992, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 3. 
28 ibid, p. 2. 
29 Boutros-Ghali,op. cit., 1992, p. 12. 
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community in particular, and to their being less susceptible to outside influence, 
while their often clandestine status sometimes makes it all the more difficult to 
obtain, where the need arises, reliable information about the locations, number of 
combatants or inventories ofweapons.3o 
For Boutros-Ghali, the problematical nature of insurgents is one of the "new military facts" 
confronting peacekeepers; when " ... governments are not able to exercise control over their 
territory, U.N. officers must deal with irregular forces and their leaders. This means that 
agreements often are not reliable, that weapons proliferate without control, and that violence 
may erupt suddenly. ,,31 
In this way, the mercurial nature of insurgent movements threatened to bring the whole 
conflict termination machinery of the international community grinding to a halt. Such defiance 
was more than frustrating and expensive. Often the pressing nature of the humanitarian or 
security threat is such that it cannot await the often tortuous negotiations needed to gain the 
consent of the parties.32 For Boutros-Ghali this raised " ... profound questions about the absolute 
need for consent from the parties in the first place.,,33 He argued that the ability to contain and 
dampen civil wars threatening global peace, and the requirement of greater security by 
humanitarian operations should be provided by "expanded peacekeeping ... [for] when established 
rules of engagement are no longer sufficient, United Nations forces may need authorisation to 
use force. ,,34 This perceived need to dispense with the requirement of consent on occasion 
infers that the United Nations must often impose peace, forcefully if necessary, against 
sporadically recalcitrant insurgent groups. 
30. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the Work of the Organization From the Forty-Sixth to the Forty-Seventh 
Session of the General Assembly, September 1992, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 52. 
31 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Beyond Peacekeeping", Conference at New York University School of Law on the 
Future afCollective Security, 20 January 1993. p. 112. 
32 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Challenges and Opportunities for the United Nations Towards the Twenty-First 
Century", United Nations University Symposium, Tokyo, 18 February 1993, pp. 17-18. 
33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "UN Peacekeeping in a New Era: A New Chance for Peace", The World Today, Vol. 
49, No.4, April 1993, p. 68. 
34. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace: One Year Later", Orb is, Vol. 37, No.3, Summer 1993, p. 
328. 
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The supporters of Agenda for Peace saw its ideas of peace-enforcement as a chance to 
authoritatively solve and prevent the festering security threats represented by civil wars. The 
obstinacy of the belligerents was identified as being responsible for the inability of the United 
Nations to resolve civil wars during the Cold War.35 Boutros-Ghali's advocacy of "consent-
enforcement" on uncooperative belligerents gained endorsements advocating an ability to 
compel parties to enter peace talks, using " ... enforcement leverage whenever either side baulks at 
a settlement or negotiations to achieve peace,,,36 and to maintain "a measure of compulsion ... to 
ensure that parties ... abide by their commitments. ,,37 For humanitarian crises, the media and aid 
agencies supported Agenda for Peace, criticising past treatment of warlords attacking relief 
supplies "as politicians",38 and calling for the use of force to protect flows of humanitarian 
aid.39 An underlying motivation of arguments supporting consent-enforcement was the 
perceived need to "win back respect for the UN,,40 among belligerents and retain the support of 
35 Henry Wiseman, "Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical Analysis", in Indar Jit Rikhye 
and Kjell Skjelsbaek (eds), The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects: The Lessons 
of 40 Years of Experience, (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 47. 
36 Andrei Kozyrev and Gennadi Gatilov, "The UN Peacemaking System: Problems and Prospects", International 
Affairs (USSR), No. 12, December 1990, p. 84. 
37. Olara A. Otunnu, "Maintaining Broad Legitimacy for United Nations Action", in John Roper, Masashi 
Nishihara, Olara A. Otunnu and Enid C.B. Schoettle, Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening 
Multilateral Peacekeeping, (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1993), pp. 77-8. 
38 Editorial, "A Fine, Painful Line for the UN", The Independent, Monday 14 June 1993, p. 17. 
39 Malcolm Fraser, "The United Nations Needs to do Better in Somalia", International Herald Tribune, 
Wednesday 4 November 1992, p. 8. 
40 "Rescue the Rescuer", The Economist, 12 June 1993, p. 17. In the aftermath of Agenda for Peace, there were 
signs of support for military credibility among United Nations member-states. Early indicators suggested that the 
United States agreed that the United Nations needed to maintain its credibility. Permanent Representative Albright 
perceived the requirement of consent as damaging to United Nations plausibility: "The UN's impartiality can be a 
key to diplomatic credibility; but it is of less help when military credibility is what is required." See Madeleine K. 
Albright, Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 5 May 1994, United 
States Information Service, London, 9 May 1994, p. 2. An early statement by a Clinton administration official 
intimated that United States forces would be used as a last resort against organisations flouting United Nations 
peace efforts. See Martin Walker, "First Sign of New US Role", The Guardian, Monday 14 June 1993, p. 8. 
Resolution 868 (1993), in which the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General to "take forward" the 
"security measures" recommended in Agenda for Peace, was adopted in response to attacks against peacekeepers, 
and threatened that such attacks "may require the Council to consider measures it deems appropriate." See Security 
Council Resolution 868 (1993) of29 September 1993. However, it seems that in the light of recent peacekeeping 
experience, this support of United Nations military credibility among its member-states was short-lived. 
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Member-States: "A UN that intervenes with ... too little effect will quickly lose the wherewithal 
to intervene at all. ,,41 
The critics of this position argued that the replacement of consent with enforcement by 
the United Nations was either undesirable or unfeasible and urged the perfection of existing 
mechanisms of conflict termination rather than wasting political resources on radical departures. 
Critics highlight the absurdity of using force to impose peace on parties who are not inclined to 
participate:42 "Force is a notoriously inefficient instrument...[when] used to pacify and rule. 
Consequently, the ability to achieve military destruction does not indicate a corresponding 
ability to exercise political control or influence over other actors or events. ,,43 Furthermore, the 
complexity of civil wars makes the prerequisite of consent essential and peace-enforcement 
impossible,44 because "the participating factions are so numerous and unaccountable that 
identifying potential enemies becomes a major problem and negotiation a nightmare ... There is 
no hope that if one of the parties reneges on the agreement and resumes hostilities, the peace 
force can somehow overwhelm them and restore the status quO.45 Other critics observe that "[i]t 
is an axiom that durable, peaceful solutions cannot be imposed by outsiders, however 
powerful,,46 and that United Nations' success is contingent upon the support and consent of the 
belligerents and local population.47 The likely failure of experiments in peace-enforcement were 
predicted to "greatly diminish [peacekeeping's] initial acceptability ... [to] the potential consumers 
of peacekeeping. ,,48 Peace-enforcement's opponents offer more than cynical criticism, however. 
41 "Binding the World", The Economist, 2 October 1993, p. 16. 
42 John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering the Void: Charting the UN's New Strategic Role", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, 
No.5, November/December 1993, p. 28. 
43 Thakur,op. cit., 1987, p. 134. 
44 Malcolm Rifkind, "Peacekeeping or Peacemaking? Implications and Prospects", RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No. 
2, April 1993, p. 5. 
4S John MacKin lay, "Powerful Peacekeepers", Survival, Vol. 32, No.3, May/June 1990, p. 243. 
46 Sir Anthony Parsons, "The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era", International Relations, Vol. 11, No.3, 
December 1992, p. 193. 
47 Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping", Survival, Vol. 36, No.1, 
Spring 1994, p. 44; see also Diehl, op. cit., 1989, pp. 173-188. 
48 James,op. cit., 1990, p. 368. 
13 
They argue for a more pragmatic utilisation of the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold 
War, urging modest reforms, the rectification of existing problems, and the perfection of current 
conflict termination techniques rather than bold experiments and ambitious proposals.49 
The debate on current and desirable United Nations conflict termination capabilities can 
be justifiably characterised as " ... the product of aspiration, focussing largely on what is 
theoretically desirable rather than on what is politically and practically feasible. ,,50 Furthermore, 
much of the debate has concentrated on expanding and updating the military aspects of what is 
predominantly a political activity.51 This thesis attempts to fill these gaps by investigating the 
United Nations' various interactions with insurgent movements for the sources of differing levels 
of viability. Thus the investigation undertaken by this thesis agrees with the approach of the 
opponents of peace-enforcement who urge sober reflection on capabilities and roles rather than 
the generation of euphoric conjectures on desirable mechanisms as the new structure of the post-
Cold War world emerges. 
1.4: Extending Paradigms: A Theoretical Base 
The analysis of an unexplored relationship must either develop its own theoretical 
structure, or extend and adapt an existing theory to the requirements of the new area. A 
theoretical basis is essential to a study of how the factors of interaction affect different 
outcomes: "By a theory the significance of the observed is made manifest. A theory arranges 
phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts; it 
shows how changes in some phenomena necessarily entail changes in others. ,,52 The majority of 
international relations theory is developed for, and alludes primarily to States. Yet the world 
49 See for an excellent summary of these views, David Cox, Exploring An Agenda For Peace: Issues Arising 
From the Report of the Secretary-General, (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993). 
50 Berdal,op. cit., 1993, p. 9. 
51 Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, "Rethinking Peacekeeping", in Rikhye and Skjelsbaek, op. 
cit., 1990, p. 29. 
52 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1979), pp. 9-10. 
14 
continues to change, and the end of the Cold War has stimulated a proliferation of relevant 
actors in world politics and a deepening density of the global system. 53 While international 
organisations have attracted a growing number of theoretical writings, sub-State groups have 
been virtually ignored by theorists, despite the fact that "In terms of shaping the postwar world, 
guerrilla warfare, in its revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forms, has been as least as 
influential as nuclear weapons. ,,54 The fact that both international organisations and sub-State 
groups have begun to impact directly on the international system qualifies them as important 
actors, and begs the attention of the paradigms of internation~l relations.55 It is a condition of 
international relations theory that it "must often struggle to catch up with changing realities.,,56 
The nature of the United Nations' and insurgent movements' actions and relations in the 
international system are not sufficiently unusual to require the development of a new theory, but 
rather fit comfortably within the neorealist paradigm. The concentration of realism on the 
motivations of power, self-interest, and security are more applicable to the United Nations and 
insurgents, actors in a war environment, than the other paradigms of international relations. 
Neorealism also enables the research design adopted to "rel[y] on structural attributes of the 
international system to generate predictions and provide a basis for explaining outcomes of 
international politics.,,57 For neorealism, the key structural determinant of behaviour in the 
international system is anarchy, which requires its actors to rely on self-help as their principle of 
action and survival: "To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition 
of anarchy ... must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for 
themselves.,,58 Neorealism thus allows the analyst to deductively focus on the actors' interests 
53 James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 
23. 
54 Fred Halliday, "'The Sixth Great Power': On the Study of Revolution and International Relati<)ns", Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 16, No.3, Summer 1990, pp. 208-9. 
55 Alan James, "The Realism of Realism: The State and the Study of International Relations", Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 15, 1989, pp. 222-3. 
56 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 107. 
57 George,op. cit., 1993, p. 109. 
58 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power", in Keohane (ed), op. cit., 1986, p. 108. 
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and capabilities as the motivations for their actions. It also allows the isolation and evaluation of 
the effects of interactions and contexts on the unit's actions: "Under different systemic 
conditions [units] will define their self-interest differently. For instance, where survival is at 
stake efforts to maintain autonomy may take precedence over all other activities, but where the 
environment is relatively benign, energies will also be directed to fulfilling other goals. ,,59 
The particular nature of the relations between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements strongly suggests the operation of realist precepts. The brevity of their contact 
entails that they exert little of the interdependent influence comparable to that exercised by 
States through their economic and informational links, 60 and even through diplomacy and war. 
The analytical model developed in this thesis relies on this fact to speculate that because there is 
no way for the United Nations and the insurgent movement to positively influence the direction 
of each others' policy, the viability of their interaction must depend on the coincidence of their 
interests, perceptions and behaviours. Furthermore, the high stakes involved in the interaction 
for both participants means that their interests will be strongly held, will determine their 
behaviour, and will to a large extent be affected by external conditions. Thus the operation of 
neorealism allows this analysis to concentrate on the United Nations and the insurgent 
movements' interests, as determined by self-help and their environment, to examine the sources 
of effectiveness or inefficiencies in their interactions. 
In examining the security-related interactions between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements, this thesis can also be relatively sure that each views the other and their relations in 
realist terms. The United Nations is for its Member-States a security mechanism through which 
they act to address the insurgent movements that they see as significantly destabilising; while 
insurgent movements are belligerents or ex-belligerents which can not rely on any higher 
authority to protect their interests as they interact with the international community and other 
less benign entities. An insurgent movement, in taking up arms against the State, absents itself 
from the State's sovereign guardianship, and thus exposes itself to the self-help logic of the 
59 ibid., p. 194. 
60 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 8-9. 
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anarchical international system. Realism dictates that the most basic interest for an insurgent 
movement is self-preservation, primarily against the vengeful State; this also entails wariness of 
other interlocutors. It entails that an insurgent movement must rely on its own capabilities to 
order and achieve its objectives. This situation generates the reliance of insurgent movements on 
their own version of raison d'etat: a realist appraisal of factors and goals, and a reliance on a 
conception of self-interest as the guide to policy and action.61 It is these considerations that 
determine insurgent movements' prosecution of war and peace, and that determine their 
approach to their interaction with the United Nations. 
Realism informs the actions of the United Nations in a different way. Its interests, 
capabilities and initiatives are determined by the level of agreement between its Member-States' 
conceptions and pursuit of their self-interest. Its approach to an interaction with an insurgent 
movement is thus based on its Member-States' common conception of the urgency of the 
security threat it represents and the best method of dealing with the threat. United Nations 
Member-States have a basic interest in preserving the present society of States, and their 
position as "the principle actors in world politics, and the chief bearers of rights and duties 
within it. ,,62 This system and its stability is basic to Member-States', and particularly the Great 
Powers', pursuit of their other goals.63 These States are, therefore, continually concerned with 
perpetuating their exclusive club against the inevitability of change, and the United Nations has 
functioned as one of the mechanisms of a constant "process of disequilibrium and 
adjustment. ,,64 The homogenising tendency of international politics65 motivates the United 
Nations' more status quo-oriented Member-States to see them as interlopers, "a challenge to the 
privileged position of States in world politics, or their right to enjoy it,,66 in international 
61 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 58-70. 
62 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), p. 
17. 
63 Carr, op. cit., 1970, p. 82. 
64 Gilpin, op. cit., 1981, p. 13. 
65 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette 
Baker-Fox, (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1980), pp. 378-381. 
66 Bull, op. cit., 1977, p. 17. 
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politics, and to want to return them to the domestic realm. As nuclear weapons and other factors 
increasingly preclude Great Power conquests of territory, insurgent movements by effect and 
demonstration increasingly represent the sole threat to the territorial integrity and viability of 
States.67 Jealousy of their sovereign prerogatives also motivates States to act to "maintain their 
monopoly of violence and deny the right to employ it to other groups. ,,68 These security-based 
considerations, along with domestic and other pressures on Member-States, and the principles of 
the Organisation, determine the motivations of the United Nations in its relations with 
insurgents. 
Realism also defines the limits of the United Nations' capabilities to carry out its policies 
in its interaction with insurgent movements by explaining its Member-States' motivations for 
acting multilaterally and demonstrating that its actions are constrained by the levels of 
agreement between their conceptions of the Organisation and their self-interest. Neorealism 
explains the systemic constraints on State action; 69 an increasingly important consideration for 
international action is legitimacy. Its requirements operate as a constraint on Great Power 
actions, particularly those concerned with preserving their interests and conceptions of order: 
"The Great Powers ... have a problem of securing and preserving the consent of other States 
to ... their managerial functions, [which have to be] accepted clearly enough by a large enough 
proportion of the society of States to command legitimacy.,,7o States have turned to the United 
Nations, with its unique universality of membership and responsibility for international peace 
and security, as a method of legitimating their interventions to maintain regional stability. 
Multilateralism, as a mechanism for the "equitable sharing of both cost and commitment,,71 also 
allows States to minimise their sacrifices to international stability, while providing them with a 
convenient scapegoat if the intervention rurIS into difficulties. 
67 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging structure of International Politics", International Security, Vol. 18, No.2, 
Fall 1993, p. 53. 
68 Bull, op. cit., 1977, p. 19. 
69 Waltz,op. cit., 1979, pp. 121-2. 
70 Bull, op. cit., 1977, p. 228. 
71 George Bush, "Aggression in the Gulf: A Partnership of Nations", Delivered at the United Nations General 
Assembly, New York, 1 October 1990, Vital Speeches o/the Day, Vol. 62, No.1, October 15, 1990, p. 3. 
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The requirement of multilateralism carries its own inherent constraints on the 
effectiveness of action. Concerted and sustained United Nations action is dependent on the level 
of agreement between its Member-States on the goals and methods of the initiative. Its Member-
States' support in turn, is based on their conceptions of self-interest and view of the 
Organisation. Each different threat and response generates its own ad hoc coalition within the 
auspices of the United Nations; each coalition is distinctive in terms of membership, resourcing, 
goals, and resolution. Because "alliances are organized against a perceived threat,,,n the 
participants' perceptions of the nature of the threat determines their commitment to the coalition 
and their cohesion. Member-States act through the United Nations when they judge it to be a 
more efficient way to advance their self-interests, but their collaboration "occurs only in ways 
strongly conditioned by the structure of anarchy.,r73 The anarchic system, and their sovereign 
perogatives, bases the commitment of the Member-States of the United Nations contingent on 
whether they see their self-interests as being advanced by the Organisation's actions. Realism 
thus dictates that the diplomatic consensus underpinning a United Nations initiative is inherently 
fragile, and based on the vagaries of each coalition members' agreement, which, based on the 
perceptions of threat and self-interest, can change at any time. This inevitably restricts the scope 
and nature of United Nations action. These realist and neorealist precepts enable this analysis to 
examine the effect of United Nations and insurgent behaviour, as determined by interests, 
motivations, and environmental stimuli, on interactions of varying viability. 
As a neorealist analysis, this study is based on a number of assumptions. Foremost is the 
assumption that the actors define their interests primarily in terms of power and security goals. 
This is based on the calculation that theirs is foremost a relationship based on security concerns 
in a former or current war environment. Another assumption is that their behaviour, on the 
continuum between war and peace, is determined by their political interests. Finally, a major 
assumption is that the protagonists' behaviour is rational. The assumption of rationality is 
necessary for the understanding of behaviour by allowing the analyst to investigate continuities: 
72 Waltz, "The Emerging Structure ofIntemational Politics", op. cit., 1994, p. 75. 
73 John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in 
Keohane (ed), op. cit., 1986, p. 134. 
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"only if human actions fonn some pattern can they ever be forecast or the relations between 
them subject to analysis." 74 Rationality allows observed behaviour to imply intention: 
"explanation consists of showing what goal the [actor] was pursuing when it acted and how the 
action was a reasonable choice, given the [actor's] objective.,,75 This allows the analysis to 
assume that the behaviour under investigation is "motivated by a conscious calculation of 
advantages, a calculation that is in tum based on an explicit and internally-consistent value 
system.,,76 It also allows the analysis to speculate on how interactions, changes in external 
conditions, and other stimuli can affect behaviour by assuming that the protagonists will modify 
their behaviour when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, and when a change in 
behaviour would be more beneficial than maintaining a previous position. The actors' rationality 
is, however, necessarily bounded imperfect infonnation, restricted resources and time, and a lack 
of a full appreciation of possible courses of action. 
1.5: Arguments and Hypothesis 
Regarding the interaction of the United Nations and insurgent movements as units in an 
anarchical system through the prism of neorealism allows the postulation of several arguments 
which lead to a hypothesis that will be tested through the ensuing analysis. It emerges that 
insurgent movements' situations are detennined by their use of war against the State, and that 
they are forced to be self-reliant for the promotion of these interests and for their own security. 
Their fonn of influence and power within the system relies on their war-making ability,77 which 
is confined to within their conflict region. The United Nations' approach is detennined 
predominantly by the interests of its Member-States, and the agreement between them as they 
fonn ad hoc alliances to deal with each threat. United Nations cohesion is affected by the nature 
of the threat, the amount of commitment to a solution, and inevitably the progress of the 
74 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory 0/ Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957), p. 4. 
75 Graham T. Allison, Essence 0/ Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971), p. 13. 
76 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy o/Conflict, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 4. 
77 Some insurgent movements, such as Unita, have fledgling diplomatic networks, but these cany little weight. 
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initiative. The United Nations' motivation is to terminate or dampen the civil war, and possibly 
to reintegrate the insurgency back into the domestic system. The sources of United Nations' 
influence rest on its legitimacy, the support of international law, and its diplomatic contacts. 
As developed more fully in Chapter Three, these factors combine to produce the 
conclusion that the United Nations and insurgent movements lack the means to exercise a 
positive influence on each other's policy. This is compounded by the brevity of their contact, and 
its security-based nature, which causes them to consider their interests even more vital. The 
combination of these arguments suggests that the more the United Nations' and insurgent 
movement's approaches to their interaction coincide, the more efficient their interaction will be. 
On the other hand, when these approaches clash, the seriousness of the stakes will tempt either 
the United Nations or the insurgent movement to resort to negative influence, or compulsion, to 
alter the other's approach to the interaction in its favour. This in turn will undermine the 
consensual nature of the interaction, either decreasing its effectiveness or ending the interaction. 
This line of reasoning suggests the hypothesis that between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions than divergent 
approaches. It is to testing this hypothesis against the evidence of recent interactions that this 
study is devoted. 
1.6: Methodology of Analysis 
The form of analysis chosen is determined by the nature of the problem and the evidence 
available. Explaining varying levels of effectiveness across a class of relationships using reports 
of behaviours and events calls for a methodology that looks for continuities in the causes of the 
various outcomes, while enabling comparisons between and within cases. A methodology 
relates the hypothesis to the evidence, by contesting that "wherever and whenever the 
combination of preconditions, necessary and sufficient, occurs, then the event in question will 
occur.,,78 The analysis must apply the evidence critically to the hypothesis: "Every genuine test 
78 Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in Inter-State Relations, (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 34. 
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of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it. Testability is falsifiability.,,79 The methodology 
selected for this study is developed from the hypothesis and its supporting arguments by 
generating a framework of indices that are designed to measure the extent of agreement between 
the United Nations' and the insurgent movement's approaches to their interaction. Those indices 
that are selected are those that are predicted to have the greatest influence on the viability of the 
interaction, based on the argument that "any set of variables that differentiates ... systems in a 
manner corresponding to the observed differences ofbehaviour ... can be considered as explaining 
these patterns ofbehaviour.,,8o The indices are selected by the criterion that "The superiority of 
the experimental method derives from its ability to logically remove as causes those variables 
that are not part of the hypothetical relationship under investigation.,,8l Only the key variables 
are chosen because of the need for parsimony: "a model that explains everything explains 
nothing. If it does not simplify, it cannot explain.,,82 Having been derived from the neorealist 
paradigm, this research design inevitably selects some aspect of the relationship to emphasise 
over others, depending on the paradigm and its assumptions. Other factors, such as the influence 
of personalities, national characteristics, psychological dynamics and personal identities will 
inevitably impact on any interaction involving human beings. However, the need for parsimony, 
and the neorealist paradigm, while acknowledging the operation of these and other factors, 
contends that other, system-determined forces have a more important impact. 
The framework of indices, which is fully developed in Chapter Three, allows the testing 
of the hypothesis across a range of interactions differing in goals, scale, size, and length, by 
assessing whether similar levels of agreement between the United Nations and the insurgent 
movement's approaches produce similarly effective interactions, and whether less effective 
interactions are characterised by clashing approaches. The framework thus measures the effect 
79 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refotations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 36. 
80 Theodore W. Meckstroth, IIIMost Different Systems' and 'Most Similar Systems': A Study in the Logic of 
Comparative Inquiry", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, No.2, July 1975, p. 133. 
81 John P. Frendreis, "Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose and Logic of 
Comparative Analysis", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 16, No.2, July 1983, p. 257. 
82 Jonathon Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models", American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 86, No.2, June 1992, p. 318. 
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of the coincidence of approaches, as the dependent variable, on the optimality of the interaction, 
the outcome. When applied to the evidence, this framework will support the hypothesis if the 
most viable interaction were attended by the highest coincidence of approaches, and will refute 
the hypothesis if it demonstrates that a viable interaction occurred between two clashing 
approaches, or that agreeing approaches resulted in a dysfunctional interaction. The direction 
and differential impact of these indices allow a fuller evaluation and comparison of the relative 
impact of the various motivations on the actors' behaviour and interaction across and within the 
cases. The application of the framework to the data consists of a procedure of searching for the 
operation and influence of each indicator in the cases selected, and comparing the effect of the 
factor with the outcome of the conflict termination process. This procedure also yields broader 
insights into the interaction between the United Nations and insurgents, concerning the 
motivations of the participants, the appropriateness of their methods, the organisational 
dynamics of the actors, and the impact of personality and environmental factors. 
The research design utilises the comparative method, one of the basic social scientific 
methods of discovering empirical relationships among variables and between variables and 
outcomes. To do this, a comparative analysis devises " ... a strategy for conducting post hoc 
research that seeks to control potentially confounding variables through careful case selection 
and matching."83 The use of an analytical tool to comparatively examine a broad range of data 
yields potentially more significant insights of wider applicability than a minutely-detailed case 
study, because 
Basic to scientific evidence (and to all knowledge-diagnostic processes including 
the retina of the eye) is the process of comparison, or recording differences, or of 
contrast. Any appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about 
singular isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis.84 
83 Frendreis, op. cit., 1983, p. 255. 
84 Donald T. Campbell, "'Degrees of Freedom' and the Case Study", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, No.2, 
July 1975, p. 179. 
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The conclusions derived from comparative analysis are also potentially more applicable to other, 
similar relationships, and even to a limited extent, to some allied or less analogous cases.85 
1.7 The Organisation of the Study 
The structure of this thesis is arranged around the application of the research design to 
contemporary empirical data to comparatively determine the validity of the hypothesis. Before 
this is attempted, however, Chapter Two sets the study within the context of the history of the 
T ~;;lted Nations and its relations with insurgent movements since its inception. It isolates the 
political trends determining these relations through the history of the Organisation, and assesses 
how the end of the Cold War has affected these forces. It sets the limits of the ensuing analysis 
by contending that in the post-Cold War era, the United Nations' Member-States have seen 
insurgent movements not as potential allies in a global ideological struggle, as during the Cold 
War, but as moderate-level security concerns to which some sort of response had to be 
formulated. Chapter Three follows from this new context of United Nations-insurgent 
interaction. From neorealist precepts, it forms a theory of the logic of insurgent action and the 
determinants of United Nations capabilities. From this basis, it develops a framework of indices 
for measuring the coincidence of the United Nations and the insurgent movement's approaches 
to their interaction, and explains how the operation of each of these variables will impact on the 
interaction of the hypothesis is valid. 
The remainder of the thesis applies this framework of approach indices to several cases 
within three types of United Nations-insurgent interaction. The three types of interaction, each 
examined in a separate chapter, are mediation, peacekeeping, and election monitoring. They 
have been selected from a range of United Nations activities in civil wars, including observer 
missions, humanitarian aid missions, economic reconstruction, reorganising security forces, and 
infrastructure rebuilding, all of which feature some level of contact between the United Nations 
and insurgent movements. The three interaction types selected, however, offer within the space 
available, the best opportunity to study the most sustained, observable, and diverse interactions 
85 ibid., p. 180. 
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between the United Nations and insurgent movements. Chapter Four applies the framework to 
three cases where the United Nations engaged in mediation in wars involving insurgent 
movements. Chapter Five tests the framework against five peacekeeping relationships, while 
Chapter Six applies it to two cases of election monitoring. The conclusion combines the results 
of all of the studies to assesses the validity of the hypothesis according to this evidence, and 
discusses the other findings and practical applications of the study. 
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2: POLITICAL-mSTORICAL CONTEXTS 
As an international security organisation in a world of sovereign States, the United 
Nations' relations with insurgent movements are profoundly influenced by the configurations of 
dissension and accord among its Member-States. Many of the United Nations' motives in its 
relations with insurgents after the Cold War cannot be properly understood without first 
exploring its ontogeny as shaped by the cycles and realignments in the post-War international 
system. This chapter identifies the major trends and structures of international politics that have 
affected the United Nations' relations with insurgent groups during and after the Cold War. The 
chapter begins by appraising the effect of the antagonism between the superpowers and of the 
politics of decolonisation on the United Nations, causing it to evolve into an increasingly radical 
and exclusive Third World forum. These forces significantly affected United Nations' policy and 
actions towards national liberation movements and other insurgent groups. The second part of 
the chapter surveys how the end of the Cold War has changed the way the international 
community views insurgent movements, and how this has altered the United Nations' stance 
towards interacting with them. The third part characterises the post-Cold War reorientation of 
States' perceptions and motives for acting through the United Nations, especially for addressing 
insurgent movements that affect them. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of the 
current status of international law regulating United Nations' contacts with insurgents, giving 
special attention to the jurisprudential changes to international law wrought by the new post-
Cold War activism of the Security Council. 
2.1: Cold War Trends Affecting the United Nations 
The birth and development of the United Nations organisation coincided with the 
outbreak and rigidification of the Cold War cleavage. The intense enmity between two States 
vastly superior to all others in nearly all indices of power, possessing nuclear weapons, and with 
mutually-exclusive global interests, and the slow polarisation of most other States around these 
superpowers, was bound to effect the development and functioning of an international collective 
security organisation based on cooperation and consent. The basis of the antagonism between 
the United States and the Soviet Union lay in the implicit challenge that each State's motivating 
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ideology posed to the ideological foundations of the other's socio-economic system. The 
American conviction that totalitarian and democratic traditions were incompatible and prone to 
conflict was given post-War specificity by identifying Soviet communism as totalitarianism's 
most dangerous manifestation: a superpower which combined an autocratic tradition, a paranoid 
obsession with an inherently hostile world, and a messianic compulsion to overturn the status 
quo.! The Soviet Union, in turn, felt it had to protect itself against a capitalist-imperialist world 
that had repeatedly demonstrated its hostility to the existence of a "more advanced stage of 
socio-economic development" in its midst. 2 
The foreign policy of each superpower consequently became conditioned by the 
existence and actions of its ideological rival. Their conviction that the antagonism of the 
opposing system precluded any compromise cast their foreign policy solely in terms of national 
security, resulting in military and economic build ups. Their conception of national security was 
globalised not only by advances in military and communications technology, but also by the 
evangel ising zeal of both ideologies. The nuclear stalemate diverted superpower conflict into 
converting and securing allies and proving the superiority of their own developmental model. 3 
Thus the Cold War was fought in phases: firstly of position, in which action was taken to 
exclude rival involvement in regions considered vital to national security; and then of 
movement, where new partners to be enlisted against the enemy were vigorously sought.4 As 
the world hardened into two opposing blocs, foreign policy lost its nuance, flexibility, and 
compromise in a precarious bipolar balance where gains or losses of allies were seen in zero-
sum terms.s 
I "X" (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No.4, July 1947, pp. 566-
582. 
2 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin A Political Biography, (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 485-491. 
3 Christer Jonsson, Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy, (London: Frances Pinter, 
1984), p. 108. 
4 Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, "Alliances and the Preservation of the Postwar Peace: 
Weighing the Contribution", in Charles W. Kegley (ed), The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and 
Projections, (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), p. 277. 
5 Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy", in Henry A. Kissinger (ed), American 
Foreign Policy, (3rd ed.) (New York: WWNorton and Company Inc, 1977), p. 56. 
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Meanwhile, a parallel rivalry was developing in the post-War world: a burgeoning global 
movement of former colonies and anti-imperialist insurgents against European domination and 
colonisation of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This movement resulted from the congruence of 
several forces after the Second World War: the exhaustion of the European imperial powers by 
the world wars; the successful military challenge to European dominance by Japan, a non-
Western State; the rise of European-educated indigenous colonial elites dedicated to the ideals of 
liberty and self-government; and the rise of two avowedly anti-imperialist superpowers 
chastened by the wartime idealism embodied in the Atlantic Charter.6 The process of 
decolonisation introduced a new type of actor onto the international stage: the national liberation 
movement. This label by no means included all insurgent movements, but was reserved for 
particular groups that exhibited certain characteristics. Those groups endorsed internationally as 
national liberation movements embodied the strictly-defined concept of self-determination 
propounded by ex-colonial States. This was that the right to self-determination existed only for 
those peoples ruled by a geographically-removed imperial centre - the so-called "salt water rule" 
of colonialism - or those denied political rights by a white, or racially-distinct minority.7 By the 
mid-1960s, the label of "national liberation movements" was to apply only to insurgent 
organisations of in Palestine, southern Africa, and the Portuguese colonies. 
As the process of decolonisation released more States and national liberation movements 
into the international system, bipolar rivalry moved into the third world, with each superpower 
defining its position vis-a-vis the new anti- and post-imperialist forces in the developing world. 
Several factors led to the entanglement of colonial and post-colonial conflicts in the Cold War: 
national liberation movements' espousal of ideals of social revolution as well as political 
independence; their search for models of social and economic development; growing regional 
confrontations between newly independent States; and superpower rivalry for bases, resources 
6 D. K. Fieldhouse, "Decolonisation", in Andrew Mack, David Plant and Ursula Doyle (eds), Imperialism, 
Intervention and Development, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 47. 
7 A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice, (Leiden: 
A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), p. 101. 
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and allies.s These two major trends of cleavage and alignment in the post-War era -
capitalism/communism and imperialism/decolonisation - were to overlap but never completely 
merge in a way that produced a pattern of confrontation in the international system that was to 
influence the United Nations' policy towards insurgent movements during the Cold War. 
The United States' primary motivation for involvement in the decolonising world was its 
perception of a threat from a rival system which was intent upon forcible expansion. It based this 
conviction on Soviet ideological pronouncements and establishment of client regimes in its 
Eastern European sphere of influence. Such a Soviet drive would threaten the American desire 
to secure global peace and security through the establishment and support of an homogeneous 
international system of peaceful democracies.9 The United States, realising that the costs of a 
direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union would far outweigh its benefits, conceived 
the policy of containment, whereby its military and economic predominance would be used to 
check Soviet thrusts into the non-Communist world, securing an internal modification of the 
aggressive totalitarian system by frustrating its external drives. lo For the United States, the 
defence of these ideological boundariesll was predicated on the need to build up the economic, 
social and political health of the non-Soviet world against Communist subversion, on the 
assumption of a direct correlation between economic health, psychological self-confidence and 
the capacity for self-defence against externally-sponsored internal challenges. l2 Containment 
thereby committed the United States to the policy of supporting the tenure and stability of status 
quo power structures and regimes in the post-War non-Communist world. 
8 Fred Halliday, Cold War, Third World: An Essay in Soviet-US. Relations, (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), 
pp.27-8. 
9 Walter C. Clemens Jr., "The Superpowers and the Third World: Aborted Ideals and Wasted Assets", in Charles 
W. Kegley Jr. and Pat McGowan (eds), Foreign Policy USA/USSR, (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 
114. 
10 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
Provocations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 27-8; 39. 
11 Christer Jonsson, "The Ideology of Foreign Policy" in Kegley and McGowan (eds), op. cit., 1982, p. 105, 
suggests that the Truman doctrine became a globalised Monroe Doctrine, with the boundaries drawn along 
ideological rather than geographical or hemispheric lines. 
12 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 41. 
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By contrast, Soviet foreign policy elected to extend support to those anti-imperialist 
insurgents and newly-independent States that were challenging the status quo power structures 
in the decolonising world. The Soviet Union saw itself as a power that had sustained severe 
internal war damage, yet faced a hostile State system alone. Soviet foreign policy was therefore 
driven by the dual objectives of restraining the West's power and influence while seeking allies 
against Western expansion by promoting the spread of the Soviet political and economic model. 
Frustrated in Europe by the Truman doctrine, Marshall aid and containment, and alarmed by its 
encirclement by United States allies, Strategic Air Command bases and intelligence installations, 
the Soviet Union, under the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" launched a counter-encirclement 
drive aimed at securing influence in the de co Ionising world. Khrushchev and his successors 
stressed that peaceful coexistence between States was subordinate to proletarian 
internationalism, and did not preclude vigorous Soviet support for the global class struggle, at 
that time being waged by pro-independence insurgents against European empires. The Soviet 
thrust into the third world was designed to maintain its foreign policy momentum and 
demonstrate the continued revolutionary vitality of its ideology by backing these anti-colonial 
insurgents. 13 Soviet ideologues duly classified national liberation movements as one of the three 
main revolutionary forces in the world, to be led by the Soviet Union as the Leninist 
revolutionary vanguard State. 14 
Soviet strategists reasoned that the Soviet Union had sufficient community of interest 
with anti-imperialist national liberation movements, most of which were fighting North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation States,15 to form the basis of an alliance. 16 Soviet propaganda was brought 
into line with this new policy direction, frequently issuing statements against imperialism and 
13 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, (4th ed.), (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), p. 166. 
14 Galia Golan, "Moscow and Third World National Liberation Movements: The Soviet Role", Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 40, No.2, Winter/Spring 1987, p. 303. 
IS Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, (3rd ed.), (Glenview, 
Illinios: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 314. 
16 Nogee and Donaldson, op. cit., 1992, p. 166. 
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proclaiming solidarity with the colonised. Soviet bloc support for national liberation movements 
took the form of selective and cost-effective arms transfers, training, and fmancial and 
diplomatic assistance. 17 It was hoped that the transition to power of Soviet-backed national 
liberation movements during decolonisation would win the Soviet Union a string of allies in the 
developing world, who would deny the capitalist system access to raw materials, thereby 
throwing it back upon its own scarce resources and eventually triggering the prophesied "world 
capitalist crisis". Following this strategy, Soviet policy and presence was gradually globalised, 
with each new third world ally providing bases for the further expansion of the Soviet 
presence. IS 
As soon as it had recovered from the traumas of its own revolutionary wars and the 
Korean war, the People's Republic of China emerged as a major alternative sponsor of wars of 
national liberation in the developing world. Originally it supported the Soviet Union's initiatives 
towards insurgents, but as the Sino-Soviet split deepened, and Chinese ideologues bitterly 
denounced "the betrayal of global people's revolutions" by the "Khrushchevite revisionists" in 
Moscow, China embarked on a vigorous and independent program of support for national 
liberation movements. The Chinese recast their foreign policy priorities in order to form an 
international alliance to oppose not only United States imperialism, but also Soviet revisionism, 
which were increasingly experiencing detente and accord on the global status quO. 19 China saw 
the volatile decolonising and developing world as offering it the greatest opportunity to advance 
these foreign policy objectives at the least cost. It participated in the Bandung Conference in 
1955, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in 1958, and has promoted itself as the 
champion of the rights of third world States ever since.20 Chinese strategy in the third world was 
17 Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World, (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988), pp. 268-270. 
18 V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 
p.86. 
19 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, 
(Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1971), p. 15. 
20 China is now a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and remains committed to championing the rights of 
the third world against imperialism and neo-imperialism, most prominently within the United Nations Security 
Council. 
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fonnulated by Defence Minister Lin Piao in September 1965, when he described Western 
democracies as "the cities of the world", and the developing States as "the rural areas of the 
world", which would ultimately encircle, besiege, and overthrow "the cities" in a global 
l · 21 revo utlOn. China singled out national liberation struggles against imperialism and 
neoirnperialism in the underdeveloped world as the single most important aspect of the world 
revolution, because they represented the most opportune way to confound and starve the 
innately agressive forces of imperialism.22 Beijing's material, training, and propaganda support 
for national liberation movements developed in competition with Moscow's, and Chinese 
pronouncements of the virtues of supporting "progressive" over "reactionary" contestarits for 
State power rationalised a policy of supporting those movements competing with Soviet-backed 
groupS?3 As Sino-Soviet foreign policy competition intensified, so the amount of support 
flowing to the movements they sponsored increased. China, then, although not admitted to the 
United Nations until November 1971, was to playa significant role in United Nations-insurgent 
relations during the Cold War 
The United States' response to both the Chinese and Soviet challenges was to extend 
containment into the third world. American foreign policy assumed communism to be 
monolithic and centrally-directed, and relied upon a successor State's ideology to predict its 
foreign policy behaviour. The coming to power of each new Soviet- or Chinese-backed anti-
colonial insurgency was seen as a direct threat to national security by President Kennedy, among 
others: "I know full well that every time a country, regardless of how far away it may be from 
our own borders, ... passes behind the Iron Curtain, the security of the United States is thereby 
threatened. ,,24 The Kennedy administration launched a comprehensive system of aid to States in 
the developing world in tandem with a policy of assistarice for counter-insurgency for non-
21 Van Ness, op. cit., 1971, p. 16. 
22 Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970, (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1971), pp. 187-9. 
23 Previously to 1964, Chinese policy advocated even-handed support of competing national liberation 
movements. Following the Sino-Soviet split, it rejected pro-Moscow movements (such as the ANC, which included 
the pro-Soviet SACP), in favour of groups that came to be seen as Chinese-backed - PAC, ZANU, Unita, Coremo, 
SWANU. The PAIGC obtained both Soviet and Chinese support and aid. 
24 John F. Kennedy, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment: A Critical Appraisal 0/ Postwar 
American National Security Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 211. 
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communist regimes as part of the doctrine of flexible response. Concern with upholding the 
status quo thereby made the United States' response to insurgents one of opposition, and 
American intervention took the form of coups d'etat or calibrated anti-insurgent military aid to 
support non-communist regimes?5 Evidence of overt and covert United States intervention 
against progressive forces served to strengthen the image of the United States in the third world 
as a reactionary gendarme, and seemed to many to vindicate the Soviet Union's charges that it 
was indeed in the vanguard of the forces of imperialism?6 
lbis policy, and the advance of communist movements in China, Korea, and throughout 
South-East Asia, was ultimately to lead to the United States' protracted and painful embroilment 
in Vietnam, which provoked critical domestic and international assaults on the morality of an 
American foreign policy that appeared to behave in the developing world in a way that would 
not be tolerated within the United States or the Western Alliance?7 "Vietnam Syndrome" crept 
into United States foreign policy, draining American self-confidence, weakening Presidential 
authority and inhibiting American resolve. This was accompanied by a growing confidence in 
Soviet foreign policy: Brezhnev's long military build up to parity had neutralised the American 
nuclear deterrent and globalised the reach of Soviet conventional forces, enabling more daring, 
overt and extensive Soviet bloc intervention in the developing world?8 As more and more 
Soviet clients came to power in the developing world, the newly confident USSR began to 
extend the Brezhnev Doctrine into the third world, intervening more and more frequently to 
protect the tenure of Moscow-aligned administrations.29 
25 Walter C. Clemens Jr., "The Superpowers and the Third World: Aborted Ideals and Wasted Assets", in Kegley 
and McGowan, op. cit., 1982, p. 118. 
26 Amos Yoder, The Conduct 0/ American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Pergammon Press, 
1986), p. 127. 
27 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), pp. 230-9. 
28 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death o/Communism in the Twentieth Century, (New 
York: MacDonald, 1990), pp. 27-37. 
29 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No.4, Spring 1986, p. 700. 
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The pendulum of superpower involvement with insurgents soon swung back, however. 
By the mid-1970s, an increasing number of Soviet allies had come under attack from indigenous 
anti-communist national liberation movements in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, 
Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Cambodia, forcing Cuba, Vietnam and the Soviet Union to adopt the 
reactionary counter-insurgency role.3o The new, assertive Reagan administration sought to 
exploit indigenous resentment and the long Soviet supply lines to the third world3 ! at minimum 
cost and risk by selectively extending aid in the form of advances in weapons technology such 
as the Stinger surface-to-air missile to anti-communist insurgents.32 This policy enabled the 
United States to assume the offensive in the third world, aiming to "roll back" Soviet influence 
by toppling its client regimes from within. The Reagan Doctrine was a success: the Soviet Union 
was forced into a comer, expending increasingly scarce resources to support an unpromising 
array of unpopular client regimes while being increasingly criticised by the anti-imperialist 
movement with which it had hitherto found a common, anti-Western cause. By the mid-1980s 
both superpowers had established a problematic record with insurgent movements. 
2.2: The Cold War's Impact on the United Nations 
These trends in the post-War international system - superpower rivalry, bitter ideological 
competition, nuclear stalemate, decolonisation, promotion of or opposition to insurgents, the 
competition for allies, bases and resources - all were to have a profound effect upon the fledgling 
United Nations organisation. All of the patterns of conflict and affiliation hitherto identified 
were carried into the security forums of the United Nations and subsequently determined the 
way in which the organisation was to act towards insurgent movements. 
The architects of the United Nations Charter, mindful of the failures of the League of 
Nations, were determined to create an effective collective security organisation of universal 
State membership, which acted on majority decision rather than unanimity and which imposed 
30 Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No.4, Spring 1986, p. 720. 
31 Curtin Windsor, "From Reagan Doctrine to Detente", Global Affairs, Vol. 3, No.1, Winter 1988, p. 55. 
32 Coral Bell, The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), p. 
105. 
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an obligation on member States to comply with its collective security actions as a condition of 
membership. The cornerstone of this system of collective security was a Security Council with a 
permanent core of five great powers and a rotating membership of ten33 non-permanent seats. 
This organ was entrusted with primary responsibility for maintaining international peace, for 
which it was given unprecedented flexibility regarding the range of collective security 
instruments at its disposal, ranging from mediation, to the application of mandatory sanctions 
and the use of force. 34 The Charter required the concurrence of all five permanent members with 
substantive Security Council actions35 as an attempt to place the ultimate responsibility for 
keeping the peace on the five great powers that had the capacity to do so, to force the Security 
Council to only adopt resolutions in concordance with the interests of the great powers and 
compatible with United Nations capabilities, and to prevent it from becoming a forum in which 
the great powers adopted futile or dangerous resolutions against each other.36 The veto was a 
symbol of great power control over the collective security instrument of the United Nations, 
making the organisation's effectiveness dependent on great power unity and the agreement of 
their conceptions of national and international security. 
The development of Cold War rivalry among the Security Council's permanent members 
meant that the great power unity upon which the United Nations collective security regime was 
predicated never materialised. The close relations between the other permanent members - the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France and Nationalist China - meant that the Soviet Union 
had viewed the organisation with distrust since its inception. Its suspicion was partly based on 
its experiences with the League of Nations, having been first disbarred from membership of that 
organisation by Britain and France, and then expelled in December 1939 for its invasion of 
Finland, having watched Germany, Italy and Japan escape virtually unpunished for their 
33 The Security Council was originally designed with six non-pennanent seats, but this was enlarged to ten non-
pennanent seats by Charter amendment on 17 December 1963, entering into force on 31 August 1965 to reflect the 
expanding membership of the United Nations and the need for a more equitable geographic representation on the 
Council. 
34 United Nations Charter, Chapters V, VI and VII, Articles 23-51. 
35 Article 27(3). 
36 Charles L. Robertson, International Politics Since World War II: A Short History, (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons Inc., 1966), p. 37. 
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aggression.37 Stalin's acquiescence to membership in the United Nations therefore was based on 
the desire to avoid the stigma of non-participation in an organisation dedicated to the 
preservation of peace, but was conditional upon possession of a veto over Security Council 
action to prevent the United Nations becoming an anti-Soviet alliance.38 In contrast, the United 
States saw the United Nations as a new normative force to ensure the preservation of an 
international order and the promotion of objectives closely corresponding to American foreign 
policy interests. As the Cold War developed and bipolarity encompassed more and more States, 
the superpower members of the Security Council began to construe most issues in international 
politics as affecting their vital interests. These perceptions led the great powers to attempt to use 
the United Nations' collective security mechanism to secure their own conceptions of global 
security through their suggestion for resolving crises. Inevitably, their conception of security 
imperatives differed and opposing permanent members would block the suggested United 
Nations resolution on the basis that it was inimical to their interests. 
The new United Nations organisation was not long spared the manifestation of Cold War 
antagonism in the form of vetoes over the Security Council's ability to respond to threats to 
international peace and security. A series of disputes involving the permanent five were brought 
to the attention of the Security Council in early 1946 that established the pattern of vetoes and 
accusation and counter-accusation that were to last until the Cold War's end. On 19 January 
1946 Iran, encouraged by the United States and United Kingdom, complained of the continued 
presence of Soviet troops in its northern region of Azerbaijan. In retaliation, the Soviet Union 
and the Ukrainian SSR on 21 January brought separate but coordinated complaints about the 
interference of British troops in the internal affairs of Greece before the Security Council. Then 
on 4 February, Lebanon and Syria demanded the withdrawal of French troops from their 
territory. The Soviet Union cast its first veto on this is~ue, vetoing it on the grounds that it didn't 
go far enough in indicting British and French imperialism. The mechanics of Security Council 
deadlock were thereby established early: Soviet-sponsored resolutions would fail to achieve the 
required two-thirds majority from the Council's Western members (termed the "hidden veto" by 
37 Rubinstein, op. cit., 1989, pp. 310-1. 
38 Nogee and Donaldson, op. cit., 1992, pp. 93-4. 
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Soviet diplomats), while the Soviet veto prevented the adoption of the resolutions supported by 
h W .. 39 t e estern majonty. 
Within a year of its genesis, then, the United Nations Security Council had become 
relatively deadlocked as an instrument of collective security.40 Many of the problems stemmed 
from the novelty of the forum: rather than a closed meeting of great power leaders resembling 
Cairo, Teheran, Yalta or Potsdam, it was a highly public debating chamber in which diplomats 
advocated national positions. No tradition of prior consultation or confidential pre-negotiation of 
resolutions had developed, and the Security Council's members had not yet conceived of it as a 
forum for negotiating consensual solutions.41 Permanent representatives became conditioned by 
experience and instruction to adopt a confIictual rather than a consensual approach to Security 
Council debate.42 Nevertheless, positive trends were developing. One of the most promising 
moves toward cooperation came in the doctrine of abstention, whereby a voluntary abstention by 
one of the permanent five was not considered as a veto, thus diminishing the rigours of the 
principle of great power unanimity.43 However, abstention in and consensual action by the 
Security Council was rare, but did nevertheless occur. Both opposing blocs regarded their 
influence within the Security Council as of paramount importance. The deadlock against the 
admission of new members into the United Nations was driven by the intense awareness by each 
bloc of the crucial importance of voting numbers in all of its bodies.44 
39 K. P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis. (Delhi: D.K. Publishing 
House, 1974), p. 53. 
40 Even though severely hampered by Cold War divisions, the Security Council did still manage to make an 
impact on global security, issuing important resolutions such as 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, dispatching peacekeeping operations, and fostering discussions between opposing States, such as the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. 
41 Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination 1945-1955, 
(London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 97. 
42 Richard Peck, "Socialisation of Some Permanent Representatives in the United Nations: Some Evidence", 
International Organisation, Vol. 33, No.3, Summer 1979, pp. 370-5. 
43 Saksena,op. cit., 1974, p. 79. 
44 Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations, (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1960), p. 89. 
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The gridlock within the Security Council resulted in a partial breakdown in the United 
Nations' collective security machinery as it had been designed by the drafters of the Charter. The 
first casualty of the veto and the lack of great power agreement on objectives and routes to 
international security was the central precept of collective security: the automatic obligation to 
protect any and all victims from any and all aggressors in all situations. The veto made Security 
Council action to protect the peace selective, dependent upon the identity, strategic importance, 
and affinities of the victims and aggressors.45 The paralysis of the United Nations' collective 
security system resulted in the growth of its other mechanisms of conflict prevention and 
containment. Primary among these were its roles as both a diplomatic forum and mediator, as 
the dormancy of its military ability gave rise to the maturation of its political skills. The Security 
Council after 1965 began to adapt to these realities, and work together more closely to prevent 
the Great Powers' marginalisation compared to the third world-dominated General Assembly. 
They adopted the "consensus procedure", whereby decisions would be negotiated among the 
members of the Security Council, and periodic meetings and an activist President became 
regular features of the Council's procedure.46 It remained gridlocked on the issue of insurgent 
movements, however, as the Security Council as a forum did not escape the developing world's 
determination to confront the Western alliance over decolonisation and development.47 Another 
political adaptation was peacekeeping, the ultimate combination of multilateral military forces 
and political-diplomatic skill deployed to facilitate a military disengagement and eventually a 
mediated solution. 
Despite mutual accusations to the contrary, superpower obstructionism within the 
Security Council did not imply their opposition to the organisation itself: both blocs quickly 
realised the diplomatic and propaganda opportunities existing in the gridlocked body, and were 
thus unwilling to damage or withdraw from the organisation. The West, with its predominant 
majority, saw the United Nations as an organ for securing international legitimacy and 
justification for actions taken in pursuit of Western foreign policy objectives. The Soviet bloc, 
45 Saksena,op. cit., 1974, pp. 361-2. 
46 Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence, (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 103-110. 
47 ibid, pp. 102-3. 
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by contrast, watched the growth of third world membership at the United Nations with interest 
and conceived a more aggressive strategy of using the United Nations as a propaganda forum for 
isolating the West from the rest of the world.48 Both sides saw control of, and propaganda coups 
within the United Nations as important weapons in their Cold War struggle. As a centre of 
international interest and attention, it was a publicity opportunity not to be missed, a " ... perfect, 
highly publicised forum ... where the machinations of antagonists could be denounced, appeals 
for justice proclaimed, and the righteousness of one's own cause declared to the world. ,,49 
Both camps placed great importance on sponsoring controversial resolutions, since the 
publicity given the debating positions and the stigma of vetoing an attempt to preserve 
international security would reinforce accusations of the opposition as an alliance of aggressor-
imperialists. A favoured tactic of Security Council members was to convene a meeting at short 
notice or at an inconvenient time and introduce without prior warning a resolution calculated to 
be unacceptable to the opposition. 50 Consequently, in its first decade, while the Security Council 
passed 110 resolutions, its permanent members vetoed 79 draft resolutions. As the Security 
Council became increasingly hostage to obstructionism and cheap propaganda victories, the 
United Nations and the international community in general became decreasingly reliant on it as 
a body. There inevitably ensued a steady decline in the number and importance of issues brought 
before the Security Council for resolution.51 
One consequence of the failure of the Security Council as an effective instrument of 
international security was its members' resort to action outside of the United Nations to 
safeguard their security and national interests. The first State to realise this was the Soviet 
Union, which had never been under the impression that the United Nations could be a factor in 
its national security. It acted unilaterally in Eastern Europe, Greece and Iran to attempt to secure 
48 Rubinstein,op. cit., 1989, p. 329. 
49 Luard,op. cit., 1982, p. 93. 
50 Sydney D. Bailey, "The UN Security Council: Evolving Practice", The World Today, Vol. 43, No.3, March 
1978, p. 10 1. 
51 H. G. Nicholas, Thr United Nations As a Political Institution, (5th ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975), p. 100. 
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buffer States around its exposed borders. These indicators of Soviet behaviour threatened the 
basis of the Truman administration's internationalist foreign policy in the United States. By not 
utilising the United Nations, and openly flouting its principles, Soviet unilateralism threatened 
disillusion with multilateralism and the rule of international law and a revival of isolationism 
among the American electorate. 52 This threat to its internationalist foreign policy was a realistic 
security threat to the United States, and it reacted to Soviet probes by responding outside of the 
United Nations framework itself. It is significant that the first crisis in the Security Council, and 
the first signs of American unilateralism in the shape of the Truman doctrine, occurred over 
Soviet bloc support for communist insurgents in Greece in 1947. The realist underpinnings of 
the resulting strategy of containment implied a rejection of the internationalist commitment 
underlying action through the United Nations, and were anathema to the philosophy of 
collective security. 
This lack of credibility and confidence in United Nations collective security led to a 
proliferation of regional defence and alliance pacts outside of the United Nations. 53 The 
"pactomania" of the first post-War decade54 professed to be a formalisation of the Charter's 
Article 51 right to individual or collective self-defence and its Chapter VIII accommodation of 
regional arrangements. The creation of regional defence pacts had the cyclical· effect of 
intensifying, reinforcing and spreading the East-West division in international politics by 
polarising regional antagonisms, which resulted in even more extensive antagonism in the 
United Nations. 
The other consequence of the marginalisation of the Security Council was the shift in 
emphasis to the General Assembly. During the United Nations' first decade the preponderant 
Western membership55 in the organisation led the West to use its natural majority in all of its 
52 Gaddis,op. cit., 1987, pp. 29-30. 
53 Eric Stein, "The United Nations and the Enforcement of Peace", Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 
10, No.1, Winter 1989, p. 307-8. 
54 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (4 April 1949) and the Warsaw Pact (14 May 1955) faced each other 
in Europe; further The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (8 September 1954), the Baghdad Pact (24 February 
1955) and the Australia, New Zealand, United States treaty (1951) extended the treaty system around the world. 
55 Out of the 51 original members of the United Nations, 5 were communist. 
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organs to control action within the United Nations and to try to enhance the power and prestige 
of the organisation it controlled. The Soviet bloc, in contrast, aware of its minority position, 
opposed attempts to empower the United Nations and played down its legitimacy and 
mandate. S6 The Western alliance, fmding its actions frustrated by the Soviet veto in the Security 
Council, abandoned that organ for the consideration of important matters, and increasingly relied 
on the General Assembly, where the absence of any unanimity requirement allowed the weight 
of its numbers to prevail. 
The Western majority gradually moved the consideration of security issues to the 
General Assembly through a variety of devices: the interim, or little assembly, the use of 
Emergency Special Sessions, and the Uniting for Peace resolution. The Article 12 restriction of 
General Assembly competence to only consider those issues not currently being considered by 
the Security Council was circumvented by using a procedural vote to remove it from the 
Security Council agenda, and later using a variety of semantic differences between the title of 
the issue on the Security Council agenda and its title on the General Assembly agenda to imply 
that the General Assembly was considering a different aspect of the problem. The increase in 
General Assembly agenda size, the importance of the issues on its agenda, and the frequency of 
its meetings began to blur the distinction between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly. The Western alliance, and particularly the United States, viewed this reactivation of 
the United Nations as a new mandate to shape and preserve the status quo: "At the peak of its 
power, the United States, confident of its support by the 'mechanical majority', viewed the 
United Nations as the epitome of the new statecraft and championed a normative approach based 
on the Charter. That posture, at the time, generally conformed to American foreign policy 
interests."S? Confident of its majority, and free of the threat of a Soviet veto, the West further 
abandoned the search for consensual solutions and spurned any attempt to accommodate the 
interests of the minority in its General Assembly resolutions. 
56 Luard, op. cit., 1982, p. 94. 
57 Stein,op. cit., 1989, p. 306. 
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The sovereignty of United Nations members, however, meant that this Western 
predominance was achieved at the expense of the credibility and binding power of the 
resolutions adopted. The empowerment of the General Assembly, continued with the adoption 
of the Uniting for Peace resolution during the Korean crisis in November 1950.58 This 
procedure, which would be used again and again as crises paralysed the Security Council,59 
established General Assembly competence to consider matters of international peace and 
security by allowing any matter to be relocated from the Security Council to an Emergency 
Special Session of the General Assembly on 24 hours notice with a vote of any seven Security 
Council members or the majority of United Nations members.60 Uniting for Peace "amounted to 
a formal expression of disillusionment with the Security Council. ,,61 It served to further promote 
the control of the United Nations by the Western majority, and was vigorously criticised as an 
ultra vires Charter amendment by the Soviet bloc, which refused to be bound by its ensuing 
resolutions.62 As even the majority realised this fact, even it began to take United Nations 
resolutions less seriously. Luard observes that " ... UN policy was essentially declaratory: it 
consisted of statements of ideal end-situations rather than in any effective exploration of the 
means which might secure them. ,,63 The rise of General Assembly competence further 
reinforced the evolution of the United Nations into a forum of confrontation and denunciation 
rather than an instrument for crafting mutually-acceptable solutions to international· problems. 
The inability of the General Assembly to issue binding resolutions affected the nature of its 
security mandate. In place of securing Security Council-ordered enforcement resolutions, the 
58 General Assembly Resolution 377A(V) of3 November 1950. 
59 The Uniting for Peace resolution was used during the Suez crisis in 1956, again in 1967 after the 6-day war, 
and again in 1973 after the October war. 
60 The main provision of the Uniting for Peace resolution reads: "If the Security Council, because of lack of 
unanimity of the pennanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of 
aggression the use of armed force when necessary." 
61 Hiscocks, op. cit., 1973, pp. 290-4. 
62 See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969). 
63 Luard, op. cit., 1982, p. 274. 
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Western alliance made do with using its General Assembly dominance to obtain legitimisation 
for its actions in support of its interests. 
At the commencement of the United Nations' second decade, the static patterns of East-
West confrontation were already being eclipsed by a rapid and unforseen growth in the number 
of Member States of the United Nations. The wave of decolonisation had begun to release large 
numbers of post-colonial States into the international system. For these new States, 
inexperienced in domestic administration and statecraft, lacking strong senses of national 
identity, and desperately poor and underdeveloped, United Nations membership was a primary 
goal. Stanley Hoffinan characterises the importance of United Nations membership to the 
security of post-colonial States: 
... the organs of the United Nations have given a solemn endorsement to the 
nation-state (even to the mini-state) and have wrapped the rights and privileges 
of the Charter around the frail and shivering new nations, thus promoting a kind 
of pluralist and equalitarian legitimacy which inhibits considerably the more 
blatant moves the superpowers could be tempted to make in their relations with 
weaker states.64 
The expansion of United Nations membership to near universality breathed new life into it. Its 
fora, particularly the General Assembly, became an accurate reflection of the newly emergent 
international community, and began to be used to address truly global concerns. The weight of 
these new members irreversibly changed the composition of the United Nations. It was no 
longer controlled by a majority of predominantly wealthy, industrialised States preoccupied with 
their security vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The members of the new majority in the United Nations 
were poor, non-white, ex-colonies, detennined to end all manifestations of the colonialism 
against which each of them had recently prevailed, and to achieve parity in wealth, industrial 
capacity and physical security with the developed world. This majority thus had a built-in 
propensity to support and protect national liberation movements, once the movements had 
demonstrated the appropriate right to legitimate self-detennination against colonial or certain 
white or racial supremacist regimes. 
64 Stanley Hoffman, "International Organization and the International System", International Organization, Vol 
24, No.3, 1970, p. 396. 
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For most of the new post-colonial majority in the United Nations, the possession of a 
vote of equivalent weight to the great and middle powers in the General Assembly was arguably 
one of their most potent foreign policy instruments. They were not long in realising their 
similarities in both situation and general objectives, sharing" ... both a sense of vulnerability as 
latecomers to the world stage and high expectations. To most, shelter in ... numbers seemed 
preferable to isolation in an uncertain environment dominated by former colonial powers.,,65 
The rationale for solidarity among the weak, post-colonial States derived from their critique of 
bipolarity in the international system. At Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, they established the 
Non-Aligned Movement as an alternative to bipolar confrontation, promoting peace and 
coexistence while acting multilaterally to eradicate colonialism and rectify the 
underdevelopment of the third world. Having defined its common interests and common 
philosophies, and negotiating agendas for action at regular meetings, the Non-Aligned 
Movement began to appreciate the advantages of solidarity in the General Assembly. 
The new majority inherited the mechanisms of enhanced authority and competence 
given to the General Assembly by its previous controlling majority. It also fully exploited its 
power over the Assembly's "specific responsibilities for approving the UN 
budget, ... apportioning expenses among members, and establishing 'such subsidiary organs as 
may be necessary,66 [giving] the Non-Aligned majority vast leverage over the UN 
organisational structure.,,67 With each passing year, the Non-Aligned majority used its growing 
experience of parliamentary diplomacy and its membership of General Assembly committees to 
assert more and more control over the General Assembly agenda, inserting items of interest and 
importance to the developing world for General Assembly consideration. The Non-Aligned 
Movement left little to chance, defining its priorities at closed, tri-annual meetings outside New 
York, and determining "how, when, and at what level they should be taken up by the larger 
body.,,68 The third world majority, like the Western majority before it, was also concerned with 
65 Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 18. 
66 Article 22. 
67 Jackson, op. cit., 1983, p. 133. 
68 ibid., pp. 167-8. 
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enhancing the authority of the United Nations, and within the United Nations organisation, of 
the General Assembly which it controlled.69 
By the end of the 1960s, the Non-Aligned majority had become frustrated by the 
stemming of the tide of decolonisation against the issues of South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia 
and Palestine, and their lack of progress in development in comparison with the industrialised 
world. This led to a radicalisation of third world policy, objectives and philosophies.7o The oil 
crisis and the Non-Aligned summit in Algiers in 1973 highlighted this radicalism, as well as 
increasing pressure on the membership to vote as a bloc and conform to Non-Aligned positions 
on issues before the General Assembly.7) A fundamental position was the support of anti-
Western bloc national liberation movements: this was the second of the five conditions of Non-
Aligned Movement membership.72 The Non-Aligned majority's antagonism was mainly 
directed towards the Western alliance which it viewed as militaristic, neo-imperialist, 
Eurocentric, monopolistic of wealth and development, and supportive of the remaining 
colonialist or racist regimes: Israel, South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal.73 The Non-Aligned 
movement began to use the mechanisms of the Uniting for Peace resolution and the convening 
of Emergency Special Sessions to reclaim issues of importance from the great power-controlled 
Security Council, to highlight Western opposition, and to give greater pUblicity to the issues 
discussed.74 The first issues dealt with in this manner are indicative of the priorities of the 
General Assembly majority: Palestine in 1980, Namibia in 1981, and the Golan Heights in 1982. 
The Soviet Union, long on the defensive against the Western permanent majority, began 
to see the propaganda and alliance opportunities presented by the anti-Western turn at the United 
69 Goodrich,op. cit., 1960, p. 58. 
70 • The exemplar of the new anti-colonial radicalism in the third world was Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth, (London: Penguin Books, 1967). 
71 Jackson, op. cit., 1983, pp. 27-8. 
72 ibid., p. 42. 
73 Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance, (London: Frances Pinter, 
1978), pp. 114-5. 
74 Jackson,op. cit., 1983, pp. 135-6. 
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Nations. The Soviet position at the United Nations went onto the offensive, supporting Non-
Aligned positions on anti-colonialism and economic justice in order to exacerbate the growing 
antagonism between the first and third worldS.75 This was an inspired diplomatic strategy, 
whereby the Soviet Union could expend less of its resources by courting a bloc to net a 
disproportionately large result in isolating the West, while the United States continued to expend 
huge resources in the futile attempt to translate aid into voting loyalty.76 Soviet solidarity with 
the third world was based on more than just an anti-Western orientation: it also was struggling to 
achieve economic and industrial parity with the West and was pennanently hungry for Western 
technology, currency and credits.77 Aware of the Non-Aligned suspicion of the superpowers, the 
Soviet Union increasingly lobbied the Movement through its clients, particularly Cuba. By the 
early 1980s, this strategy resulted in an over 75% coincidence in Non-Aligned and Soviet bloc 
voting in the General Assembly, moving that body increasingly against Western interests and 
heightening Western alienation from the United Nations.78 For the Soviet Union, this fortuitous 
reliance led it increasingly towards the pursuit of its foreign policy interests through the United 
Nations and international law; particularly the promotion of anti-Western revolution in the third 
world. 79 
The congruence of Non-Aligned majority and Soviet policies on national liberation, and 
the logic of parliamentary diplomacy80 at the United Nations combined to make the vigorous 
support of anti-Western national liberation movements a dominant priority of the United Nations 
and its committees. The method of ensuring group voting cohesion from issue to issue in the 
General Assembly was to establish linkages between the issue under consideration and broader 
75 Nogee and Donaldson, p. cit., 1992, p. 177. 
76 A number of empirical studies have found no correlation between trade and aid and voting loyalty at the 
United Nations. See Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study", 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No.3, September 1973, pp. 868-888. 
77 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., 1985, p. 144. 
78 Jackson,op. cit., 1983, p. 140. 
79 Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op. cit., 1985, p. 175. 
80 Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Politics of Value Allocation in the United Nations System", in Lawrence S. 
Finkelstein (ed), Politics in the United Nations System, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 6-8. 
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points of agreement and solidarity for the group of which the caucused party is a member. These 
broader points of agreement, or "super-issues" were essential to the dominance of the majority in 
any United Nations body.8! The Non-Aligned Movement's mobilising super-issues have been 
identified as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, self-determination and economic and political 
sovereignty for third world States.82 The third world bloc also gained cohesion from economic 
issues during its formulation of a policy establishing the New International Economic Order, but 
a common Non-Aligned experience of colonialism83 made anti-Western bloc colonialism a 
primary point of reference around which States formed their policy towards issues before the 
United Nations. 
The repeated usage of the voting bloc and its super-issues imparted a rigidity of policy 
among the Non-Aligned: the difficulty of renegotiating an issue or position to the satisfaction of 
all members of a bloc the size of the Non-Aligned84 meant that it minimised attention on issues 
over which it was divided and concentrated on issues of agreement. For this reason, the issues of 
decolonisation came to dominate the General Assembly agenda more and more. Its presence as a 
super-issue and a point of reference became established in the United Nations through 
"foundation documents": General Assembly resolutions which were to be repeatedly cited as 
precedent for later action, quoted, and reaffirmed in later resolutions.85 The most prominent of 
these was General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV),86 The Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which defined colonialism as a denial of 
human rights and the right to self-determination, and thus contrary to the Charter. Through 
reference to this and other foundation documents, the General Assembly majority could pursue 
81 Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and Proposal", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No.4, December 1963, p. 904. 
82 Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations", American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 60, No.2, June 1966, pp. 336-7. 
83 Although some prominent members, such as Yugoslavia and some Latin American countries had no recent 
experience of colonialism. 
84 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System 
Structure in International Crises, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 351. 
85 Jackson,op. cit., 1983, p. 170. 
86 General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960. 
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its anti-colonial agenda reinforced by the legitimacy of United Nations auspices and 
international law. 
The support of self-determination against Western-supported colonialism served two 
purposes for the General Assembly majority: as a super-issue imparting group solidarity on 
other issues, but also as a mandate to support the cause of national liberation movements 
fighting for self-determination against Western-supported regimes. The national liberation 
movements to be supported were determined primarily by their anti-Western bloc credentials by 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Arab League. 
Commitment to the overthrow of regimes outside of Europe that were friendly to the West 
became the primary criterion of United Nations support for a national liberation movement, 
often regardless of its popular support.87 The rise of militant national liberation movements in 
Palestine and Southern Africa in the 1960s caught the attention of the General Assembly, which 
expanded United Nations action from applying pressure against the incumbent regimes to also 
vigorously supporting the national liberation movements opposing them. In a series of General 
Assembly resolutions,88 black-white symbolism and references to "alien domination" were used 
to extend anti-colonialism to the broader issue of anti-racialism, thus linking the Southern 
African and Palestine issues under a single super-issue. 
As the numbers, confidence and cohesion of the United Nations' Non-Aligned majority 
grew over time, its support for approved national liberation movements became more and more 
comprehensive. It began as resolutions supporting the legitimacy of the struggle of national 
liberation movements opposing the South African, Rhodesian, Israeli, and Portuguese-
administered regimes.89 The Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and 
87 Jackson, op. cit., 1983, p. 171. 
88 General Assembly Resolution 2649 (XXV) used the tenn "alien domination" for the first time to link the 
Southern African and Palestine issues in the same resolution; Resolution 3175 (XXVII), 17 December 1973 alluded 
to "all ... peoples ... under foreign occupation"; Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) condemned "the unholy alliance between 
Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, Zionism, and Israeli imperialism"; and Resolution 3324 E (XXIX) 
condemned relations between South Africa and Israel. 
89 See for example General Assembly resolutions 3294 (XXIX) (1974), 2787 (XXVI) (1971), 1663 (XVI) 
(1961),33/38 (1978), 341100 (1979) and Security Council resolutions 312 (1972), 277 (1970), 288 (1970), 314 
(1972). 
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the Arab League, so convinced that the national liberation movements they supported were the 
legitimate representatives of their oppressed peoples, and so committed to universality of 
membership in international organisations, then moved to issue observer status to these 
movements, and full membership to some.90 Following the granting of independence to the 
Portuguese colonies, the Non-Aligned Movement concentrated on advancing the Southern 
African and Palestinian liberation movements that it supported. It began to use its predominance 
in the General Assembly and its committees to secure these national liberation movements 
access to the United Nations' forums and to provide them with material and moral support in 
waging their struggles. 
The liberation movements supported by the Non-Aligned Movement were those 
approved by the Organisation of African Unity and the Arab League: South Africa's African 
National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC); Namibia's South West 
African People's Organisation (SW APO); Rhodesia's Zimbabwe African People's Union 
(ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) , and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO\. The first task that the Non-Aligned majority set about was gaining these 
~FJPS access iv the United Nations fora so they could personally lobby the world community 
on behalf :Ji their struggle. The General Assembly repeatedly proclaimed itself in favour of the 
participation of its approved national liberation movements in the work of the organisation, 
being "Convinced that the participation of the national liberation movements [recognised by the 
Organisation of African Unity and the Arab League] helps to strengthen international peace and 
security.',91 Against the objections of Western States that the United Nations is an organisation 
of States and that granting access to national liberation movements implies recognition of 
statehood, the Non-Aligned majority argued that they were indeed States in the making. A 
commonly cited precedent for prematurely granting recognition to States was early United 
Nations practice, at Dumbarton Oaks and San Fransisco, where countries such as India were 
granted membership prior to full independence: 
90 The Palestine Liberation Movement and the South West African People's Organization were both granted full 
membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
91 This statement appears regularly in the preamble of General Assembly resolutions 351167 of 15 December 
1980, 371104 of 16 December 1982, 39176 of 13 December 1984, 41171 of 3 December 1986, 431160B of 9 
December 1988,45/37 of28 November 1990, and 47/29 of25 November 1992. 
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That amply demonstrated the general trend towards conferring on entities other 
than States the same rights and duties as States, because of the functions of those 
entities. They should accordingly have the same privileges and immunities as 
States, since those privileges and immunities were functional in purpose.92 
The PLO was to gain the most spectacular access to the United Nations. For a number of 
years representatives of the PLO had travelled to United Nations headquarters as members of 
various Arab States' missions; however on 14 November 1969 the General Assembly's Special 
Political Committee authorised the PLO to speak in its session without special authorisation, 
implying recognition of that organisation by the Committee.93 The campaign of particularly 
Algeria and the Arab League intensified over the next years, culminating in a concerted push for 
PLO representation in the United Nations in 1974. This began with a letter from 56 States to the 
Secretary -General on 11 September 1974 requesting the inclusion of a separate item entitled 
"The Question of Palestine" on the General Assembly'S agenda. When this item was considered 
by the General Assembly on 14 October 1974, it adopted resolution 321O(XXIX),94 which 
recognised the PLO as "the principle party" to the question of Palestine and the "representative 
of the Palestinian people", inviting it to participate in General Assembly deliberations on the 
question of Palestine.95 This resolution also invited Yasser Arafat to speak to the General 
Assembly; his famous "gun and olive branch" speech was delivered on 13 November. On 22 
November 1974, the General Assembly further adopted resolution 3237(XXIX),96 which 
92 Statement by Mr Hamad, Penn anent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations in a 
debate of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly on the resolution relating to the observer status of 
national liberation movements recognised by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab 
States, General Assembly Official Records, AlC.6/35/SR.74, 1982, p. 14. 
93 United Nations Department of Public Infonnation, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United 
Nations, 1969), p. 234. 
94 Adopted by roll call vote 105 to 4 with 20 abstentions. 
95 General Assembly resolutions affrrrning the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the preeminent 
position of the PLO as their representatives were adopted annually thereafter; see for example General Assembly 
resolutions 31120 of 24 November 1976; 32/40A of 2 December 1977; 33/28A of 7 December 1978, 34/65A of 29 
November 1979, 351169A of 15 December 1980, 36/120D of 10 December 1981; and 37/86A of28 April 1982. 
96 Adopted by recorded vote of 95 to 17 with 19 abstentions. The United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Canada and Denmark expressed reservations during the debates on resolutions 3210(XXIX) and 
3237(XXIX) on the grounds that only representatives of states should participate in General Assembly debates. 
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granted permanent observer status to the PLO in the Assembly's work and in all international 
conferences under its auspices. 
The General Assembly further enhanced the PLO's diplomatic status with resolution 
3375(XXX) of 10 November 1975,97 which called for the invitation of the PLO to participate in 
all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East held under United Nations auspices 
on an equal footing with the other parties.98 Resolutions 3236(XXIX)99 and 3375(XXX)100 
asserted that the PLO was indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the 
Middle East. Consequently when Egypt and Israel concluded a separate peace at Camp David in 
1979, the General Assembly reacted with resolution 34/65B, condemning the Camp David 
accords on the grounds that they had been concluded outside United Nations auspices, ignoring 
its Charter, its resolutions, and without PLO participation, and declaring that the accords had no 
validity "insofar as they purported to determine the future of the Palestinian people and the 
. d . . ,,101 
occuple temtones. 
The precedent established by the General Assembly began to spread the PLO's access to 
other United Nations Organs. On 3 July 1975, the Economic and Social Council, in accordance 
with its rules of procedure, invited the PLO to participate without a vote in all its deliberations of 
concern to the PLO. 102 In November 1975 the PLO was invited to participate without a vote in 
the Security Council's consideration of the Question of Palestine against the opposition of the 
United States. France, Italy and the United Kingdom abstained, expressing reservations that the 
PLO had been invited under Security Council rule of procedure 37, which implied statehood to 
the PLO. 103 The extension of the Security Council invitation to the PLO over the same 
97 Adopted by roll call vote 101 to 8 with 25 abstentions. 
98 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1975), p. 242. 
99 22 November 1974. 
100 10 November 1975. 
101 General Assembly resolution 34/65B of29 November 1979, adopted 75 to 33 with 37 abstentions. 
102 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1975), p. 242. 
103 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1976), p. 229. 
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opposition and abstentions occurred January and June 1976, October 1977, July 1979, and 
March 1980 "in accordance with past practice" of the Security Council, rather than under 
reconsideration of the rules of procedure. 104 
Of the other national liberation movements supported by the United Nations, only 
SW APO approached the PLO's level of access to United NationS' bodies. Its access route was 
similar to the PLO's: participation in the General Assembly'S Council for Namibia eventually led 
to its invitation to participate as an observer in the work of the Special Political Committee in 
June 1973. 105 In the same year the General Assembly recognised SW APO as the "sole authentic 
representative of the Namibian people". 106 By resolution 3295(XXIX)107 the General Assembly 
allocated financial support of SW APO adequate to allow it to maintain permanent representation 
in New York City. Then in 1976, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/152 108 granting 
SWAPO observer status at the General Assembly, in all conferences convened under the 
auspices of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations. 
The other national liberation movements supported by the General Assembly were not to 
achieve the formalisation or level of access to United Nations bodies as the PLO and SW APO. 
They became regular participants in the deliberations of the General Assembly's Special 
Committee on Apartheid, and on the recommendation of this Committee, became observers in 
the discussions of the Special Political Committee in 1974. 109 Formal observership in the 
plenary sessions of the General Assembly were to elude them however: they were confined to 
making statements to General Assembly debates on South Africa. I 10 While not granting them 
observer status, the General Assembly did confer on them other indirect forms of recognition. Its 
104 United Nations, Yearbook o/the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1980), p. 456. 
105 General Assembly resolution 2980(XXVU) of 14 December 1972 adopted 98 to 4 with 24 abstentions. 
106 General Assembly resolution 3111(XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, adopted 107 to 2 with 17 abstentions. 
107 13 December 1974 adopted 102 to 6 with 14 abstentions. 
108 20 December 1976, adopted 94 to 12 with 24 abstentions. 
109 United Nations, Yearbook o/the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1974), p. 123. 
110 United Nations, Yearbook o/the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1976), p. 122. 
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resolutions regularly reaffinned the ANC and PAC and ZANU and ZAPU as the authentic 
representatives of the people of South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. 111 Further prestige 
and status were given to the PAC and ANC when the General Assembly's Credentials 
Committee repeatedly refused to recognise the credentials of the South African representatives 
since 1970 on the grounds that they did not represent the people of South Africa. 112 This 
position was reaffinned by the plenary in 1975. General Assembly resolution 3411G (XXX) 
reaffinned " ... that the racist regime of South Africa [was] illegitimate and had no right to 
represent the people of South Africa [and that the] national liberation movements ... were the 
authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of those people." 113 Invitations to the 
PAC, ANC, ZANU and ZAPU were also extended by the Security Council to participate in its 
deliberations on South Africa, but the invitations were finnly issued under rule 39 of its Rules of 
Procedure covering invitations to non-governmental organisations. I 14 
All of these liberation movements were voted copious amounts of moral, material and 
financial assistance by the General Assembly to complement their various levels of recognition. 
Their main fonns of moral support came in the fonn of expressions of solidarity and resolutions 
legitimating their armed struggle against the illegal regimes of their opponents. 115 The Non-
Aligned majority argued that these resolutions were not in fact contrary to the Charter's 
prohibition of the use of armed force, but rather a vindication of its Article 51 right to self-
defence against "the pennanent aggression of colonialism. ,,116 It was the incumbent colonialist 
regimes that were seen as "situations ... that had led to international friction, and, if continued, 
might endanger international peace and security", 117 rather than the insurgents, whose "peoples' 
III See General Assembly resolutions 3411 G (XXX) of 10 December 1975,31161 of 9 November 1976, 311154A 
of 14 December 1976 and 34/931 of 12 December 1979. 
112 Unit.ed Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 106-7. 
113 General Assembly resolution 3411 G (XXX) of 10 December 1975, paragraph 5. 
114 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 109-110. 
115 See General Assembly resolutions 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, 3324C (XXIX) of 16 December 
1974,3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974,3411 B, C, and D (XXX) of28 November 1975,31/61 of9 November 
1976,33/38 of 13 December 1978,37/69 of9 December 1982 and 38/39 of 5 December 1983. 
116 Caroline Thomas, New States, Sovereignty and Intervention, (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), pp. 10, 65-66. 
117 General Assembly resolution 1663 (XVI) of28 November 1961. 
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struggle for their emancipation and liberation from colonial and other forms of sUbjugation and 
oppression ... contribut[ed] to the strengthening of international peace and security ... ,,118 The 
belligerents were called on to accord captured national liberation movement cadres status as 
prisoners of war under the 1977 Geneva ProtocOIS. 119 The General Assembly attempted to tip 
the scales militarily in favour of these national liberation movements by repeatedly appealing for 
States and organisations to render them appropriate military assistance,120 while, in the case of 
South Africa, the Security Council applied mandatory arms sanctions against the incumbent 
121 government. 
A variety of forms of material and financial assistance were extended to these national 
liberation movements by the United Nations. With its control of the budget of the Organisation, 
the General Assembly majority was free to determine the amount, purpose and route of United 
Nations funding to national liberation movements. As well as regularly passing resolutions 
requesting all States and organisations to expand their assistance to these liberation 
movements,122 it apportioned large parts of the organisation's budget for assistance to these 
liberation movements. In the Fifth (Financial) Committee, the Non-Aligned Movement's 
predominant numbers enabled it to repeatedly vote generous amounts of assistance to its 
approved liberation movements. A major form of direct United Nations assistance was the 
financing of permanent offices adjacent to United Nations headquarters in New York for the 
PLO, SW APO, ANC and PAC, 123 and the defraying of the costs of these movements attending 
lIS General Assembly resolution 34/100, The Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of 
International Peace and Security, of 14 December 1979. 
119 See General Assembly resolution 361172A of 17 December 1981. 
120 See for example General Assembly resolutions 3324C (XXIX 16 December 1974, 33/183K of 24 January 
1979, 35/206J of 16 December 1980, 37/69A of 9 December 1982, 37/233A of 20 December 1982, 38/17 of 22 
November 1983, 38/39 of 5 December 1983, 40/461 of 13 October 1985, and 42175 of7 November 1987. 
121 Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977 called on all states to cease provision to South 
Africa of anns and related materiel of all types. This was the ftrst time in the Organisation's history that such action 
had been taken by the United Nations under Chapter VII against a member state. 
122 See for example General Assembly resolutions 35/227A-J of6 March 1981,36/52 of 24 November 1981, 
36/l21A of 10 December 1981, 361172A of 17 December 1981, 37/69A of 9 December 1982, 371134 of 17 
December 1982, 37/233A of 20 December 1982, and 38/51 and 38/36A of 1 December 1983. 
123 Under General Assembly resolutions 35/206J of 16 December 1980, 361172A of 17 December 1981, 37/233C 
of 20 December 1982 etc. An example of the costs of ftnancing these offices in New York City is supplied by the 
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relevant conferences under United Nations auspices. 124 However, most United Nations 
assistance to national liberation movements was funnelled through a variety of other United 
Nations organs. Most prominent among these was the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), whose expenditures on national liberation movements between 1987 and 1991 were 
US$17 million 125 on such projects as education and training, airlifting food supplies, health 
assistance, vocational assistance for cadres, telecommunications, agriculture, and land 
126 development. 
A large amount of United Nations material and fmancial assistance for national 
liberation movements was channelled indirectly through United Nations agencies' assistance to 
refugees or oppressed peoples. Having recognised these national liberation movements as the 
legitimate representatives of their people, and having sought their advice in United Nations 
forums as to how to assist the liberation struggle, the General Assembly consequently gave these 
movements a controlling voice as to how these humanitarian funds would be spent. Often 
UNDP aid for the education, health and feeding of refugees was directed to these movements, 
many of whom controlled the refugee camps in neutral States, usually coinciding with guerrilla 
training bases. Other United Nations Agencies indirectly funding these national liberation 
movements included UNICEF (aid for children in refugee camps); UNESCO (development of 
multi ethnic, multicultural programs for South Africa); UNCHS (Habitat) (construction of 
housing and infrastructure); UNIDO; UNCTAD; WHO; UNRWA and UNHCR. 127 A number 
of Western countries objected to such humanitarian aid being channelled through national 
liberation movements; the overruling of these repeated objections was to contribute to the 
Fifth Committee's 1983 budget. One year's support of the ANC offices cost the Organisation US$ 248,200. General 
Assembly Official Records, A/C.5/38/53, pp. J -2. 
124 An example of the amounts spent every year by the General Assembly on defraying these national liberation 
movements' conference and travel costs is illustrated by the total for the ANC in 1983 of US$ 507,100. General 
Assembly Official Records, A/C.5/38/53, pp. 5-8. 
125 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 96. 
126 For a typical breakdown of UNDP assistance to national liberation movements, see for example United 
Nations Development Program Official Records, Governing Council Twenty-sixth session "Assistance to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples During 1978: Report of the Administrator", DP/362, 23 March 1979. 
127 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1991), pp. 123-126. 
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United States' repeated defaulting on its payments to the United Nations during the Reagan 
administration. 
The United Nations lent its considerable publicity potential to these liberation 
movements in the provision of organisational and propaganda assistance. The General Assembly 
and its various Committees voted for countless resolutions directing the United Nations 
Department of Public Information (UNDPI) to publicise the plight of the peoples on behalf of 
whom the approved national liberation movements were fighting. The UNDPI published and 
disseminated a wide range of reports, posters, stamps, commercials aired on United States 
television, teaching aids and other publicity material directly or indirectly supporting the causes 
of the United Nations' approved national liberation movements. In addition, the PLO and 
SW APO, under General Assembly resolution 431160A had all of their communications relating 
to the sessions and work of the General Assembly issued and circulated as official documents of 
the General Assembly and under United Nations symbols. 128 In 1977, the General Assembly 
established a Special Committee on Palestinian Rights within the Secretariat to give maximum 
publicity to the plight of Palestinians and to organise the observance of 29 November each year 
as the International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People. 129 In these ways, United 
Nations support enabled these movements to maintain a constant and high level of international 
attention on their struggle. 
The extent to which United Nations support of its approved national liberation 
movements assisted them in achieving their objectives is difficult to quantify. Twenty years after 
the first admission to observer status at the United Nations of a national liberation movement, 
Zimbabwe has changed to majority rule, Namibia has achieved independence, South Africa has 
held its first multi-racial, democratic elections, ,md the PLO has signed a declaration of 
principles for peace with the Israeli government. Certainly United Nations support of national 
liberation movements gave them a range of advantages: lobbying access to a forum of world 
governments, an international identity, an influence on United Nations positions on their 
128 General Assembly resolution 431160A of 9 December 1988. 
129 General Assembly resolution 32/40B of2 December 1977. 
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problems, the material, financial military and organisational resources to mount sophisticated 
guerrilla and diplomatic campaigns against the incumbents, and their public identification with 
mobilising issues such as racial discrimination, refugees and human rights. 
While the material and diplomatic resources directed to these movements was great, the 
United Nations' major assistance was in the diplomatic field. The imparting of an international 
personality on a national liberation movement " ... had opened new horizons permitting the 
consolidation of...[its] international status, the broadening of the international recognition 
accorded to it, and the expansion of support for its cause." 130 It also enabled the national 
liberation movement to influence the international community's perception of its problem and 
subsequently the approach to its solution. For example, once able to work within the 
Organisation, the PLO was able to help change the way the United Nations perceived the 
Palestinian problem from an issue of refugees to one of the denial of rights to self-
d .. 131 etermmatlOn. 
Involvement with the United Nations not only changed the views of the international 
community. It changed the national liberation movements themselves and the direction in which 
they waged their campaigns: " ... through their delegations at the United Nations, [national 
liberation movements] became absorbed in a socialisation process that favoured the achievement 
of a solution ... by diplomatic rather than violent means." 132 As SW APO's standing acceptance of 
peace efforts attests, United Nations' advocacy of an equal role for liberation movements in 
peace talks or peace initiatives ultimately committed it to a diplomatic track, rather than the 
continued pursuit of an unequal military struggle with its adversary.133 When assessing the 
contribution of United Nations assistance to these national liberation movements' objectives, it 
130 Statement by a PLO representative after General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 
November 1974 had recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. United 
Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations, 1975), p. 242. 
131 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The United Nations: Does the Rhetoric Matter? A Case 
History: Palestine 1947-1983, Foreign Policy Document No. 223 (London: HMSO, October 1983), p. 5. 
132 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause, 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1986), p. 143. 
133 See Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) of29 September 1978 and 566 (1985) of 19 June 1985. 
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should not be forgotten that the solutions arrived at in Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Israel were predominantly reached by diplomatic means. 
While United Nations support for its approved national liberation movements has been 
generous and extensive, there are other national liberation movements that have sought similar 
assistance but failed to secure the same levels to United Nations attention or promotion. Peoples 
suffering similar levels of deprivation of the right to self-determination as did formerly 
Namibians, black South Africans, Zimbabweans and Palestinians but without the requisite 
characteristics to unify and mobilise the Non-Aligned majority in the United Nations have been 
either actively opposed or denounced, or ignored, or given lukewarm moral encouragement. 
An instructive example of a national liberation movement that has received at best weak 
endorsement by the United Nations is Fretilin of East Timor, fighting against the annexation of a 
formerly independent State134 by Indonesia since December 1975. According to standards 
established by the United Nations itself,135 Indonesia has committed an act of colonialism and 
aggression against the East Timorese people. The original military invasion was conducted by a 
State of different racial origin to the Timorese, who had recently exercised their right to self-
determination from their Portuguese colonisers. Furthermore, the continued occupation has been 
characterised by severe deprivations of human and political rights: "There is always fear. We 
lack the freedom to speak, to walk where we want, to have different opinions. If people talk, 
they know they will be interrogated. They will be tortured. ,,136 Fretilin, supported by various 
former Portuguese colonies, has mounted a guerrilla campaign and a diplomatic campaign for 
the independence of East Timor from Indonesian occupation. 
134 East Timorese independence had formerly been granted by Portugal on 28 November 1975, when a 
provisional East Timorese government proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. 
Fifteen states had recognised the state of East Timor after its independence. 
135 See for example General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, The Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which states that alien SUbjugation and domination 
and colonialism, including the denial of rights on the basis of racial background are contrary to the Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a threat to international peace and security. The United Nations 
Charter, Article 2(4) orders that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations." 
136 Carlos Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili, quoted in Philip Shenon, "Brutality and Suspicion Reign m a 
Tormented Paradise", The Guardian, Saturday 24 April 1993, p. 16. 
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Among other forums, the United Nations is lobbied annually by Fretilin 
representatives. 137 Fretilin's inability to mobilise support for its cause at the United Nations is 
best explained by the nature of its opponent rather than by any characteristic of the movement or 
its cause. Indonesia is a strong founder-member of the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN, a 
major oil-exporter, an ex-colony and a developing country. Not only does the anti-Western 
decolonisation super-issue not fit Indonesia, but any potential State supporters of East Timor's 
independence must realise that criticism of Indonesia threatens to split the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Neither can Fretilin find allies in the West: during the Cold War the Suharto regime 
proved a redoubtable anti-communist bulwark in South-East Asia. With the fourth-largest 
population in the world, Indonesia is a promising market and also boasts an abundance of raw 
materials. Strategically, it controls the Ombai-Wetar straits connecting the Pacific and Indian 
oceans. 138 
Through its few State supporters 139 , Fretilin was often granted the right to make 
statements before the General Assembly and Security Council in their consideration of the 
situation in East Timor, but the resolutions and measures adopted by these bodies have been 
generally weak and declaratory. A typical General Assembly resolution on East Timor 
"Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and 
independence and the legitimacy of their stlUggle to achieve that right," 140 while rejecting "the 
claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia, inasmuch as the people of the territory 
have not been able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence.,,141 The 
137 Joan T. Seymour, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, told the 
author in an interview conducted on II March 1994 at United Nations Headquarters, New York City, "Mr Ramos-
Horta [the international representative for Fretilin's CNRM] is here to appeal to the Decolonisation Committee and 
anyone else who will listen every year. But there are few who will listen. " 
138 Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soci Liong, The War Against East Timor, (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 7-10. 
139 Fretilin's regular supporters at the United Nations during the Cold War included the former Portuguese 
colonies, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, the Soviet bloc, 
Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, and Portugal. 
140 General Assembly resolution 33/39 of 13 December 1978. 
141 General Assembly resolution 32/34 of 28 November 1977. 
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only fonn of General Assembly action in support of Fretilin has been to authorise the Special 
Committee on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People to dispatch a 
visiting mission to observe the situation in East Timorl42 and then to repeatedly call on the 
government of Indonesia to grant the body admission to East Timor. 143 The Security Council 
similarly adopted resolutions "eal/[ing] upon the Government ofIndonesia to withdraw without 
delay all its forces from [East Timor]" and "Request[ing] the Secretary-General to send urgently 
a special representative to East Timor for the purpose of making an on-the-spot assessment of 
the situation and of establishing contact with all the parties ... concerned ... " 144 Virtually ignored 
by the international community, after nineteen years of guerrilla struggle and diplomatic effort, 
Fretilin has advanced little along the road to achieving its objectives. These were generally the 
impediments faced by national liberation movements that were unable to gain access to or the 
assistance of the United Nations for their struggles. 
Insurgent movements that most often incur United Nations opposition are those that 
advocate secession or irredentism from an existing State. Because of the territorial rather than 
national conception of the State embraced by multi-ethnic ex-colonial States, most States 
comprising the Non-Aligned majority are sensitive to the potentially disintegrative tension 
between their artificial, ex-colonial borders, and the belief that the State should be the expression 
of an ethnically-homogeneous group.145 The maintenance of territorial integrity has become 
important for the member States of the United Nations, which champion the international legal 
principle of uti possidetis, that boundaries existing at the assumption of statehood are not subject 
to change. Consequently, insurgents advocating secession, irredentism or other changes to 
international borders are either ignored or opposed by the United Nations. Spumed secessionist 
142 General Assembly resolution 33/39 of 13 December 1978. 
143 General Assembly resolution 32/34 of28 November 1977. 
144 Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) of22 December 1975 and 389 (1976) of22 April 1976. 
145 Stanley Hoffman, "The Problem of Intervention", In Hedley Bull (ed), Intervention in World Politics, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 14. 
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movements include the various Kurdish independence movements,146 the Eritrean Liberation 
Front, and the Biafran independence movement during the Nigerian civil war. 
The United Nations has also actively opposed secessionist movements. When in 
November 1983 Turkish Cypriot leaders issued a declaration creating an independent State in 
Northern Cyprus, the Security Council reacted with resolution 514 (1983) in which it classed the 
announcement a threat to international peace and security, deplored the declaration and 
pronounced it invalid and called for its withdrawal. 147 The most active United Nations 
opposition to a secessionist movement came in the form of enforcement action against Katangan 
separatists in the Congo in 1962, where the Security Council, "Completely rejecting the claim 
that Katanga is 'a sovereign independent nation'" adopted resolution 169 (1961) "Authoriz[ingJ 
the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of 
force ... ,,148 to end the secession. Beginning on 28 December 1962, ONUC launched Operation 
Grandslam which destroyed and dispersed the Katangan military forces and ended the secession. 
2.3: The End of the Cold War and the United Nations 
Thus through the Cold War paralysis on Great Power control of the United Nations and 
its sheer weight of numbers, the Non-Aligned majority was able to gain control of the General 
Assembly and thereby determine United Nations' policy towards insurgents. However, the end 
of the Cold War was to re-establish Great Power commitment to and control of the United 
Nations' security instruments, and consequently alter the Organisation's policy towards 
insurgents. 
146 The establishment of UN safe havens for Kurds in Northern Iraq under Security Council resolution 688 
(1991) can not in any but the most liberal sense be construed as supporting the establishment of an independent 
Kurdish state. See Julie Flint, "World Turns Its Back As Kurds Die Quietly", Independent on Sunday, 22 August 
1993, p. 12; and David Hirst "Kurds Build Their State in the Shadow of Saddam", The Guardian, Friday 12 
February 1993, p. 11. 
147 Security Council resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983, adopted 13 to 1 with 1 abstention. 
148 Security Council resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961. 
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Prior to the thaw in superpower relations that was to precede the end of the Cold War, 
the United Nations was becoming an increasingly radicalised and irrelevant actor in international 
politics. The era during which the Non-Aligned majority controlled the actions of the United 
Nations through its control of the General Assembly produced Great Power alienation from the 
Organisation as a whole, and consequently the marginalisation of the United Nations as an actor 
in international politics. The anti-Western focus of the Non-Aligned-Soviet bloc alliance meant 
that it was the States of the Western alliance that were flrst to question the value and relevance to 
their national interests of such a hostile body. The confrontationalism and propagandization of 
General Assembly debates meant that often resolutions were debated and voted on not so much 
to authorise consensual action as to embarrass and isolate the Western minority.149 Beginning 
with the tenure of Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Moynihan, the United States 
had begun to adopt the policy of accepting the majority as hostile and vigorously defending its 
interests. ISO The adoption of General Assembly resolutions so patently contrary to United States 
interests began to prompt opposition towards the United Nations among the important, and 
previously internationalist, sectors of the American electorate: industry and big business, Jewish 
groups, the media, human rights activists and labour unions. lSI General Assembly radicalism, 
and Security Council deadlock, consequently began to have the effect of turning against the 
organisation the group of its wealthiest and most powerful members. 
The United States began to oppose and then withdraw its support from an increasing 
number of United Nations institutions and actions which it saw as opposed to United States 
interests. According to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, the United Nations interests were no longer 
compatible with United States interests, 
149 Goodrich, op. cit., 1960, p. 59. 
150 See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter X, and 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1979). 
151 Toby Trister Gati, "The UN Rediscovered: Soviet and American Policy in the United Nations of the 1990s" in 
Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bailer (eds), Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War, (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991), p. 207. 
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· .. the language of the UN was no longer the language of democracy ... self-
determination didn't mean self-determination. It meant aligned with the Soviet 
bloc ... Nationalliberation movements, very especially, meant small groups using 
. I .. h S . bl 152 VIO ence to move countnes mto t e oVlet oc. 
It began by withdrawing from the Soviet bloc-dominated ILO, then from UNESCO, and 
threatened to leave the IAEA over the ban on Israeli participation. It refused to sign the Law of 
the Sea Treaty, did not recognise the ICJ jurisdiction or ruling against it on Nicaragua, and 
declined to participate in the 1987 Special Session on Disarmament and Development. It began 
to attack the Soviet bloc and President Reagan made more speeches to the General Assembly 
than any other President, admonishing the Non-Aligned-Soviet bloc majority for subverting the 
original ideals of the United Nations. 153 Generally, the United States and other members of the 
Western alliance " ... became uncooperative at the UN, seldom supporting multilateral approaches 
to international security, and opposing UN involvement in US spheres of influence, while at the 
same time practicing aggressive unilateralism." 154 
One way in which the alienation of the Western bloc, and particularly the United States, 
manifested itself was in the foml of the witbholding of its financial contributions. Through 
Charter Articles 17 fu'1d 19, the General Assembly controlled the finances and the level of each 
member's contribution. The Non-Aligned majority thereby had the power to make the richest 
States pay for the initiatives - often inimical to the rich States' interests - that it was pursuing 
through the United Nations. The United States began by objecting to certain uses of United 
Nations funds, particularly the channelling of UNDP and other agencies' aid through national 
liberation movements. IS5 These were followed by warnings that if United Nations aid to 
national liberation movements continued, the United States would consider withholding its 
152 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Projecting and Protecting U.S. Interests in the United Nations: U.N. Strategy and Its 
Relations to U.S. Foreign Policy", Vital Speeches o/the Day, Vol. 54, No.8, 1 February 1988, p. 229. 
153 See President Reagan's address to the General Assembly of 26 September 1983, General Assembly Official 
Records, N38/PV.5. 
154 Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Moscow's UN Policy", in Frederic J. Fleron Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann 
and Robbin F. Laird (eds), Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy From Brezhnev to Gorbachev, (New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991), p. 734. 
155 See for example the explanation of the United States vote on General Assembly resolution 33/147 of 20 
December 1978. 
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contributions to the programs assisting those organisations. 156 In 1985 the United States 
Congress passed the Kassebaum Amendment, requiring the administration to reduce United 
States contributions from 25% to 20% of the United Nations budget unless it introduced 
weighted voting on budgetary matters, and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act 
requiring across-the-board cuts in federal spending, including United Nations contributions. The 
Reagan administration enthusiastically complied, leading to a protracted fmancial crisis at the 
United Nations throughout the 1980s. 
Following its anti-insurgent involvements in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and 
Cambodia, the Soviet bloc also became an object of attack in the General Assembly. The Non-
Aligned majority had long been suspicious of Soviet attempts to co-opt it to gain advantages in 
the East-West conflict, particularly during the crisis over Dag Hammarskjold's authority over the 
Congo operation. 157 Furthermore, the growing development crisis in the third world prompted 
the majority increasingly to include the Soviet bloc in the industrialised world in its campaign 
against global wealth distribution. This growing rift became open hostility after the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the Vietnamese embroilment in Cambodia. China exploited this image of the 
Soviet Union, constantly reinforcing the message that the Soviet Union was just another 
imperialistic Great Power along with those in the Western alliance. 158 
While the General Assembly's one-State-one-vote rule empowered the weaker States 
within the United Nations, their use of this majority to propel the Organisation in directions 
inimical to the interests of the more powerful States in the international system had the effect of 
decreasing the relevance and influence of the United Nations on world politics. Great power 
frustration with their loss of control of, and alienation from, the United Nations prompted them 
to activate and use regional organisations and pursue unilateral action to secure their own visions 
156 See for example the United States' explanation of its vote on General Assembly resolution 37/69A of 9 
December 1982. 
157 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). 
158 Rubinstein, op. cit., 1989, p. 328. 
64 
of world order. 159 The withdrawal of great power support deprived the United Nations of its 
plausibility as a security institution: 
... without American support there seemed little strength behind the Charter claim 
of the prohibition of force. With the 'normative retreat' by the United States, ... the 
UN's claim to the role of centralised peace enforcement lost any reality. 160 
Great power opposition to activism of the organisation also influenced the choice of less 
assertive Secretary-Generals after Dag Hammarskjold,161 and their exercise of tighter controls 
over Secretary Generals' authority.162 Great power alienation and withdrawal of support, in tum, 
led to third world frustration with the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, and even greater 
h '1' d h ~ h' . 163 OSt11ty towar t e great powers lor t elr uncooperatlveness. 
A reprieve from marginalisation and eventual fading into obscurity came for the United 
Nations with Mikhail Gorbachev's reorientation of Soviet foreign policy objectives, and the 
peaceful ending of the Cold War. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the indicators 
of the erosion of Soviet global power and prestige were Uflffiistakable: the slow bleeding of its 
military establishment by its counter-insurgency commitments, the signs of the growing 
disparity between Soviet and Western military technology, 164 and the increasing acuteness of 
the stagnation of the Soviet economy. Gorbachev's "new thinking" rejected the previous Soviet 
obsession with military security in favour of a concept of national security that addressed 
political and economic security as well as military. In order to concentrate on restoring the 
159 John Norton Moore, "The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order", in Cyril E. 
Black and Richard A. Falk (eds), The Future of the International Legal Order: Volume III: Conflict Management, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 129. 
160 Stein, op. cit., 1989, p. 312. 
161 Amos Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System, (New York: United Nations, 1989), p. 68. 
162 Nicholas,op. cit., 1975, p. 195. 
163 Luard,op. cit., 1982, p. 366. 
164 Examples of the superiority of Western military technology over Soviet weapons abounded in the early 
1980s: the vulnerability of its helicopter gunships to Stinger and Redeye missiles in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and 
Angola, the unblemished record of the Israeli airforce in the Bekaa Valley, and the panic caused by the Strategic 
Defence Initiative among the Soviet military industrial complex. 
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Soviet Union's economic and political security, Gorbachev sought to relieve the pressure on 
Soviet foreign policy by reducing its areas of conflict with the West, limiting the drain on Soviet 
resources of supporting client regimes, and extricating itself from regional conflicts. 165 
Gorbachev saw a rejuvenated, universally-supported United Nations as an ideal way of 
easing relations with the West and China, extricating the Soviet Union from regional conflicts 
while saving face and preventing concomitant Western advances, and substituting United 
Nations aid for its aid to its third world clients. 166 The General Secretary accordingly published 
a ground-breaking article in Pravda in September 1987 which referred to the United Nations as 
the "main universal security body" and advocating the activation and strengthening of its 
conflict resolution and peacekeeping roles. 167 Beginning with the Forty-third General Assembly 
session in 1988, the Soviet Union began to advance proposals on strengthening the political and 
preventive role of peacekeeping; solving the finance crisis through a variety of funding schemes 
(including the payment of Soviet debts); expanding the United Nations role in mediation and 
conflict resolution; and a revival of the Military Staff Committee to create standing United 
Nations military and naval forces. 168 This change in the Soviet conception of the United Nations 
role was enormous: from having been suspicious of any expansion of power or prestige of the 
organisation, it had become one of the biggest supporters of its reactivation and the 
establishment of a central role for it in international politics. 169 
Another change in Moscow's United Nations policy was its voting alignments. Rather 
than continuing to slavishly vote with the Non-Aligned majority, the Soviet Union began to 
165 Roger E. Kanet and Garth A. Katner, "From New Thinking to the Fragmentation of Consensus in Soviet 
Foreign Policy: The USSR and the Developing World" in Roger E. Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara 1. 
Resler (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 129. 
166 G. R. Berridge, Return to the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991), p. 
31. 
167 Quoted in Alan James, "The United Nations", in David Armstrong and Eric Goldstein (eds) The End o/the 
Cold War, (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 184. 
168 Weiss and Kessler, op. cit., 1991, pp. 730-1. 
169 A tangible indicator of the importance of a strong United Nations to Soviet objectives was Gorbachev's 
promotion of Vladimir Petrovsky, the Head of the Department of International Organisations in the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry since 1979, to the post of Deputy Foreign Minister. See Berridge, op. cit., 1991, p. 26-7. 
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identify itself more with the concerns of the industrialised States, and among these, adopting a 
role as a leader and prophet of multilateralism. 17o Gorbachev's version of multilateralism 
emphasised an interdependent global conception of security: 
Democratisation also means the inclusion of all States in the solution of the most 
important problems of our time. The time has passed when a handful of great 
powers decided for the whole world ... without heeding the multivoiced world ... 
171 
For Soviet foreign policy, regional conflicts in the third world no longer represented 
opportunities for encircling the capitalist world, but rather as threats to global stability and 
. 172 prospenty. 
The change in Soviet policy towards the United Nations coincided with and prompted a 
thaw in the Western alliance towards the United Nations. The States of the European 
Community had begun to extend their belief in multilateralism and interdependence into 
growing support of the United Nations. 173 The Europeans had begun to put pressure on the 
United States to resume cooperating at the United Nations: they were not prepared to make up 
defaulted United States payments, and were frustrated and anxious over its unilateral actions, 
such as the bombing of Tripoli. Within the United States as well, internationalist pressures had 
begun to mount: the uncooperative, belligerent image was beginning to damage the United 
States' global interests and to isolate it diplomatically. It had also achieved many of the 
objectives of its dissension policy at the United Nations; for example in the areas of budget 
reform and weighted voting on financial matters. 174 Policy-makers realised that certain 
objectives could not be as easily secured outside of the United Nations. The conspicuous failure 
170 Weiss and Kessler, op. cit., 1991, p. 733-4. 
171 Mikhail Gorbachev, "Foreign Relations - U.S.S.R.: The Democratization of World Politics", Vital Speeches of 
the Day, Vol. 54, No. 14, 1 May 1988, p. 420. 
172 Berridge,op. cit., 1991, p. 30. 
173 Rosemary Foot, "The European Community's Voting Behaviour At the United Nations General Assembly", 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 17, No.4, June 1979, pp. 351-2. 
174 The main reforms were included in General Assembly resolution 41/213 of 19 December 1986. 
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of the MNF II peacekeeping force in Lebanon provided perhaps the best example of the benefits 
of intervention through the United Nations. 175 
The accession of George Bush, a former United Nations permanent representative, to the 
Presidency, and his coordination and legitimation of the extraordinary success of the Gulf War 
through the United Nations,176 led to the reorientation of United States foreign policy around 
Bush's vision ofa "new world order": 
... a partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War; a partnership based on 
consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international 
and regional organisations; a partnership united by principle and the rule of law 
and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment; a 
partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase 
d d 177 peace an re uce arms. 
The decline of the influence of the Cold War on action within the United Nations had an effect 
additional to the renewed cooperation of the Great Powers: other coalitions of the Cold War 
began to break up as well. The end of the Cold War had this effect particularly on the Non-
Aligned majority, which with its decline in cohesion, also lost its more dogmatic, radical 
ideology.178 The Non-Aligned Movement's June 1994 summit in Cairo witnessed the decline of 
anti-colonialism as a super-issue and the mobilisation of concern over development issues. 179 
The end of the Cold War and the changes it wrought to the international system led most 
States to re-evaluate the United Nations as a mechanism through which to advance their security 
175 Berridge, op. cit., 1991, p. 35. 
176 See Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), Part Two for an account of 
the Bush administration's use of the United Nations to mobilise and piece together an international force for 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and to gain international legitimacy for action against Iraq. 
177 George Bush, "Aggression in the Gulf: A Partnership of Nations", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 57, No.1, 
15 October 1990, p. 3. 
178 Sir Brian Urquhart, "Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and the Future", The John W Holmes Memorial Lecture, 
1989, (Ontario: York University, 1989), p. 31. 
179 Kim Murphy, "Non-Aligned Reshuffle Their Goals in World Where East Meets West", The Guardian, 1 June 
1994, p. 11. 
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interests. On one level, having to confront a world that had lost its familiar structures, States 
naturally gravitated towards consultation and cooperation through the only international 
organisation with almost universal membership, and on whose diplomatic fora they had relied 
on during the most compelling crises of the Cold War. On a more practical level, States based 
their renewed use of the United Nations on a variety of practical considerations based on their 
capabilities, liabilities, and the nature of security concerns in the post-Cold War world. The 
demise of the threat of a global, Great Power war, possibly involving nuclear weapons, being 
provoked by ideological and geopolitical competition, realigned States' security priorities. In the 
absence of definite security threats, areas of chronic instability rose to prominence among the 
security concerns of States. This change in focus reoriented the international community's, and 
ultimately the United Nations', position towards insurgent movements. Sub-State belligerents 
began to be selected for attention by the United Nations Member-States not on the basis of their 
usefulness in an ideological struggle, but when States saw them as problems to be eliminated or 
contained. This new perception of insurgent movements, along with Member-States' new 
motivations for acting through the United Nations, has wrought a reorientation of the 
Organisation's approach to these groups. 
After the Gulf War, the majority of security concerns that have preoccupied the United 
Nations have been civil wars. Insurgents have come to be perceived by United Nations Member-
States as linked with these disturbances to international peace. Civil wars pose almost no direct 
threat to the security of the wider international community. Insurgent movements therefore lack 
the threat to compel a major response from States other than those they are at war with. For a 
number of reasons, however, the international community sees a need to address certain civil 
wars, and to deal with their insurgent movements on the occasion that they adversely affect the 
interests of States, particularly the Great Powers. 
A predominant motivation for the desire to terminate non-threatening civil wars is when 
they endanger either the closer cooperation or the maximisation of a mutual-benefit relationship 
among States. This concern has been paramount in the early aftermath of the Cold War. During 
the Cold War, a number of civil wars in the developing world had been sponsored by the 
opposing blocs as a method of waging proxy war. As the Great Powers developed a new 
69 
commitment to international cooperation, a number of regional and civil wars continued, whose 
perpetuation posed a obstacle to closer and more beneficial interaction. They saw the existence 
of fonnerly sponsored insurgencies in regions of interest as poisoning their increasingly cordial 
relations. Examples of such conflicts - Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, EI Salvador, Nicaragua 
and Namibia - littered the international landscape after the Cold War. It was thus in the interest 
of States affected by civil wars in this way to expend some effort on defusing and terminating 
them. In the eyes of a fickle international community, insurgent movements overnight came to 
be seen not as opportunities but as embarrassments. 
A more nebulous motivation is the concern to preserve the structure and stability of the 
international system from challenges to its units and organisation. On a basic level, insurgent 
movements threaten the cohesion and viability of the States that they are challenging. States 
committed to the preservation of the international status quo, therefore, see them as disturbances 
to their underlying concern to "preserve the nation-state as the very foundation of international 
life."lso The fact that the basis of most new civil wars has been ethnic chauvinism, particularly 
in fonnerly totalitarian States of central and eastern Europe, indirectly threatens most members 
of the international community. In a world in which there are only a handful of mono-ethnic 
States, concerns have been raised about the demonstration effect of ethnic conflict in other 
regions. The emotive power of inter-ethnic conflict further threatens to polarise third party States 
into supporting opposite sides of the conflict. The genocidal strategies of "ethnic cleansing" 
often pursued by ethnic nationalists stimulate international refugee flows on purpose. In an 
increasingly overcrowded world, these massive displacements of humanity can pose very real 
threats to those States and regions that grant them asylum. ISI Those insurgent movements that 
pose these sorts of threats also attract the attention of the international community. 
Civil wars and their insurgent movements pose the danger of detonating wider conflicts 
by inviting opportunistic interventions as well. Compounding the dangers posed by the 
180 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "UN Multilateralism: A Cure for Ugly New Nationalisms", International Herald 
Tribune, 22 August 1993, p. 6. 
181 Apart from the strain they place on a state's resources and infrastructure, refugees can contain criminal 
elements and belligerents determined to use contiguous refugee camps as bases from which to continue the struggle. 
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profusion of civil conflicts as possible sparks for international conflicts is the multipolar nature 
of the post-Cold War world, deprived of the bipolar superpower competition which acted to 
restrain regional conflicts during the Cold War. Mearsheimer predicts that through unrestrained 
competitive intervention, these great powers will magnify the threat of civil wars to international 
security: 
It is likely that the great powers that dominate the new multipolar world will 
intervene in the third world ... [their] power projection capabilities ... will not reach 
great power levels but that limit in reach will be compensated for by the increase 
in the number of major powers will be active in the third world. 182 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided the international community with a sobering example of 
the new pattern of threat to international security: the attempt of middle powers to fill regional 
power vacuums; aggression without warning and the attempt to hide behind a fait accompli; the 
accessibility of sophisticated military technology; the use of external adventurism by internally 
unstable regimes; and the vulnerability of resource centres to expansionist middle powers.183 
The retreat of global superpower involvement in containing regional conflicts has left the 
international community with a different security problem: the maintenance of stability in a 
multipolar world which contains a profusion of power vacuums and civil wars. President Bush 
was one of the first to realise this threat "to the entire world's vision of our future. It threatens to 
tum the dream of a new international order into a grim nightmare of anarchy in which the law of 
the jungle supplants the law of nations." 184 For the international community, national security is 
no longer able to be protected so easily by preparing against a small number of conceivable 
threats; the contemporary threats to security are more numerous, if less compelling, and often 
unable to be foreseen. Status quo States concerned with reorienting their security apparatuses 
have begun to link "vertical" security, security within States, to "horizontal" security, security 
182 John J. Mearshiemer, "Disorder Restored", in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (eds), Rethinking 
America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), p. 
234. 
183 Gaddis, op. cit., 1992, pp. 205-6. 
184 George Bush, "Aggression in the Gulf', Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 57, No.1, 15 October 1990, p. 4. 
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between States. 18S States which are undergoing civil wars are regarded as "weak States", whose 
domestic instability threatens to diffuse into the international system: "The present international 
system contains more States on the weak than on the strong end of the spectrum, and thus has a 
massive element of international insecurity built into itself.,,186 In the new era, in which States 
must be protected as much from internal attack as from external aggression, all insurgent 
movements can potentially be seen as dangers that need to be dealt with. 
Finally, States can be motivated to intervene in civil wars by the pressure applied to their 
leaders by domestic public opinion. The increasing brutality of civil wars has been matched by 
the international media's growing efficiency at graphically reporting the gruesome details. Thus, 
although human suffering and genocide in civil wars pose some threats to international security, 
such as triggering refugee flows and possible punitive State interventions on behalf of the 
persecuted, it is predominantly through public opinion that human rights abuses stimulate States' 
actions: "[p ]rosperous, peaceful societies cannot ignore the horrors of hunger and genocide ... nor 
can they accept the relaxed cynicism of diplomats and historians, for whom these horrors are 
seen as inevitable ... ,,187 The media conveys the atrocities of mass murder, ethnic cleansing and 
rape in selected civil wars to Western publics with a horrifying immediacy that is calculated to 
command attention. The communications revolution, by stimulating concern and revulsion 
among Western electorates, thereby applies pressure on Western policy makers to act to restore 
and preserve human rights within these civil wars. Humanitarian demands on foreign policy-
makers can thus cause States to concentrate their attentions on insurgent movements whose wars 
have stimulated such altruistic demands among their domestic electorates. 
The lengthening post-Cold War record of United Nations humanitarian intervention 
demonstrates the prevalence of this factor as a stimulus to States' altruistic responses through the 
185 Fred Halliday, "'The Sixth Great Power': On the Study of Revolution and International Relations", Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 16, No.3, Summer 1990, p. 219. 
186 Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era, (2nd ed), (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 155. 
187 Pierre Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order", Survival, Vol. 35, 
No.2, Summer 1993, p. 60. 
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Organisation. 188 This motivation for United Nations intervention has been carefully fostered by 
the leaders of its principal Member-States as a method of sustaining public support for 
maintaining force levels and preserving a global role after the decline of tangible Cold War 
threats to national security: "Our humanitarian actions nurture the ... public's support for our 
engagement abroad.,,189 Recent Security Council resolutions, and significantly resolutions 688 
(1991) on Iraq, 794 (1992) on Somalia, and 749 (1992) on Bosnia, have begun to establish the 
doctrine that massive deprivations of human rights in civil war situations that threaten 
international peace and security are a legitimate concern of the United Nations. Concern with 
promoting the humanitarian regime led the Security Council in June and August 1992 to 
authorise UNPROFOR II to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid under the enforcement 
provisions of Chapter VII.190 
However, constraints exists on the unlimited interventions in support of human rights, 
mainly in the form of opposition from the developing world. As ex-colonial States jealous of 
their sovereignty, many view assertive multilateral interventions in support of a normative vision 
of order developed by the West as showing disturbing aspects of neo-imperialism. China, 
recently admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement, has emerged as a leading voice of dissent 
against conceptions of multilateral intervention to shape a "new world order". At the Security 
Council Heads of State Summit, Chinese premier Li Peng voiced Chinese opposition to the 
proposals advanced for United Nations activism, warning that China will consistently oppose all 
external interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign States "using human rights as an 
excuse.,,191 Within and outside of the United Nations, third world concern has been voiced over 
the possibility of future imperialistic interventions by the United Nations or the great powers 
188 Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis", International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 
3, Summer 1986, pp. 605-7. 
189 Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 60, No.1, 15 October 
1993,p.17. 
190 Security Council resolutions 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992 and 770 (1992) authorised the use of "all means 
necessary" to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies in Bosnia. 
191 Quoted in Tad Daley, "Can the UN Stretch to Fit Its Future?", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 48, No. 
3, April 1992, p. 42. 
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being justified by the need to protect human rightS. 192 Another constraint exists in the perils 
confronted by humanitarian missions, which often enter conflict environments whose volatility 
takes a heavy toll on the intervening force. Public altruism has been demonstrated to evaporate 
quickly in the face of casualties, making the potential political costs of such interventions a 
rful ' th . unl' . d 193 powe restramt on err mute use. 
These stimuli of international attention on civil wars, by their non-compelling nature, 
have caused the affected Member-State also respond repeatedly to these situations through the 
United Nations. States affected by insurgent movements and their civil wars have 
overwhelmingly addressed them through the mechanisms of the United Nations and other 
multilateral bodies, not because of a new-found commitment to world government, but because 
the United Nations represented the most convenient and efficient response to these challenges 
among the range of foreign policy options open to them. The reasons for States' choice of 
multilateral responses to security concerns over unilateral responses are two-fold: to retain 
international legitimacy, and to share the costs and liabilities of interventions in civil wars. The 
success of the Western and Middle Eastern States in using the United Nations to legitimate and 
share the expenses of the Gulf War, which secured their own interests, in the early aftermath of 
the Cold War, acted on a wide range of foreign policy establishments as a timely lesson on the 
advantages ofmultilateralism in the post-Cold War era. 
States interact in a system which has experienced the extraordinary growth and 
acceptance of certain principles of international order and legality over the last fifty years. The 
advance of these principles of State behaviour can justifiably be seen as the growth of a regime: 
192 Peter J. Fromuth, "The Making of a Security Community: The United Nations After the Cold War", Journal 
a/International Affairs, Vol. 46, No.2, Winter 1993, pp. 359-360. 
193 The most dramatic evaporation of altruistic domestic support for a humanitarian mission occurred in the 
United States after the casualties in the Bakhara Market in October 1993. The political costs of that operation are 
still being felt within the United States and the United Nations. 
74 
Principles may change for a number of reasons, ... because of the emergence of 
new demands and of different expectations of behaviour. If these demands and 
expectations prevail and agreement on new principles can be achieved, the 
regime "grows".194 
Among the principles that command almost universal lip-service are those of sovereign 
inviolability and the illegitimacy of intervening in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. 195 
These principles have become even more sacred in the wake of decolonisation, and make the 
interventions of status quo States in civil wars to further their own interests questionable, and 
doubly so for Western Great Powers. l96 If such actions are sanctioned by the international 
community through the United Nations, the motive for intervening is justified in terms of the 
global good. If the intervention is implemented by an Organisation primarily dedicated to 
international peace and security using broadly multilateral forces from non-Western States as 
well, the form of the intervention is legitimised in terms of its non-partisan nature. If the 
objectives of the intervention are agreed upon by an international forum, the interests of the 
initiative are internationally endorsed in terms of the most appropriate resolution. And finally, if 
the conduct of the operation is accountable to the United Nations, the method of intervention is 
the responsibility of all. Multilateral response through the United Nations is thus a method for 
States to legitimate interventions into civil wars to promote their interests. 
Coordinating their responses to the civil wars that affect them also allows States to 
spread the costs of launching the initiative, while still deriving the same benefits of terminating 
or containing the conflict as they would through a unilateral intervention in which they bore all 
expenses. Among governments forced to cut defence and foreign policy expenditures by publics 
demanding to see the domestic benefits of the "peace dividend" of the end of the Cold War, an 
194 Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981 ", 
International Organization, Vol. 37, No.2, Spring 1983, p. 217. 
195 These principles by no means command universal obedience; overt and covert interference in the domestic 
politics of other states remains a common feature of the international system, especially with the growth of 
intelligence communities in nearly all states. Yet a measure of the growth of this regime is the growing proportion 
of covert interventions and the need for states to justify overt interventions in terms other than the national interest. 
196 A good example of these concerns is the rumblings of discontent in Africa on the eve of the Unified Task 
Force's intervention into Somalia, despite its somewhat multilateral form. These misgivings among African states 
were subdued by the essentially altruistic, humanitarian intent ofUNITAF. 
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opportunity is irresistible to share the cost of intervening with other States, and to "hide" the 
expenses of the initiative among already existing contributions and commitments to the United 
Nations. It is not only material costs that can be defrayed by the United Nations, however. 
Political costs of intervention in civil wars, especially if this involves the military, can also be 
minimised multilaterally. Luttwak argues that changes in the demographic character of modem, 
postindustrial societies which result in families producing less children, "all of whom are 
expected to survive, and each of whom represents a larger share of the family's emotional 
economy" exponentially increases the political costs of casualties to the governments that 
dispatch the operation, and act as a powerful constraint on States' action. 197 
The political costs of intervention, particularly using the military, are more easily borne 
if they are justified as part of a peacekeeping mission and fulfilment of the country's obligations 
to international peace and security. United Nations peacekeepers are calculated to attract less 
casualties than other forms of intervention. 198 These multilateral missions have also been used 
by governments to defend their military establishments against demands for even greater cut-
backs. Acting through the United Nations also defrays political costs by providing States with a 
convenient scapegoat to blame if the intervention runs into trouble or fails. Thus, for States 
unwilling to pay dearly to secure their interests by addressing the less compelling concerns 
represented by civil wars and their belligerents, coordinating their actions through the United 
Nations, as a way of making the action legitimate and cost-effective, has emerged as an 
accessible solution. However, not all such interventions are directed by the affected States 
through the United Nations. As recent American intervention in Haiti demonstrated, other 
concerns may override the desire to legitimate action and defray costs to the same extent through 
the United Nations, and mandate a more unilateral response to certain non-compelling concerns. 
The new willingness, particularly by the Great Powers, to advance more of their security 
interests through the United Nations is attested to by the greater amount of business addressed 
197 Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.4, July/August 1994, pp. 
23-8. 
198 A sobering lesson of this fact is the disparity between the fatalities borne by the UNIFIL and the MNF II 
operations in Lebanon, the latter being driven out by a bomb attack on a United States marine base in Beirut in 
1983, which killed 243 peacekeepers. 
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by the Security Council, the increase in the number of security initiatives, especially 
peacekeeping operations, dispatched by the United Nations, and the increased efficiency with 
which especially the Security Council functions. The majority of security concerns addressed by 
the United Nations after the Cold War have been dealt with through the Security Council, 
reflecting not only the importance of its Great Power Permanent Five in determining its security 
responses, but also the Permanent Five's new willingness to utilise the Security Council and the 
United Nations. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States is currently aware of the 
need to act multilaterally for several reasons. As the Gulf War demonstrated, the United Nations 
lends legitimacy and deflects criticism from United States' action to protect its national interests. 
As the State to which others in trouble turn, the United States is aware that action through an 
international organisation will "share among nations the costs and effort of pursuing peace." 199 
The initial post-Cold War American willingness to commit itself to supporting the United 
Nations has cooled, after a unilateralist, conservative reaction to a number of peacekeeping 
failures has advocated a decreased commitment and reliance on the United Nations.2oo The 
United States does, however, continue to play an active role in the Security Council and the 
United Nations. 
For the Russian Federation, retaining the Soviet Union's permanent seat,201 the United 
Nations offers an opportunity to remain engaged in global affairs while preserving resources, 
attention and effort for internal regeneration and asserting its interests in "the near abroad" ?02 
199 Bill Clinton, "Reforming the United Nations: The United States Intends to Remain Engaged and Lead", 
Speech delivered to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 27 September 1993, Vital Speeches 
of the Day, Vol. 60, No.1, 15 October 1993, p. 12. 
200 Specifically the "Peace Powers Act", which advocates reducing by one-third the United States fmancial 
contributions to the United Nations, the prohibition of placing American troops under foreign command, requiring 
Congressional approval for the dispatch of American troops on peacekeeping missions, and the ability to defray the 
costs of unilateral actions in support of United Nations actions against the American fmancial contribution to the 
Organisation. 
201 Strictly speaking, the succession of the Soviet Union by the Russian Federation to the Security Council is an 
unauthorised and illegitimate Charter amendment; the Soviet Union's position as a permanent member of the 
Security Council is explicitly in Article 23. Such amendments, according to Article 108, need to be voted through 
by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of all United Nations members, including all of 
the permanent members of the Security Council. 
202 Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No.2, Spring 1992, p. 11. 
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So too with the other members of the Security Council. France and the United Kingdom, 
conscious of their shrinking global reach and increasingly preoccupied with European 
integration, advocate action through a reinvigorated United Nations as a way of telescoping their 
influence on global affairs. China, remains on the periphery, criticised for its human rights 
record, and suspicious of the Security Council as a "Great Power club" ?03 Yet its desire to 
maintain its influence in the newly activist Security Council, as the voice of the developing 
world, and as a restraint on neo-imperialist tendencies, is demonstrated by its growing 
commitment to peacekeeping, from which it had formerly stood aloof, its payment of 
accumulated and current peacekeeping contributions, its joining of the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations, and its dispatch of Chinese troops on peacekeeping missions such as 
UNTAC in Cambodia?04 Neither have the non-permanent members been able to impede the 
Council's renewed utilisation, either because they are supportive of its policies, or unable to 
effectively oppose them. Previously able to wield a "sixth veto" by denying the nine affirmative 
votes necessary to pass a Security Council resolution through its members holding seven non-
permanent seats,205 the Non-Aligned Movement has been both unable and unwilling to mobilise 
a cohesive bloc against the wishes of the majority in the Security Council. 
After the Cold War, the Security Council has become the central instrument in the 
United Nations for the preservation of international security as its founders intended. No longer 
a forum for confrontation and propaganda, the Security Council is treated by its members as a 
mechanism to be used to advance their common security interest in global stability. Many of the 
procedures of co-operation, such as the consensus procedures and periodic meetings, were 
developed in the latter stages of the Cold War, as the Security Council began to mature out of 
what Hiscocks aptly terms its "adolescence" ?06 Most prominent in this process has been the 
203 Henry A. Kissinger, "Balance of Power Sustained" in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, Rethinking 
America's Security: beyond Cold War to New World Order, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992), p. 
239. 
204 James,op. cit., 1990, p. 185. 
205 Sir Crispin Tickell, "The Role of the Security Council in World Affairs", Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, Vol. 18, No.3, Winter 1988, p. 308. 
206 Hiscocks, op. cit., 1973, pp. 103-110. 
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willingness of the Permanent Five to assume their role as the cooperative guarantors of 
international security. The majority of the Security Council's business is now pre-negotiated in 
informal, closed session consultations between the Permanent Five. These meetings, where 
Security Council policy is hammered out, are not preceded by the circulation of an agenda, no 
records of the consultations are kept, no statement is issued at their conclusion, and they escape 
mention in the Secretariat's voluminous records.207 Public Security Council sessions have 
become little more than a forum for committing to the formality of a vote resolutions that in 
their provisions and text have been negotiated before hand to secure consensus or at the very 
least non-opposition and abstention among Security Council members. This new efficiency 
reflects the new business-like attitude of the Great Powers, which have begun to see the United 
Nations as an effective foreign policy tool, to be used soberly. 
The decline of bloc politics in the international system has been reflected inside the 
Security Council by a new flexibility of policy options and a narrower conception of the national 
interest: 
There is an element of recognition that some people have more at stake in a place 
than others ... there is a kind of acceptance that you shouldn't barge around in 
1 h h ., .. . 1 d 208 paces were t ere Isn t a major mterest mvo ve . 
Rather than viewing regional conflicts and civil wars as opportunities for the advancement of 
national security at the expense of the rival system, the Permanent Members conceive of their 
national security as being secured by ensuring general global stability through the United 
Nations among other mechanisms: 
... the national interest in practically all these issues for any country .. .is very 
modest. .. But there is a collective interest which is the United Nations that is what 
the Charter lays down for the Security Courlcil and within the Security Council it 
gives certain rather clear responsibilities to the five permanent members simply 
because of their continuance, because of the fact that they're always there.209 
207 Berridge,op. cit., 1991, p. 5. 
208 Interview with Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom Permanent Representative To The United Nations, New 
York City, 29 March 1994. 
209 ibid. 
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Pragmatism has thus replaced ideology as the determinant of policy within the post-Cold War 
Security Council. 
The end of the Cold War has also removed the constraints on the Secretary-General's 
range of action. The United Nations' founders conceived the role of the Secretary-General as a 
major and dynamic international diplomat, wielding influence and prestige commensurate with 
the rank of the foremost civil servant of a vigorous international security institution, and able to 
take personal initiatives towards solving international disputes?lO The first two Secretary-
Generals, Lie and Hammarskjold, were activists, both incurring the wrath of various of the 
permanent members over different Cold War incidents.2l1 Soviet non-cooperation with 
Hammarskjold during the 1960 Congo operation led to a crisis in the office of the Secretary-
General. The Secretary-Generals that succeeded Hammarskjold, Thant, Waldheim and Perez de 
Cuellar, all adopted a less assertive role, and consequently the stature and authority of the office 
declined. The effect of the end of the Cold War on the reactivation of the office of the Secretary-
General is most obvious by observing the actions of the previously-quiescent Perez de Cuellar 
after 1987. The prominent role played by the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives 
in the resolution of the conflicts in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and EI Salvador displayed an 
assertiveness and initiative inconceivable during the earlier Cold War years. The selection of the 
outspoken Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the sixth Secretary-General further demonstrates the 
proactive role envisaged for the Secretary-General by the post-Cold War United Nations?12 The 
enhanced role of the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives has been used 
extensively by the Organisation in its interactions with insurgent movements. 
210 Luard,op. cit., 1982, p. 343. 
211 Lie angered the United States and the Western alliance over his advocacy of awarding the Security Council 
seat to Communist China and then alienated the Soviet Union over his support for the United Nations' role in Korea; 
Hammarskjold fIrst offended France and the United Kingdom over the Suez crisis, and then the Soviet Union over 
the Congo. 
212 For assessments of the forceful and often abrasive diplomatic style of Boutros-Ghali, see Michael S. Serrill, 
"Under Fire", Time, 18 January 1993, pp. 14-6, James Bone, "Abrasive Secretary-General Attempts Charm 
Offensive", The Times, Saturday 2 January 1993, p. 10, and Elaine Sciolino and Paul Lewis, "UN's Chief Turns Out 
to be US's Chief Antagonist", International Herald Tribune, Monday, 18 October 1993, p. 5. 
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2.4: United Nations-Insurgent Interactions and International Law 
To complete this examination of the new United Nations policy towards insurgents, it is 
necessary to survey the status of United Nations interventionism in international law. 
International law exists as a set of authoritative parameters governing the transactions of States 
in international relations. It claims jurisdiction over the relations between the Member-States of 
the United Nations,213 over States' relations with the insurgents and incumbents in civil wars, 
and over the behaviour of the combatants in civil wars. This brief survey examines the nature of 
international law, before investigating the state of the law governing external relations with 
belligerents in internal wars, and the status of legal obligations on contemporary insurgent 
movements. 
International law is an horizontal legal system between formally equal participants in the 
international system which implement norms of self-help and restraint. Consequently, it forms a 
loose corpus of prescriptive norms, rules, and principles which do not form a coherent system, 
although some rules are recognised as taking precedence over others?14 The international law 
between formally equal autonomous units derives from considerations of necessity and 
consent.215 States utilise international law for a variety of purposes in their relations with each 
other: as a parameter for State behaviour in competitive and conflictual interactions/16 as a 
rhetorical justification for their own actions or to censure other States' behaviour,217 and for the 
moderation of conflict by shifting it from the highly-charged political to the more objective legal 
plane. When applied to the intervention of outside bodies in civil wars, and the conduct of the 
participants in those wars, international law attempts to regulate behaviour to within a 
213 Mainly through the ratification of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and the subsequent resolutions 
adopted by the Organisation. 
214 Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, (London: Martin Robertson, 1970), p. 20. 
215 Hans 1. Morgenthau, Politi~s Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace, (4th ed) (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 266·7. 
216 William D. Coplin, The Functions of International Law: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in 
the Contemporary World, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 17·25. 
217 James Fawcett, Law and Power in International Relations, (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), p. 118. 
81 
recognised and accepted set of standards and norms, for reasons of order, stability, and 
principles of humanity. 
In traditional international law, the intervention of outside actors in civil wars was 
heavily regulated by considerations of sovereignty. The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the 
regulation of behaviour in wars imposed a number of preconditions that needed to be satisfied 
before a civil war qualified as a war in international law, while earlier conventions regulated the 
behaviour of outside States towards the combatants according to their recognition of the status of 
the belligerents?IS Depending on the recognising States' perception of the success of the 
insurgency, the insurgents could be classified on a scale between rebellion and belligerency, 
with the highest level of recognition implying acknowledgment of the insurgents' status as 
contestants for power, rather than merely as lawbreakers?19 The recognition of belligerency 
carried an obligation of neutrality for external States?20 Such formal recognition, however, has 
rarely been accorded since the Second World War.221 The predominant form of recognition 
during the Cold War, as we have seen, was a moral endorsement by sympathetic States and 
international organisations which conferred a form of "government in exile" status to national 
liberation movements fighting alien or racist regimes?22 In this way, recognition became a form 
of partisan intervention that could be used to help or hinder insurgents,223 and wils actively 
sought by insurgents as a source of support, bases, and legitimacy?24 These conventions on 
218 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws 0/ War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 
159-326. 
219 Rosalyn Higgins, "Internal War and International Law", in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk (eds), The 
Future o/the International Legal Order, Volume III Conflict Management, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1971), p. 88. 
220 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), p. 
48. 
221 Helmut Freudenschuss, "Legal and Political Aspects of the Recognition of National Liberation Movements", 
Millenium, Vol. 11, No.2, Summer 1982, p. 117. 
222 Higgins, "Internal War and International Law", op. cit., 1971, p. 104. 
223 Richard A. Falk, "Introduction", in Richard A. Falk (ed), The International Law o/Civil War, (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 14. 
224 George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in James N. Rosenau (ed), International 
Aspects o/Civil Strife, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 17. 
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intervention have changed in response to the changes in international politics brought by the end 
of the Cold War. 
A corollary of the fact that international law is based on, and derives its authority from, 
trends in the practice of interstate relations,225 is that the changes in interstate relations caused 
by the end of the Cold War have wrought parallel changes in international law. Changes in the 
behaviour of States, particularly the great powers, are quasi-legislative, and harden into accepted 
doctrine when cited as precedent for repeated actions of these types?26 So the post-Cold War 
United Nations activism, itself based on new patterns of accord and cooperation among its 
Member-States has caused changes in the international law of intervention in civil conflicts. In 
this way, usage and precedent of new justifications for intervention by the political organs of the 
United Nations are developing into legal rules which are or will be accepted as legally binding 
and legitimate by the majority of members of the Organisation?27 The new collegiality and 
secrecy of the Security Council has resulted in less discussion of the legal bases of United 
Nations action, and the need for prompt action has often overridden the extensive consideration 
of legal and jurisdictional issues.228 However, it is through its actions, and its consistent 
reference to the same motivations and justifications for action that, "". the UN is unfolding itself 
before our eyes, and is now emerging as a true judge, setting forth the law and endeavouring to 
fi . ,,229 en orce It... 
The growing perception among the international community that internal wars represent 
threats to international peace and security, and are thus legitimate subjects of international 
225 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 
143. 
226 R. 1. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 
375-6. 
227 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 5. 
228 N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 27, 42-3. 
229 Francois Mitterand, "The Rule of Law", speech delivered to the 45th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, 24 September 1990, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 57, No. 1,15 October 1990, p. 5. 
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concern,230 have begun to restrict considerations of sovereignty and impulses towards moral 
endorsements of insurgent movements as alternative govemments?31 The requirement of 
safeguarding international order has thus overridden other conventions of international law 
regarding recognition in civil wars. However, some States continue to aid and abet insurgent 
movements out of sympathy and for strategic reasons, in defiance of international convention. 
Nevertheless, after the Cold War, a different set of international preferences govern recognition 
and intervention by the United Nations organisation in civil wars: considerations of regional 
stability, humanitarian concerns, and the desire to prevent the fragmentation of States. 232 
The most significant of these changes that the new United Nations interventionism is 
causing to international law is through its reinterpretation of its own Charter's Article 2(7) which 
States: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
This Article is the most explicit limitation on the reach of United Nations action and jurisdiction 
contained in the Charter, intended as a safeguard against the encroachment of the Organisation 
on the sovereignty of its Member-States. By definition, United Nations involvement in a civil 
war constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of a State and thus contravenes Article 2(7). 
However, the United Nations has the ability to change international law through interpreting and 
reinterpreting its own Charter,233 and its actions after the Cold War have constituted a 
reinterpretation of Article 2(7). 
230 Evan Luard, "Civil Conflicts in Modem International Relations", in Evan Luard (ed), The International 
Regulation o/Civil Wars, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), p. 19. 
231 Richard A. Faik, "Janus Tonnented: The International Law of Internal War", in Rosenau (ed), op. cit., 1964, 
p.208. 
232 Rosalyn Higgins, "International Law and Civil Conflict", in Luard, op. cit., 1972, pp. 174-5. 
233 H" . 1963 4 Iggms,op. cIt., ,pp. -5. 
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Because Article 2(7) is the greatest Charter restriction on United Nations competence, its 
interpretation plays a major part in determining the expansiveness or narrowness of the 
Organisation's mandate for maintaining international peace and security. During the Cold War 
when the Great Powers were suspicious of the United Nations and concerned to limit its 
mandate in their proxy wars, the Article was accorded a more expansive interpretation. 
However, the end of the Cold War and the interest of the international community in stabilising, 
eliminating and resolving civil conflicts through multilateral institutions has necessitated a more 
restrictive reinterpretation of Article 2(7). The Article has been mainly redefined through the 
principle of domestic jurisdiction which is subjective and contains a high degree of 
interpretability.234 As when during the Cold War the Security Council veto determined the 
permissibility of United Nations intervention,235 so after the Cold War, the lack of vet os and the 
presence of Security Council solidarity has caused the main restrictions to the application of 
domestic jurisdiction. The extent to which the inviolability of the domestic jurisdiction of States 
has been restricted by recent Security Council practice can be seen by the weapons of mass 
destruction plank of resolution 687(1991) which permits the international community to 
permanently monitor the Iraqi military-industrial complex in the interests of the safety of the 
international community, and resolution 748(1992) imposing an embargo on Libya in order to 
compel it to hand over two of its citizens for trial on charges of terrorism?36 
The main determinant of the activation of United Nations intervention in domestic 
conflicts is the identification that therein exists a threat to international peace and security. 
Article 39 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to "determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and ... to maintain and restore 
international peace and security." Recent practice has established the precedent that once a civil 
war is found to threaten international peace and security under Article 39, it becomes a matter of 
international concern and no longer lies within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.237 
234 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, (2nd 
ed), (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1949), pp. 113-4. 
235 ibid, p. 106. 
236 Fromuth,op. cit., 1993, pp. 354-5. 
237 White,op. cit., 1993, p. 58. 
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Consequently, United Nations intervention in such a situation to "maintain and restore 
international peace and security" is not prohibited under Article 2(7). A survey of post-Cold War 
Security Council resolutions reveals that most that initialise United Nations involvement in civil 
war situations contain within their preambles a paragraph noting the threat to international 
security represented by the conflict.238 This practice has led to the gradual acceptance in the 
corpus of international law that civil wars are international wars, even if they are not interstate 
239 
wars. 
The other mechanism used to activate United Nations involvement in civil wars without 
falling foul of Article 2(7) is that the parties invite the United Nations to help them resolve the 
conflict. This has also become a common precursor for United Nations intervention. Most often 
the invitation occurs in the form of a peace accord signed by the belligerents, the provisions of 
which include the use of the United Nations to monitor the implementation of the agreement. 
Security Council resolutions initialising involvement on these grounds contain reference to the 
relevant peace agreement, and the Security Council's endorsement and support for the peace 
process?40 Thus either a determination of a threat to international peace and security or an 
invitation implied in a peace agreement for the United Nations to oversee its implementation are 
the two methods used by the United Nations to legally intervene to resolve civil wars in the post-
Cold War world. 
International law also confers rights and imposes obligations on the belligerents in civil 
wars. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions conferred, once certain prerequisites had been 
satisfied, legal combatant status on sub-State belligerents, and thereby extended to them the 
protection of the laws of international war, as well as requiring them to observe the parameters 
238 For example, see Security Council resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 743 (1992) of 21 February 
1992,749 (1992) of7 Apri11992, 775 (1992) of28 August 1992, 808 (1993) of22 February 1993, and 814 (1993) 
of26 March 1993. 
239 Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 1. 
240 See Security Council resolutions 644 (1989) of7 November 1989,650 (1990) of27 March 1990,668 (1990) 
of20 September 1990,690 (1991) of29 April 1991, 696 (1991) of30 May 1991,717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, 
747 (1992) of24 March 1992,782 (1992) 13 October 1992,797 (1992) of 16 December 1992, 818 (1993) of 14 
April 1993, 832 (1993) of27 May 1993, and 888 (1993) of30 November 1993. 
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of international standards of combatant behaviour?41 Recognising that the guerrilla tactics 
employed by modem insurgents preclude openly carrying arms and displaying badges of 
allegiance, Article 44 of the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I extended legal recognition to 
guerrilla combatants?42 Protocol II of the same conventions placed definite responsibilities for 
the humane conduct of war and treatment of non-combatants on insurgents and incumbents. 243 
The international community has grown increasingly attentive to the tactics used by combatants 
in civil wars, as the recent activation of international war crimes actions against the belligerents 
in the wars in the former Yugoslavia attests?44 Furthermore, the international community has at 
times shown itself willing to intervene against regimes using unsavoury tactics against insurgent 
populations, as Security Council 688 (1991) and Operation Provide Comfort for the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq showed. 
However, these standards of combatant behaviour are mostly ignored by civil war 
belligerents, and are rarely enforced by the international community. A survey of contemporary 
insurgents attests to the extent to which these international regulations are ignored. All of the 
insurgent movements examined in this study have used, to varying extents, terrorism against 
their opponents and the civilian population, with a growing number using techniques of 
genocide, mass rape, popUlation transfers, and perpetuation of famine conditions, particularly in 
ethnic or tribal conflicts. In the final analysis, insurgent movements, the "objects" of 
international law, pay little attention and feel little obligation to the standards and rules that have 
been negotiated between States, the "subjects" of international law?45 The most common 
enforcement mechanism in international law is the sanction of reciprocity, whereby most States 
241 See Harry Eckstein (ed), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, (New York: Free Press, 1964). 
242 As long as arms were openly carried and used during engagements and insignia or identification devices were 
displayed during the preparation for the attack and the action. See Roberts and Guelff, op. cit., 1982, pp. 411-413. 
243 ibid, pp. 449-458. 
244 A number of leaders and combatants among the Bosnian Serbs and the Krajina Serbs have been indicted by 
the international community on war crimes charges. See "Serb War Trial", The Times, 15 October 1994, "Genocide 
Trial Opens", The Times, 21 October 1994; and Caroline Moorhead, "Nations Struggle Against Catalogue of 
Abuse", The Independent, 11 June 1993. 
245 Wilson,op. cit, 1988, p. 8. 
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observe international law because "its breach would incur a reciprocal response.,,246 Insurgent 
movements are little troubled by considerations of reciprocity or international censure: their 
tactics are determined by the consuming nature of their struggle and the realism this fosters. 
Neither are States likely to intervene to uphold these standards of conduct. In these ways, then, 
realism overshadows and modifies the precepts of international law, with respect to international 
intervention in civil wars, as well as in the conduct and motivations of the insurgent movements. 
It can be seen from examining the international currents that determine the United 
Nations' approach to civil wars, and the way its Member-States view insurgent movements, that 
the end of the Cold War has wrought important changes. Insurgent movements are no longer so 
much ideological opportunities as irritants and concerns; while the United Nations is less a 
forum for propaganda and deadlock as a mechanism enabling the minimisation of the costs of 
addressing the non-compelling, but insistent security concerns of civil wars. An understanding 
of these forces informs the further analysis of United Nations actions involving insurgents. It is 
to the analysis of the post-Cold War United Nations' relations with insurgents that this study will 
now turn. 
246 Higgins,op. cit., 1963, p. 8. 
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3: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
To analyse and compare the relationships between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements, the important criteria that determine the nature of their interactions have to be 
isolated. The basis on which these analytical criteria are selected is determined on a deductive 
basis from the theoretical approach of this study. This chapter develops two sub-arguments from 
neorealist precepts: one on the logic of insurgent action, the other on the determinants of United 
Nations initiatives. It follows that when these approaches interact, each side's commitment to its 
interests, and inability to alter the other's approach, mandates that a pre-existing coincidence in 
their approaches will optimise the outcomes of the interaction for both. This logic suggests the 
hypothesis tested in this thesis, that between the United Nations and insurgent movements, 
concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions than divergent approaches. The third 
part of this chapter develops a mechanism for testing this hypothesis by constructing an 
analytical framework of seven indices for measuring the extent of agreement between the United 
Nations and the insurgent movement's approaches to their interaction and relating these to the 
optimality of the interaction. When this framework is applied to cases later in the study, the 
influence of the variables on the interactions will be evaluated to determine the validity of the 
hypothesis. 
3.1: The Logic of Insurgent Action 
This analysis is based on the contention that despite the many differences among the 
insurgent movements with which the United Nations interacts, all share common features that 
impart a certain logic on their actions rendering their relations suitable for social scientific 
generalisation and analysis. The most basic property shared by insurgent movements is that they 
employ violence against the State and other groups within society. They use force in the pursuit 
of an increase in political power, or to effect a change in the structure, control, composition, or 
extent of the political system of the State. The often ethnically-based nature of most 
contemporary civil wars imbues the violence employed by their insurgent movements and 
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incumbents with added savagery and intractability. 1 The downfall of Soviet bloc authoritarian 
power structures, combined with resource and population pressures in the developing world, has 
prompted the rise of ethnic and tribalist chauvinism, and the outbreak of a rash of insurrectionist, 
irredentist, or secessionist conflicts after the Cold War. These conflicts demonstrate similar 
patterns of violence: as opportunistic leaders exploit ethnic resentments to gain power, pressures 
are formed within the group to gain control of the State, the guarantee of ethnic predominance 
and survival, and exclude all other groups from power? This prompts a parallel response among 
the other ethnic groups, which feel the need to mobilise and compete for State power or else be 
dominated and possibly destroyed by the ethnic group that seizes control of the State. A classical 
security dilemma develops among the ethnic groups: as each group acts to increase and protect 
its own security and decrease its vulnerability to attack, other ethnic groups interpret its actions 
as building an offensive capability and take similar measures. As the original group responds 
reciprocally, an arms race and intensifying cycle of hostilities ensues.3 These pressures make 
contemporary insurgent movements highly dependent on violence to advance their interests and 
protect themselves, a condition with important ramifications for their actions towards the United 
Nations. 
Insurgent violence also confers certain prerogatives of the international system on an 
insurgent movement. Once it has declared war on the State, the insurgent movement becomes 
literally outlawed, absenting itself from the sovereign protection of the State. As the hostilities 
intensify, the incumbent government begins to treat the war as an interstate war, using the army 
rather than the police force to try to restore internal control. These ramifications expose the 
insurgent movement to the logic of the international system. International law partially 
recognises this fact by recognising, subject to the conditions laid down under Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions,4 the admissibility of belligerent status for sub-State groups at war, and 
I See John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 143-
170. 
2 Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 
pp.4-5. 
3 Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 28-31. 
4 Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 3, belligerent status could be conferred, depending on the level of 
hostilities, on irregular troops, providing they carried a recognisable badge of allegiance, a chain of command, 
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bestowing some of the prerogatives and attributes of international actors on the insurgent 
group.5 A corollary of its international personality is that the insurgent movement is exposed to 
the anarchy of international politics, with its attendant requirement to be self-reliant in securing 
•. 6 1ts mterests. 
Self-reliance in an anarchic system confers motivations on insurgents' action similar to 
those of States. Because the consequences of incompetence in pursuing self-interest in 
international politics are domination and destruction, units promote their interests with an 
urgency and conviction less commonly found in heirarchic systems.7 The most basic motivation 
of States in a self-help system is physical survival and continued viability: "In anarchy, security 
is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can [units] safely seek such other goals as 
tranquillity, profit, and power."s Insurgent war confers on its perpetrators an even greater 
incentive to protect themselves. Unlike a State that wages war, an insurgent movement has no 
pre-existing recognised antebellum territorial area to withdraw into upon defeat or capitulation, 
thereby avoiding total destruction. Insurgent war is thus partly based on a political calculus with 
the physical survival of the group at stake: "[insurgents] have nothing to gain and everything to 
lose by giving up. In fact, once the banner of revolution has been raised and blood has been 
shed, it is no easy matter to give up. The rebels begin to fight for whatever reason; they continue 
openly carried their weapons, and complied with the laws of war. Protocol II to these Conventions of 1977 modified 
these conditions for civil wars and liberation struggles, enabling belligerent status to be extended to insurgents with 
an identifiable chain of command, significant control of territory, and the ability to carry out sustained military 
operations and comply with the laws of war. See Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the Use 0/ Force by 
National Liberation Movements, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
5 Christopher O. Quaye, Liberation Struggles in International Law, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1991), pp. 29-30. 
6 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o/Order in World Politics, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), 
pp.46-51. 
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o/International Politics, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1979), pp. 93-
105. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Structure of Anarchy" in Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 1986), p. 127. 
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because they must. ,,9 In simple terms, self-reliance for survival means that if resistance costs 
less than defeat or negotiating peace, an insurgent movement will continue to fight. \0 
The threat of annihilation upon defeat is made greater by the total nature of the 
incumbent's response to the insurgent's challenge to its existence and authority. For the State, an 
insurgent challenge not only threatens its existence: it contests its sovereign authority over the 
extent of its territory and population, the legitimacy of its monopoly on the use of force, and its 
prerogative to represent the State internationally. A violent internal challenge also weakens and 
divides the State; often insurgencies become conduits for hostile third party intervention. The 
incumbent takes the insurgent challenge very seriously, and commonly prosecutes a brutal 
counter-insurgent war against the rebel forces and their supporters. Insurgents and their 
supporters, as contestants for legitimate authority in the State, reject the State's protections, 
"recognising no legitimacy save that created by their own aspirations." II In the eyes of the 
incumbent power-holders, insurgents have committed treason and are duly subject to the 
application of punishments and measures differently categorised than those for other offences by 
nature of the seriousness of their challenge to the existing order. 12 Furthermore, a military 
challenge to the State often prompts a limited abandonment of some of the guarantees of civil 
government by the incumbent,13 often triggering a militarisation of the State's opposition to the 
insurgency and its attendant emphasis on total victory and subjugation of opponents. Since they 
often use the guerrilla tactic of provoking a brutal government reaction,14 the insurgent 
movement's reliance on self-help for its security must often also be extended to protecting its 
supporters from the collateral damage of government counter-insurgency operations. Insurgent 
movements' self-help obligations in an anarchical system, and the urgency and logic of the total 
9 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, (St. Albans: Paladin, 1970), 
p.45. 
10 Andrew M. Scott, Insurgency, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970), p. 20. 
II Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, (London: Temple Smith, 1983), p. 34. 
12 L.J. MacFarlane, Violence and the State, (London: Nelson, 1974), p. 76. 
13 See Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 81-92. 
14 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 13. 
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war they wage, makes the maintenance of their existence a fundamental interest and motivation 
for action. 
Anarchy also requires that a unit is self-reliant for the pursuit of its other interests. Their 
violent opposition to the State excludes them from the ability to appeal to any superior body 
with the ability or obligation to provide for the interests of the group. Insurgent movements take 
up arms for a variety of reasons and continue to wage the war to secure a range of objectives. By 
deflnition, an insurgent movement's use of violence against the State is waged for political 
reasons. These political goals can range from the desire to seize control of the administration of 
the State, to excluding other groups from the ability to shape or control the State, to exempting a 
group from the jurisdiction of the State, to a general improvement of social, economic or 
political conditions for a sector of society. Insurgents, like any other political actors, have 
numerous interests - strategic and tactical, overt and covert, primary and secondary - of varying 
levels of importance and influence. ls These interests are not ordered by a flxed hierarchy of 
importarIce; rather "[e]very action involves a trade-off, and the effort to achieve one objective 
inevitably involves costs with respect to some other desired goal." 16 The relative importarIce of 
an insurgent movement's interests are determined by the constellation of environmental 
opportunities and constraints it confronts at that time, and each action is the result of a rational 
calculation and compromise between its diverse concerns. As units in an anarchical, self-help 
system, then, insurgent movements' concern to promote their own interests and ensure their 
security determines their behaviour. 17 
Insurgent movements are distinguished from other opposition groups by their use of 
violence, among other diplomatic and propaganda methods, to pursue their interests. Often the 
option for violence has been chosen as a result of the frustration of the disaffected groups' 
attempts to achieve the desired changes through the political system; it can also be a response to 
a real or perceived threat to the group's survival. Once it has directed violence subversively 
15 Julian Lider, On the Nature o/War, (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), p. 92. 
16 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 19. 
17 Waltz,op. cit., 1979, p. 105. 
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against the State, however, its illegality deprives it of the ability to advance its interests within 
the political system of the State. Neither can the insurgent movement rely on the State which it 
opposes, or any higher authority, for protection. It becomes, like States, self-reliant for its 
protection on its ability to wage war or mobilise international protection for itself. IS An 
insurgent movement that renounces war deprives itself of its one of its reliable means of self-
help and abandons itself to the brutal logic of domination and destruction. The abandonment of 
war, nevertheless, can secure the insurgent movement's interests or forestall dangers that it has 
not been able to secure through war. Often a willingness to end hostilities grants an insurgent 
movement significant influence. Insurgents' mechanisms of influence thus represent a 
continuum of options between total war and total peace. However, its anarchic situation ensures 
that an insurgent movement will not choose to discontinue its war if this entails the loss of a 
realistic method of gaining political power or exposes it to the possibility of physical 
destruction. 
The violence used by insurgents is therefore closely bound to their political interests, and 
as such follows Clausewitz's maxim: 
War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other 
means ... this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, .. ,it continues to 
exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and ... the chief lines 
on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only 
the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes 
place. 19 
Thus the use of violence by insurgents reflects the passion with which their political objectives 
are pursued, and a reaction to the inability to achieve them by other means: " ... the use or threat 
of physical force is the most elementary way of asserting power and controlling one's 
environment.,,2o Insurgent violence, then, " .. .is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear 
18 A recent example of this is the Kurds in northern Iraq in the aftennath of the Gulf War, who, unable to protect 
themselves from Iraqi brutality, secured United Nations endorsement and international enforcement of their own 
"safe area". 
19 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (trans. Anatol Rapoport), (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p. 402. 
20 Howard,op. cit., 1983, p. 8. 
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its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of war, in its great features, is therefore 
policy itself ... ,,21 The obverse side of the political nature of the decision to prosecute insurgent 
war is that any decision by insurgents to terminate the war must also depend on their political 
calculations. 
As an instrument of an interest group's policy, the military thrusts of insurgent war are 
directed towards targets instrumental to the attainment of political objectives. Insurgent tactics 
are thus supremely opportunistic, in seeking to exploit existing and create new weaknesses in the 
government's control of the State and society?2 A corollary of the opportunistic, political nature 
of the war, is that insurgent policy is therefore essentially pragmatic in terms of the conduct of 
war and peace. The actions of war are determined by the belligerents' intentions towards each 
other at any given stage in the fighting, an interaction that Schelling views as an extension of the 
political negotiation process: 
War is always a bargaining process, one in which threats and proposals, 
counterproposals and counterthreats, offers and assurances, concessions and 
demonstrations, take the form of actions rather than words, or actions 
accompanied by words ... The critical targets in such a war are in the mind of the 
enemy as much as on the battlefield; the state of the enemy's expectations is as 
important as the state of his troops; the threat of violence in reserve is more 
important than the commitment of force in the field?3 
As their one means of influence and self-help then, insurgent movements will manipulate their 
waging of war and peace and their selection of tactics in a way designed to influence not only 
their enemies, but all of their interlocutors, in such a way as to advance their interests. Insurgent 
behaviour thus reflects the political interests they are pursuing in their interaction with the actor 
affected. 
21 Clausewitz,op. cit., 1982, p. 410. 
22 Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in Interstate Relations, (New 
York: st. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 218. 
23 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 142-3. 
95 
This highly political nature of insurgents' conduct of war and peace dictates an intimacy 
in relations between military means and political objectives often greater than in interstate war. 
Not only does " ... the political cause of [the] war [have] a great influence on the manner in which 
it is conducted,,,24 but the influence is reciprocated, dictating that the political objectives are 
tailored to a level achievable with the military capabilities available to the insurgents.25 In this 
way, political calculations and objectives are profoundly influenced by the conduct and fortunes 
of the war: 
As war .. .is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object 
determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased ... As 
soon ... as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no 
longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the result.26 
Insurgent political objectives, then, are not set, but respond to the stage and success of the war, 
depending on the ideology, interests, and cohesion of the movement. Insurgent movements' 
interests vary in degrees of importance and negotiability. Primary among their compelling 
concerns are survival, enduring ideological interests, and basic demands. Their unique 
vulnerabilities therefore make their commitment to peace contingent on their security and their 
evaluation that it represents a realistic method of advancing their political interests. In this way, 
the configuration of the insurgent movement's fortunes, environment, and interlocutors, which 
determine the opportunities and constraints it confronts at any stage, will influence the ordering 
of its priorities and regulate its behaviour as a method of a attaining its interests which arise from 
a rational calculation and compromise between its diverse concerns. 
The influence of environmental and self-help considerations on insurgent movements' 
behaviour is not modified or constrained by the prerogatives imposed by international society 
that regulate State behaviour. They escape the sobering influence of international opinion or 
constituent preferences: 
24 Clausewitz,op. cit., 1982, p. 400. 
25 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, (trans. Richard Howard and Annette 
Baker Fox), (London: Wiedenfield and Nicholson, 1966), p. 25. 
26 Clausewitz, op. cit., 1982, p. 125. 
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Governments are very sensitive to what public opinion and what other 
governments as well as the heads of certain powerful international agencies think 
of their actions because they're the people that they have to live with if not 
depend on in the future. A guerrilla group which may have some other interest, 
which may in some cases be mercenary in character, is less interested in that kind 
of consideration. So you don't have the normal type of leverage?7 
This fact carries important ramifications for the dynamics of relations between insurgent 
movements and other international actors. It entails that States and international organisations 
cannot exert to the same level their interdependent diplomatic, economic, or security links 
through which pressure can be exerted on insurgent movements. 
This has important consequences for the dynamics of United Nations' interactions with 
insurgent movements. The mechanisms of influence open to the United Nations - legitimacy, 
moral suasion, Member-States' obligations according to the Charter, custodianship of 
international law, and diplomatic contacts - are less effective against insurgents. Insurgent 
movements are excluded from United Nations membership28 and thus are not bound by the 
provisions of its Charter, including the renunciation of the use or threat of force to obtain their 
objectives in relation to States.29 Similarly, it is only United Nations Member-States that are 
bound by Security Council decisions: insurgent acquiescence can only be obtained through the 
conclusion of special agreements. Often their actions are clandestine, making attribution difficult 
and blame hard to assign. This absence of parameters or constraints on insurgent behaviour 
makes the Organisation's interaction with them problematical. While the recognition of 
insurgents as belligerents gives them a right of veto over the entry, operations and tenure of 
United Nations interventions,3o the international community lacks the means to ensure their 
27 Alvaro de Soto, Political Adviser to and Special Representative for the United Nations Secretary-General, 
quoted on BBC News and Current Affairs, "Revolution on the 37th Floor", BBe Radio 4, 22 April 1993, 8 p.m. 
28 Permanent observer status for insurgent movements such as the PLO and SWAPO does not imply the 
privileges and responsibilities of full membership. 
29 The prohibition on the use or threat offorce is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
30 Ramesh Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force, 
(Boulder: Westview Press: 1987), p. 124. 
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accountability for fulfilling the obligations to which they have agreed.3l Neither does the 
"hostage effect", which grants immunity to United Nations missions by inducing hosts to 
guarantee the safety of the peacekeepers or face the indignation of the United Nations 
membership,32 operate with full influence on belligerents that are not United Nations members. 
The logic of insurgent action is thus detennined by self-interest and environmental 
stimuli in an anarchic system, reliance on war and peace as means of influence, and a lack of 
conduits of positive influence for the international community. The confrontation of an 
international organisation of States with a sub-State organisation thus gives rise to a singular 
relationship of limited influence and brevity of interaction. The United Nations' leverage over 
State behaviour is lost on sub-State organisations that do not acknowledge the prerogatives 
imposed by international society regulating State behaviour. Conversely, sub-State 
organisations, which by virtue of their lack of sovereign status are disbarred from United 
Nations membership, can exercise no detennining influence on the Organisation's resolutions or 
actions. Even if they are admitted as observers,33 insurgent groups have little influential power 
over the direction of policy, having no voting, financial contributions, or membership assets 
with which to bargain and gain support. This lack of mutual influence, as well as insurgents' 
military commitment to the objectives of power and survival, profoundly influences the 
approach of insurgents to interactions with United Nations missions charged with containing or 
tenninating the conflict. 
31 D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice, (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1964), pp. 79-83. 
32 John MacKin lay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface, 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 222. 
33 Of the insurgent movements examined in this thesis, UNIT A and the FMLN have attended Security Council 
debates without being able to participate. The Khmer Rouge was able to attend as the representative for Cambodia 
before the Paris Accords and then after the accords as part of the rotating SNC arrangement of representation as a 
member-state under Rule 37 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, but was never a member of 
the Security Council at these times and thus never had a vote. None of the other groups have been present at 
Security Council debates, although British Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sir David Hannay has 
assured the author in correspondence that " .. .individual Council members, whether in New York or in capitals, have 
been lobbied by them." Thus the influence of insurgents on the United Nations' formal decision-making machinery 
can be said to be negligible. 
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3.2: The Determinants of United Nations Initiatives 
The motivations and capabilities of the United Nations' approach to interacting with an 
insurgent movement are determined by factors different from those influencing insurgent 
movements' approaches. The interests of the United Nations' approach to the interaction are 
determined by the agreements among its Member-States, as determined by their relative 
influence within the Organisation,34 adapted to the normative aspirations of the Organisation. Its 
capabilities in promoting these interests reflect the dependence of United Nations action on the 
agreement of its Member-States, the fragile nature of which inhibits the commitment and 
influence of the mission to obtain its objectives. 
United Nations' initiatives emerge from the process of interaction and compromIse 
between its sovereign Member-States, each striving to promote its internally-defmed interests 
through the Organisation for a variety of reasons. Those interests they pursue through the United 
Nations are interests that are better served for the State through collaboration. Coordinating their 
actions multilaterally, we have seen in Chapter Two, allows United Nations Member-States to 
respond to the security concerns of civil wars that are not compelling enough to deserve large 
political and material sacrifices, but are sufficiently serious to require some form of response. A 
United Nations response that coincides with these interests allows States to defray the expenses 
of such an initiative, while participation in multilateral actions in support of universalist ideals 
such as peace and stability and human rights is much more politically justifiable for 
governments than unilateral interventions in pursuit of naked self-interest.35 Similarly, the 
United Nations can be conveniently blamed for any failures or casualties arising from the 
intervention. Action through the United Nations utilises its universality of membership, and 
majority decision making procedures, to bestow a legitimacy on the intervention which stems 
from the validity of the " ... universal principals that are invoked rather than national special 
----
34 Obviously the Security Council's Penn anent Five and the other great powers or significant regional powers in 
the Organisation detennine its policy to a greater extent than the less influential or concerned States. 
35 Not just domestically: compare the international reactions to President Reagan's actions in support of 
American interests in Libya in 1986, with international reactions to President Bush's actions in support of American 
interests in Kuwait in 1990-1991. 
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interests. ,,36 lnis Claude observes that the United Nations has evolved as the foremost repository 
of collective legitimation, "a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the 
claims, policies and actions of States.,,37 It is worth noting, however, that the influence of 
United Nations collective legitimation extends only as far as its authority is accepted. The body's 
authority over non-members and non-State organisations is considerably less than over its 
Member-States. The United Nations' possession of legitimacy and its moral suasion, then, has 
little effect on insurgent movements. 
Action through the United Nations in support of their interests imposes constraining 
requirements on the nature of the response Member-States are able to direct towards the civil 
war of concern. United Nations action, in order to gain the endorsement and legitimacy of its 
membership, should be consistent at a basic level with the established and prevailing purposes of 
the Organisation. Being an Organisation of States, however, it does innovate to set new 
precedents that can contradict previous doctrine.38 Nevertheless, much of the rationale for 
United Nations intervention in civil wars "derives its impetus from the urge to avoid war; and 
assumes that war should be and can be prevented.,,39 United Nations' policy towards civil wars 
are to some extent informed by its Organisational convictions and Member-States' concurrence 
on the causes of war and how it can be prevented or terminated.4o These convictions define the 
Organisation's approach to each individual conflict, and govern its attempts to influence the 
conflict's outcome.41 The United Nations' three basic convictions on the nature of post-Cold 
War civil wars are, first, that war is an illegitimate method of gaining political power. This is 
based on belief in the legitimacy of Western ideals of popular endorsement of governments, 
36 Thakur,op. cit., 1987, p. 147. 
37 Inis L. Claude Jr., "Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations", International 
Organization, Vol. 20, No.3, 1966, p. 367. 
38 For example, the changes in the importance and applicability of sovereignty, as discussed in Chapter Two. See 
also Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
39 Claude,op. cit., 1965, p. 198. 
40 ibid. 
41 Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 7. 
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which inform the basic philosophy and structure of the United Nations,42 and its prohibition of 
war as a method of gaining foreign policy objectives.43 This leads the United Nations to devote 
its energy to at least attempting to stop the fighting first, regardless of the context or goals of the 
war, and often indifferent to the terms of or conditions obtaining after the ceasefire.44 This 
assumption also dictates that the solution to the war advocated by the United Nations will, 
irrespective of the demands or ideology of the belligerents, be based on an advocacy and 
assumed acceptance of Western ideals of universal suffrage, majority government, power 
sharing, civil-military separation, and the peaceful adjustment of claims. 
The United Nations' second conviction on the nature of civil war is that any solution or 
outcome arrived at must preserve the State's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is adamant 
that the organisation is not prepared to suffer the balkanisation of its members as a result of an 
epidemic of civil wars: 
... the UN seeks to preserve the nation-state as the very foundation of international 
life ... And subnational, ethnic or tribal factions cannot expect to undermine the 
political unit in which they exist while claiming the privileges of a sovereign 
. 45 
natIon-state. 
This conviction dictates that any solution endorsed by the United Nations must have the 
outcome of a single legitimised government with full control over a unified, centralised, and 
territorially whole State.46 The third conviction on the nature of civil wars is that they are 
42 A cursory glance at the Charter demonstrates the founding of the organisation on the ideals of Western 
democracy: the preamble begins with "We the people of the United Nations ... "; its endorsement of human rights; its 
bestowal of sovereign equality on its members, and its techniques of parliamentary diplomacy and decision by 
majority vote. 
43 Article 2(4). 
44 Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946-1964 
Volume I, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 2. 
45 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "UN Multilateralism: A Cure For Ugly New Nationalisms", International Herald 
Tribune, 21 August 1993, p. 6. 
46 The obvious exception to this case lies in the fonner Yugoslavia, and the recognition and admission to 
membership of all of its fonner constituent units. As will be discussed below, in the examinations of United Nations 
mediation attempts with the Bosnian Serbs, however, this anomaly in United Nations attitudes was caused by 
extreme discord among its most powerful and influential members on the nature and preferred outcome of the war. 
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disputes over non-divisible or scarce commodities. This causes the United Nations, as a 
guarantor of international peace and security, to offer peaceful negotiation as a substitute to war 
for the adjustment of claims by making "available a variety of peaceful substitutes for the 
technique of violence, and to encourage - if not insist upon - their utilisation by the parties to the 
disputes. ,,47 
In addition to these three basic convictions, action through the United Nations also 
entails the operation of a variety of lesser considerations that operate only in some circumstances 
during interactions with insurgent movements. Although not universally held among Member-
States, belief in popular support as the measure of domestic legitimacy can lead to an impulse 
from sections of its membership not to endorse or legitimise groups that lack popular support. 
Similarly, advocacy of the laws of war can influence United Nations approaches to insurgent 
movements and other belligerents that have perpetrated extensive war crimes through terrorism, 
civilian targeting, and genocide. It has also shown itself prepared to hold insurgents accountable 
for their actions in wartime, as witnessed by Security Council resolutions 764(1992)48 and 
808(1993),49 reminding the Bosnian belligerents of their obligations under the laws of war and 
establishing a war crimes tribunal. The United Nations has also refused to endorse the claims of 
ethnic chauvinism, and actively supported the viability of multiethnic States. Often the Member-
States of the United Nations are concerned with upholding these normative standards in the very 
conflicts they are seeking to terminate through the United Nations. This inevitably impacts on 
the Organisation's approach to its interaction with insurgent movements. 
These considerations, and the underlying motive of advancing Member-States' interests, 
dictate that the United Nations' approach to relations with insurgent movements is nearly always 
normative in terms of advocating its own preferred solution, rather than being problem-solving 
47 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 
(London: University of London Press Ltd., 1965) p. 200. 
48 Security Council Resolution 764(1992) of 13 July 1992. 
49 Security Council Resolution 808(1993) of22 February 1993. 
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and based on an appreciation of the belligerents' grievances and objectives.5o With its self-image 
as the bestower of legitimacy in the international system, and its suppositions on the nature of 
civil wars as threats to post-Cold War stability, the organisation attempts to secure particular 
solutions to these conflicts, using its inventory of conflict termination and containment 
mechanisms. This means that in the United Nations-insurgent relationship under examination, 
the insurgents are not the only party approaching conflict termination with interests. It is these 
interests that determine the United Nations' approach to, and behaviour towards the insurgent 
movement during their interaction. 
The collaboration of States to pursue these interests through the United Nations, 
however, "occurs only in ways that are strongly conditioned by the structure of anarchy.,,51 
States' self-reliance in the international system makes them jealous of their sovereignty of action, 
a fact that has important ramifications for United Nations' capabilities. They are concerned to 
retain strict control over United Nations actions, by making all initiatives dependent on their 
endorsement and resourcing, because "In the measure that an international organisation is 
effective, it is bound to impair the freedom of action of its members. ,,52 While United Nations 
membership and ratification of its Charter entails the formal agreement of its Member-States to 
sacrifice some of their sovereignty and freedom of action in return for the benefits of 
membership, the sovereignty assumed by the United Nations is so limited that it remains 
incapable of positive action without the agreement and consent of the majority of its Member-
States. It is from this basic logic that the tension between expectations and abilities arises: "The 
unanswerable question is whether institutional endeavours should be geared to the requirements 
posed by the objective situation, or to the possibilities offered by, and limited by the political 
• . ,,53 
sltuatlOn. 
50 John W. Burton, "The History of International Conflict Resolution", in John W. Burton and Edward Azar 
(eds), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, (Sussex: WheatsheafBooks, 1986), p. 45. 
51 John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transfonnation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in 
Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), p. 134. 
52 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle/or Power and Peace, (5th ed), (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1978), p. 481. 
53 Claude,op. cit., 1965, p. 96. 
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A corollary of the high degree of Member-State control over its actions is that the United 
Nations is unable to act on issues other than those few on which a majority of its members agree. 
Its procedure of taking decisions by majority vote mandates that the United Nations' political 
capabilities are dictated by the popularity of its objectives. The popularity of these objectives is 
determined for each Member-State by its own perceptions of national interest, conception of 
international order, ideology, philosophy on the mandate of international organisations, and 
degree of contentment with the status quo, as well as the highly individual way in which each 
State conceives of the problem at hand. Any multilateral action, therefore, must be based on a 
delicate diplomatic balance of agreement: "In practice, U.N. multilateralism can work only if all 
nations share a common perception of a danger, are willing to run the same risks and agree on a 
common strategy. ,,54 Agreement between Member-States differs from issue to issue as well as 
fluctuating over time. 55 Any decision that is arrived at runs the risk of either universal 
endorsement of a resolution that has been negotiated down to extreme declaratory vagueness, or 
a precise mandate for concerted action that is seen as illegitimately serving sectional interests. 
It is to the negotiation of a response that avoids these extremes that United Nations 
Member-States devote their energies in mustering support for initiatives on civil wars. Not every 
Member-State of the United Nations is interested in every problem, or becomes involved in 
every action .. Most of the Organisation's decision-making on civil wars is located within the 
Security Council, and initiated by the Permanent Five, reflecting the oligopoly of an 
international system in which the Great Powers determine the form and structure of the 
system. 56 The inverse relationship between broadness of support for an initiative and the 
effectiveness and precision of its implementation, has imparted a particular logic on the 
mobilisation of support within the Organisation, and the Security Council in particular. Each 
initiative of the United Nations is the result of a different ad hoc coalition of those Member-
States that are most concerned with the problem it addresses or the solution it proposes. An 
54 Henry A. Kissinger, "Recipe for Chaos", Washington Post, 9 August 1993, p. 19. 
55 Alan James, "The United Nations", in David Annstrong and Eric Goldstein (eds), The End of the Cold War, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 186. 
56 Gilpin, op. cit., 1981, p. 29. 
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international organisation such as the United Nations is an ideal forum in which to "activate 
potential coalitions in world politics. ,,57 These ad hoc coalitions demonstrate some of the logic 
of alliances. The members of the Security Council each have their own interests and conceptions 
of international order which are invoked to varying degrees by different civil wars, and which 
determine their active interest, rather than benign acquiescence, in the United Nations 
response. 58 The· nature of the coalition is thus determined by the nature of the threat and the 
response proposed, and the divisibility of the rewards of concerted action. 59 
The selection of coalition partners is driven by a number of considerations. Initially, 
those partners are chosen that show a sufficient level and community of interest to support and 
contribute to the initiative. Legitimacy and the ability to use the United Nations for this function 
also requires that the coalition include any other significant States with interests, perhaps even 
interests essentially antagonistic to the coalition's, in the conflict and its outcome.60 As partners 
are collected, the coalition leaders may use private, non-collective side-payments to subsidise 
rewards, or compensate the disadvantages of a particular response for the concerned coalition 
member.61 Even if the benefits of the action are positive-sum, and benefit the entire community 
of States, ad hoc United Nations coalitions are subject to their own "minimax principle", 
whereby its participants create a coalition just large enough to ensure an effective response.62 
Member-States are aware that with increasing coalition size comes decision making rigidity and 
policy dilution as an increasing number of divergent interests have to be accommodated. Within 
the United Nations, therefore, it is rational to increase the coalition size, and thus the legitimacy 
57 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 36. 
58 Interview with Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom Penn anent Representative to the United Nations, Ntw 
York City, 29 March 1994. 
59 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 28-34. 
60 This consideration was obviously manifest in the creation of the Western Contact Group coalition for Bosnia, 
which includes some diametrically opposed interests. 
61 For a full discussion on side payments and the divisibility of outcomes, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
62 William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32-3. 
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of the initiative, to just below a level where additional members will moderate the initiative or 
decrease the flexibility of action required for effectiveness. 
The cohesion of United Nations coalitions, so crucial to the effectiveness of the action, is 
also dependent on the nature of the threat. The non-compelling threats posed by civil wars cause 
the coalitions underlying United Nations' relations with insurgent movements to be extremely 
fragile. Any alteration in conditions on the ground or within the mission will impact on 
members' interests and policy, affecting their commitment to the operation, and thereby 
disrupting the diplomatic consensus underlying the initiative. Member-States are also much less 
concerned about the effects of their actions on ad hoc United Nations coalitions than their other 
alliances. Defaulting on temporary United Nations coalitions is more easily done, because 
nothing more than a temporary alliance of expediency over a relatively minor concern is at 
stake. Furthermore, the breakdown of these alliances will not significantly harm the United 
Nations structure, which will survive to be used again in similar circumstances. 
Often, however, a coalition will modify its objectives to preserve alliance cohesion and 
commitment, if a particular initiative experiences difficulties. These coalitions "provide their 
members with considerable "breathing space" for reaching some form of agreement on the 
purposes of the alliances, ,,63 often opting for a less optimal response that still carries significant 
rewards. A desire to resolve a civil war can thus be downgraded to a policy of containing and de-
escalating by a pragmatic coalition that would rather be content with a less optimal outcome 
than expend further resources on the initiative.64 Particularly when the problem is not urgent, 
States will accept a compromise response that allows them to opt for solutions that require the 
minimum commitment of resources by them to the multilateral effort: 
63 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances: Comparative Studies, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 74-5. 
64 This conception of a continuum of responses available to the United Nations in civil war situations, calculated 
to the political requirements of the situation, is proposed by Alan James, "Internal Peacekeeping: A Dead End for 
the UN?", Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No.4, December 1993, pp. 359-368. 
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States still prefer action which is low cost and has a limited degree of 
commitment. There is a tendency for the UN and its Member-States to rely on 
methods of remote control, including economic sanctions of doubtful efficacy, 
and on limited ad hoc responses to crises, including humanitarian operations and 
k . 65 peace eepmg. 
Often little provision is given for the actual implementation of the resolution, leading to 
criticism that the Security Council acts as though its resolutions are "self-executing".66 
These considerations of coalition cohesion carry major ramifications for the United 
Nations' capacity to secure its normative interests when interacting with belligerents. It is the 
resulting lack of the United Nations' ability to influence the behaviour of insurgent movements 
towards its preferred outcomes, that makes the effectiveness of its relations with these groups 
dependent on the agreement of their approaches to the interaction. Much of its lack of influence 
stems from its composition, and original orientation towards States. This has led to a poverty of 
knowledge of, and few mechanisms of influence over civil war situations: 
A major problem for the United Nations is that international peace has often been 
endangered by the aspirations and actions of entities other than States, and that 
the Organisation is so constructed that its organs prefer to deal with states rather 
than with dissident political organisations, insurgent groups, liberation 
1 . .. d h l'k 67 movements, communa mmontles, an tel e. 
An Organisation constructed for the prevention of disputes between States, finds itself helpless 
when dealing with internal strife and its most capricious participants, the insurgent 
movements.68 
65 Nicholas Hopkinson, The United Nations and the New World Disorder: Wilton Park Paper 75, (London: 
HMSO, 1993), p. 21. 
66 "General Boutros on Parade", The Economist, 31 July 1993, p. 50. 
67 Sydney D. Bailey, "The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-64", International 
Affairs, Vol. 58, No.3, Summer 1982, pp. 20-1. 
68 Bailey,op. cit., 1982, p. 469. 
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The United Nations possesses certain instruments of persuasion and coercion over most 
international actors. These have, however, limited effect on insurgent movements. The nature of 
its peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations severely limit its ability to apply military 
force to coerce belligerents, particularly those involved in complex civil wars. The multilateral 
nature of a United Nations operation makes it unable to wield the level of military effectiveness 
that would be necessary to coerce an alteration in insurgent behaviour. The diverse quality, 
training, and equipment of national contingents in the peacekeeping force paralyses the United 
Nations' ability to operate as a coordinated military force, while the Organisation is ill-equipped 
to direct operations, possessing little military expertise and concerned more with administration 
than logistics or tactics.69 Neither are the interests important enough for Member-States to judge 
it sufficiently worth while to expend significant material, military, and political resources to 
mount a multilateral military effort "concerned with matters beyond the limited horizons of their 
interests." 70 Coercion in a civil war entails all of the expense, casualties and political costs of 
counter-insurgency, a burden that neither the United Nations nor its Member-States are willing 
to bear. 
Neither do the United Nations' mechanisms of persuasion have as much effect on 
insurgent movements as they do on States and non-governmental organisations. For reasons of 
expense and acceptability, the United Nations prefers to rely on non-military means of inducing 
actors to cooperate with its initiatives. Most basic among these is the moral suasion of the 
collective opinion of its Member-States: 
... collective approbation is an important asset and collective disapprobation a 
significant liability in international relations ... A State may hesitate to pursue a 
policy that has engendered the formal disapproval of the Assembly not because it 
is prepared to give the will of that organ priority over its national interest but 
because it believes that the adverse judgement of the Assembly makes the pursuit 
of that policy disadvantageous to the national interest.7! 
69 Mats Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?", Adelphi Paper 281, (London: Brasseys and IISS, October 1993), 
p.32. 
70 Claude,op. cit., 1965, p. 97. 
71 Claude,op. cit., 1966, p. 375. 
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The publicisation of the non-cooperation of a belligerent party by a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation affects the accused party's position by influencing the opinion of its 
fighters and supporters; encouraging the resolution of its rivals, and providing opponents with 
propaganda material.72 However, the influence of United Nations' moral opinion has more effect 
on Member-States than on other entities.73 Insurgent movements, locked in a total conflict for 
political power and obsessed by the self-preservation, will be little affected by considerations of 
United Nations approval or the publicity effect of their non-cooperation. 
The other non-military mechanisms of influence possessed by the United Nations are 
also ill-suited to applying pressure to insurgent movements. These include sanctions, censure by 
resolution, the according or withholding of recognition, and the increase or discontinuation of 
aid or other assistance. The United Nations' ability to apply mandatory sanctions against a region 
or State 74 can furnish it with some leverage over States that continue to support or abet 
insurgencies. However, the direct application of sanctions or the interference with other 
interdependent links with the insurgent movements themselves are unlikely to affect insurgent 
movements to any significant extent, because their 
... sources of supply and military equipment are always clandestine. The fact that 
they're clandestine means that the United Nations can't interdict them very 
successfully by normal legal means. So one can have one's doubts whether ... [an] 
arms embargo on [an insurgent movement] ... has very much effect, because 
people didn't go around the world saying they were selling arms to ... [insurgents] 
in the first place.75 
Thus the United Nations is unable to exercise a significant amount of leverage to induce the 
other insurgent movements with which it interacts to adjust their behaviour to coincide with its 
own approach. 76 
72 James,op. cit., 1969, pp. 195-6. 
73 Claude,op. cit., 1965, p. 218. 
74 According to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. 
75 Interview with Sir David Hannay. United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New 
York City, 29 March 1994. 
76 Bowett, op. cit., 1964, p. 76. 
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It thus transpires that insurgent movements' inability to influence United Nations 
approach to their interaction is matched by the United Nations' reduced influence on insurgents' 
behaviour towards its intervention. This unique logic of sub-State - super-State interaction 
suggests an important detenninant for the viability of these interactions. Insurgents, obsessed 
with the use of force to gain power and protect themselves, while not possessing the advantages 
or limitations of States, are confronted by, but unable to influence an international organisation 
with presuppositions on civil conflict and its resolution, which they are unable to adjust. The 
United Nations, hampered by a divided and fragile peace mandate and lacking credible means of 
compulsion, is faced with sub-State organisations that recognise no compulsions or constraints 
on their behaviour other than their objectives and their security. When synthesised, these 
conclusions reveal that the United Nations and insurgent movements lack mutual influence or 
access for the adjustment of any differences in their approaches to their interrelations. This is 
compounded by the brevity and singularity of their contact, and the importance that each 
attaches to its interests. Consequently, when their approaches coincide, the benefits of their 
interaction will be optimised, but when their approaches clash, the seriousness of the stakes will 
cause one or both to resort to coercion to influence the other's behaviour in its favour, thus 
undermining the interaction's efficiency. This leads to the hypothesis that between the United 
Nations and insurgent movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions 
than divergent approaches. The next section constructs a framework of indices for measuring the 
coincidence of approaches and its effect on the viability of interactions, and will thus allow the 
empirical testing of this hypothesis. 
3.3: United Nations-Insurgent Interaction: A Framework for Analysis 
The indices selected to comprise this framework are based on considerations arising 
from the determinants of United Nations' and insurgent movements' interests as determined by 
their situational constraints and capabilities. The most important variables have been selected, 
according to the need for explanatory power based on the amount of influence of each on the 
interaction, and the need for parsimony. Of the seven indices selected, the first four determine 
the extent of the coincidence of the approaches, while the last three qualify the level or extent of 
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the operation of these factors on the approaches of the actors studied. The application of the 
framework to the data consists of a procedure of searching for the operation and influence of 
each framework indicator in the cases selected to compare the effect of the coincidence between 
the United Nations' and the insurgent movement's approaches with the efficiency of their 
interaction. The impact of these factors will be compared between different cases, and between 
different types of United Nations-insurgent interactions. Thus the influence of the framework 
indices on the interaction in the direction hypothesised will detennine the validity of the 
hypothesis. In this way, realism, and the model deduced from it, allows the analysis of the 
dynamics and continuities across a range of diverse relationships between the United Nations 
and insurgent movements. 
3.3.1: Objectives 
Political objectives form the most basic determinant and component of any actor's 
approach to a political interaction. All behaviour during the interaction is oriented to securing or 
promoting these interests. Therefore, the foremost framework indicator of the concurrence 
between the United Nations' and the insurgent movement's approaches to their interaction is the 
measurement of the compatibility of their objectives. The hypothesis suggests that the closer the 
complementarity of the United Nations and the insurgent movement's goals in the interaction, 
the more productive and mutually satisfactory their encounter will be. This relationship is 
suggested by the preceding analysis which identifies the mutual lack of leverage and influence 
between the United Nations and insurgents. This means that they have no means of bargaining 
to adjust their expectations and goals, and thus the viability of their interaction has to rely on 
essential, pre-existing compatibility between their objectives. It also means that conversely, if 
their objectives are opposed, the effectiveness of their interaction will be reduced, and both will 
be less satisfied with its outcomes. Total agreement between actors in a civil war environment is 
almost impossible, however. A viable interaction, nevertheless, should be based on 
complementarity between objectives that are common to both the United Nations and the 
insurgent movement, and to which both attach overriding importance. Both the United Nations 
and the insurgent movement will have differently prioritised objectives: long term and 
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transitory; compelling and secondary. Concurrence of long term, overriding objectives should 
yield greater optimality than agreement on transitory or less important interests. 
The goals that the United Nations seeks to promote through its interaction with the 
insurgent movement are determined by the combination of the interests of the coalition of 
Member-States that sponsor the initiative. While an accommodation of their particular national 
interests takes place in the form of a negotiated compromise, generally their objectives are 
informed by predominantly the concerned Great Powers' conceptions of world order: "Great 
Powers contribute to international order ... by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to 
impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole." 77 These 
objectives are moderated and adjusted to be consistent with the United Nations' normative 
standards, to ensure the acceptability of the initiative to the remainder of the Security Council 
and the membership of the United Nations. The promotion of United Nations principles also 
makes the initiative more justifiable to the domestic opinion of the sponsoring coalition. Thus 
the United Nations' approach to civil wars is couched in terms of stopping the fighting, ending 
external interventions, protecting human rights, and rehabilitating the State and its control of its 
territory. The dynamics of the sponsoring coalition within the Security Council, however, can 
for reasons of expediency and cohesion, lead it to modify its expectations once its initial 
intervention runs into trouble. The objectives of a United Nations coalition will strongly 
determine the behaviour of the initiative during any interaction. These indicators will inform the 
analysis of the nature of the objectives promoted by the United Nations in each interaction with 
an insurgent movement, and will be used to assess an important component of the compatibility 
of their approaches. 
Insurgent movements' objectives in interacting with the United Nations or any other 
actor are determined by its rational calculation of its options according to its self-interest and the 
opportunities and dangers confronting it. The requirement of self-help makes the insurgent 
movement dependent on its own power and abilities to advance its interests and control the 
77 Bull,op. cit., 1977, p. 207. 
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influence of its environment.78 Its exposure to anarchy makes the insurgent movement "self-
regarding", in that it views all interactions and interlocutors in terms of opportunities to advance, 
or dangers to, its own internally-defmed interests. This means that an insurgent movement's 
behaviour during an interaction with a United Nations mission will be based on its calculation of 
the opportunities or dangers posed by that interaction. The utility of the interaction will be 
maximised if the insurgent movement can advance its interests while the United Nations is 
promoting its objectives. These objectives need not be identical; they merely need to be 
compatible. The foundation of compatibility will usually rest on coinciding commitments to 
peace. The United Nations initiative may provide a benign environment and a chance to promote 
otherwise frustrated objectives. 
An insurgent's abandonment of war will informed by its interests, on the logic that "the 
outbreak of war and the outbreak of peace are essentially decisions to implement aims by new 
means.,,79 Such a change in behaviour is ultimately linked to a group' objectives: 
A decision to stop fighting is always closely linked in the minds of the parties to 
discernible progress towards a political settlement, and it may be taken for 
granted that one party, and often both, will be reluctant to stop fighting without 
some assurance that political demands will be met or at least given a fair 
h . so eanng. 
Insurgent movements often have a range of objectives, many of which are covert, and others 
which are publicised for reasons of propaganda and gaining support for the movement. At any 
time, the group's behaviour is determined by a rational trade-off between these interests, and the 
decision to prosecute war is taken at the expense of interests such as welfare and political 
participation.S! A more benign situation that offers the chance to promote its other interests can 
cause a reorientation of the trade-off, and affect a change in behaviour. Often peace terms which 
78 Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality Vs. Neorealist Theory", International Security, Vol. 19, No.1, Summer 
1994, p. 116. 
79 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes o/War, (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 248. 
80 Bailey,op. cit., 1982, p. 2. 
81 Gilpin,op. cit., 1981, pp. 17-19. 
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seem to contradict the overt objectives of the movement are accepted because the continuation 
of the war threatened vital secondary considerations or had begun to damage its political 
progress.82 However, cooperative behaviour may also be a tactic used to gain time, either to 
build military strength, or to await the dissipation of the factors that compelled the insurgent 
movement to seek peace.83 Thus the insurgent movement's calculations on the promotion of its 
interests infonn its behaviour towards the United Nations. It is the compatibility of its reordered 
priorities and goals with those of the United Nations initiative that will indicate the basic 
compatibility of their approaches to their interaction. 
3.3.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The second indicator detennining the compatibility of the United Nations' and insurgent 
movements' approaches is the assessment of the level of agreement between them on the 
mechanism through which they interact. By controlling the dynamics of the interaction and the 
extent of influence exerted by the participants, the selection of the mechanisms of their 
interaction will detennine the behaviour, tactics, and assessments of threats and opportunities of 
the United Nations initiative and the insurgent movement. Their agreement on interaction 
mechanisms is intimately linked with the compatibility of their objectives, by determining the 
extent to which each sees the presence of, and interaction with, the other as promoting or 
inhibiting the achievement of its own goals. Thus concurring levels of agreement on the 
mechanism of their interaction will contribute to the efficiency of the relationship between the 
United Nations and the insurgent movement. 
The United Nations' assessment of the acceptability of the interaction mechanism is 
based on considerations of efficiency and parsimony. As the participant in the interaction that 
initiates the contact with the insurgent movement, and enters its environment, the United 
Nations to a large extent detennines the fonn of their interaction. Its selection of the initiative is 
modified to some degree by consultations and considerations of the nature and interests of the 
82 Scott, op. cit., 1970, p. 84. 
83 Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations", Survival, Vol. 32, No.3, May/June 1990, p. 267. 
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belligerents and its past experience in dealing with civil wars, but ultimately reflects the goals 
that the sponsoring coalition wish to promote. Therefore, a major determinant of the selection of 
the interaction mechanism is its appropriateness for promoting the coalition's interests with 
respect to the civil war. These considerations are closely tied to the nature of their aims, and are 
assessed on their ability to terminate or contain the fighting, address some of the bases of the 
conflict, confront any other major concerns, and generally accomplish the most optimal outcome 
achievable. The selection of interaction mechanisms will also be determined by the parsimony 
of the sponsoring coalition, and what costs they are prepared to bear, based on their opinion of 
the seriousness of the concern, and their assessment of the minimum outlay required to address 
it. In these ways, the United Nations' satisfaction with the interaction mechanism selected will 
influence its behaviour and be used to determine its approach to its interaction with insurgent 
movements. 
The insurgent movement's evaluation of the acceptability of the interaction mechanism 
introduced by the United Nations will be based on its considerations of whether it provides the 
group with a reasonable and safe method of promoting its interests. Since any United Nations 
initiative will be directed towards terminating or containing the war, the most basic determinant 
of the insurgent movement's assessment of the merits of interacting with it on these terms will be 
whether the abandonment of its war will help or harm the movement and its interests. Basic to 
an insurgent movement's adoption of peace is a rational decision to abandon war as the most 
efficient method of achieving its goals. For the insurgents, a decision to stop fighting is usually 
linked to a belief that peaceful methods will advance their interests more effectively than the 
continuation of the fighting. Therefore they will only accept and cooperate with interaction 
mechanisms that they calculate to have a positive impact on their position.84 More importantly, 
they will only submit to a peace process that they see as giving them a reasonable chance of 
attaining their objectives and which will protect them if they don't succeed in gaining political 
power. In other words, the process must be seen by the insurgent movement as enabling it to 
either win power, share power, or lose and be guaranteed of security. To be acceptable to the 
insurgents, the interaction mechanism must grant a significant amount of control to them over 
84 James, op. cit., 1990, p. 12. 
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the method of adjudicating between and adjusting the claims. They should also be assured about 
the extent of finality of the outcomes and the possibility of later peaceful adjustments. It is thus 
these considerations of expedience that determine an insurgent movement's acceptance of an 
interaction mechanism, and inform its approach to that interaction. The levels of acceptance by 
both the United Nations and the insurgent movement of the interaction mechanism will be used 
to measure the compatibility of their approaches, and be compared against the efficiency of their 
interaction. 
3.3.3: Instrumentality 
The third variable that will be used to assess the complementarity of the United Nations' 
and insurgent movements' approaches is the extent to which each sees the other's presence as 
instrumental to their initiative and the promotion of their interests. The selection of this indicator 
is based on the calculation that basic to the viability of any interaction is the parties' acceptance 
of each other's legitimacy and relevance as an interlocutor. Assessments of instrumentality by 
the United Nations and the insurgent movement, then, will be based on the recognition that the 
interests that they wish to promote will be more difficult or impossible to realise without the 
inclusion of the other, as a major actor, in the interaction designed to promote those interests. In 
a relationship of mutual lack of influence such as obtains between the United Nations and 
insurgent movements, the viability of the interaction will partly be a factor of mutual inclusion. 
It implies that the most effective will be consensual relationships, based on cooperation. 
The United Nations' perceptions of the instrumentality of the insurgent movement will 
be based on several factors. Foremost are practical consideration that derive from the nature of 
the objectives its sponsoring coalition is seeking to promote, and the mechanism of interaction 
designed to secure those goals. Because these interests will be based on terminating or 
containing the conflict in question, assessments of the importance of the insurgent movement's 
inclusion in the peace initiative will be founded on the impact of the group and its ability to 
continue the war. This consideration recognises that any peace that ignores the wishes and 
participation of a major party to the conflict is doomed to disruption and ephemerality. By 
including the major belligerents, including the powerful insurgent movements, the chances of 
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the peace initiative is increased. The United Nations' selection of interaction mechanisms will 
also reflect its assessment of the instrumentality of the insurgent movement by defIning the 
nature and extent of their intended contact. A moderating consideration on assessments of 
insurgent instrumentality will be opinions of acceptability in terms of international standards. 
Many of these standards are violated by insurgent movements: the laws of war, the prohibition 
of the use or threat of force, the prohibition of terrorism, and numerous human rights principles. 
Neither do many insurgent movements carry the support or endorsement of much of the 
population. The Member-States of the United Nations, motivated by cognisance of international 
standards, the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the liberal public opinion of 
their own citizenry, often fInd it impossible to treat with, or endorse the position of the more 
objectionable disputants, particularly in civil wars. These influences determine the United 
Nations' calculation of the instrumentality of the insurgent movement to the promotion of its 
interests. By affecting the United Nations' approach to their interaction, this indicator will 
influence the effIciency of their interaction. 
Insurgent movements' assessments of the instrumentality of the United Nations initiative 
are primarily motivated by calculations of the opportunities or dangers posed by their 
interaction. Again, this reckoning will be aware that the United Nations is concerned to promote 
peace or contain the war. Perceptions of United Nations instrumentality will therefore derive 
from the objectives ofthe insurgent movement, its belief that they can be more or less effIciently 
achieved by renouncing war and participating in the peace process, and its belief in the 
interaction mechanisms offered for the advancement of this process. Put simply, an insurgent 
movement will consent to a United Nations initiative if it feels the Organisation will be 
benefIcial to it. Once the decision to abandon the war has been taken, a United Nations presence 
can be seen as a desirable verifIcation presence, to protect the insurgent movement from the 
vengeful or unforseen actions of its enemies once it has abandoned war, its one means of self-
help. The promise of a United Nations presence in the resolution process can reduce suspicion 
and misgivings and facilitate the arrival of the parties at an agreement. 85 In addition, the 
insurgents appraisal of the interaction mechanisms will inform their judgements of 
85 James, op. cit., 1969, pp. 92-3. 
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instrumentality, with its assessments of whether the mandate and powers of the United Nations 
initiative will be helpful or obstructionist to the promotion of its interests. If the insurgents see 
the United Nations' presence as either an obstacle to the achievement of their objectives, or an 
unwelcome intervention trying to cajole them into a disadvantageous peace, they will oppose the 
initiative. If they have placed such store in the advantages of the United Nations presence, the 
insurgents' assessments of its acceptability will also be based on whether it is of the appropriate 
size and nature to carry out its projected role: too weak or ill-equipped a force can be judged 
inadequate for the purposes intended. Thus the levels of belief in each other's instrumentality 
between the United Nations and insurgent movements will be used as a measurement variable to 
determine the compatibility of their approaches, on the reasoning that relations between parties 
that accept each others importance will be more efficient. 
3.3.4: Impartiality 
The fourth indicator used to measure the compatibility of the United Nations' and 
insurgent movement's approaches is the impartiality of the behaviour during the interaction. 
Given the complex nature of civil wars, and the importance with which both the United Nations 
and the insurgent movements hold their interests, it is natural that interacting parties will attempt 
to gain the maximum advantage from each situation they are offered to promote their interests. 86 
Yet this predictable maximisation of interaction opportunities by all participants is different 
from manipulation or subversion of the relationships for ulterior motives. The importance of 
impartiality to the effectiveness of the interaction derives from the delicacy of any peace 
process, which obtains from the fact that any viable peace process involves the cumulative 
building of trust between the participants. The brevity and consensual basis of the interaction 
also make it vulnerable to partial behaviour by the participants. In a conflict or post-conflict 
environment, relations between units need to be conducted within certain limits; prejudicial 
behaviour, especially among former belligerents, will inevitably prompt a return to violence, 
their former means of self-help, thereby pushing the interaction back over the rubicon into 
warfare. 
86 James, op. cit., 1994, p. 30. 
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A United Nations initiative that becomes doubtful of the motives or behaviour of an 
insurgent movement will necessarily modify its approach to that interaction in a way that 
decreases its ability to achieve optimal outcomes from the interaction: "Differing degrees of 
respect for the original agreement by the contending parties often makes it impossible and 
undesirable for the UN force to maintain neutrality by equidistance. ,,87 Differential rates of 
cooperation of disputants with peacekeepers can also prejudice its reporting and actions towards 
different parties.88 An insurgent movement that does not keep its behaviour within the limits 
agreed, can, therefore, modify the approach of the United Nations, thereby destroying the 
confidence in, and viability of, the peace initiative. Insurgent impartiality, and United Nations 
assessments of their behaviour, is based on the movement's cooperativeness, openness, and 
responsiveness to the United Nations initiative, and any agreement that obtains between them. 
Impartiality is, therefore, based on the insurgent movement's level of acceptance of the 
interaction mechanism. If it fully endorses the mechanism as a promising way of promoting its 
interests, it will confine its behaviour with those terms, while it will be less inclined to 
scrupulously cooperate when dubious of the ramifications of a particular initiative. Impartiality, 
then, will be used to measure the conduciveness of an insurgent movement's approach to an 
effective interaction with the United Nations. 
Insurgent movements entering a peace process increase their vulnerability by entering 
the political system and surrendering their ability to use violence for self-protection. Typically, 
then, they are very sensitive to the actions of the other participants with whom they interact, and 
wary of any actions that pose a danger to the movement or its supporters. If they accept the 
instrumentality of a United Nations presence, partly to protect them from attack and their 
interests from manipulation during this vulnerable time, their continued acceptance of that 
presence and participation in the interaction will derive partly from their assessments of the 
impartiality of the United Nations. Any evidence of United Nations' sympathy with or help from 
the groups' former enemies will cause the insurgent movement to modify its approach to the 
87 Holst, op. cit., 1990, p. 269. 
88 James, op. cit., 1990, p. 7. 
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interaction, thereby damaging its effectiveness. An third party is perceived as impartial if all 
participants assess its general preference for the others as not greater than for themselves.89 This 
is a vital prerequisite of a cooperative interaction, because " .. .it is obvious that there will be no 
confidence in the supervisory system unless it is clear that personnel are impartial and 
independent.,,9o A United Nations initiative that is perceived to be impartial facilitates the 
conflict termination process " ... by providing credible evidence and assurance to all sides that the 
others are not breaking the rules.,,91 Its impartiality will also be assessed by the insurgent 
movement according to how faithful its actions are to the interaction mechanisms and any other 
agreements that obtain between them. Thus mutual assessments of impartiality between the 
United Nations and insurgent movements will be used to measure the conduciveness of their 
approaches to an efficient interaction. 
3.3.5: Timing 
The final three indicators measure not so much the compatibility of the United Nations' 
and insurgent movements' approaches to their interaction, as the motivations behind, origins of, 
and the extent of the operation of these variables. The factor of the timing of the interaction 
between the United Nations and the insurgent movement is used to characterise the insurgent 
movement's approach to the interaction. It allows this analysis to measure specifically its 
compatibility with the United Nations approach by measuring how committed it is to a peace 
initiative. Timing allows us to assess the fortunes of the war for the insurgent movement, and 
from there characterise its military calculus of the relative advantages of war and peace. This is 
based on a realist calculation that only environh1ental pressures influencing a unit's calculation 
of an ability to promote its self-interests or the proximity of a threat to its self-defence will 
influence a change in behaviour as momentous as the abandonment of insurgent warfare. The 
measurement of the effect of timing on the interaction's effectiveness makes use of Zartman's 
concept of "ripeness", or those military conditions characterised by "mutual or painful 
89 James,op. cit., 1969, p. 37. 
90 Bailey,op. cit., 1982, p. 291. 
91 lohan Jorgen Holst, "Support and Limitations: Peacekeeping From the Point of View of the Troop-
Contributors", in Rikbye and Skjelsbaek (eds), 1990, p. Ill. 
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stalemates marked by recent or impending catastrophe; [when] both parties' efforts at unilateral 
solutions ... are blocked and bilateral solutions ... are conceivable. ,,92 
This analysis will assess the conflict at the time of the interaction for its proximity to this 
condition of a stalemated war with a high attrition rate, and from there making the calculation 
that the insurgent movement will make a rational judgement that it will gain more and lose less 
by acceding to the United Nations initiative rather than continuing to fight. 93 The circumstances 
of civil wars, and the sluggish nature of the United Nations' decision making and conflict 
termination machinery, means that its peace efforts are most often applied to wars that are 
protracted and belligerents whose positions are hardened.94 Such a prolonged military struggle 
is a means for the belligerents to reach an agreement on their relative power, and therefore, their 
bargaining strength: "In essence the very factor which ma[kes] the enemies reluctant to continue 
fighting also persuade [ s] them to negotiate. That factor [is] their agreement about their relative 
bargaining position. ,,95 As a general rule, a willingness to negotiate will be taken to increase or 
decrease in inverse proportion to success on the battlefield: consistent military failure will raise 
an insurgent movement's receptiveness to peace terms, while military success will lead to the 
expansion of goals and the hardening of the belligerent bargaining position.96 This analysis will 
thus inform its assessment of the level of compatibility of the insurgent movement's approach to 
the United Nations' by examining the dynamics of the conflict at the time of the interaction, on 
the basis that insurgents will be more eager to abandon a war they are losing for a viable peace 
process, but will reject any peace initiative at variance with its military impetus, that threatens to 
freeze disadvantageous positions, or offers an unacceptable outcome. 
92 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 10. 
93 Blainey, op. cit., 1973, p. 122. 
94 Claude, op. cit., 1965, p. 218. 
95 Blainey, op. cit., 1973, p. 114. 
96 Scott, op. cit., 1970, p. 84. 
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3.3.6: Support and Isolation 
The sixth indicator in the framework allows the analysis to gauge with greater accuracy 
the impact of both actors' approaches on the efficiency of their interaction. The measurement of 
involved Member-States' levels of support for the United Nations initiative informs the analysis 
of the amount and extent of influence the international community is prepared to exercise on 
behalf of this initiative. Attention to the insurgent movement's degree of isolation from former 
supporters in the international community allows the study to examine the insurgent movement's 
ability to promote and defend its own interests during the interaction. The sponsorship of 
insurgent movements by States is the one interdependent relationship that can modify the 
original logic underlying the interaction of the United Nations and insurgent movements. The 
exertion of positive influence in either direction during an interaction is thus a mitigating factor 
on the otherwise compelling logic of the mutual lack of influence between the United Nations 
and insurgent movements. This variable allows the analysis to inform its assessment of the 
compatibility of the approaches of the United Nations and insurgent movements with 
considerations of how strongly each is able to advance its interests during the interaction with 
the other. Support and isolation are thus mitigating factors on the need for the complementarity 
of approaches: some disagreements in approaches can be reconciled in favour of the participant 
wielding the greater influence over the other, courtesy of its supporters in the international 
community. 
The extent of support for a United Nations initiative by its Member-States is an indicator 
used to measure the authority with which the approach it takes is pursued during the interaction. 
This measurement informs this assessment of not only the capabilities of the initiative, but more 
importantly of the extent of the international community's influence over the insurgents that 
allows it to promote the United Nations' interests with much greater effectiveness during its 
interaction with the insurgent movement. Support for the United Nations initiative will be 
measured by the willingness and efforts of its members to use their individual or collective 
influence on insurgent movements which they currently or previously sponsored, to promote the 
sponsoring coalition's interests. Conversely it will also be gauged by their assent to abstaining 
from involving themselves in the conflict with any agenda other than the United Nations'. Such 
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concerted pressure can have a considerable affect on the success of the peace process: "If enough 
members of the Council are determined that the fighting shall stop and are prepared to use 
diplomatic and other forms of persuasion and pressure to that end, then it is certainly possible 
eventually to make the Council's decision effective. ,,97 On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
the conflict termination can be undermined if an important member of the United Nations and 
the international community dissents from the majority position on the civil war, regards the 
United Nations as intruding into its sphere of influence, and instead backs one of the belligerents 
to continue fighting despite the peace initiatives. 
The extent of an insurgent movement's isolation informs the analysis of the ability or 
inability of the group to influence the United Nations' approach to be more compatible with the 
achievement of the insurgent movement's goals. External support and encouragement of an 
insurgent movement will increase its intransigence and inspire it to increase its demands. 
Conversely, isolation or desertion by an international backer will decrease not only the 
resources, but the confidence of the movement. This factor inevitably affects insurgent 
movement's calculus of the costs of war and peace, and isolation is more likely to increase its 
receptiveness to peace overtures. In addition to cutting off support, erstwhile backers can 
advance the peace process by using the leverage of years of contact and support to pressure 
former insurgent clients towards peace: 
... because it happens that the superpowers have been very ready to conceive of 
themselves as having some general responsibility for world order, internal 
disputants have additionally found themselves under considerable pressure to 
settle ... the UN Security Council [as] ... guardian of world order...has shown a 
willingness to get involved in a variety of situations, cajoling, pushing and 
sometimes threatening parties towards the negotiating table.98 
An important consideration to be taken into account when assessing the impact of this factor on 
insurgents is the size and influence of the actor supporting an insurgent movement: a great or 
regional power's support will be more confounding to the peace process than that of a small 
97 Bailey, op. cit., 1982, p. 111. 
98 James, "The Problems ofintemal Peacekeeping", op. cit., 1994, pp. 27-8. 
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State or another insurgent group. In these ways, the support or isolation of the United Nations 
and the insurgent movement will be measured and used as a variable modifying the impact of 
the other indicators measuring the compatibility of their approaches. This indicator mediates the 
earlier relationships by providing that a degree of incompatibility of approaches can still result in 
a viable interaction through the potential influence of third party States on the interaction. 
3.3.7: Cohesion 
The final framework indicator also measures the capabilities of the United Nations and 
the insurgent movement to advance their interests through their interaction. It qualifies the 
impact of the concurrence of their approaches on the efficiency of their interaction by warning 
the analysis that the internal cohesion of each actor affects its viability and effectiveness in 
promoting its interests through the interaction in different ways. This variable takes note of the 
various internal structural and factional interest constraints or advantages that affect the United 
Nations mission's and the insurgent movement's behaviour. It further informs the analysis of the 
influence of the compatibility of their approaches on the efficiency of their interaction with an 
indicator of the ability of each to promote and protect its interests in the interaction. Levels of 
cohesion also affect the changing priorities of objectives and the impartiality of the behaviour of 
the United Nations and insurgents, thereby exerting a modifying influence on the relationship 
between the concurrence of approaches and the efficiency of the interaction. 
The cohesion within the United Nations, and particularly among its sponsoring coalition, 
informs the analysis of the capabilities and confidence of the initiative, and moreover the 
conviction with which the initiative promotes the interests of the sponsoring coalition. The 
cohesion within the Security Council is a measure of the coincidence of interests among its 
Great Power backers: as "a gathering of sovereign States, and therefore what it can do is 
circumscribed by the common ground that exists between them ... from case to case and also from 
one period to another. ,,99 Another determinant of cohesion is that the extent to which the 
members of the supporting coalition see the Organisation as the best way of advancing their 
99 James, "The United Nations", op. cit., 1990, p. 186. 
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interests with respect to the conflict at hand. The appearance of United Nations' cohesion is also 
important to the success of its initiatives, both in its effects on its own members and on the 
disputants. The recent track record of the United Nations is an important factor in the decisions 
of its Member-States to support its subsequent ventures: "[there is] a direct relationship between 
the performance of the UN as an institution and the willingness of Member-States to commit 
resources and political capital to enhance its peacekeeping activities."loo Higher levels of 
cohesion behind the operation enable more concerted actions, and greater effectiveness in 
promoting United Nations interests. 101 The cohesion of the coalition formed within the Security 
Council to address concerned States' interests relating to the conflict also determines the 
conviction with which the United Nations initiative holds and advances its interests. A coalition 
exhibiting a high level of agreement and determination to advance a certain set of interests will 
be more concerned that they are secured by the initiative, despite the level of efficiency of its 
interaction with the belligerents. A coalition without such agreement, such as one forced to 
include a number of disparate interests for reasons of legitimacy, will find its cohesion further 
damaged when the United Nations initiative experiences difficulties; and in this case a less 
efficient interaction will cause the coalition to moderate its expectations and opt for a less 
optimal outcome. 
The amount of cohesion within the insurgent movement enhances the analysis of the 
insurgent movement's approach to the interaction by informing the assessment of its intention 
with an appraisal of its capability to act on that intention. Excessive factionalism and 
disagreement with the peace process can be damaging to its peaceful pursuit of the insurgent 
movement's objectives. Extremist factions, opposing the leadership's commitment to peace and 
compromise, may launch attacks against the delicate structures and guarantees of trust that form 
the start of any peace process, and thus destroy the peace by provoking the retaliation of former 
opponents against the whole movement. Factionalised or decentralised insurgent movements can 
also find it difficult to enforce compliance with the terms of peace agreements on all of their 
cadres, further destroying the trust and mutual advancement of the peace process. So cohesion 
100 Berdal, "Wither UN Peacekeeping?", op. cit., 1993, p. 5. 
101 Bailey,op. cit., 1982, p. 111. 
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and centralised direction in an insurgent movement is contributive to the complementarity of its 
approach to the United Nations' peace initiative. The measurement of levels of cohesion within 
both the United Nations and insurgent movement allows for the examination of their conduct as 
its relates to the other factors determining their intentions and approaches, and can also explain 
seeming contradictions between stimuli, intentions and behaviours. 
The seven indicators identified of the compatibility of United Nations' and insurgent 
movement's approaches to their interaction are thus arranged into an interrelated framework. 
This enables the ensuing analysis to apply them to the evidence of such interactions in a way 
that can not only select the important indicators of behaviour, but can produce a coherent 
assessment of the influence of the level of compatibility of the approaches on the effectiveness 
of the interaction. It allows a comparison of these assessments between a variety of cases 
differing in types of interaction, levels of commitment, and forms of contact. The framework of 
indices will be applied to interactions between the United Nations and seven insurgent 
movements after the Cold War: Unita, the Bosnian Serbs, the Khmer Rouge, the FMLN, 
Renamo, the Nicaraguan Contras, and the SNC-SNA. Each of the ensuing chapters will apply 
the framework to a number of cases in each of a different class of United Nations-insurgent 
relationship: mediation, peacekeeping, and election monitoring. The cases analysed in each 
chapter are selected on the basis of the existence of that class of relationship between the United 
Nations and the insurgent movement, and the level of efficiency of the interaction. The level of 
compatibility between approaches measured by the framework indices on each of the cases can 
thus be compared between interactions that were similarly efficient, between similarly 
dysfunctional interactions, and between viable and unviable interactions. In this way, the 
analysis will test the validity of the hypothesised relationship between the United Nations and 
insurgent movements after the Cold War. 
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4: MEDIATION 
Mediation initiatives offer an opportunity to study one of the earliest phases of 
interactions between the United Nations and insurgent movements.! As a sustained interaction 
between sub-State and super-State actors, a mediation relationship should be affected by the 
logic of mutual lack of influence, and the subsequent determinants of optimal interactions, that 
this analysis is based on. This chapter assesses the extent to which this logic affects United 
Nations mediation efforts with insurgents after the Cold War. To do this, it initially applies the 
framework of approach indicators, developed in Chapter Three, to the modalities of United 
Nations mediation, to demonstrate how each indicator operates in the mediation context. This 
mediation framework is then consecutively applied to three different cases of United Nations 
mediation with insurgent groups after the Cold War. The interactions selected - the FMLN, the 
Khmer Rouge, and the Bosnian Serbs - are chosen because they exhibit differing degrees of 
success and failure and a range of differing attributes of varying impact on the mediation 
relationship. The objective of this analysis is to compare the sources of viability and dysfunction 
among these mediation relationships according to the framework variables in order to determine 
the validity to mediation of the hypothesis, that between the United Nations and insurgent 
movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions than divergent 
approaches. 
4.1: Mediation: A Framework for Analysis 
Mediation, whether international or internal, is a voluntary, peaceful intervention2 
designed to affect the conflict situation towards a peaceful resolution.3 A mediator enters the 
dispute to establish, as an intermediary, a non-military channel of interaction between the 
I Prior contacts with the conflicts may have been made by the United Nations, such as the dispatch of a fact-
fmding mission, overtures to the combatants, and even expressions of concern. However, none of these preliminary 
moves can be regarded as constituting a concerted effort on behalf of the Organisation to terminate the war. 
2 United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Codification Division, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
Between States, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 40. 
3 Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful 
Outcomes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No.3, 1986, p. 156. 
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disputants to attempt to substitute negotiation for warfare as a method of apportioning the 
disputed commodities at the base of the conflict.4 As "the nature and form of mediation in 
international relations changes over time as new forms and innovations are developed and 
become accepted by members of international society", the responsibilities for mediation are 
increasingly shifting onto multilateral actors. 5 Among contemporary multilateral actors, the 
United Nations' unique combination of profile, status, scope, and legitimacy make it 
increasingly the international organisation sought as mediator in internal conflicts.6 Article 33 of 
the United Nations Charter requires disputants to seek a mediated solution to their conflict, 
while Articles 34 and 36 grant the Security Council the mandate to recommend the application 
of mediation to a dispute. This has developed into an obligation: according to Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali, "If a Member-State is asking for the assistance of the United Nations and the 
mediation of the United Nations, I believe that it is a duty of the United Nations to intervene.,,7 
The role of mediator for the United Nations has fallen to the office of the Secretary-
General and his Special Representatives.8 The accessibility and neutrality of the office of the 
Secretary-General means that sub-State organisations can interact with the Secretary-General 
" ... on the understanding that his good offices are completely non-prejudicial and do not in any 
way depend on a prior solution of such issues as recognition or legitimacy of the status of any 
party. ,,9 The Secretary-General's office further has at its command all of the diplomatic 
4 Vivienne Jabri, "The Western Contact Group as Intennediary in the Conflict over Namibia", in C. R. Mitchell 
and K. Webb (eds), New Approaches to International Mediation, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 103-4. 
5 C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb, "Mediation in International Relations: An Evolving Tradition", in ibid., p. 5. 
6 Other multilateral actors involved in recent mediation include the European Union and the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference in the fonner Yugoslavia, the Organisation of African Unity in Somalia, ASEAN in Cambodia, 
the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique and ECOW AS in Liberia. 
7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, quoted in Ian Black, "Britain Still Finn on Bosnia After Talks With UN Leader", The 
Guardian, 26 October 1994. 
8 Paul E. Mason and Thomas F. Marsteller Jr., "U.N. Mediation: More Effective Options", SAIS Review, Vol. 5, 
No.2, SummerlFall 1985, pp. 272-3. The Secretary-General was originally conceived by the United Nations' 
founders to be a "super diplomat", with President Roosevelt advocating the title of "World Moderator" for the 
position. 
9 Vratislav Pechota, The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations 
Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace, (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1972), p. 
48. 
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resources of the United Nations Organisation, greatly enhancing the infonnation access!O and 
influence available to its mediation efforts.!! This broad access to international actors also gives 
the Secretary-General the ability to coordinate his own mediation efforts with those of other 
third parties. As the mediation of the United Nations in disputes involving insurgents is 
proliferates, the Secretary-General must often substitute for his personal intervention his chosen 
Special Representatives, who assume the powers and attributes of the office of the Secretary-
General in their capacity as mediators, and execute their assignments under the authority of the 
Secretary-General as granted by Article 101 of the Charter. 
Mediation is a fonn of conflict termination intervention in which the mediator has high 
control over the process, but low control over the outcome of the mediation. 12 While "[a]s 
currently constituted, the United Nations [as a mediator] has .. .little real political leverage. Its 
promises and threats lack credibility,,,!3 the insurgent movement enters an interaction in which 
its mechanisms of influence have little impact on the mediator. This mutual lack of influence 
suggests that it is appropriate to apply the framework for analysis to mediation relationships 
between the United nations and insurgent movements. This section prepares the framework for 
this by demonstrating how each of the framework indices - objectives, interaction mechanisms, 
instrumentality, impartiality, timing, support and isolation, and cohesion - detennines the United 
Nations' and insurgent movements' approaches to the mediation interaction. As modified, this 
mediation framework will then be applied to selected mediation interactions. 
4.1.1: Objectives 
The compatibility of objectives between the United Nations and insurgent movements is 
as important to the viability of mediation as it is to other stages of their interaction. As in any 
10 The recently-created Office for the Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) also provides United 
Nations mediators with vital information on the conflicts and their contestants. 
II Pechota,op. cit., 1972, pp. 69-70. 
12 Jacob Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Jacob Bercovitch 
and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), Mediation in International Relational: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 8. 
13 Saadia Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.5, September/October 1994, p. 45. 
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other interaction, parties entering mediation will be pursuing their own objectives through the 
mediation process. The mediation relationship is highly consensual: it is non-coercive in 
process, and the extent to which former belligerents are bound by its result depends on their 
satisfaction with the outcomes. 14 For this reason, any enduring mediation outcome will 
necessarily be based on the acquiescence to, and therefore the substantive satisfaction of the 
parties' objectives. Yet the mediator, by its presence, will be attempting also to achieve 
objectives, in the form of agreement reached, from the mediation interaction. The consensuality 
of the interaction, and the ease of withdrawal from the process, suggests that if the mediators' 
interests clash with those of the insurgent movement, the interaction will either break down or 
produce a sub-optimal result. A more effective mediation interaction, on the other hand, will 
arise from a situation in which the interaction allows both mediator and insurgent movement to 
advance their interests through negotiation. The concurrence of common and overriding 
objectives should yield a more effective mediation interaction and a more enduring agreement 
than a mediation that satisfies transitory or secondary objectives at the expense of ignoring 
interests which are conflicting, but more important. Essential objectives that are more 
complementary, then, should produce a more optimal mediation interaction. 
The United Nations' objectives as it mediates are determined by its Member-States' 
wishes and by its own institutional preferences. Member-State wishes usually emerge from the 
process of compromise and collective decision making. These instructions to United Nations 
mediators emerge either informally or through resolutions on the Organisations' opinion of the 
principle on which the resolution should be based. The Secretary-GeneralIs and Special 
Representative's "brieP' is the outcome of a negotiated compromise among an ad hoc coalition 
of interested United Nations Member-States, particularly the Great Powers of the Security 
Council's Permanent Five. In advocating particular terms of conflict settlement, the concerned 
Member-States seek to promote their own interests and conceptions of world order. These 
objectives are modified by cognisance to the United Nations' normative standards and 
assumptions on civil wars. IS United Nations mediators' objectives are therefore usually based on 
14 Bercovitch, "Structure and Diversity of Mediation", in Bercovitch and Rubin, op. cit., 1992, p. 4. 
15 A fonner Special Representative to the Cyprus conflict stated: "[Any settlement] must be consistent with the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter, of which the following in particular seems relevant: the purposes, 
principles and obligations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the peaceful settlement of 
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a need to end the civil war in question, and alleviate human suffering, using mediation to reach 
an agreement on an alternative to fighting to apportion the disputed commodities at the base of 
the conflict. They usually seek to restore to a unified government, legitimated by popular 
support, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a formerly divided State. These instructions 
are issued in the form of resolutions advocating particular terms of settlement, or as instructions 
passed on through the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, and the diplomatic environment of the 
mediator. 
To be compatible with the United Nations mediators', the insurgent movement's 
objectives must in some way be consistent with the abandonment of war as a method of 
promoting its interests. Yet this does not mean surrender: in a viable interaction, the mediation 
process represents for the disputants the continuation of their struggle to achieve their objectives 
and maintain their security by another, non-military means. The insurgent movement is still 
concerned with promoting the optimal combination of its interests and maintaining its physical 
survival. It follows that disputants will only enter a mediation process that offers them the 
opportunity of securing to some extent their objectives, and that their interest in reconciliation 
depends on the attractiveness of the solution proposed. 16 A decision to enter mediation will be 
based on either a rational calculation that these objectives can be more efficiently secured 
peacefully; or it can arise from a reordering of the objectives and a prioritising of less martial 
interests. Without this willingness to contemplate a peace process, a mediation interaction with 
the United Nations will not make progress. When mediating with insurgents, whose objectives 
are central to their existence, it is impossible to mediate away or adjust diametrically clashing 
objectives. Thus the viability of the mediation interaction depends on the compatibility of the 
objectives which the United Nations and insurgent movements bring to the mediation 
interaction. 
disputes, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognition of the sovereign equality of member-
states, abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, and respect for treaty obligations not in conflict with those of the member-states under the Charter." See 
Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 6-12. 
16 Samuel G. Amoo and I. William Zartman, "Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization of 
African Unity in Chad", in Bercovitch and Rubin, op. cit., 1992, p. 132. 
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4.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
Mediation is a fonn of interaction that carries its own distinctive dynamics, based on the 
give and take of the negotiation process. When the United Nations chooses this mechanism as a 
method of stopping or containing the fighting and securing its other interests is detennined by 
various requirements of the conflict situation, efficiency, and parsimony. Having chosen such a 
consensual mechanism, United Nations mediators are heavily reliant on mediation techniques to 
reconcile the positions of the disputants, thereby securing the optimal outcome of the interaction. 
These strategies are influenced by the nature and modalities of the conflict. Mediators use their 
detachment from the conflict to break up the conflict dynamic and reach a creative solution: 
"Redefining the issues in conflict, or finding a fonnula for its resolution or management is the 
key to its tennination, with the parties frequently needing help in finding a solution hidden in the 
morass of bad relationships or in constructing a solution from the pieces of the conflict itself. ,,17 
A mediator, through providing a non-military fonn of interaction between the disputants, is able 
to provide alternative perceptions and costings of the conflict: "Parties involved in a 
conflict. .. are not likely to have sufficient knowledge either of the sources of their conflictual 
relationships, or of the options available to resolve them. In the absence of adequate knowledge, 
there can be no accurate costing of policies, or of the consequence of behaviours." 18 
The most basic mediation strategy is to find a mediating framework that addresses the 
disputants' concerns and to which the parties agree, based on their perception of being able to 
secure their objectives through that fonnula. Basic to an appealing mediating framework is 
devising a general fonnula which alters the parties' tenns of reference towards the dispute from a 
zero-sum equation to a mutually-benefiting trade-off of items of differing value. 19 This is the 
technique of deductive negotiation, whereby a general framework is established governing an 
agreed-on definition of the conflict and the general principles susceptible to agreement, followed 
17 Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in Saadia Touval and I. William 
Zartman, International Mediation in Theory and Practice, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 12. 
18 John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 6-7. 
19 I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982), p. 13. 
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by negotiations to work out the details of the agreement.20 Often the deductive method leaves 
residual disagreements on which no agreement can be reached; if such matters are minor they 
can be moved past and marked for later negotiation?! Disagreements can also be papered over 
in the interests of the broader settlement using Kissinger's formulation "constructive ambiguity", 
or the use of vague or equivocal language to disguise conflicting interpretations or positions?2 
The mediator can also build deadlines into the mediation framework and use these along with 
international interest in the process to induce concessions and ensure continued cooperation. 
An insurgent movement accepting mediation as its mechanism of interaction with the 
United Nations must regard the initiative as a viable and safe way of advancing its interests. 
Often the genuine acceptance of mediation by an insurgent movement signals a desire to end the 
conflict and use non-military means to distribute the disputed commodities.23 Once this 
commitment to peace has been made by the disputants, the mediation process becomes " ... an 
extension and continuation of the parties' own conflict management efforts.,,24 The belligerents, 
by inviting or agreeing to mediation, agree on the need for a negotiated solution and 
acknowledge the need for a third party to help them achieve an agreement. Mediation is a more 
attractive option for suspicious former belligerents than other peace initiatives, because it is non-
binding, and the disputants can explore the options and consequences of demands and 
concessions and make conditional commitments in a non-coercive forum. 25 Mediation grants 
the disputants the most control over the process of resolution, thereby allowing them to 
safeguard their interests by threat of withdrawal and non-cooperation?6 Insurgents' genuine 
20 Zartman and Bennan, op. cit., 1982,pp. 89-113. 
21 Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976), pp. 16-18. 
22 See Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 816-846. 
23 Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 
p.llO. 
24 Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Bercovitch and Rubin, 
op. cit., 1992, p. 4. 
25 Miall, op. cit., 1992, p. 87. 
26 Indar lit Rikhye, "Critical Elements in Detennining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United 
Nations Secretary-General" in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart l. Thorson (eds), Timing and De-Escalation of 
International Conflicts, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 59. 
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commitment to mediation will be based on their belief that it is a method that will be at that 
moment more effective than war for the securement or salvaging of their objectives: "The parties 
must be shown that it is the negotiation process that is the way through their problem. ,,27 They 
must trust the confidentiality of the mediation, which allows them to explore options without 
having to publicly justify these positions, and creates a rational, non-propagandised atmosphere 
for negotiations.28 Commitment to the mediation process means that the belligerents must be 
prepared, as part of the process, to re-evaluate their policies and objectives and compromise. A 
rigid adherence to original goals by any party is highly destructive to any mediation process, and 
belies any protestations of agreement to mediation. However, once genuine acceptance of 
mediation has been given by the parties and the United Nations, a peace momentum sets in, 
" ... and a new dimension is thereby added to the dispute that is not under the control of the 
disputants. ,,29 In these ways, the viability of the United Nations-insurgent interaction partly 
depends on whether both see mediation as the best method of advancing their interests. 
4.1.3: Instrumentality 
As an essentially consensual activity, effective mediation requires the United Nations' 
and the insurgent movement's acceptance of each other as a legitimate and relevant interlocutors 
during the mediation. For the United Nations, viable peace talks must include all of the major 
belligerents in the civil war. The United Nations' acceptance of the participation of the insurgent 
movement is tempered by considerations of its organisational standards. Often insurgent 
movements' opposition to the State, lack of popular endorsement, and unsavoury military and 
human rights practices makes them unpopular participants in the peace process for mediators 
and other belligerents. The United Nations' decisions on the participation of insurgent 
movements in peace talks is more heavily determined by realist considerations, however. It is 
aware that for a mediated solution to have any meaning, all major disputants need to be party to 
27 Colosi, "A Model for Mediation and Negotiation", in Sando Ie and Sandole-Staroste, op. cit., 1987, p. 93. 
28 Sir Anthony Parsons, "The U.N. and International Security" in G.R. Berridge and A. Jennings (eds), 
Diplomacy at the UN., (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 52. 
29 Puchala, "The Secretary General and His Special Representatives", in Rivlin and Gordenker, op. cit., 1993, p. 
86. 
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the negotiations and the final agreement. A major pressure towards recognising the 
instrumentality of the insurgent movement to the mediation process is the desire of the United 
Nations and the other belligerents for peace, and their recognition that the insurgents, as a major 
belligerent, exercise a veto over an effective solution. The only way to secure insurgents' 
cooperation in the peace process is to include them in the process.3D In this way, negotiations 
"arise from a double veto, wherein both parties can block a negotiated solution if it does not 
satisfy them, but can also prevent a unilateral solution from taking place if it excludes them. ,,31 
For an effective mediation interaction, the insurgents' negotiators, once included in the 
mediation, need to be recognised as legitimate spokespeople for their movement and have or be 
able to access positions of decision-making power.32 
Essential to the conduciveness of its approach to a viable mediation interaction is the 
insurgent movement's acceptance of the role and importance of the United Nations as a 
mediator. The parties' perceptions of its credibility is determined by their belief that the mediator 
is an independent, credible and knowledgeable actor who is prestigious and authoritative, with 
original ideas, access to information and resources, and who can act unobtrusively.33 They must 
also trust the mediator's discretion. The prestige associated with the office of the Secretary-
General and the United Nations Organisation are considerable, and the Organisation is often 
seen as more impartial than other possible third parties. The privacy of the Good Offices of the 
Secretary-General enable the relations with and between the disputants to occur in strict 
confidentiality, thereby deflecting public pressure, promoting a calm atmosphere, and allowing 
greater flexibility and creativity during the negotiations.34 The United Nations can provide a 
discrete communication channel, which can be used to break a recognition and communication 
impasse, where the parties either don't recognise each other or where they refuse to negotiate 
30 Zartman and Bennan, op. cit., 1982, p. 58. 
31 ibid, pp. 57-8. 
32 Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions ... ", op. cit., 1986, p. 
160. 
33 Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful 
Outcomes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No.3, 1986, p. 163. 
34 Pechota, op. cit., 1972, pp. 53-54. 
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directly.35 A discrete mediation process also offers the belligerents a safe way of making 
concessions without risking their reputations or future bargaining positions.36 Thus an insurgent 
movement's acceptance of the instrumentality of the United Nations as a mediator depends on its 
assessment of United Nations mediation as a viable way of promoting and protecting its 
interests. 
4.1.4: Impartiality 
The delicate nature of peace talks, and the vulnerabilities of their participants, makes 
their commitment to the mediation interaction depend on their trust of the process. As the 
embodiment of the process, and a safeguard against foul play, a mediator needs to be perceived 
as impartial if he or she is to preside over a viable mediation. Insurgents' judgements on the 
acceptability of a mediator are determined by their "trust in the prospective mediator 
and ... perception that the potential mediator is independent of [their] ... opponents.,,37 The trust of 
the parties in the mediator and the framework can be used as a foundation for the building of 
trust between the parties.38 Touval contends that to the belligerents, the ability of a mediator to 
provide an acceptable outcome is more important than his or her impartiality;39 nevertheless, the 
ability to provide an acceptable solution implies a necessary amount of distance from the 
advancement of the adversary's objectives. Similarly an unbiased mediating formula developed 
by the mediator will also secure the parties' trust: " ... the matter of balance - the formula must not 
be so favourable to the proposer as to be rejected by the other side, but not be so generous as to 
be suspect - is crucial to acceptance. Indeed, insuring a balance of interests in the formula is 
another way of indicating that it must be fair. ,,40 Thus a viable mediation will be based on an 
impartial mediator. 
35 Mason and Marsteller, op. cit., 1985, p. 273. 
36 Zartman and Touval, "Conclusion", Touval and Zartman, op. cit., 1985, p. 245. 
37 Stephens, "Acceptance of Mediation Initiatives", in Mitchell and Webb, op. cit., 1988, p. 57. 
38 ibid, p. 274. 
39 Touval, op. cit., 1982, pp. 326-7. 
40 Zartman and Berman, op. cit., 1982, p. 114. Italics in original. 
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Mediation, an activity based on the accumulation of conditional commitments, is most 
effective when the participants' actions and motives are transparent and have no ulterior 
motives.41 The impartiality of the insurgent movement's mediation behaviour, and its 
commitment to mediation, when matched by the commitments of the other parties, will lead to a 
more productive interaction. While they will naturally try to negotiate the best outcome from 
negotiations, sustained and deliberately partial behaviour by the insurgent movement will cause 
a breakdown in peace talks: "[b]y interfering with problem-solving, hostile and contentious 
behaviour reduces the likelihood that agreements will be reached or, if reached, that they will 
provide high joint benefit and thus be mutually satisfying.,,42 Using talks for strategic reasons, 
not intending to honour undertakings, stonewalling, gambits designed to exacerbate divisions 
within the international community or alleviating embargoes by confusing the mediation 
initiative, are all behaviours which will damage and disrupt the interaction. Insurgents' impartial 
behaviour is based on their acceptance of the mediation initiative, and their conviction that the 
problem " ... can only be resolved jointly and when they ... have the will to end an existing 
situation that they consider unacceptable. ,,43 Their commitment to the process and the final 
settlement is a measure of the durability of that settlement. 
4.1.5: Timing 
The timing of the mediation initiative, measured against the insurgent movement's 
military position at that time, is an important indicator of the insurgent movement's commitment 
to peace, and thus the compatibility of its approach with the United Nations mediators'. 
Belligerents' receptivity to mediation is determined by their calculations of their military 
position. This contention is based on the reasoning that an insurgent movement will be most 
amenable to peace overtures when the conflict enters a stagnant, painful stalemate, and the 
41 Ikle describes mediation as "an exchange of conditional promises, by which each party declares that it will act 
in a certain way on condition that the other parties act in accordance with their promises." See Ikle, op. cit., 1976, p. 
7. 
42 Zubek et. aI., "Success in Mediation", op. cit., 1992, p. 549. 
43 ibid., p. 66. 
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group's position threatens to worsen. At this time, the insurgent movement will cease to 
contemplate unilateral solutions as realistic, and begins to see a negotiated, bilateral solution as 
the only way to salvage its interests and security.44 Timing is a measurement of insurgents' 
perceptions: the parties must shift from a winning to a salvaging mentality. The insurgents, ever 
aware of the calculus of power and influence, often try to ensure that they do not enter 
negotiations from a position of weakness, and be faced with accepting the diktats of a more 
powerful opponent, by trying to improve their military situation or credibility prior to 
negotiations.45 The timing of a mediation initiative is crucial to the tenability and leverage of the 
mediator: "the mediator's work is at the mercy of the evolution of the conflict, on a particular 
conjunction of forces that makes his efforts appear like an opportunity for the parties rather than 
a meddlesome distraction. ,,46 An intervention at the right point in a conflict can thus use the 
conflict dynamic at that stage as leverage to induce cooperation: "the existence of situational 
pressures is important for inducing the parties to make concessions. Hence the importance of the 
timing, and the circumstances of the mediation. ,,47 Bad timing of a mediation initiative can 
create obstacles to the resolution process, for example by making the position of one or more 
parties more intractable. The United Nations mediator must therefore be able to identify 
moments of ripeness in the patterns of conflict, escalation and stalemate in a conflict. 48 
4.1.6: Support and Isolation 
The amount of support provided to a United Nations mediator by the Organisation's 
Member-States is an indicator of the amount of leverage available to the mediator over the 
insurgents. Parallel pressure by States with influence over the insurgents can enable, to varying 
degrees, the interaction to overcome some incompatibilities between their approaches by 
44 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 10. 
45 James O. C. Jonah, "The Military Talks at Kilometre 101: The U.N.'s Effectiveness as a Third Party", 
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 6, No.1, January 1990, p. 54. 
46 Zartman and Touval, "Conclusion", in Touval and Zartman, op. cit., 1985, pp. 264-5. 
47 Touval, op. cit., 1982, p. 328. Italics in original. 
48 Zartman, op. cit., 1989, p. 263. 
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allowing the United Nations and insurgent to modify each others' positions. The most important 
supporters for United Nations mediators are those States with links to the conflict that can 
exercise a facilitating influence on the belligerents. Ties to the parties can translate into leverage: 
"Theoretically, the more ties a mediator has with a party - the more disposable goods it 
possesses that the parties value - the greater the possibility of pressing the parties by suspending 
ties and withholding value. tt49 With no mutual interdependent links, the United Nations must 
look to Member-States with these links to supply its leverage. This works in favour of the 
United Nations mediator when these States fully support the mediation, and are willing to use 
their ties with the belligerents to complement the mediator's efforts. A State that is willing to 
apply such leverage on behalf of the United Nations is putting its own relations with the 
belligerent on the line; this requires a high level of commitment to a mediated solution on behalf 
of that State. The Secretariat can coordinate this support through the appropriate pennanent 
missions to the United Nations. Such mechanisms can also be used to coordinate the United 
Nations' mediation with other, parallel mediation initiatives.5o 
Links with States enable insurgent movements to modify the United Nations' position 
when the State supports the insurgent movement rather than the United Nations mediation. 
Sustained campaigning on behalf of the insurgent movement by a member of the sponsoring 
coalition can reorient the United Nations' mediation objectives to be more compatible with the 
insurgents'. Conversely, an insurgent movement's isolation from fonner State supporters can be 
used to measure its commitment to peace, and the compatibility of its approach to mediation 
with the United Nations'. While an insurgent movement with a strong source of external supply 
and support is more likely to be confident of winning or continuing the conflict, and therefore be 
intransigent and unreceptive to a mediation initiative, a group deprived of external supporters on 
whom it depended will affect its military calculus to be more amenable to peace overtures. An 
insurgent movement whose fonner sponsors now strongly support the mediation initiative will 
be more inclined to cooperate with the mediation initiative. Measurements of support and 
isolation can in this way infonn the comparison of the compatibility of approaches with the 
49 Touval and Zartman, "Introduction", in Touval and Zartman, op. cit., 1985, p. 13. 
50 Pechota, op. cit., 1972, p. 52. 
139 
effectiveness of the mediation, by taking into account mechanisms of influence between the 
United Nations and insurgent movements. 
4.1.7: Cohesion 
The cohesion of the Organisations behind both the mediators and the insurgent 
negotiators is an important indicator of the tenability of their approaches, the genuineness of 
their commitment, and the strength of their negotiating position. F or an international 
organisation like the United Nations, the cohesion of the supporting coalition of its interested 
Member-States behind the mediation is a determinant of the authority and vigour of its 
mediation initiative: "the basic questions of interest and leverage which are the key to the 
understanding and the practice of mediation have to be answered in terms of the Member-States, 
not in terms of the Organisation: it also means that the question of whether to mediate becomes 
more important than the question of how to mediate.,,5l The coalition's cohesion derives from its 
members' commitment to the resolution of the conflict through mediation, their belief that a 
negotiated peace will serve their interests, and their willingness to make use of the United 
Nations' mediation machinery, rather than pursue unilateral or regional efforts.52 The mediators' 
confidence in pursuing an effective mediation strategy effectively, depends on their belief in the 
continuing support of the Member-States for their efforts. A divided membership encumbers a 
mediator: "Such discord undermines a coherent mediating position. It reduces a mediator's 
leverage and strengthens the hand of the disputants. It provides an opening for the disputant to 
divide both the mediator from his adversary and the mediators amongst themselves."s3 
Furthermore, the insurgents' perception of United Nations' cohesion and determination affects 
how receptive and amenable the parties are to the mediation strategy.54 
51 Amoo and Zartman, "Mediation by Regional Organisations" in Bercovitch and Rubin, op. cit., 1992, p. 131. 
Italics in original. 
52 Mark N. Katz, "Mechanisms of Russian-American Conflict Resolution", International Journal of Group 
Tensions, Vol. 23, No.1, 1993, p. 32. 
53 Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails", op. cit., 1994, p. 54. 
54 Jonah, "The Military Talks at Kilometre 10 I", op. cit., 1990, p. 68. 
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The tenability of the insurgents' approach to mediation is also affected by the cohesive 
support in their organisation for the leadership's entry into the mediation process. Any disunity 
or lack of cohesion makes negotiation difficult by depriving the parties' representatives of their 
authority and power to grant concessions. 55 The representatives of an internally divided 
disputant will be unable to make concessions to the opponents from fear that compromise will 
be used against them in the internal power struggle. 56 A leader with strong control of his or her 
organisation, however, will find it easier to compromise with the mediator and the other parties 
while convincing the party followers of the wisdom of the concessions. An agreement with a 
cohesive disputant will also be more likely to endure, because its followers will cooperate with 
the terms of the agreement as ordered by their leaders. Thus cohesion is a moderating variable 
on the effect of degrees of compatibility between approaches on the effectiveness of the 
mediation interaction. 
In these ways, each of the framework indices will be used to measure the compatibility 
of United Nations and insurgent approaches and to compare them with the effectiveness of the 
mediation interaction. The hypothesised dependence of the mediation interaction on the 
compatibility of the United Nations' and insurgent movement's approaches derives from the 
limited influence they have over each other during mediation. The next two sections of this 
chapter apply the mediation framework to three recent incidences of United Nations mediation 
with insurgents. While there is some United Nations involvement in most contemporary 
mediations,57 the cases examined here feature a predominant United Nations role. The cases 
examined - the FMLN, the Khmer Rouge, and the Bosnian Serbs - demonstrate a range of levels 
of optimality as well as variations in the operation of the mediation framework indices. In 
analysing and comparing the operation of these indices on the compatibility of approaches and 
their relationship to the viability of the mediation, this chapter will test, in a mediation context, 
the central hypothesis of this thesis: that between the United Nations and insurgent movements, 
concurring approaches will produce more optimal interactions than divergent approaches. 
55 Bercovitch, "The Conditions for Successful Mediation", op. cit., 1991, p. 21. 
56 Zartman,op. cit., 1989, p. 274. 
57 The United Nations often participates as an observer in mediations carried out by other bodies; often to advise 
the framers of the agreement on practical aspects of a implementing a solution that the United Nations will be asked 
to oversee. 
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4.2: The FMLN: A Timely Success 
In the early aftermath of the Cold War, the United Nations played a major role in 
mediating an end to the civil war in EI Salvador. Since 1980, the Salvadoran government had 
been locked in a brutal struggle against a front of left-wing insurgents, the Frente Faribundo 
Marti para fa Liberacion Nacionaf (FMLN). In October 1980, the FMLN formed, under Cuban 
sponsorship, from five groups rebelling against the right-wing military dictatorship of Jose 
Napoleon Duarte.58 This resistance had its roots in the considerable opposition among 
intellectuals, trade unions, and the church, to the wealth disparities and the power of the military 
in Salvadoran society. Drawing on this protest, FMLN propaganda proclaimed itself as the 
vanguard of the opposition, committed to "the unification and leadership of the oppressed 
against the imperialist North Americans and the millionaire oligarches ... combined with their 
followers and defenders. ,,59 The FMLN was convinced of the need for a violent anti-imperialist, 
anti-oligarchic and anti-capitalist struggle to bring about a socio-economic restructuring and 
erect a new, egalitarian society. While drawing on Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and Castroism 
for its rationale, the FMLN was nevertheless pragmatic: "we do not convert the tenets of 
Marxism-Leninism into dogma that might isolate us from reality.,,6o This pragmatism was born 
of the need to forge five groups and a multitude of support organisations into a common 
insurrectionary front. 61 After the failure of its "final offensive" in January 1981 to spark a 
general insurrection in the cities and topple the government, its 6000-strong army retreated to 
the countryside to wage a Castroite guerrilla campaign supported by Soviet bloc, Cuban and 
58 The five core groups fonning the FMLN were: the Communist Party of EI Salvador (PCES), the Farabundo 
Marti Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Anny (ERP), the Anned Forces of National 
Resistance (F ARN), and the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). Close links were fonned 
with other, non-military front and political organisations, such as the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). 
59 From a Radio Venceremos broadcast, 7 December 1988, quoted in Christina Meyer, Underground Voices: 
Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p. 5. 
60 FMLN Commander Joaquin Villalobos, quoted in Yvon Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN: A Glossary of 
Five Words", Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.2, Spring 1991, p. 56. 
61 Given the wide-ranging differences between the components of the FMLN, from the violently Marxist ERP to 
the moderate, social democratic FDR, a great deal of effort has been expended by the FMLN leadership on creating 
consensus and control over all organisations. See Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left", Orb is, Vol. 
28, No.4, Winter 1985, pp. 673-684. 
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Nicaraguan aid.62 It gained support among sections of the Salvadoran peasantry, and carved 
"liberated zones", over which it resisted government attempts to regain control, and where it 
gained quasi-sovereignty as a shadow government providing rudimentary public services, order, 
and commodities. Outside of these areas, its tactics were to concentrate on economic sabotage, 
particularly the electricity grid and other infrastructure, as well as oligarchic-capitalist interests, 
in order to undermine the government and mobilise the oppressed until a favourable correlation 
of forces allowed an FMLN seizure ofpower.63 Nearly a decade of armed struggle did not bring 
these results, however. The FMLN's use of terrorism had alienated many Salvadorans, while 
massive United States support propped up a government that was steadily democratising. 
Meanwhile, the civil war had settled into a brutal stalemate, the horrors of which echoed around 
the globe, between the FMLN, the counter-insurgent Salvadoran army, and the sinister death 
squads. 
Responding to growing calls to end the horror, the United Nations mediation effort 
followed a number of regional peace initiatives which, although unsuccessful, began to build a 
platform for eventual talks.64 Following calls from the regional actors for direct United Nations 
involvement,65 the Security Council directed the Secretary-General to apply his good offices to 
attempt to terminate the war in El Salvador.66 Direct mediation by the Secretary-General and his 
Special Representative, Alvaro de Soto, began in January 1990. Over the next two years, the 
United Nations negotiators led the Salvadoran government of Alfredo Christiani and the FMLN 
to an agreement, signed in Mexico City on 16 January 1992, which committed the government 
to significant constitutional and socio-economic changes and reduction and purging of the armed 
62 James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador, (London: Junction Books, 
1982), p. 168. 
63 Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods, 
(Washington: Pergammon-Brassey's, 1990), pp. 187-234. 
64 These initiatives began with the Contadora process in 1983 and continued through the Esquipulas agreements 
and various regional contact groups. These efforts were acknowledged and encouraged by the Security Council in 
Resolution 530 (1983) and the General Assembly in Resolution 38110 (1983). 
65 In the Declaration of San Isidrio Coronado in December 1989, the five Central American Presidents (Mexico, 
Guatemala, EI Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) appealed to the Secretary-General to facilitate talks 
between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. 
66 Security Council Resolution 637 (1989). 
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forces in return for the FMLN's ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation, and participation in the 
democratic process. By applying the mediation framework to the mediation with the FMLN, this 
section will illuminate the extent to which the complementarity of approaches between the 
United Nations mediators and the FMLN contributed to or otherwise affected the optimality of 
the process. 
4.2.1: Objectives 
The objectives of the United Nations mediators were determined both by the wishes of 
the Member-States and the internal standards and assumptions of the Organisation. The majority 
of the concerned membership wished to see an end to the conflict in EI Salvador. Regional 
States were concerned and frustrated by the continuing threat that wars in EI Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala posed to the internal stability of their own States, and the repellent 
effect that this instability had on investment and development in the region.67 Many also 
resented the continuing external involvement in the affairs of Latin America. The Contadora 
process, advocating peace, an end to external intervention, and the economic benefits of stability 
and cooperation, began to assemble the eventual sponsoring coalition within the United Nations 
for a solution in EI Salvador.68 The election of Arias in Costa Rica and Cerezo in Guatemala 
added the Esquipulas group to the regional members of the coalition.69 As they became more 
engaged in improving their bilateral relations, the superpowers joined the coalition, keen to 
remove Cold War thorns such as their proxy war in EI Salvador from the continued growth of 
their cooperation. The United States, following the embarrassment of the Iran-Contra scandal, 
was keen to transform its relations with Central America into an overt involvement dedicated to 
cooperation and prosperity. The superpowers' commitment to the United Nations sponsoring 
67 See for example the Guatemala Peace Plan signed by Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua of7 August 1987, and the statements of the officials at the Summit, Facts on File, 14 August 1987, pp. 
581-4. 
68 The Contadora group, of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, joined by Argentina, Brazil, Peru and 
Uruguay formed in January 1983 into a pressure group for peace in Central America. Its efforts within the United 
Nations resulted in Security Council Resolution 530 (1983) and General Assembly Resolution 38/10 supporting the 
peace efforts in Central America and asking the Secretary-General to keep the Organisation informed of their 
progress. 
69 The Esquipulas Group, comprised of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, formed in 
August 1987 to cooperatively remove structural impediments to the resolution of the region's civil wars. 
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coalition became complete in August 1991, when Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister 
Besmertnykh urged the Secretary-General to become personally involved in mediating the 
Salvadoran conflict.70 Britain, France, Spain and Germany, responding to popular concern over 
the wars in Central America, completed a comprehensive United Nations coalition with 
coinciding interests in resolving the civil war in EI Salvador. 
The United Nations' instructions to its mediators, as well as advancing the combination 
of its sponsoring coalition's interests, had to be tempered by the Organisation's institutional 
considerations and principles. Because the concern with resolving the civil war had to be 
reconciled with the United Nations' prerogative to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of one of its Member-States, the partition of EI Salvador between the contending parties was 
never countenanced. It was also vital to put an end to all external involvements in the 
Salvadoran civil war. A solution to the conflict that allowed the people ofEI Salvador adjudicate 
between the contending claims was a desirable outcome for a United Nations initiative. Thus, as 
representatives of the United Nations, the mediators advanced institutional objectives that 
coincided with the membership'S wishes. They set out to terminate the hostilities and develop a 
formula for peacefully adjudicating the contending claims, distributing the disputed 
commodities, and establishing a single, legitimate, sovereign Salvadoran government.71 
The objectives of the FMLN were determined by both its political goals and its military 
fortunes. As a Marxist insurgent movement, the FMLN was dedicated to overthrowing the 
Salvadoran government and seizing power in order to address "the structural causes of war": 72 
primarily the concentration of wealth, influence and property in the hands of a small elite. As its 
military position and external sponsorship changed, the FMLN pragmatically altered its 
demands from complete revolutionary overthrow to the transformation into a more just 
70 This request was one of the subjects of a joint communique issued by the two on 1 August 1991. 
71 United Nations Briefmg Paper, "United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", DPV1306IRev.2, 31 
October 1993, p. 27. 
72 Quoted in Yvon Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN: A Glossary of Five Words", Conflict Quarterly, Spring 
1991, p. 59. 
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Salvadoran society through the democratic process.73 Specifically, it demanded admittance into 
a power-sharing government in order to oversee this transformation while ensuring the security 
of the movement and its followers. 74 Immediately prior to United Nations involvement, the 
FMLN dropped its insistence on power-sharing and acknowledged the centrality of the electoral 
process to the resolution of the conflict. 75 The FMLN was confident that it would form the 
government chosen by such an election, and that this would be a transitional stage on the path to 
. I' 76 SOCia Ism. 
At the point of United Nations intervention, the FMLN had decided to abandon armed 
struggle and pursue its goals using peaceful methods. These peaceful methods, however, needed 
to offer the movement a significant chance of securing these goals, a level playing field on 
which to compete for power. A foremost condition for such a level playing field was for the 
FMLN the end of United States influence in El Salvador, and in particular, an end to United 
States sponsorship of the Salvadoran government: "that national sovereignty be restored and 
that.. .relations with the United States be reoriented on the basis of the unconditional respect of 
the right of self-determination and independence." 77 The FMLN's commitment to peaceful 
methods, however, was greatly tempered by its concern for the security of the organisation and 
the safety of its followers from the revenge of opponents within the government, armed forces 
and Salvadoran society. Central to the objectives of the FMLN was the reform of the Salvadoran 
armed forces and other paramilitary elements such as the death squads, which it identified as 
posing the greatest threat to its post-bellum security: "What use is there in talking about 
democratisation, cease-fires, political participation when the government continues waging a 
dirty war with its death squads against unarmed civilians?,,78 Close links between the 
73 David Holiday and William Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons From El Salvador", Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 46, No.2, Winter 1993, p. 418. 
74 Fransisco A. Alvarez, "Transition Before the Transition: The Case of El Salvador", Latin American 
Perspectives, Issue 56, Vol. 15, No.1, Winter 1988, p. 83. 
75 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 58. 
76 ibid., pp. 55-6. 
77 Department of Social Sciences, Universidad de El Salvador, "An Analysis of the Correlation of Forces in El 
Salvador", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 55, Vol. 14, No.4, Fall 1987, p. 446. 
78 Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) Communique, quoted in Facts on File, 30 October 1987, p. 799. 
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government, the ruling ARENA party, the army and the death squads,79 prompted FMLN fears 
that their political candidates would be murdered and its followers intimidated.8o The FMLN 
therefore insisted on a reduction and restructuring of the security forces to ensure its safety. So 
much importance did it place on this that the armed forces issue became central to the mediation 
d .. d' 81 an a major lffipe lffient to an agreement. 
Essential agreement prevailed between the objectives of the United Nations mediators 
and the FMLN at the time of the intervention of the United Nations into the conflict. Both were 
devoted to ultimately stopping the war and establishing a mechanism for the fair and legitimate 
resolution of the conflict. Any differences were in form and succession rather than substance: 
while the United Nations' first priority was to end the war, the FMLN was determined to 
preserve its military potential for as long as possible during the mediation process. It remained 
for the United Nations mediators to adapt to these minor differences and concentrate their efforts 
on creatively devising a formula that would eventually reconcile the demands of the Salvadoran 
government and the FMLN for an agreed process for adjusting their competing claims. The 
essential disagreement between the government and the FMLN was that while the government 
demanded the FMLN stop fighting and disarm before any political reforms were discussed, the 
FMLN remained determined to preserve its military potential until the necessary guarantees 
were in place to enable it to reintegrate into civilian society in full legality and safety.82 The 
United Nations mediators were able to overcome these opposing approaches by devising a 
formula to address both parties' concerns simultaneously, thereby tying them to the mediation 
process. 
79 The closest link emerged in 1987 with the revelation that Roberto D'Aubuisson, a wealthy land owner and 
founder and honorary President for Life of the ARENA party, was a leading member and organiser of the death 
squads, who as a major in the Salvadoran National Guard, had ordered the murder of outspoken archbishop of San 
Salvador, Oscar Amulfo Romero. 
80 Thomas P. Anderson, "EI Salvador's Dim Prospects", Current History, Vol. 85, No. 507, January 1986, p. 36. 
81 See Report of the Secretary-General, "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace", Security Council Document 
S/22031, 21 December 1990, pp. 1-2. 
82 United Nations, EI Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. iv-v. 
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4.2.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations was strongly committed to the mediation process. Both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly had overwhelmingly advocated a mediated and peaceful 
solution to the conflict since the early 1980s.83 Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, himself 
Latin American, maintained a close interest in the conflict, maintaining close contacts with the 
regional governments and other actors such as the OAS. As his term of office drew to a close in 
1991, he staked his reputation on mediating an end to the war in EI Salvador. It remained for 
United Nations mediators to secure the commitment of the FMLN and the government to the 
mediation process as the way of resolving the conflict. Their method of achieving this was to 
devise a mediating formula that reconciled the parties divergent demands while promising both 
the opportunity to secure their objectives. 
The FMLN had, due to various military, strategic and international factors, decided to 
eventually abandon war in favour of finding a peaceful way to secure its objectives. It did not, 
however, modify its objectives of attaining political power, effecting socio-economic change in 
EI Salvador, and ensuring the safety of its cadres and supporters. The FMLN, therefore, entered 
mediation under United Nations auspices believing and assuring its rank and file that the peace 
talks were another route to victory over the government. 84 Convinced that the military path to 
imposing a unilateral solution had closed, the FMLN tt ... primarily viewed [a negotiated] 
settlement as its last, best hope for achieving fundamental societal and political reforms. tt8S Both 
the FMLN and the government were thus committed to the negotiating process, hoping to secure 
the best possible conditions before an election that both parties were sure they would win by 
tt ... reaping the benefits of popularity from [their] role in ending the war ... tt86 The FMLN was 
thus committed to peace talks, while preserving its military capability based on its belief in the 
83 See Security Council Resolutions 530 (1983) and 637 (1989) and General Assembly Resolutions 38110 (1983) 
and 4411 0 (1989). 
84 Joseph G. Sullivan, "How Peace Came to El Salvador", Orbis, Vol. 38, No.1, Winter 1994, p. 85. 
85 Holiday and Stanley, "Building the Peace", op. cit., 1993, p. 418. 
86 Linda Robinson, "Why Central America is Still Not Democratic", SAIS Review, Vol. 12, No.2, Summer-Fall 
1992, p. 89. 
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"correlation of forces" and its desire to ensure its safety from the armed forces and the death 
squads.87 
Once the government and the FMLN were committed to the mediation process, the 
problem for the United Nations mediators was to reconcile the FMLN's desire to preserve its 
military capacity until its political, economic and security demands had been met, with the 
government's refusal to begin serious negotiations before the FMLN had stopped fighting and 
disarmed. Mediators Perez de Cuellar and de Soto held a series of secret meetings with the 
FMLN and the government in early 1990, from which they produced a framework for 
negotiation which creatively addressed the concerns of both parties.88 The Geneva framework 
and the subsequent Caracas Agenda compressed the political talks and the ceasefire issue into a 
two-stage process: the first resolving the issues of the armed forces, human rights guarantees, the 
judicial system, elections, constitutional, economic and social reforms and United Nations 
verification; the second creating security guarantees for the reincorporation of the FMLN into 
Salvadoran society.89 These schedules also established a defined timetable incorporating a date 
and duration for a ceasefire.9o The timetable for negotiations made creative use of deadlines to 
hasten agreement and minimise obduracy "by forcing the negotiating parties to confront 
potential blame for failed negotiations. ,,91 
Such blame was seen by both parties as damaging to election prospects. The mediation 
framework selected was largely deductive, seeking to build broad agreement on the important 
issues and then discussing outstanding items while steadily establishing the conditions for a 
ceasefire and demobilisation of both sides. The compromise between the FMLN's insistence on 
political settlement first and the government's insistence on ceasefire first was that while the 
87 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, pp. 62-3. 
88 Enrique Baloyra-Herp, "The Persistent Conflict In El Salvador", Current History, Vo!' 90, No. 554, March 
1991, p. 122. 
89 United Nations, El Salvador Agreements, op. cit., 1994, pp. 1-6. 
90 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security", A/461713; S/23256, 2 December 1991, pp. 1-2. 
91 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 84. 
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political agreements would be negotiated before the ceasefire, talks on the implementation of 
these agreements would follow the ceasefire.92 The Geneva Agreement also tied both parties to 
the mediation process, containing the undertaking of both not to abandon negotiations 
unilaterally.93 In this way, the United Nations mediators, using an appropriate mediation 
formula, were able to secure the FMLN's commitment to the mediation mechanism to a level 
consistent with their own commitment and convictions. 
4.2.3: Instrumentality 
The United Nations mediators also saw the FMLN as necessary participants in the peace 
process. As one of the sides in the conflict, they realised that there could be no resolution 
without the agreement of the FMLN, and that the FMLN had an endless ability to disrupt a 
process from which it was excluded. The Security Council and General Assembly repeatedly 
called on the FMLN to cooperate with the mediation process,94 and the mediators held 
preliminary secret talks with the movement prior to the start of the mediation initiative. Thus no 
ethical standards or Member-State expectations interfered in the United Nations mediators' 
relationship with the FMLN, and the movement's treatment as a legitimate and equal participant 
in the peace process contributed to its commitment and cooperativeness with the mediation: 
The negotiations were built on the solid foundations of recognition: the belligerents 
recognised each other's importance and legitimacy in the peace process and the vital role played 
by the United Nations mediators. The government had, by the time of United Nations 
involvement, realised that it would be unable to govern EI Salvador without first coming to 
terms with the FMLN, which it was unable to defeat, and which could playa disruptive role 
indefinitely. The FMLN recognised that in order to advance its objectives peacefully, it would 
first have to find an agreement with the government, which it had failed to overthrow. Both 
92 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to El Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 89. 
93 United Nations Department of Public Information, Press Release SG/SMJ4426 of 4 April 1990. 
94 See for example Security Council Resolution 637( 1989) and General Assembly Resolution 38/1 O. 
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belligerents separately urged a United Nations role in the mediation process.95 The FMLN in 
particular stipulated United Nations involvement, wanting to negotiate, but being historically 
suspicious of other potential mediators: the United States-dominated OAS, and nervous of 
regional statesmen who had strong links with the Salvadoran government. By the time of his 
intervention, United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar had actively advocated a 
positive United Nations role in the peace process for over five years.96 The United Nations 
Secretariat was repeatedly indispensable to the progress of the talks, formulating compromise 
solutions and proposals on such intractable issues as the armed forces, human rights, and land 
distribution.97 The United Nations monitors from the ONUCA and ONUSAL forces were also 
vital to the progress towards agreement by reassuring both parties of the implementation and 
. f h . 98 protectIOn 0 t elr agreements. 
The prestige, diplomatic expertise, and personality of Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar 
impacted heavily on the instrumentality of the United Nations to a mediated solution to the 
conflict. As his tenure as Secretary-General drew to a close, Perez de Cuellar became 
passionately committed to ending the Salvadoran civil war as a prestigious way to conclude his 
distinguished career. He became the prime mover and initiator of all United Nations action 
during the mediation, working tirelessly to secure resources, attention, and Member-State 
support for the negotiations. The mediation process showed marked acceleration and yielded 
greater results when the parties met face-to-face under the direct mediation of Perez de Cuellar 
or de SotO.99 Perez de Cuellar's presence, as a Latin American, and commitment were vital to 
the dedication of the parties to the mediation and settlement of the conflict. Nearing the end of a 
second term as Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar was able to draw on vast experience as a 
95 United Nations Department of Public Infonnation, "The Peace Process in EI Salvador and the United Nations: 
Fact Sheet 1 ", DPVI149A-40697, 1 July 1991, p. 1. 
96 Stephen Baranyi and Liisa North, Stretching the Limits of the Possible: United Nations Peacekeeping in 
Central America: Aurora Papers 15, (Ontario: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992), pp. 8-9. 
97 See Secretary-General's Reports S/23222; S123256; and S/22031. 
98 H.P. Klepak, "Peacekeeping in Central America", in David A. Charters (ed), Peacekeeping and the Challenge 
of Civil Conflict Resolution, (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, 1994), p. 90. 
99 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 96. 
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mediator and diplomat, having completed extensive tours of duty in Europe and Latin America 
since joining the Peruvian foreign ministry in 1940. His experience in United Nations affairs 
was unparalleled, originating in his participation in the very first General Assembly in 1946, and 
on the Secretariat staff since 1975. His mediating style was also particularly well-suited to the 
needs of the Salvadoran belligerents. Predominantly quiet and retiring, Perez de Cuellar's 
reputation for confidentiality and integrity had become well known. IOO His inventiveness, 
intelligence, and energy in pursuing diplomatic solutions to conflicts and Organisational 
problems had remained undiminished for over a decade as Under-Secretary-General for Special 
Political Affairs and Secretary-General. 101 Vowing to reach a negotiated solution before 
surrendering office at the end of 1991, Perez de Cuellar bent all of his skills towards mediating 
agreement. This culminated in a dramatic climax after midnight, 31 December 1991, at United 
Nations headquarters, when the clock was stopped on Perez de Cuellar's official retirement while 
the FMLN, the Salvadoran government, and the Secretary-General thrashed out the remaining 
obstacles to a solution. Perez de Cuellar's personal contribution to the peace agreement was 
acknowledged by his successor, Boutros-Ghali, at the official peace ceremony at Chapultepec, 
Mexico, in January 1992. 
4.2.4: Impartiality 
An important component of the United Nations' indispensability to the peace process 
was its perceived impartiality. Because of Latin America's history of interventions, other 
potential mediators, from the superpowers, regional States, and the OAS, were seen by one or 
both sides as irreversibly biased. 102 The FMLN in particular was insistent on heavy United 
Nations involvement in mediation and verification, rather than accepting the original 
government proposal of making use of the Secretary-General's good offices. 103 The Security 
100 For an excellent appraisal of Perez de Cuellar's personality and diplomatic style, see G. R. Berridge, Return to 
the UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 12-15. 
101 Examples of Perez de Cuellar's energy and initiative abound, from his fostering of the Security Council 
Permanent Five as a Contact Group, to the uncompromising insistence on even higher standards for the 
Organisation even after the spectacularly successful year of 1991, see Javier Perez de Cuellar, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1991, (New York: United Nations, 1991). 
102 Klepak, "Peacekeeping in Central America", in Carters, op. cit., 1994, p. 84. 
103 Baranyi and North, op. cit., 1992, p. 24. 
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Council, when considering the issue of El Salvador, maintained an unbiased approach to the 
situation: Resolution 693 (1991) urged both sides to pursue negotiations urgently and flexibly; 
and Resolution 714 (1991) commended both parties for their flexibility and seriousness in the 
negotiations. 104 Both parties trusted the United Nations to draw up proposals for dealing with 
the most contentious issues: the armed forces, police and socio-economic modifications. The 
heavy involvement of the United Nations was used by both sides to monitor each other's fidelity 
to the mediation process, and as a safeguard against bad faith. The FMLN especially saw the 
United Nations mediation and verification as a safeguard and guarantee of its security and 
interests during and after its concessions. Heavy use of United Nations verification mechanisms 
for monitoring compliance with the agreements as they were reached was also recognised by 
Perez de Cuellar as a vital component of progress in the negotiations. \05 In May 1991, the 
United Nations established the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador to verify the 
agreements already reached between the parties, and monitor the human rights and security 
situation in support of further negotiations. 106 The mediators also used ONUSAL verification as 
one of the methods of tying the disputants to the mediation process; this mechanism was duly 
built into the Caracas framework for mediation. 107 The impartiality of the United Nations 
mediators, and the fidelity of the disputants to the mediation process reinforced the positive 
impetus of the negotiations. 
The FMLN's behaviour in the negotiation process also contributed to the viability of its 
interaction with the United Nations mediators. Initially, the FMLN's reluctance to abandon its 
military capability until after a peace agreement was signed, and its use of insurgent violence to 
bolster its position during the negotiations, aroused the suspicion and anger of the government, 
and impeded the progress of the negotiations. The FMLN's decision to negotiate did not mean it 
was ready to surrender its military capacity immediately. True to its revolutionary ideology, the 
FMLN believed that success depended on a favourable correlation of forces, and was prepared 
104 Security Council Resolutions 693 (1991) of 20 May 1991; and 714 (1991) of 30 September 1991. 
105 United Nations Department of Public Information, ""The Peace Process in El Salvador", op. cit., 1991, p. 3. 
106 See Security Council Resolution 693 (1991) of 20 May 1991; and Report of the Secretary-General, "Central 
America: Efforts Towards Peace", S!22494, 16 April 1991, pp. 2-5. 
107 ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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to complement its negotiations with military actions designed to enhance its political 
leverage. 108 Throughout the negotiations the FMLN established a tradition of staging incisive 
military attacks against government targets on the eve of negotiating rounds in order to 
demonstrate its continuing potency. Its particularly successful 1989 general offensive gave the 
FMLN the confidence to fully participate in negotiations, having demonstrated its disruptive 
power, and able to trade its demonstrated military potential for significant concessions. 109 The 
mediator's use of a negotiating framework and timetables, however began to tie the FMLN ever 
deeper into serious negotiations. On 14 November 1991, the FMLN announced an indefinite 
ceasefire, and entered the final round of negotiations to end the civil war. Its growing 
commitment to negotiating a satisfactory peace agreement entailed a parallel growth in its 
cooperativeness and veracity in its negotiating behaviour. As the FMLN's impartiality increased, 
so did the efficiency of the mediation interaction. 
4.2.5: Timing 
The fatigue and stalled military momentum of the FMLN and the government by the late 
1980s strongly determined their favourable response the United Nations mediation efforts in the 
early 1990s. The civil war in EI Salvador had settled into the recognisable pattern· of a 
stalemated insurgency: the FMLN insurgents had proved unable to defeat or topple the 
government, while the government was unable to flush out and defeat the guerrilla forces. While 
the FMLN could stage impressive offensives such as that in 1989 which struck at the heart of 
San Salvador, the FMLN had no hope of militarily defeating the government's vast, American 
trained and supplied army. It had also become well aware that the Castroite model of popular 
revolution had failed to materialise, and that the guerrillas had been unable to spark a popular 
uprising. IIO Prospects of such an uprising receded further and further as the government strove 
to address the socio-economic inequalities that had started the uprising. II I The government's 
108 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 63. 
109 Pamela Constable, "At War's End in El Salvador", Current History, Vol. 92, No. 572, March 1993, p. 107. 
110 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 54. 
III Sullivan, "How Peace Came to El Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 83. 
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steady self-Iegitimisation through popular elections and peaceful transfers of power, and its 
crackdown on death squad activity further deprived the FMLN of support. 112 By 1989, then, the 
FMLN had realised that not only was it not winning the war, but that with each wartime month 
that passed, it was losing the popular support it would need to complete its democratic 
transformation of EI Salvador. It saw that Slavadorans, dying, emigrating and getting poorer 
from the war, desperately wanted peace, and that popular support would accrue to any party 
advocating, pursuing and delivering peace. I 13 Beginning in 1987, the FMLN leadership made 
the decision to "humanise" the civil war and seek talks with the government and thereby seize 
power democratically. I 14 An examination of the FMLN's political-military circumstances shows 
the extent to which the FMLN needed to commit itself to peace talks, once it saw its interests 
and survival would be protected. 
4.2.6: Support and Isolation 
The civil war in EI Salvador had become, by the early 1980s, a proxy war between the 
Superpowers, each supporting one of the belligerents. Each sides' dependence on this external 
assistance furnished the mediators with potent sources of leverage, depending on the 
cooperativeness of the Superpowers. The United Nations mediators found this cooperation 
forthcoming, and both Superpowers used their leverage to support the mediators and encourage 
flexibility in the belligerents. The United States, with the heaviest involvement in the conflict 
having supported the government with $4 billion in aid over the 11 year conflict, exercised the 
greatest influence on both parties' willingness to compromise by creatively manipUlating its aid 
levels in response to the parties' military and negotiating behaviour. The Bush administration 
apportioned $85 million in aid to the Salvadoran government for fiscal year 1991, but withheld 
half of the funds, which were to be released only under certain conditions. The United States 
made clear that this potential aid was to be used as an incentive for the FMLN and the 
112 Jose Z. Garcia, "Democratic Consolidation in EI Salvador", Current History, Vol. 87, No. 533, December 
1988, p. 423. 
113 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 57. 
114 FMLNIFDR, "Proposal of the FMLNIFDR", Latin American PerspectNes, Issue 55, Vol. 14, No.4, Fall 
1987, pp. 481-486. 
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government to negotiate. liS The aid was released following FMLN uncooperativeness in the 
negotiations and increased military activity in early 1991. The FMLN soon realised that United 
States support of the government could be interdicted by its own cooperativeness in the peace 
process, thereby increasing its own relative strength and influence in the negotiations. 116 The 
United States, as a close supporter of the government, was also able to furnish the FMLN with 
f . l··th 117 guarantees 0 ensunng government comp lance WI any agreements. 
The United Nations mediators also made use of the support of other actors that were 
prepared to use their influence with the parties towards an agreement. In August 1991, Perez de 
Cuellar requested that the United States and the Soviet Union write a joint letter urging 
concessions from the parties, a move which was to prove successful in breaking a deadlock. I IS 
Another ad hoc group of interested States, calling itself the Four Friends of the Secretary-
General, composed of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Spain, formed to complement the 
mediators' efforts and urge both sides to come to agreement as quickly as possible.119 Vital 
external communication between the FMLN, the United Nations and the United States was 
handled through the parties' connections with the Four Friends. 12o The mediators also used the 
support of the general membership of the United Nations as a form of leverage on the parties to 
come to agreement by using United Nations headquarters in New York as the site for a crucial 
round of negotiations in September 1991. The combination of the interest and support of the 
entire international community, and the personal mediation of Perez de Cuellar worked to 
produce a timely agreement and created an impetus for the successful conclusion of the 
115 Facts on File, 16 February 1990, p. Ill. 
116 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 85. 
117 ibid., p. 95. 
118 See S/22693, and Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International 
Peace and Security", Al46/713 and S/23256, 2 December 1991, p. 3. 
119 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 86. 
120 ibid., p. 87. 
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mediation effort. 121 International support thus became crucial to the success of the United 
Nations mediators. 
A vital factor in the FMLN's cooperativeness in negotiations and final adherence to the 
peace agreement was its growing isolation from international sponsors upon which it had 
formerly depended so heavily. For most of the war it had made use of the assistance of the 
Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua, all of whom saw supporting the FMLN as advancing their 
objectives of spreading revolution through Latin America and tying the United States to a costly 
obligation to support the embattled Salvadoran regime. The end of the Cold War and Soviet new 
thinking in foreign policy began a process of receding Soviet interest and assistance to former 
clients in the developing world. Support declined for Cuba, Nicaragua, and ultimately dried up 
for the FMLN from all three sources. The Bush administration applied heavy pressure to the 
Soviet Union to stop all aid to the FMLN. 122 Former supporters of the FMLN, notably the 
Soviet Union and Mexico,123 became supporters of the mediation and used their leverage to 
pressure the FMLN to compromise. Regional States, particularly Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, combined to condemn FMLN uncooperativeness, thereby 
intensifying its isolation, at crucial impasses in the negotiations. 124 The Four Friends of the 
Secretary-General at the July 1991 Iberoamerican Summit in Guadalajara sent a strong warning 
to Cuba to support the negotiations and stop aiding the FMLN. 125 Finally, the electoral defeat of 
the Sandanistas in Nicaragua in February 1990 completed the process of isolation of the FMLN 
that contributed to their dedication to the mediation process and adherence to the final peace 
agreement. 
121 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security", Al461713 and S/23256, 2 December 1991, p. 3. 
122 At the U.S.-Soviet Malta Summit on 2-3 December 1989, and later in an hour-long telephone conversation on 
7 December 1989, James Baker and Eduard Schevardnadze explored ways to completely isolate the FMLN from its 
suppliers, following Bakers demand that there would "be a political price to pay" if greater Soviet cooperation was 
not forthcoming. See Facts on File 15 December 1989, p. 926. 
123 FMLN headquarters was located in Mexico City. 
124 See for example their presidents' "Declaration on the Situation in El Salvador", Al45/906 and S/22032, pp. 
17-19. 
125 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salavador", op. cit., 1994, pp. 93-4. 
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4.2.7: Cohesion 
The mediators' position was strongly enhanced by the support of a large and cohesive 
United Nations supporting coalition which was eager to see a peace agreement reached in EI 
Salvador. The civil war in EI Salvador, as a central conflict of the Cold War, had by the late 
1980s become a regional impediment to the growing detente of the Superpowers. Its removal 
became a primary concern of the increasingly cooperative international community. While the 
Reagan administration expressed some opposition to international intervention within its 
hemisphere, the Bush administration accepted the United Nations as the most acceptable 
mediator and possibly the only actor capable of finding agreement between the parties and 
thereby removing a thorn from relations with the Soviet Union. Security Council support for the 
d· . h' d 126 Th ., f me Iators was unarumous, co eSIve, an constant. e partIes awareness 0 strong 
international support for the mediation process played an important role in their cooperation 
with and confidence in the negotiations. 
The FMLN, as a loose umbrella organisation of five groups, needed to maintain its 
cohesion in order to be able to cooperate fully in the mediation. This was largely maintained 
through the groups' high level of ideological homogeneity,127 and the FMLN's adoption of 
democratic centralism as a method of making and enforcing decisions. 128 Factional discontent 
was further forestalled during negotiations by including the leaders of the most influential 
groups in the negotiating team: Villalobos of the ERP, Schafik Handal of the PCES, Cienfuegos 
ofFARN, and Martinez of the PRTC. 129 Nevertheless, internal criticism still occurred over what 
some factions saw as premature concessions on human rights and the armed forces questions, 
and repeatedly forced the FMLN negotiators to temporarily adopt intransigent positions. 130 
126 See for example Report of the Secretary-General, "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace", S/22031, 21 
December 1990, p. 6, and Security Council Resolution 714 (1991). 
127 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 53. 
128 Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left", Orbis, Vol. 28, No.4, Winter 1985, p. 677. 
129 ibid., p. 681. 
130 Sullivan, "How Peace Came to El Salvador", op. cit., 1994, p. 90. 
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Generally, FMLN negotiators and leaders managed to carry the bulk of their membership and 
support with them towards the peace agreement, a vital factor in the final agreement and the 
successful conclusion of the peace process. 
The Salvadoran peace agreement emerged as the most successful mediated by the United 
Nations after the Cold War in terms of success, longevity, and implementability. Having applied 
the mediation framework to the process, it can be seen that important factors were in agreement, 
and whatever minor disagreements existed were able to be reconciled using a creative and active 
mediation strategy. The United Nations realised the necessity to mediate an end to the war, and 
was helped by a cohesive regional peace momentum, as well as superpower disengagement from 
El Salvador after the Cold War. The FMLN's recognition of its inability to spark a general 
insurrection, and its loss of support from its former State sponsors informed a rational decision 
by the organisation to become receptive to mediation and to countenance a growing 
commitment to a negotiated peace. Its determination to preserve its military potential reflected 
its realist determination to use its most potent instrument, guerrilla attacks, to assist its position 
during the negotiations, as well as its Marxist-Leninist belief in the need to base action on a 
favourable correlation of forces. Once the FMLN had taken the decision to abandon the war, its 
security became a paramount concern. Security, and its continuing military capability, became 
the major impediments to a mediated solution. Once peace, as an overriding objective had been 
agreed upon between the United Nations and the FMLN, both insurgents and mediators shared 
concurrent interests in finding a creative solution to these impediments. At this point, the 
prestige of the United Nations, and the skill and dedication of Perez de Cuellar and his Special 
Representative was instrumental in finding a creative mediation formula which overcame these 
problems. The mediators were also able to take advantage of existing peacekeeping forces in El 
Salvador to foster confidence in the process and build on already-monitored agreements. Thus, 
the impetus coming from the end of the Cold War, combined with existing peacekeeping 
mechanisms and a genuine commitment to a negotiated peace, made United Nations mediation 
appropriate to the Salvadoran civil war. These factors delivered a concurrence of approaches to 
the mediation interaction between the United Nations and the FMLN. At that time, the United 
Nations possessed the necessary skill, support and resources to take advantage of these factors, 
and negotiate a tenable and durable peace agreement for that ravaged country. 
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4.3: The Khmer Rouge and the Unravelling Paris Agreement 
By the late 1980s, the Khmer Rouge had acquired a reputation as one of the most 
murderous and implacable contemporary insurgent organisations. Much of this infamy stems 
from revelations of its seizure of power and attempt to immediately create an equalitarian, 
agrarian society between 1975 and 1979. This experiment resulted in the death of over 1 million 
Cambodians from torture, murder, and starvation, while another 500,000 refugees fled the 
country. Deposed by a Vietnamese invasion in January 1979, the Khmer Rouge began a 
guerrilla war against the Vietnamese-installed regime from secure bases in the Cardamom 
mountains and over the Thai border, supplied by Chinese and Thai weapons and assistance. It 
soon found that, despite its genocidal reputation, its resistance to the Vietnamese invasion 
carried tangible diplomatic benefits and brought international support. 131 Even though there 
have been recent admissions of past "mistakes" during its rule over Democratic Kampuchea, 132 
much of the Khmer Rouge's ideology betrays a continuity with the policies of that period: the 
anti-urbanism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-clericism, the closure of Cambodian society to 
external links, and the Cambodian chauvinism and xenophobia, particularly against the 
Vietnamese. 133 It remains committed to a violent, insurrectionary seizure of power, followed by 
an authoritarian restructuring of Cambodian society along radical agrarian, Maoist lines. 134 
131 Such as the creation of the CGDK, the opportunity to occupy the Cambodian seat at the United Nations in 
rotation with the other resistance groups, and support by ASEAN, China, and Thailand. These aspects are dealt with 
in greater detail in the ensuing analysis. 
132 See David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1993), p. 174. These admissions are however usually rationalised as being attributable to corrupt members of the 
Khmer Rouge, or instigated by Vietnamese agents. 
133 See Christophe Peschoux, Enquete sur les "nouveaux" khmers rouges: essai de debrouissai/lage, (Paris, 
1992). 
134 The determination of the Khmer Rouge leadership to preserve its military potential to seize power in 
Cambodia is attested by reports of Khmer Rouge defectors. See Nick Cumming Bruce, "Khmer Rouge Hit By 
Defections", The Guardian, 17 September 1993; and William Branigin, "'Number One' Still Pulls the Strings", The 
Guardian, 11 May 1993; and David Brunnstrom, "UN Warns of Khmer Rouge Threat", The Independent, 20 May 
1993. 
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The Khmer Rouge leadership is intolerant of opposition, and ideological indoctrination, 
strict discipline, and brutal purges persist within the insurgent movement. 135 Its leadership, 
largely unchanged since 1978, gains cohesion from interlinking familial relationships, while 
retaining its supreme dictatorial power over the organisation, but remaining withdrawn and 
inaccessible to cadres or the outside world. 136 Tactically, the Khmer Rouge's estimated 15,000 
guerrillas rely on Maoist tactics of rural warfare to establish liberated zones and isolate and 
attack the cities. The Khmer Rouge carved a liberated zone in north-west Cambodia, where it 
controlled the population with a brutal discipline and kept its army supplied with recruits, 
porters, and "supporters", and from which it financed its campaign by trading in the diamonds 
and hardwood common to the region. This fledgling sovereignty, along with its diplomatic 
support and access to international fora, bestowed on the Khmer Rouge the vestiges of a para-
Statehood. The insurgent army is decentralised, but relies on ideological indoctrination, terror, 
and strict hierarchical discipline for control. Regional commanders enjoy a large amount of 
tactical initiative, while strategic direction is disseminated through attached and travelling 
political cadre. 137 While its military prowess perpetuated the war in Cambodia and gave rise to 
pressures to resolve the conflict, its uncompromising ideological rigour and commitment to the 
revolutionary seizure of power made the Khmer Rouge the most troublesome participant in the 
Cambodian peace negotiations and their subsequent implementation. 
Although the United Nations was able to mediate a peace agreement between the 
warring Cambodian factions, the agreement was not honoured by the Khmer Rouge. The 
ephemerality of the Paris Agreement, and its lack of binding power on the Khmer Rouge, points 
to, among other problems,138 a deficient mediation interaction leading to the agreement. By 
135 Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society, (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), pp. 34-5. 
136 David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 238. 
137 Interview with Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, former UNTAC Force Commander, Canberra, 15 
December 1993. 
138 There are numerous interpretations of the locus of the failure to commit the Khmer Rouge to the Cambodian 
peace process. While at times the implementation and compliance mechanisms are singled out, most assessments of 
the Cambodian peace process highlight the weaknesses in the original Paris Agreements and how they were arrived 
at as partially to blame. 
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applying the mediation framework to the Cambodian negotiations, this section will investigate 
the sources of these deficiencies in their interaction. The United Nations had been interested in 
promoting a solution to the Cambodian civil war since 1979, when the General Assembly 
reacted to the Vietnamese invasion by calling on the Secretary-General to follow the situation 
closely and exercise his good offices in a search for peace. 139 Upon taking office in 1982, Perez 
de Cuellar signalled close interest in the conflict by making his first visit as Secretary-General to 
Thailand and Vietnam over the question of Cambodia. 140 Based on this visit he reported to the 
General Assembly in 1982 that only a comprehensive political solution, achieved through 
genuine negotiations, would ultimately bring peace. 141 He appointed his Special Representative 
for Humanitarian Affairs in South-East Asia, Rafeeudin Ahmed, as his Special Representative to 
the Cambodian parties. 
Based on his and Ahmed's discussions with the warring parties in Cambodia, Perez de 
Cuellar presented a report to the General Assembly in 1985 listing the main elements of a 
comprehensive settlement for Cambodia. 142 These proposals formed the basis for the first peace 
conference attended by all the parties, hosted by Indonesia at the first and second Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIM) in July 1988 and February 1989. Subsequently the Permanent Five of 
the Security Council became actively involved in the peace process, convening a Peace 
Conference in Paris in July 1989. Although no agreement was reached, the conference launched 
an active search for a compromise solution. The formula for such a solution was furnished by 
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who proposed a transitional United Nations 
administration in Cambodia in the lead up to national elections. 143 A second Peace Conference 
was held in Paris in October 1991, at which a peace agreement was signed, whereby the Khmer 
139 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Towards Peace in Cambodia", DPI091, September 1990, 
p. 1. 
140 Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard, (New York: Praeger, 
1991), p. 187. 
141 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Towards Peace in Cambodia", DPV1091, September 
1990, p. 1. 
142 ibid, p. 2. 
143 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal, (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990). 
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Rouge and the other parties agreed to cease fighting, surrender arms and demobilise while taking 
part in the Supreme National Council (SNC), a consultative body to the transitional United 
Nations administration (UNTAC), and participate in free multiparty elections. The agreement 
was to be short lived, however, as by July 1992 the Khmer Rouge had refused to comply with 
the agreement or cooperate with UNTAC. Although the elections were successfully held, the 
Khmer Rouge fights on against the elected government, unbound by any peace agreement. 
4.3.1: Objectives 
United Nations involvement in the Cambodian peace process was stimulated ·by the 
growth of a large and cohesive sponsoring coalition within the Organisation, largely agreeing on 
the shape of a solution to the Cambodian civil war that needed to be negotiated by United 
Nations mediators. Like El Salvador, the Cambodian civil war had long been a bone of 
contention and a proxy conflict between the Great Powers. A geopolitical struggle in Indochina 
between Vietnam, China, and the ASEAN countries, had overlapped with an ideological rivalry 
primarily between China and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent between the Soviet Union 
and Vietnam and the West. As the Cold War ended and East Asian economic growth soared, the 
Great Power rivalries in which Cambodia had been entangled began to thaw. The Soviet Union, 
keen to build more cooperative relations with China, the West and Asia, advocated resolving the 
Cambodian civil war as a method of removing it as an impediment to closer relations. 
Responding to the pressure of its Soviet client, as well as its own intervention fatigue and desire 
for economic investment from the region, Vietnam wanted to withdraw and resolve the civil war 
in its neighbour which had cost it so much, domestically and internationally. China had gained 
all of the diplomatic benefits from its involvement, but as its connection with the Khmer Rouge 
began to isolate it, it too began to see the benefits of resolving the war. The other members of the 
growing coalition also saw a need to include China in resolution initiatives, given China's 
independence of foreign policy, keen interest in the region, and leverage over the Khmer Rouge. 
The ASEAN States, and associated regional powers such as Australia, Japan, and India, desired 
the end of the conflict and instability in the region, agreeing with Thailand's Chatichai, who 
advocated turning Indochina "from a battlefield into a marketplace" upon coming to power in 
August 1988. France, the former colonial power, and Britain added their interest in seeing the 
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conflict resolved, as a way to extract themselves from their nominal sponsorship of the non-
Communist resistance. 144 All of these interests agreed to a large extent, and coalesced around 
the Security Council's Permanent Five contact group, first activated to address the Iran-Iraq war, 
but increasingly concerned to resolve the Cambodian civil war. Among this broad and cohesive 
sponsoring coalition, France and Indonesia, as representatives of the Permanent Five and 
ASEAN, and as Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference, emerged as the activators of United 
Nations initiatives for the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, quietly and ably supported by 
Perez de Cuellar and the Secretariat in the background. 
The solution that this sponsoring coalition advocated was tailored in acting through the 
United Nations to be consistent with the principles and norms of the Organisation. These 
interests, first enunciated in Paris in January 1990, were that the fighting must stop, foreign 
forces must withdraw, no agreement by force of arms was acceptable, elections should be held 
to allow Cambodians the right to self-determination, the only lasting solution was through a 
comprehensive political settlement, and that the United Nations needed to playa strong role in 
the mediation and oversight of the agreement. 145 The objective that the United Nations sought 
through the peace process was the creation of a single, legitimate, and universally recognised 
Cambodian government by enabling "The Cambodian people to determine their own political 
future through free and fair elections organised and conducted by the United Nations in a neutral 
political environment with full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia." 146 It was 
further concerned to preserve Cambodian unity and territorial integrity, and to promote its 
144 Generally among the Western allies there was a desire to disassociate themselves from the brutal Cambodian 
civil war: Britain and other NATO powers had provided lethal military equipment to the resistance, while in the 
United States in late 1989, Congress pressured President Bush to stop aiding the Resistance and seek a political 
solution to the conflict. 
145 "Summary of the Conclusions of the Meeting of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council on the 
Cambodian Problem, Paris, 15-16 January 1990", in Amitar Aharya, Pierre Lizee, and Sorpong Peou (eds), 
Cambodia - The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents, (New York: Kraus 
International Publications, 1991), pp. 487-8. 
146 Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Kampuchea: Question of Peace, Stability 
and Co-operation in South-East Asia", AJ45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, p. 3. 
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sovereignty, independence and neutrality.147 These objectives also included their wish to see 
"Cambodia ... adopt a system of liberal, mUltiparty democracy and ... promote and encourage 
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms," as well as their 
stipulation of a "phased return to civilian life of all categories of forces of the Cambodian 
parties." 148 At a series of six meetings in Paris and New York in 1990, the Permanent Five drew 
these objectives and principles into a framework for a settlement covering five areas: transitional 
administration arrangements; transitional military arrangements; United Nations-verified 
elections, human rights protection; and international guarantees. 149 The closeness of the 
agreement of the coalition members imparted a certain rigidity on these principles, which none 
of the sponsors was prepared to alter. The United Nations mediators approached the mediation 
with this rigid framework, which they presented to the parties and relied on international 
pressure and negotiation to deliver the parties' agreement. ISO In this way, the concerted desire of 
the Permanent Five to secure a particular resolution to the Cambodian conflict was to determine 
the approach of the United Nations, and the reactions of the parties, to the mediation process. 
The Khmer Rouge, the major Cambodian insurgent movement,151 obsessed with 
regaining sole power in Cambodia, and consumed with distrust of the other parties to the 
conflict, approached the talks seeking victory rather than resolution. It saw itself as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia, fighting to liberate the country from invading Vietnamese 
147 Letter dated 8 January 1991 From the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United 
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Cambodia", AJ46/61 and S/22059, 11 January 1991, 
pp.4-5. 
148 Letter dated 3 September 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Cambodia", AJ46/418 and S/23011, 4 
September 1991, p. 2. 
149 Letter dated 31 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Kampuchea: Question of Peace, Stability 
and Co-operation in South-East Asia", AJ45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, pp. 2-3. 
150 Pierre Lizee, "Peacekeeping, Peace-Building and the Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia", in 
Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 138. 
151 The other Cambodian insurgent movements were Front uni national pour un Cambodge independant, neutre, 
pacifique et cooperatif (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The 
incumbent government referred to itself as the State of Cambodia (SoC). 
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forces in what it saw as an international, not civil, war. IS2 Consequently the Khmer Rouge's 
main objective was to obtain a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the creation of conditions 
permitting it to seize back power from the Vietnamese-backed government. 1S3 Agreement 
existed with the United Nations on the withdrawal of foreign forces, whereas agreement with the 
other objectives of the United Nations framework would depend on their conduciveness to the 
Khmer Rouge seizing sole power over Cambodia. 
The Khmer Rouge's eventual agreement to the peace plan drawn up by the United 
Nations was based more on partial agreement and international pressure than on an enduring 
agreement of objectives with the Permanent Five. While the United Nations expected the 
resulting agreement to be binding and immutable, the Khmer Rouge, along with the other parties 
" ... expected to develop and negotiate further the parameters of the settlement and the modalities 
of its implementation."ls4 In order to tum the agreement into an opportunity to seize power, the 
Khmer Rouge needed to maintain its military potential and its control over its areas, cadres, and 
refugee camps, all of which would have been made impossible by the strict implementation of 
the United Nations framework. 155 The Khmer Rouge's goal in the negotiations was to create 
under the peace agreement conditions that would enable it to seize and maintain power in the 
aftermath of the war. Its domination of the other two insurgent movements, and its tactics of 
infiltration and military seizure of power thus dictated the solution to the conflict that it 
advocated throughout the talks. The Khmer Rouge maintained that the interim administration 
leading up to the elections should be based on a quadripartite division of power between the 
government and the three insurgent movements in all branches and levels of the government. 156 
152 Lizee, "Peacekeeping, Peace-Making and the Challenge", in Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 137. 
153 "Declaration by Mr Khieu Samphan President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party and Vice-President of 
Cambodia in Charge of Foreign Affairs Condemning the Vietnamese Aggressions and Their Lackeys for Making an 
Attempt on the Life of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Cambodia", N45/220 and 
S/21253, 14 April 1990, pp. 2-3. 
154 Jarat Chopra, John MacKinlay and Larry Minear, Report on the Cambodian Peace Process, (Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of Intemational Affairs, 1993), p. 16. 
155 ibid, p. 9. 
156 "Declaration by Mr Khieu Samphan President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party and Vice-President of 
Cambodia in Charge of Foreign Affairs Condemning the Vietnamese Aggressions and Their Lackeys for Making an 
Attempt on the Life of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Cambodia", N45/220 and 
S/21253, 14 April 1990, pp. 2-3. 
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This arrangement would have granted the Khmer Rouge a controlling interest in three quarters 
of the State administration, a position not justified by its battlefield position, but from which it 
could infiltrate and launch a military seizure of power in Cambodia before any elections could 
take place. 157 Achieving a quadripartite settlement, therefore, would enable the Khmer Rouge 
"".to subvert the government from within while attacking it from without." 1 58 
The incumbent SoC government, however, adamantly opposed Khmer Rouge 
participation in an interim government, which, according to President Heng Samrin, would have 
been "tantamount to bringing war right into the heart of Phnom Penh.,,159 Needing a 
compromise solution and wary of giving the Khmer Rouge too much power and legitimacy, the 
United Nations during and after the 1989 Paris Conference rejected the quadripartite proposal, 
advocating instead a transitional UNTAC administration and an SNC of limited power in which 
the Khmer Rouge had two votes in thirteen. 160 The transitional arrangement was inimical to the 
Khmer Rouge's seizure of power, as it would force the Khmer Rouge to disarm and contest a 
popular election, deprived of its legitimacy as a resistance movement, but handicapped by its 
genocidal reputation. 161 These basic disagreements between United Nations and Khmer Rouge 
objectives were to translate into a short lived agreement that failed to bind the Khmer Rouge. 
Hence, it can be seen that the United Nations' and Khmer Rouge's objectives diverged: the 
United Nations wanted to implement a selection mechanism allowing Cambodians to choose 
their government, whereas the Khmer Rouge was determined to seize power. 
157 William S. Turley, "The Khmer War: Cambodia After Paris", Survival, Vol. 32, No.5, September/October 
1990, p. 442. 
158 Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No.2, Spring 
1990, p. 33. 
159 Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Civil War in Cambodia?" Foreign Policy, No. 76, Fall 1989, p. 33. 
160 Trisha Thomas, "Into the Unknown: Can the United Nations Bring Peace to Cambodia?", Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 44, No.1, Spring 1990, p. 500. 
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4.3.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations, detennined to stop the Cambodian civil war, needed first to end the 
fighting and the complex of interventions in the conflict, and obtain a basic agreement before 
undertaking more ambitious measures. To obtain this preliminary, it advocated the mediation of 
the Cambodian conflict. In this task, it was faced with the problem of committing the four 
suspicious warring parties, each with conflicting objectives and strategies, to the mediation 
process. Faced on one side with international pressure to secure peace in Cambodia, and on the 
other, intransigent and distrustful parties, the United Nations mediators needed to find a 
mediation fonnula to entice and tie the parties to the peace process. After extensive 
consultations, the Jakarta Infonnal Meetings, and the first Paris Peace Conference, it became 
clear to United Nations mediators that no common ground existed between the parties on the 
path to a peace agreement. The government disagreed with the resistance factions' holding of the 
Cambodian United Nations seat under the alliance named the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The government and the insurgent movements were also 
bitterly divided over the structure of an interim administration: the government wanted to run a 
caretaker administration, while the resistance wanted a dismantling of the SoC and the 
installation of the Khmer Rouge's quadripartite arrangement. 
Faced with such diametrically opposed positions, the United Nations mediators decided 
that it was incumbent on them, as a disinterested third party, to find a compromise fonnula 
which would in turn be presented to the parties. The task of fonnulating a proposal away from 
the parties was taken on by Indonesia and France as the Co-Chainnen of the Paris Conference 
on Cambodia (PCC), the Pennanent Five, the Co-Chainnen of the three PCC Committees, India, 
Canada, Malaysia, Laos, Australia and Japan, and Special Representative Ahmed at a series of 
meetings in 1990 and 1991. As a draft agreement on a comprehensive political settlement took 
shape, it was presented at various times to the Cambodian belligerents " .. .in order to infonn 
them and to seek their understanding and support of the progress made so far.,,162 The draft 
agreement was finalised in Paris in November 1990, in addition to a framework for 
162 "Press Statement of the Co-Chainnen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia", A/451719 and S/21940, 10 
November 1990, p. 2. 
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comprehensive settlement adopted earlier in August 1990. 163 Once the parties had agreed to the 
framework and formed the Supreme National Council (SNC), the mediators intended to 
reconvene the Paris Conference to secure the parties' accord to the draft agreement and work out 
a detailed plan of implementation. 164 At Jakarta in September 1990, the Cambodian disputants 
agreed to the framework for settlement and set up the SNC, thereby clearing the way for the 
reconvening of the Paris Peace Conference. 165 The United Nations mediation strategy for the 
Cambodian conflict was to formulate a solution without the participation of the parties, which 
then had to be pressed on to the parties for their agreement. This approach was necessitated by 
the clashirtg objectives of the parties and between the parties and the United Nations. 
The mechanism formulated by the mediators to bypass disagreements between the 
parties over United Nations representation and the transitional administration, and to tie the 
parties to the mediation process, was the SNC. Including members of all the parties, the SNC 
would, during the transitional period between the ceasefire and elections, occupy the United 
Nations seat, be the repository of Cambodian sovereignty, and consult with the UNTAC 
transitional authority on the administration of Cambodia. 166 After the agreement of the parties to 
form the SNC, the mediators used it as a mechanism to tie them to the peace process by 
presenting all of their peace proposals to the SNC for negotiation. 167 They also used the SNC to 
attempt to commit the parties to the components of the peace agreement by inviting the SNC as 
163 Paris Conference on Cambodia, "Communique", A/45/829 and S/21985, 26 November 1990, pp. 2-3. 
164 Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Kampuchea: Question of Peace, Stability 
and Co-operation in South-East Asia", A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, p. 4. 
165 "Joint Statement of the Informal Meeting on Cambodia, issued at Jakarta on 10 September 1990", A/45/490 
and S/21732, 17 September 1990, pp. 2-3. 
166 Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Kampuchea: Question of Peace, Stability 
and Co-operation in South-East Asia", A/45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, p. 7. 
167 See for example Letter dated 5 August 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Cambodia", A/46/340 and 
S/22889, 5 August 1991, p. 3. 
169 
a body to declare a ceasefire and an end to external military assistance,168 and stipulating that 
the Agreement would become operational upon its signature at the Paris Conference by the 
members of the SNc. 169 While allowing the belligerents to negotiate the composition of the 
SNC, the mediators defined its functions and firmly delineated its subordination to UNT AC, and 
required that its "advice [be] consistent with the objectives of the comprehensive political 
170 
settlement. " 
For the Khmer Rouge, dedicated to the radical agrarian, revolutionary Maoist tactics and 
philosophies developed over decades of guerrilla insurgency, the mediation of a compromise 
end to its insurgency was an alien concept. When confronted with the Permanent Five's peace 
plan, and pressured to agree and join the SNC, the Khmer Rouge disagreed fundamentally with 
the disarmament and election mechanisms of resolution it contained, seeing the danger this 
process posed to its aspirations and organisational survival. It was also dissatisfied with the SNC 
composition that was negotiated, which gave the SoC government six seats and each of the 
insurgent movements two.17I It further disagreed with the majority voting procedure and the 
lack of power of the SNC in the transitional arrangements. Under considerable international 
pressure, the Khmer Rouge finally acquiesced in the mediation process, but only as a gambit to 
temporarily deflect criticism and displeasure. It never intended to cooperate with either the letter 
or spirit of the Paris Agreements, but instead intended to exploit the structures of the 
Agreements to violently seize power for itself. Hence, despite finding a creative mediation 
formula, United Nations mediators could not overcome basic differences in objectives between 
the parties and with the United Nations, and were ultimately unable to permanently tie the 
Khmer Rouge to the peace process and the Agreement. 
168 "Final Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia in Pattaya (Thailand)", 
Al46/271 and S/22740, 26 June 1991, p. 3. 
169 Letter dated 8 January 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Cambodia", Al46/61 and S/22059, 11 January 1991, 
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Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
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4.3.3: Instrumentality 
By the time of its substantive involvement, the United Nations was generally 
acknowledged by all of the parties as the mediator of choice for the Cambodian conflict. At a 
meeting in Paris in the aftermath of the first Paris Conference, " ... common understanding was 
reached among all concerned, notably the Cambodian parties, on the need for the United Nations 
to have an enhanced role in dealing with the various aspects of the Cambodian settlement 
process." 172 The parties recognised the United Nations as the most appropriate mechanism to tie 
together the many and often antagonistic international sponsors of the peace negotiations. The 
international community saw that the United Nations was the only body with sufficient prestige 
and acceptability to deal with all of the disputants and their diverse sponsors in what was an 
extremely complex mediation process. But the Khmer Rouge's acceptance of the United Nations 
as a mediator had no mitigating impact on the destructive impact on the viability of the 
mediation interaction of the Khmer Rouge's basic rejection of mediation and a negotiated peace: 
it saw the United Nations and the peace process as mechanisms to exploit for its ulterior motives 
of infiltrating the government to the extent that it could militarily seize power. 
The acceptance of the Khmer Rouge in the peace process was problematical for both the 
SoC and for the United Nations. Successive revelations about the Khmer Rouge's genocidal 
policies while in power, which resulted in the death of between 800,000 and one million 
Cambodians out of a popUlation of 8 million between 1975 and 1979, had led to a growing 
chorus of international condemnation of the movement by the late 1980s. China and the ASEAN 
States, as the main supporters of resistance to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, organised 
the CGDK in 1982, which provided the Khmer Rouge with a fig leaf of legitimacy by 
combining it with the other two democratic insurgent movements and allowed it to maintain the 
United Nations seat.173 With the onset of serious peace negotiations, the facade of the CGDK 
172 Letter dated 15 March 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation In Kampuchea: Question of Peace, Stability 
and Co-operation in South-East Asia", A145/167 and S/21196, 16 March 1990, p. 3. 
173 Turley, "The Khmer War", op. cit., 1990, p. 438. 
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and Khmer Rouge legitimacy became untenable, particularly as serious objections to Khmer 
Rouge participation were raised by the SoC and Vietnam.174 Serious opposition to giving the 
Khmer Rouge any opportunity to regain power was growing within the United Nations itself, 
formally the most vociferous supporter of its resistance to the Vietnamese invasion. Successive 
General Assembly resolutions advocated the role of the United Nations in ensuring a "non-
return to the policies and practices of the past." 175 United States Secretary of State James Baker 
summed up the growing consensus in the West when he stated "The United States strongly 
believes that the Khmer Rouge should play no role in Cambodia's future." 176 
Notwithstanding its unsavoury reputation, the Khmer Rouge was included in the 
Cambodia mediation process as an equal participant. The mediators, the international 
community, and the other belligerents realised that as a major disputant, the Khmer Rouge had 
to be included in any peace settlement in order to forestall it from attacking such a settlement 
and perpetuating the civil war. l77 The exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from the peace process 
would also have alienated its strongest sponsor, China, thereby destroying international 
solidarity behind the peace process while enabling the Khmer Rouge to fight on indefinitely 
with a permanent external sponsor. 178 Eventually a formula was found to allow the easier 
inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the peace process: Son Sen and Khieu Samphan nominally 
replaced Pol Pot and Ieng Sary as the leaders of the Khmer Rouge; 179 while a distinction was 
made by the international community between "leaders" and "followers" of the movement, with 
174 ibid, p. 439. 
175 See General Assembly Resolution 43/19 (1988) and Letter dated 31 August 1990 from the Permanent 
Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The 
Situation In Kan\puchea: Question of Peace, Stability and Co-operation in South-East Asia", Al45/472 and S/21689, 
31 August 1990, p. 15. 
176 James Baker III, "International Efforts for a Peaceful Cambodia", Washington D.C: Bureau of Public Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State, 30 July 1989. 
I77 Michael Leifer, "Power-Sharing and Peacemaking in Cambodia", SAIS Review, Vol 12, No.1, Winter-Spring 
1992, p. 145. 
178 Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community", op. cit., 1990, p. 110. 
179 David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 
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elements of the latter deemed acceptable participants in the negotiations. 18o This acceptance, 
however, had little impact on the Khmer Rouge's lack of commitment to negotiating an end to 
its insurgency. 
4.3.4: Impartiality 
United Nations mediators were not seen as completely impartial by the main parties to 
the conflict. The Khmer Rouge was wary. of United Nations intentions based on the growing 
condemnation of the movement within the United Nations and opposition to its possible 
empowerment. The SoC was also suspicious of United Nations mediators, who it saw as 
responding to the will of the majority that had consistently refused to recognise it as the 
legitimate government of Cambodia while seating the Khmer Rouge. 181 Both the SoC and the 
Khmer Rouge, however, were willing to deal with the Secretary-General and his representatives, 
and to a lesser extent the Permanent Five, rather than the condemnatory General Assembly. 182 
Thus while the United Nations impartiality was compromised, it was generally acceptable to the 
parties as a mediator. 
While the Khmer Rouge maintained a facade of fidelity to the mediation process for 
reasons of expediency, the impartiality of its intentions during the mediation was extremely 
questionable. After years of adopting uncompromising positions, it had to be pressured into 
accepting an agreement that compromised its own objectives, and can thus be seen to have 
acceded to the mediation process while being ultimately dedicated to subverting and modifying 
the agreement to its own advantage. The Khmer Rouge intended to challenge and change the 
agreement on the ground once it came time to implement it, an purpose that was borne out by its 
post-agreement behaviour. 183 Thus while its mediation behaviour was innocuous and impartial, 
its intentions belied any genuine commitment to peace. 
180 Acharya, Lizee and Peou, op. cit., 1991, p. xxxvi. 
181 Haas,op. cit., 1991, p. 187. 
182 ibid., p. 217. 
183 Chopra, MacKinlay and Minear, op. cit., 1993, p. 16. 
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4.3.5: Timing 
The United Nations mediation initiative chose a propitious military juncture at which to 
intervene in the Cambodian conflict. The Cambodian civil war had degenerated into a grim 
stalemate only punctuated by seasonal changes in military fortunes when the government-
Vietnamese forces launched annual armour-based dry season offensives into Khmer Rouge 
strongholds in north-western Cambodia, followed by the cyclical Khmer Rouge retaking of its 
lost territory in the wet season each year. By the late 1980s, the Khmer Rouge had realised that it 
would never succeed in carving out a "Liberated Zone" in Cambodian territory, while the SoC 
recognised that it could never completely defeat such an experienced guerrilla movement with 
Thai sanctuaries and strong external support. 184 After the unilateral Vietnamese withdrawal in 
November 1989, all ofthe resistance factions launched a concerted attempt to win the war. Their 
failure to do this by February 1990 convinced all sides that a unilateral military solution was 
impossible against the existing correlation of forces. 185 The Khmer Rouge, now deprived of the 
anti-Vietnamese rationale, fighting factionalism in its own ranks, and militarily exhausted,186 
was faced with a weakening military position. With China and Thailand bound into the United 
Nations' efforts to end the war, it also faced losing its external sponsors.Its military position thus 
disposed the Khmer Rouge to be receptive to mediation overtures, seeing them as an opportunity 
to exploit, particularly as they offered it the chance to attempt to seize power against a different 
correlation of forces and from a less isolated position. 
4.3.6: Support and Isolation 
The war in Cambodia was intimately linked to overlapping regional and international 
rivalries which drove and supported much of its ferocity and intractability. As these external 
supporters ultimately resolved their bilateral differences, they provided much of the leverage that 
184 Turley, "The Khmer War", op. cit. 1990, p. 439. 
185 Haas, op. cit., 1991, p. 215. 
186 Chopra, MacKinlay and Minear, op. cit., 1993, p. 9. 
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was needed to bring the Cambodian disputants to agreement. The Soviet Union and Vietnam, 
the sponsors of the incumbent government, and China, Thailand and the ASEAN nations, who 
supported the Khmer Rouge, began to experience a detente in their relations based on wider 
political, ideological and economic trends. 187 These former sponsors, with close links to the 
parties, and a strong desire to stop the conflict, supported United Nations mediators with strong 
1 th · 188 everage to pressure e partles to agreement. 
The United Nations mediation strategy of formulating a draft peace agreement with only 
limited contact with the parties, and then presenting it to the parties at a formal Peace 
Conference and cajoling the disputants' agreement, was based heavily on considerations of the 
extent and quality of this international support. All major external supporters of the parties were 
included in the conference, and provided strong pressure, in the form of both threats and side-
payments, on the parties to accept the agreement. 189 Finally, all interested States agreed not to 
support the parties or take any action violating "the independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.,,19o The strength of the 
international support of the mediators was the major factor in enabling the United Nations to 
secure an agreement on the Khmer Rouge which had opposed objectives. The cohesion of the 
interested States also acted negatively, by convincing the coalition of its own potency and ability 
to pressure an agreement onto an unwilling party. The United Nations' and Khmer Rouge's 
approaches to the mediation interaction were too divergent to be compensated for by this 
leverage, however, and the need for such international pressure ultimately boded ill for the 
longevity of the resulting peace agreement. 
187 Apart from the end of the Cold War, perhaps the greatest influence on improving relations was growing east 
Asian economic success and the desire to normalise political relations in order to secure a greater volume of intra-
regional trade. Thai Prime Minister Chattichai proclaimed on comin:~ to office the desire to stop war in Indochina in 
order to turn it "from a battlefield into a market place." 
188 Lizee,op. cit., 1994, p. 136. 
189 While such leverage from sponsors was often covert and thus hard to trace, its effect on changing intransigent 
positions is observable. The best example of public pressure used was by the Thai government, which threatened 
closing the Khmer Rouge refugee camps over the Thai border unless greater flexibility was shown by the Khmer 
Rouge. The loss of these camps, in terms of both sanctuaries and "supporters", would have been militarily 
devastating for the Khmer Rouge, which duly altered its stance on negotiations. 
190 "Framework for the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict", AJ45/472 and S/21698, 
pp. 18-20. 
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A major factor behind the Khmer Rouge's cooperation with the mediation process was 
its slowly evolving separation from its former major ally, China. China's increasing involvement 
with the sponsoring coalition and the Permanent Five initiative soon translated into a growing 
readiness to apply pressure to the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with the mediators. Chinese aid to 
the Khmer Rouge is estimated to have surpassed $100 million per year by the end of the 1980s, 
including large-scale transfers of weapons, particularly artillery and missiles. 191 Chinese support 
for the Khmer Rouge, based on opposition to Vietnamese influence in Indochina, had yielded 
significant diplomatic benefits for China, including the isolation of Vietnam, improved relations 
with Thailand and ASEAN, and increased Chinese influence with the West during the darkest 
days of the Second Cold War. 192 Given its growing detente with both the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam, and the increasingly vociferous international criticism of the Khmer Rouge, Chinese 
support of the Khmer Rouge promised diminishing returns while risking international 
isolation. 193 The members of the European Union,194 Thailand, and the United States began to 
pressure China to end its support for the Khmer Rouge and to use its influence to urge it to 
cooperate with the mediators. 195 Finally in August 1990 after a meeting of the Permanent Five 
in New York, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian publicly pledged to stop aiding the Khmer 
Rouge. 196 Although Chinese support is thought to have continued into 1991,197 it diminished as 
China became more committed to ending the war. Its long time sponsorship of the group 
provided it and the United Nations with considerable leverage over the Khmer Rouge, and was 
. I·· h 198 mstrurnenta m secunng t e agreement. 
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4.3.7: Cohesion 
The support of the United Nations membership, and particular the unprecedented 
cohesion of the five permanent Security Council members behind the United Nations mediation 
effort, had a strong influence on their endeavours and on the final signing of the Paris 
Agreement by the parties. The Permanent Five had begun informal caucusing at the suggestion 
of Perez de Cuellar in 1985 in support of solutions in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. It was 
not until the failure of the 1989 Paris Conference that it became involved in seeking a solution to 
the Cambodian conflict, as the United States, the Soviet Union and China became concerned 
about its poisoning influence on their warming relations. 199 At successive meetings after 1990, 
the Permanent Five pledged " ... to remain in close contact and to meet as necessary in order to 
sustain their efforts in search for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict. ,,200 This 
Permanent Five support for a mediated solution naturally translated into regular Security 
Council support for the mediators,201 and eventually for the framework for a comprehensive 
settlemene02 and the draft agreement.203 The Permanent Five regularly reiterated its calls on the 
Cambodian disputants to accept the agreement, be flexible in their negotiations,204 and join and 
cooperate in the functioning of the SNC.205 The cohesive pressure of a united international 
community behind the mediation effort thereby played a strong role in the decision of the parties 
to finally accede to the Paris Agreement. 
199 Haas, op. cit., 1990, p. 190. 
200 "Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council on Cambodia", AJ45/671 and S/21908, 
25 October 1990, p. 4. 
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In yielding to an agreement that was nominally detrimental to its achievement of its 
objectives, the Khmer Rouge needed strong control over internal dissension. While its guerrilla 
bands are organised on a loose regional basis and there were reports of political rivalry within 
the upper ranks of the Khmer Rouge,206 it was able to maintain an impressive unity of direction 
throughout the peace process. This is undoubtedly due to its rigid power hierarchy and its use of 
terror for recruitment and discipline among its cadres and supporters. United Nations personnel 
engaged in negotiations with the Khmer Rouge were left with little doubt that all major 
decisions or concessions had to be cleared with the movement's top leadership?07 In this way, 
the Khmer Rouge was able to manage its temporary cooperation with a peace process that 
impeded its securement of its objectives. 
While the United Nations mediators walked away from the 1991 Paris Conference on 
Cambodia holding a peace agreement which all the disputants had signed, they had not secured a 
resolution of the conflict or even a durable end to the Cambodian war. Within six months of the 
signing of the agreement, the Khmer Rouge had ceased to cooperate with attempts to implement 
its provisions. As is shown in Chapter Five, the Khmer Rouge was to renege on its vital 
commitment to disarm and demobilise its guerrilla army in June 1992, effectively withdrawing 
from the peace process to which it was signatory. From this position it began to stage a series of 
attacks against the process and the peacekeeping operation. The UNT AC peacekeepers that were 
sent in to implement the Paris Agreement lacked the capacity to force the Khmer Rouge's 
fidelity to the agreement, making it only too easy for the Khmer Rouge to renege on its 
agreement on the ground. It took no part in the May 1993 elections, the culmination of the 
process, and thereafter rejected all appeals from the Funcinpec-dominated government of 
national unity to participate in the government and political process. The Khmer Rouge fights on 
in the Cambodian jungles against the new government, unaffected by the peace process, 
unwavering in its determination to resurrect Democratic Kampuchea. 
206 Craig Etcheson, "Civil War and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.1, January 1987, p. 200. 
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The interested Member-States within the United Nations approached the Cambodian 
mediation determined to secure a negotiated settlement to a war that had become embarrassing 
and irritating. The Permanent Five of the Security Council, particularly, were eager to explore 
the possibilities of their new cooperation, and keen to eradicate any hangovers from the Cold 
War that could jeopardise this cooperation. The Cambodian conflict presented an opportunity to 
satisfy both impUlses. Furthermore, a solution would solve the problem of Cambodian 
representation by producing a universally-recognised Cambodian government from the four 
contending claimants. In confronting the Khmer Rouge, however, the United Nations mediators 
found a movement whose radical Maoist ideology spurned any genuine cooperation or 
compromise, whose organisational structure was based on isolation, control, and terroristic 
discipline, and whose only tactics were to subvert, attack, and overthrow. This was an insurgent 
group for whom agreements and undertakings were open to manipulation and interpretation, 
whose inviolability needed to be underwritten by force. Finding the United Nations' approach to 
mediation was not shared by the Khmer Rouge, the Permanent Five, intoxicated by its new-
found cohesion, conceived of the mediation strategy of finding a formula for agreement, which 
the parties would then be pressured to sign. The strengths of the Cambodian mediation process, 
its timing, international support and cohesion, were subsequently relied upon to deliver an 
agreement through applying pressure to the disputants. In this way, diverging objectives were 
translated into discordant approaches to the mediation. This mediation strategy was entirely 
inappropriate for an insurgent movement as implacable as the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge 
allowed itself to be pressured into signing the agreement, believing it was a temporary 
compromise that could be renegotiated, by force if necessary, on the ground at a later date. The 
United Nations expected the agreement to be inviolable and not open to any reinterpretation. 
The Khmer Rouge's ultimate defaulting on its commitments demonstrated that an agreement can 
only be forced if it can be enforced. The Paris Agreement was to prove worthless for tying the 
Khmer Rouge to a resolution of the Cambodian conflict. 
179 
4.4: The Bosnian Serbs: Talking to the Wind 
In March 1992, ethnic Serbs began a secessionist insurgency against the government of 
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,208 which had recently voted for independence from 
Yugoslavia by referendum/o9 and been granted diplomatic recognition by the European Union, 
the United Nations, and most of the international community.21o Fighting against being 
absorbed into a State dominated by other ethnic groups, the Bosnian Serbs embarked on a 
project of carving a "greater Serbia" from the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia.21l 
The project of uniting the Serb diaspora into one ethnically-homogeneous State stemmed from 
memories of past massacres of Serbs at the hands of the Croatian Ustashi during the Second 
World War, and the Muslims during Ottoman rule?12 These goals were rationalised by Serbian 
nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic's assertion that the boundaries of the republics in federal 
Yugoslavia were administrative, and that it was nations, rather than republics, that were 
sovereign?13 The Bosnian Serbs felt betrayed by the international community, which they 
believed had consigned them to minority status and possible genocide in the newly independent 
republics. Their self-reliant resort to violence to correct the situation coincided with their 
nationalist self-image as a heroic, independent, tenacious, and virile people, perpetually 
struggling against adverse conditions.214 The Bosnian Serbs, initially with the help of the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA), were able to quickly seize and hold 70% of Bosnia, and link 
208 Hereafter shortened to "Bosnia". 
209 The referendum, which was held from 29 February to 1 March 1992, was boycotted by the 31 % ethnic Serb 
population, and returned a 90% result in favour of independence. 
210 The United States and the European Union recognised Bosnia on 17 April 1992, and was accepted as a 
member of the United Nations on 22 May 1992. 
211 This plan had originated during the Serbo-Croat civil war which had coincided with the Second World War. 
See Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92, (London: Verso, 1993), p. 
324. 
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these with Serbia and the Krajina region of Croatia?15 In the areas they controlled, they carried 
out widespread policies of ethnic cleansing, to rid them of Muslims, Croats, and undesirable 
Serbs.216 Adding to the international horror at their practices, Bosnian Serb forces established 
rape camps and waged systematic genocide, as much in revenge for historic grievances and 
catharsis agairIst their collective irIferiority complex as for any political or military reasons.217 
On 7 April 1992, the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the independent "Republika Srpska", led by 
Radovan Karadzic and the 70-seat "parliament" at Pale, controlling the 70% of Bosnia-
Herzegovina seized, and nominally responsible for the Bosnian Serb army.218 The Bosnian Serb 
"republic" demonstrates all of the trappings of a proto-State, possessing a capital, a Parliament, a 
flag, a fledgling foreign ministry,219 and providing protection, public services and amenities, 
and commodities to the population under its control. 
The Bosnian Serb army (VRS) remains the strongest of the military forces in Bosnia, 
compensating for a personnel deficit with a predominance in heavy weapons, training, airpower, 
and technology.22o Much of this advantage originated from the JNA's bequeathing of 54,000 
Serb JNA troops, most of its artillery, T-55 tanks, and Serb officers to the Bosnian Serb army 
after "withdrawing" from Bosnia in May 1992; and also from the Bosnian Serb capture of most 
of the 40% of Yugoslavia's armaments industry that had been based in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and 
the continued supply of material such as SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 anti-aircraft missile systems 
215 For full accounts of the Bosnian civil war, see Noll Scott and Derek Jones (eds), Bloody Bosnia: A European 
Tragedy, (London: The Guardian and Channel Four Television, 1994); and Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: 
The Struggle in Yugoslavia, (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1993). 
216 See Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horros of Ethnic Cleansing in 
Bosnia, Shaftsbury: Element, 1993); and Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, The Muslims of Bosnia: The Genocide of a 
People, (Markfield: The Islamic Foundation, 1994). 
217 Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, (London: Mandarin, 1994), pp. 267-70. 
218 Reports from peacekeepers have unanimously denied any respect for orders from Pale among Bosnian Serb 
troops in the field; agreements have to be negotiated with army commanders or local Serb forces. See Ian Traynor, 
"Bihac Sides Jostle Over Truce Terms", The Guardian, 26 November 1994. 
219 The diplomatic network is necessarily limited by the fact that no State recognises Republika Sprska. 
220 The Bosnian Serb army commands 80,000 troops, 330 tanks, 800 artillery pieces, 20 fighter aircraft and 12 
helicopters, compared with the Bosnian government army's 110,000 troops, 40 tanks, negligible artillery and no 
aircraft, and the Bosnian Croat army's 50,000 troops, 75 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, and 6 helicopters. See Michael 
Sheridan and Christopher Bellamy, "Hunkering Down for a Long, Long War", The Independent, 2 May 1995. 
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from Serbia and the Krajina as required.221 This superiority has dictated the military tactics of 
conventional armour-led infantry thrusts, reliant on bombardment and blockade, the seizure of 
strategic roads and heights, command of the air, and the expulsion of potentially disruptive 
populations from "liberated" areas.222 Its defence of long, unusually-shaped front lines has made 
the VRS somewhat vulnerable to guerrilla tactics by the Muslim-Croat federation, but its 
military predominance has allowed it to retain with relative ease the gains made in the first 
months of the war?23 The Bosnian Serb army is organised along decentralised, regional 
commands, tactically reliant on local initiative, with central commands slow and infrequent.224 
It is led by General Ratko Mladic, a talented, radical Serb nationalist and former JNA general, 
whose success has built him an independent political base in Republika Srpska. He is ably 
supported by former JNA generals such as Mile Mrksic, Manojlo Milovanovic, and Dragomar 
Milosevic, and by gifted, brutal guerrilla commanders such as the infamous "Arkan". This 
military prowess, nationalist fervour, and self-righteousness, has made the Bosnian Serbs 
formidable interlocutors for United Nations mediators and peacekeepers. 
The United Nations, concerned with the growing security and humanitarian threats of the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the destructive effect of the conflict on the cohesion of the 
international community, has been engaged in a frantic effort to mediate a solution since the 
beginning of the conflict in March 1992. To date, these efforts have been spectacularly 
unsuccessful. This lack of success points to a seriously dysfunctional mediation process, and 
ultimately the unsuitability of United Nations mediation for bringing an end to the conflict at 
present. The application of the mediation framework to the Bosnia negotiations will illustrate the 
location and extent of these problems in comparison to more successful efforts in EI Salvador 
and Cambodia. 
221 John Pomfret, "U.N. Rejects Call to Hit Serb SAMs", Washington Post, 3 December 1994. 
222 Almond,op. cit., 1994, pp. 270-1. 
223 John Pomfret, "Bosnian Muslims Use New Tactics on Battlefields", Washington Post, 3 November 1994. 
224 Phillipe Morillon, "U.N. Operations in Bosnia: Lessons and Realities", RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No.6, 
December 1993, p. 34. 
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In the first weeks of the war in Bosnia, the Security Council initiated the mediation 
process by requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch his Special Envol25 to assist the peace 
efforts of the European Community,z26 In this capacity, Special Envoy Cyrus Vance had already 
met with Moslem, ethnic Serb and ethnic Croat leaders in Sarajevo on 6 March 1992, obtaining 
their agreement to seek a peaceful settlement of their differences. By September 1992, the 
European Community and the United Nations established the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia (lCFY) in London as a formal mechanism to coordinate their mediation 
efforts. Co-chaired by the United Nations Special Representative and the European Community 
Envoy, the ICFY consists of a Steering Committee and six Working Groups meeting in Geneva 
to "prepare the basis for a general settlement and associated measures,,,227 in support of the 
efforts of the mediators. Thus United Nations mediators played a collaborative but significant 
role in efforts to mediate an end to the war in Bosnia. 
4.4.1: Objectives 
The ferocity and visibility of the war in Bosnia stimulated a wave of international horror 
and summoned visions of an anarchy that gave the lie to the much-vaunted "new world order". 
So much of the international response to the crisis has been dictated by States' domestic 
pressures to respond, but has been tempered by a reluctance to become heavily involved in the 
conflict. These conflicting impulses made interested States' response through the United Nations 
inevitable, as a way of legitimately responding, while minimising costs and liabilities. Eager to 
test their new security independence after the Cold War, the European Union States originally 
claimed the response to the crisis was the "hour of Europe". Acquiescing to a new stridency in 
German foreign policy,228 the members of the European Union recognised the sovereignty of 
the seceding Yugoslav republics, eventually carrying the United States and the United Nations 
225 Perez de Cuellar had earlier appointed Cyrus Vance as his Personal Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia on 8 
October 1991. 
226 Statement by the President of the Security Council, 10 April 1992. 
227 "Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/24795, 11 
November 1992, pp. 3-4. 
228 Germany advocated recognising the seceding republics of the former Yugoslavia as a cheap way of stopping 
the hostilities. 
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reluctantly with them, and to some extent hastening the onset of hostilities. Seeing their attempts 
at conflict resolution fail, the European Union called for United Nations involvement in October 
1991.229 The Europeans in the Security Council, headed by Britain and France in the Permanent 
Five, thereafter formed the core of the sponsoring coalition of United Nations mediation efforts. 
Most of the United Nations' mediation and peacekeeping initiatives have been instigated by 
these two States. Their perception of the Bosnian conflict as a civil war to be contained and 
resolved informed early United Nations decisions on Bosnia, and, as embodied by the large 
European contingents among the peacekeepers there, this perception remains the basis of official 
United Nations policy on Bosnia. 
After initially acceding to European dominance in responding to the Yugoslav wars, the 
United States became involved with the activation of a United Nations response. Much of the 
disunity in the sponsoring coalition on Bosnia has stemmed from disagreements between the 
United States and the other coalition partners. The American position on Bosnia is determined 
by a different perception of the conflict, seeing the war in Bosnia as an international conflict, 
with the sovereignty of a United Nations Member-State threatened by external intervention?30 
Initially the United States contemplated military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian 
government,23J but thereafter acceded to the European position of containment, relief, and 
negotiations, in the interests of retaining unity with the Western Europe. The United States has 
declined to contribute peacekeeping forces to Bosnia;232 a fact that became a source of acrimony 
with the Western Europeans as the United States began to advocate its policy of lifting the arms 
embargo on the Bosnian government and shifting the military balance in its favour using 
229 After the failure of the European Union peace plan, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Austria 
requested United Nations involvement in resolving the Yugoslav wars on 18 October 1991. 
230 American policy was originally defmed by James Baker's June 1991 Belgrade speech, which advocated the 
continued existence of the state of Yugoslavia. However, once convinced to recognise the seceding republics, 
American Bosnia policy has been informed by legalistic considerations of sovereignty, and sensitive to domestic 
demands to respond meaningfully to the conflict. 
231 On 27-28 June 1992 President George Bush had a series of telephone conferences with Russia's Yeltsin, 
Britain's Major, and Canada's Mulroney on the possibility of a Gulf War-type multilateral enforcement action in 
Bosnia. 
232 As a compromise and a way to deflect divisions within NATO, United States Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher proposed the use of United States troops in a preventative deployment in Macedonia in a NATO 
meeting in Athens on 10 June 1993. 
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surgical air strikes.233 The Europeans, particularly the French, have also shown their annoyance 
at American reluctance to pressure the Bosnian government to accept various peace plans 
advocated by the United Nations. The dissenting American position has led to splits between the 
European coalition partners; Britain and France expressed their irritation when German 
Chancellor Kohl advocated lifting the embargo on the Bosnian government at a private 
European Union dinner on 21 June 1993 after correspondence with United States President 
Clinton,z34 The American position has often agreed with that of the Islamic members of the 
sponsoring coalition, sympathetic to the largely Muslim Bosnian government, who advocate 
lifting the embargo and helping Bosnia defend its sovereignty,z35 
The other dissenting members of the sponsoring coalition are those States sympathetic to 
the Bosnian Serb position, particularly the Russian Federation and Greece. Closely interested in 
the conflict for geopolitical reasons, and connected with the Serbs through common religious 
links, Russia and Greece have contributed another series of diplomatic obstacles to any changes 
in United Nations policy in Bosnia, particularly those advocating punishing or pressuring the 
Serbs. The Western members of the coalition, particularly sensitive to preserving the tenure of 
the Yeltsin regime in Russia, have restrained their own initiatives to coincide with the Russian 
position.236 The Russian leadership, determined to dampen right-wing opposition, and to appear 
independent of Western policy in this traditional area of Russian influence, has repeatedly 
warned that Russia "would not allow attempts to solve the problems in Bosnia without 
233 This acrimony has been particularly bitter between Britain, France and the United States, and is exemplified 
by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's pointed remarks on 27 May 1993: "I haven't agreed with the so-called 
division of labour between those who are in the sky and those who are on the ground. I wish that all of the Great 
Powers involved in the painful drama will assume their responsibility." 
234 British and French frustration with Germany parallels their annoyance with the United States. They are aware 
that they acceded to German pressure to recognise the Yugoslav republics initially, and that Germany can respond 
freely to the internal pressures of right-wing groups and expatriate Croatians while fully aware that because of Nazi 
atrocities in the Balkans in the Second World War, German forces will never be invited to intervene in Bosnia, and 
thus will never be threatened by the positions the German government advocates. 
235 This coincidence in positions has led to such anomalies as the 29 June 1993 Security Council vote on lifting 
the arms embargo against Bosnia, where the United States was supported by Iran and Libya in voting for the draft 
resolution, which failed to be adopted through a lack of votes. See "UN Council Blocks Arms for Bosnians", New 
York Times, 30 June 1993. 
236 A good example of the operation of this consideration came on 12 April 1993, when the United Nations 
Security Council postponed a vote on strengthening sanctions against Serbia until after the 25 April referendum on 
the popUlarity of the Yeltsin government. 
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Russia. ,,237 Hence, the number of the Great Powers with strongly-held interests in the Bosnian 
crisis, necessitated the creation of a large sponsoring coalition for United Nations initiatives on 
Bosnia. The extent of divergence between these States' positions, however, produced a limited 
and faltering response to the crisis. Much of the diplomatic activity and policy responses of the 
coalition have been motivated towards preserving the fragile coalition, a consideration that has 
deprived the United Nations response of its coherence and purpose.238 
The United Nations' unique involvement in the origins of the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia entailed serious normative responsibilities for the Organisation towards the conflicts. 
Having in part prompted the conflict through recognising the breakaway republics, and watched 
with horror the ferocity of the wars, the United Nations had no alternative but to attempt to 
adhere to its normative principles in its efforts to end the war. On 18 May 1992239 Bosnia 
sought and was granted United Nations recognition of its sovereignty as an independent State 
after fulfilling the Carrington Arbitration Commission's requirement of two-thirds of its voters' 
support for independence in a referendum,z4o This made it incumbent on the United Nations to 
uphold the sovereign prerogatives of Bosnia, " ... which, as a State Member of the United 
Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.,,241 Foremost 
among these rights are " ... the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this 
regard. ,,242 
•.. ' 
~ .. 
237 President Yeltsin, quoted in The Independent, 15 February 1994. 
238 In fact, one of the prominent features of Bosnia diplomacy has been the periodic meetings between, in 
particular, the United States, Russia, France, Spain and Britain, to negotiate joint strategies on Bosnia, such as that 
on 22 May 1993. 
239 Security Council Resolution 775 (1992) of20 May 1992. 
240 The Bosnian referendum, held between 29 February and 1 March 1992, was boycotted by Bosnia's 31 % 
ethnic Serb population. Of the remaining voters, 90% voted for Bosnian independence. 
241 Security Council Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. 
242 See Security Council Resolutions 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993; 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993; and 859 (1993) 24 
August 1993. 
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Having tolerated the breakup of the former Yugoslavia by the consent of its populations, 
the United Nations has invoked the international legal principle of uti possedetis in refusing to 
tolerate the further breakup of its constituent republics through the use of force: "Bosnia and 
Herzegovina should remain a sovereign, independent, integral and multi-ethnic State in which 
all parts of the population could live in peace in accordance with their respective cultures and 
traditions. ,,243 Accordingly, the United Nations, the ICFY Co-Chairmen, and the mediators 
" ... deemed it necessary to reject any model based on three separate ethnic/confessionally based 
States. ,,244 This entails an explicit statement that the United Nations' " ... primary objective 
remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced from 
their homes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace. 11245 
Any peace agreement acceptable to the United Nations, therefore, must include some 
measure of" ... withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force, ,,246 and the 
reversal of " ... the practice of 'ethnic cleansing' [which] is unlawful and unacceptable, and will 
not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,,,247 and insists that all displaced persons be enabled to 
return in peace to their former homes. ,,248 The objective of the United Nations is to secure a 
lasting solution to the conflict based on the principles of: 
243 "Report of the Secretary-General on the New York Round of the Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina (3-8 
February 1993)", S/25248, 8 February 1993, pp. 1-2. 
244 "Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/24795, 11 
November 1992, p. 13. 
245 Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. 
246 The Permanent Representatives of France, The Russian Federation, Spain, The United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations, "Joint Action Programme", 
S/25829, 24 May 1993, p. 2. 
247 Security Council Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. 
248 Security Council Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. 
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... immediate and complete cessation of hostilities; withdrawal from territories 
seized by the use of force and "ethnic cleansing"; reversal of the consequences of 
"ethnic cleansing" and recognition of the right of all refugees to return to their 
homes; and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.249 
These basic principles have remained consistent in the various manifestations of peace plans 
which the mediators have advanced to the Bosnian disputants. 
Although its negotiating strategies are ostensibly based on " ... the views of the three 
[Bosnian] parties ... on the structure of the future Bosnia and Herzegovina, ,,250 these basic United 
Nations objectives also strongly influence the negotiating position of the ICFY. The ICFY also 
rejects forced border changes, ethnic cleansing, and supports the sovereignty, integrity and 
independence of Bosnia.251 The basic framework informing all peace talks in Bosnia are thus 
based on a synthesis of " ... the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant 
decisions of the Security Council and the principles of the International Conference [on the 
Former Yugoslavia].,,252 The most important principles of the ICFY as negotiated at the London 
Conference are " ... the need for a cessation of hostilities, the principle of a negotiated solution 
freely arrived at, [and] the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or by 'ethnic 
cleansing,.,,253 The Security Council, in turn, fully supports the principles254 and mediation 
efforts of the ICFy?55 An important, but less mentioned objective of the United Nations and the 
ICFY, is to contain the fighting within Bosnia and prevent its spread into the unstable Balkan 
region. Such definite principles and objectives have had a determining effect on the strategies of 
the United Nations mediators in Bosnia. 
249 Security Council Resolution 836 (1993), of 4 June 1993. 
250 "Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/24795, 11 
November 1992, p. 13. 
251 ibid 
252 "Report ofthe Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", 
S/25221,2 February 1993, p. 1. 
253 Quoted in Security Council Resolution 859 (1993) of24 August 1993. 
254 "Statement by the President of the Security Council", S/2451 0, 2 September 1992. 
255 Security Council Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. 
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The objectives of the Bosnian Serbs are implacably opposed to those of the mediators 
and the other disputants. The Bosnian Serb position is based on the contention that 
... as far as they are concerned the independent State of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has never existed and does not exist [and] ... that it is being forced by the 
international community to live within Bosnia and Herzegovina against its 
. h 256 WIS es. 
The Bosnian Serbs demand the same right to exercise self-determination as was extended to the 
former Yugoslav republics after the international community ignored their objections to Bosnia 
seceding from Yugoslavia.257 They refuse to live as minorities in States ruled by other ethnic 
groups. The solution they advocate is the acknowledgment of the incompatibility of the three 
main Bosnian ethnic communities and they accordingly " ... continue to argue for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to be divided into what would effectively be three separate States," defined by 
ethnicity?58 The Bosnian Serbs recommend partitioning Bosnia along the lines currently 
dictated by military holdings, which would award the Serb State over 70% of Bosnian territory. 
These Bosnian Serb areas, according to leaders Karadzic and Mladic, must be linked territorially 
and be cleansed of communities other than Serbs?59 
Bosnian Serb military action took over 70% of Bosnia in the first six months of the war, 
and by the time the mediators presented a peace proposal to them based on the United Nations' 
principles, " ... the reality on the ground was that Serb-held areas were already joined on the map; 
Serb military leaders would never sacrifice these links, which were a key element in their own 
plans. ,,260 Any surrender of territory held is completely unacceptable to the Bosnian Serb 
military, led by General Mladic, who states that the lines of conquest "have been traced in 
256 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: 
Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, p. 4. 
257 The International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994. 
258 ibid. 
259 Quoted in Facts on File, 20 May 1993, Vol. 53, No. 2738, p. 361. 
260 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 248. 
189 
Serbian blood and no one has the right to erase them.,,261 The Bosnian Serbs want eventually to 
unite with Serbia and the Republic of the Krajina Serbs in Croatia, and further require their 
Republic to be contiguous with these territories.262 They defend their claim to 70% of Bosnian 
territory for 31 % of the pre-war Bosnian population by asserting that the Serbs in Bosnia are 
predominantly rural, and that the Muslims and Croats would retain the major cities and natural 
resources of the State?63 These objectives held by the Bosnian Serbs are diametrically opposed 
to the principles enunciated by the United Nations for ending the conflict: restoration of Bosnian 
sovereignty and unity, a reversal of ethnic cleansing, and a rejection of the territorial claims 
made as a result of military force and ethnic cleansing. 
By the end of 1994, the United Nations mediators and the ICFY had presided over the 
tabling of three major attempts to define a mediation and settlement framework that reconciles 
the objectives of the Bosnian Serbs with the needs of the other parties to the conflict and the 
wishes of the international community: the Vance-Owen plan, the Serb-Croat proposal, and the 
Contact Group plan. The first framework advanced by mediators came in the form of a 
comprehensive settlement plan designed by United Nations envoy Vance and European Union 
envoy Owen. In an early attempt at compromise between clashing interests, the Vance-Owen 
plan proposed dividing Bosnia into ten ethnically-mixed cantons, each with built-in guarantees 
of power-sharing between all three ethnic groups and the respect of human rights. Although the 
plan's decentralisation of the State and explicit recognition of the three ethnic groups was an 
acknowledgment of Serb concerns about living in a Bosnian State, the cantonisation 
recommendation amounted to a direct rejection of the Bosnian Serb objective of ethnically 
partitioning Bosnia?64 The Vance-Owen plan explicitly forbade any prospect of international 
personality or unification with territories or States outside of Bosnia?65 The map drawn up by 
261 Quoted in The International Herald Tribune, 2 December 1993. 
262 International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994. 
263 Patrick Moore, "Bosnian Impasse Poses Dilemmas for Diplomacy", Radio Free Europe, Vol. 2, No. 14, 2 
April 1993, p. 28. 
264 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", 
S/25221 , 2 February 1993, p. 13. 
265 "Draft Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25050, 6 January 1993, p. 16. 
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Vance and Owen proposed the reduction of Bosnian Serb-held territory from 70% to slightly 
over 43%, including the vital northern Brcko corridor that links Serb territories in eastern and 
western Bosnia,266 as well as making a linking of Serb areas together and to the Krajina and 
Serbia virtually impossible?67 Given such fundamental disagreements between the Vance-
Owen plan objectives and those of the Bosnian Serbs, then, it was not surprising that they 
repeatedly rejected the plan in its successive manifestations in January, April and May 1993. 
Following the final rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats advanced their own formula for peace in Bosnia. The plan proposed a confederation of 
three ethnically-defined constituent republics, while retaining many of the constitutional 
principles that had been established in the Vance-Owen plan?68 While based on the positions of 
two of the belligerents, the plan encountered the opposition of the United Nations and ICFY 
mediators, based on their own objectives for a peace settlement. They advanced several elements 
on behalf of the Bosnian government and Muslims that had to be included if the plan was to be 
successful. Their constitutional suggestions showed concern to preserve the sovereignty and 
integrity of the Bosnian State, while they were anxious to secure for the Muslims in the 
territorial divisions " ... an equitable and economically viable share of territory, with guaranteed 
access to the Sava River and the Adriatic Sea. ,,269 The international mediators remained 
adamant that an equitable share amounted to not less than 30% of Bosnian territory for the 
Muslim republic. Confederalism was objected to because "it would be seen as the first step 
towards secession. ,,270 Rejecting all solutions that were incompatible with United Nations 
resolutions and principles, 58 of the 69 deputies in the Bosnian Parliament in September 1993 
voted to reject the Serb-Croat plan. 
266 "Next in Bosnia", The Economist, 23 January 1993, p. 19. 
267 Malcolm,op. cit., 1994, pp. 247-8. 
268 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066, 8 July 1993, p. 4. 
269 ibid., p. 5. 
270 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26260, 6 August 1993, p. 3. 
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The international community mobilised to propose an alternative framework for 
settlement after the downfall of the Serb-Croat plan by forming a Contact Group comprised of 
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany in London on 26 April 
1994. Following the negotiation of the Muslim-Croat federation by United States envoy Charles 
Redman in February 1994, the Contact Group advanced a fresh peace plan based on this new 
alignment of forces. The plan proposed dividing Bosnia between the Muslim-Croat federation 
with 51 % of the territory and the Bosnian Serbs with 49%?71 The plan explicitly prohibited the 
possibility of the eventual unification of the Serb territories with Serbia. Not surprisingly, it was 
rejected by the Bosnian Serbs by the end of August 1994?72 Once more they objected to 
surrendering nearly one-third of their 70% territorial holdings, particularly in the Brcko corridor 
and in eastern Bosnia around Jajce, Doboj, Sanski Most and Visegrad.273 Thus none of the three 
attempts to formulate a creative mediation strategy to reconcile the demands of the Bosnian 
Serbs with the other disputants and the United Nations could overcome the vast disagreements 
in objectives between the parties and with the United Nations. 
4.4.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations' advocacy of " ... the imperative need to find an urgent political 
solution for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,,274 followed closely on the outbreak of 
hostilities in Bosnia. The Steering Committee of the ICFY emphasised the importance of 
persevering with mediation when it warned of "The dangers of escalation of the conflict if the 
parties tum their backs on the search for negotiated solutions. ,,275 Similarly to the Cambodian 
mediators, the ICFY proposed to deal with the problem of the strongly opposing positions of the 
disputants by directing its Working Groups to "prepare the basis for a general settlement and 
271 International Herald Tribune, 6 July 1994. 
272 International Herald Tribune, 31 August 1994. 
273 International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994. 
274 Security Council Resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992. See also Resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 
and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993. 
275 "Report of the Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference of the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066, 8 July 1993, p. 5. 
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associated measures,,276 which would then be presented to the parties who would be encouraged 
and pressured to sign it. These have been developed in closer consultation with the "ideas and 
proposals advanced by the parties,,277 than occurred in the Cambodian negotiations. The three 
frameworks developed so far have not managed to tie the belligerents, especially the Bosnian 
Serbs, to the mediation process. United Nations mediators have as a result resorted to reminding 
the parties of their previous commitments to peace: " ... the decision to choose peace or war rests 
with you ... You agreed to the principles of the International Conference adopted on 26 August. 
You committed yourselves that all parties should cease fighting and should engage actively in 
negotiations. ,,278 The United Nations has also tried to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into becoming 
more flexible and accepting the peace plans through applying sanctions to Serbia279 and by 
issuing warnings and ultimatums.28o The Bosnian Serbs' unpunished defiance of all of these 
appeals, sanctions and ultimatums has enabled them to withhold their commitment to serious 
negotiations on the basis of the objectives advanced by the United Nations. 
Having made and secured their military holdings by September 1993, the Bosnian Serbs 
became receptive to the idea of a negotiated peace based on their military gains. As they saw it, 
"[w]ith control of contiguous territory making it possible to travel from Belgrade to Banja Luka 
and beyond into Serb-held territory in Croatia without crossing a front line, the Serbs were in a 
position to seek a settlement in order to get international sanctions lifted. ,,28 I Their serious 
adherence to the mediation process, however, was clearly contingent on the assumption that the 
276 United Nations Department of Public Infonnation, "The United Nations and the Situation in the Fonner 
Yugoslavia", Reference Paper, DPII1312IRev.2, March 1994, p. 27. 
277 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Fonner 
Yugoslavia", S/26233, 3 August 1993, p. 2. 
278 Opening Statement of Cyrus Vance to the January 1993 Peace Talks in Geneva, quoted in "Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Fonner Yugoslavia", S/25050, 6 January 
1993, p. 7. 
279 Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 apply 
sanctions to Serbia and Montenegro, explicitly linking the lifting of these sanctions to Serb co-operation with the 
peace plans. 
280 "Bosnia Faces Ultimatum to Accept Peace Plan", International Herald Tribune, 6 July 1994. 
281 James Gow, "Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension", The World Today, Vol. 50, No.5, 
May 1994, p. 97. 
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peace settlement would reflect their military position and be a stage on the route to secession of 
the Serb areas and their integration into Greater Serbia.282 Mediation proposals that reject these 
Serb conditions are viewed as "diktats" imposed on the Serbs by the international community 
and deserving rejection and non-cooperation?83 Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic has repeatedly 
warned ICFY mediators that if their conditions are not agreed to in the negotiations, the Serbs 
will continue to wage war in Bosnia?84 Contemptuous of the use of appeals, threats and 
sanctions to pressure them into unfavourable negotiations, Bosnian Serb military commanders 
boast that they have enough martial spirit and arms stockpiles to continue the war independently 
for another six or seven years.285 It can be seen that the Bosnian Serbs lack any serious 
commitment to the mediation initiatives offered by the ICFY, and that no amount of creative 
frameworks or pressure can tie them to a process that they see as harmful to their interests in its 
present and past manifestations. 
4.4.3: Instrumentality 
The complexity of the Bosnian war and its international ramifications have caused a 
deep confusion in the roles of the United Nations and the ICFY as mediators. The United 
Nations' admission and recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its dedication to defend its 
sovereignty and unity, and its advocacy of the interests of the Bosnian government and Muslim 
1 . 286 h d . f b' 287 . . . h d' h . bl popu atlOn ave rna e It more 0 an ar Iter or a partICIpant 10 t e Ispute t an a sUlta e 
third party. As international opinion has steadily polarised over the war, and States have begun 
to advocate the positions of different belligerents, the United Nations and ICFY have become 
increasingly preoccupied with maintaining international unity at the expense of single-mindedly 
282 Malcolm,op. cit., 1994, p. 249. 
283 David B. Ottaway, "Bosnian Serbs Seem Poised to Spurn Partition Plan", International Herald Tribune, 19 
July 1994. 
284 Quoted in Facts on File, Vol. 52, No. 2712, 12 November 1992, p. 849. 
285 Quoted in Malcolm, op. cit., 1994, p. 243. 
286 See especially the Co-Chairmens' reaction to the Serb-Croat peace plan "on behalf of the Muslim people", 
S/26066, 8 July 1993. 
287 Zametica, op. cit., 1992, p. 27. 
194 
searching for a solution to the conflict. As a result of these pressures, the importance of the 
presence of United Nations mediators to the peace process has been diminished. Rather than 
seeing it as possessing the ability to help them find a consensual solution, the opposing parties 
view the United Nations as one of the forces to be manipulated in the course of their struggle. 
The Bosnian government generally regards the United Nations as a protector and advocate, 
while the Bosnian Serbs see it as yet another opposing presence to be countered. The original 
choice of Cyrus Vance as United Nations mediator may have also been unfortunate.288 Vance, 
having served posts from Deputy Secretary for Defence in the Johnson administration to 
Secretary of State in the Carter administration, was seen more as a tool of antagonistic interests 
of the United States than as an impartial mediator by the Bosnian Serbs?89 Furthermore, 
Vance's extreme pacifism290 and legalism291 seem to have rendered his personality ill-equipped 
to deal with the brutality of the Bosnian civil war or the hard realpolitik of its stakes. These 
perceptions and personality incompatibilities have had a very damaging effect on the United 
Nations' effectiveness as a mediator in Bosnia. 
The United Nations, in tum has granted the Bosnian Serbs grudging recognition as an 
indispensable participant in the peace process. Since the first reports by the media and its own 
human rights rapporteurs,292 the United Nations has regularly expressed horror at the practice of 
ethnic cleansing and condemned the Bosnian Serbs as its perpetrators?93 The Security Council 
has repeatedly denounced the practice of ethnic cleansing and expressed concern over its use in 
288 Almond, op. cit., 1994, p. 290. 
289 Zametica, op. cit., 1992, p. 67. 
290 Vance resigned as Secretary of State when the Carter administration decided to go ah~ad with plans to rescue 
the hostages in Teheran with a commando raid. 
291 Kissinger describes Vance (positively) as "the epitome of a New York corporation lawyer" in The White 
House Years, (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), p. 256. 
292 "Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Commission Resolution 
1992/S-I/1 of 14 August 1992", Al48/92 and S/25341, 26 February 1993, p. 7. 
293 While the Serbs are not the only combatants practicing war crimes - the Croats and Muslims have both been 
documented as committing atrocities and acts of terror against civilians - they have received most of the 
international blame, as a consequence of being the largest perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. 
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"the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. ,,294 Notwithstanding the Bosnian 
Serbs' unsavoury reputation, however, the United Nations mediators have been forced by 
recognition of their sheer military dominance to include the Serbs in the peace process as equal 
participants. Such prejudices necessarily have an adverse effect on the negotiating process 
however: 
The a priori negative characterisation of one of the parties in a conflict is a sure 
disincentive for them even to appear at the bargaining table, and in turn can well 
provide the rationale for the other belligerents to refuse to participate in the 
process. Labelling has a powerful impact not only on the warrin~ parties, but on 
the individuals and organizations designated to act as mediators.2 5 
The less than complete acceptance of each other by the mediator and the major belligerent will 
inevitably exercise a negative influence on the progress of the negotiations. 
4.4.4: Impartiality 
While the United Nations and ICFY mediators have characterised their roles as that of 
"clarifying the issues,,296 and as a "channel of communication to clarify ideas and proposals 
advanced by the parties during discussions,,,297 the Organization's advocacy of definite 
objectives for the peace process and condemnation of the Serbs have affected its impartiality. 
Inevitably the United Nations' agenda has caused the Bosnian Serbs to view it as biased in 
favour of the government and the Muslim population. Neither is this perception mitigated any 
Serb belief that the United Nations as a mediator can provide an outcome that is acceptable to 
the Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs have instead adopted a self-image as a misunderstood, persecuted 
294 Security Council Resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993. See also Resolutions 787 (1992) of 16 November 
1992 and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993. 
295 Edith S. Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution in the Territories of the Former Yugoslavia" in Charters, op. 
cit., 1994, p. 161. 
296 "Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066, 8 July 1993, p. 4. 
297 "Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26233, 3 August 1993, p. 2. 
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and embattled people standing up to a hostile international community.298 This has developed 
into anger and hostility towards the international community, as reported by UNPROFOR 
Commander General Morillon: "The Serbs denounced a plot of the whole world against their 
Nation, only guilty of continuing to assume its historic role of barrier of the Christian West 
against the spread of Islam.,,299 These feelings of victimisation have only been increased by 
international threats and sanctions.30o These perceptions of its impartiality have compromised 
the United Nations' acceptability and effectiveness in any peace negotiations with the Bosnian 
Serbs. 
Neither have the Bosnian Serbs or the other parties remained faithful to the mediation 
process. During the Bosnia negotiations all parties have developed into a fme art the skill of 
using agreement, disagreement, temporising or tortuous haggling to manipulate the international 
community. The government enters and uses the mediation process as a means of securing and 
retaining Western involvement, while the Bosnian Serbs continue to flirt with peace proposals as 
the most likely way of limiting Western military intervention and exacerbating divisions within 
the international community.301 The United Nations has also come to realise that agreement on 
paper rarely translates to compliance in the field: "Nor can intermediaries keep [the parties] to 
their word. Cease-fires are entered into in the full knowledge that they are not going to be 
fulfilled, and other pledges broken within hours of being made. ,,302 The parties have begun 
openly admitting their intentions to enter agreements for political reasons with no intention of 
implementing them: "We'll sign and then ignore the agreement. That's what everyone has done 
in this war so far.,,303 The Bosnian Serbs have consistently made their fidelity to mediation 
298 Ruger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "Paranoid and Vengeful, Serbs Claim Their War is to Right Old Wrongs", 
Wall Street Journal, 18 September 1992. 
299 Phillipe Morillon, "U.N. Operations in Bosnia: Lessons and Realities", RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No.6, 
December 1993, p. 34. 
300 Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution", in Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 160. 
301 "After Owen-Vance", New Statesman and Society, 7 May 1993, p. 5. 
302 "Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26260, 6 August 1993, p. 2. 
303 Bosnian government official, quoted in William Pfaff, "Really, the Only Bosnia Plan on the Table", 
International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994. 
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contingent on the recognition of the right to self-determination of the areas that they control. 304 
Their use of referenda in their ethnically-cleansed areas to overwhelmingly reject the various 
peace plans by 96% majorities is an attempt to imbue their aspirations with a popular legitimacy 
as a counter to the condemnation of their intransigence by the international community. 305 Such 
an insincere approach to mediation by all parties, but particularly the Bosnian Serbs, contributes 
strongly to the unviability of the mediation interaction. 
4.4.5: Timing 
The timing of the United Nations mediation intervention and the objectives it has 
advocated are at variance with the military situation on the ground in Bosnia. The timing of 
United Nations involvement was primarily motivated by an urgent need to stop the fighting and 
the human rights abuses rather than by considerations of the conduciveness of the military 
situation to peace talks. 306 It believed that the only way of stopping the conflict and preventing 
its spread was to broker a comprehensive ceasefire and political agreement between the warring 
parties.307 United Nations mediators proposed an immediate "[t]emporary freezing of the 
military situation, pending agreement on return of forces to designated provinces. ,,308 This, 
along with its other proposals, was completely at variance with the military momentum and 
position of the strongest party, the Bosnian Serbs. Supported and constantly resupplied from 
within Serbia, the Serbs quickly conquered and consolidated their hold on 70% of Bosnian 
territory.309 Their subsequent preponderance in heavy weaponry and defiance of international 
304 Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution", in Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 158. 
305 These efforts have been rejected by the mediators who point out that as a result of ethnic cleansing, 
"consultations with the populations involved could not be carried out fairly in the prevailing circumstances." See 
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Fonner Yugoslavia", 
S/25221,2 February 1993, p. 2. 
306 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities ofthe International Conference on the Fonner Yugoslavia", 
S/25221,2 February 1993, p. 2. 
307 "Report of the Secretary-General on the New York Round of the Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina (3-8 
February 1993)", S/25248, 8 February 1993, p. 2. 
308 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities ofthe International Conference on the Fonner Yugoslavia", 
S/25221,2 February 1993, p. 27. 
309 Malcolm,op. cit., 1994, pp. 237-9. 
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threats and sanctions have enabled them to hold these gains with little threat of losing them to 
the Muslims or the Croats.3IO Bosnian Serb military predominance translated into a hardening of 
their bargaining position and an insistence on their demands.3II Attempts to blockade Bosnian-
Serb held areas have had little effect, and even NATO airstrikes have been responded to by 
taking peacekeepers hostage and other measures, rather than modifying the basic Bosnian Serb 
conditions.3I2 Furthermore, the Serbs have realised that its inability to secure a settlement has 
paralysed the international community's action over Bosnia: with the implementation of each of 
its peace plans in mind, "it signalled to the Serbs that a large NATO force would be inserted into 
Bosnia not if the fighting continued, but only if it stopped. ,,3 13 A survey of the Bosnian Serbs' 
military position therefore shows the extent of the incompatibility of their approach to mediation 
with a United Nations that wishes them to concede territory and their right to independent 
Statehood or irredentism. 
4.4.6: Support and Isolation 
The war in Bosnia stands alone among contemporary conflicts for the widest and most 
diverse range of external interests and supporters of the warring parties. These connections with 
the parties, however, have not been used to provide the mediators with leverage because of the 
international community's own deep disagreements about the war and the solution to the crisis. 
The variety of agendas among the various external supporters of the parties has left United 
Nations mediators with very little cohesive support of their efforts. The tightening sanctions 
310 The best example of the Serbs' ability to maintain and increase their gains almost at will came during their 
response to the government breakout of the Bihac enclave in November 1994. They absorbed the Bosnian 
government 5th Army's offensive and counter-attacked in concert with the Krajina Serbs and Fikret Abdic's forces 
and made large gains in the Bihac enclave despite fierce 5th Army and other elements' resistance and against the 
threats of the United Nations and the limited airs strikes of NATO. 
311 The mediators reported that by March 1993 "the position of the Bosnian Serbs had hardened appreciably 
since the Geneva round of negotiations in January on many of the political aspects of an overall settlement." See 
"Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Peace 
Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, p. 5. 
312 See for example Michael Evans, "Airstrikes Expose Limits of West's Military Options", The Times, 24 
November 1994. 
313 David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.4, July/August 1994, p. 40. 
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regime applied by Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992)314 and 787 (1992)315 and the 
appeals and pressures of various Great Powers316 finally forced Serbia to condemn Bosnian 
Serb intransigence and institute a blockade of military supplies to the Bosnian Serbs, monitored 
by the United Nations.317 States with ties to the Bosnian Serbs, such as Russia and Greece, have 
been willing to appeal for cooperation, but have adamantly opposed proposals by advocates of 
the Muslims to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the table with coercive action.318 Despite these 
divisions, however, the mediators' efforts have been supported by a number of unilateral 
initiatives. Foremost among these was the engineering of the Muslim-Croat alliance by the 
United States in February 1994. Generally, however, the support rendered by the international 
community has been insufficient to make up for the other deep inconsistencies in the Bosnia 
negotiations. 
The Bosnian Serbs' intransigence has also been supported by their imperfect isolation 
from external support. Despite the international arms embargo around the former Yugoslavia319 
and the tightening sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro,320 Bosnian Serbs continue to 
receive supplies and support from various sources. Military resupply for the Bosnian Serbs is 
smuggled through the porous Serbian border,321 through Macedonia, the republic of the rump 
314 30 May 1992. 
315 16 November 1992. 
316 Beginning with the visit to Belgrade by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vassily Churkin in March 1993. 
317 International Herald Tribune, 13 September 1994. 
318 Russian warnings against aiding the Muslims have been often belligerent: in June 1994, Kozyrev warned 
secret shipments of arms to the Muslims could ignite a "new world war", see "Bosnia Arms Could Spark World 
War", International Herald Tribune, 15 June 1994; while European Powers, particularly Britain, France and 
Germany, have been equally blunt with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe calling American plans to lift the arms 
embargo against the Muslims "an absurdity", see "America and Europe Clash Over Arms Ban", Daily Telegraph, 
12 September 1994. 
319 Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) of25 September 1991. 
320 Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992) of30 May 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. 
321 Diplomats and media sources have collected a growing corpus of circumstantial evidence the Slobodan 
Milosovic's regime is breaking its own embargo against the Bosnian Serbs. Observers have seen elite Serbian 
paramilitary units such as the Tigers operating in the Bihac pocket, the presence after the NATO airstikes in the 
Krajina of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems probably of Serbian origin in Bosnian Serb-held territory, and 
have noted the sudden abundance of fuel and ammunition available to Bosnian Serb forces in late November-early 
200 
Yugoslavia with the lower international profile, from Greece through Macedonia, and through 
the Krajina region in Croatia. The Bosnian Serb counter-offensive from the Bihac pocket in 
November 1994 would have been impossible without comprehensive military resupply.322 
Furthermore, Russian diplomatic patronage has provided support for the Bosnian Serbs' 
intransigence and manipulation in negotiations.323 The Bosnian Serbs' confidence in Russian 
and Greek sympathy, support, and protection has undoubtedly buttressed their intransigence to 
all attempts to resolve the conflict in ways unfavourable to them. On the other hand, the Bosnian 
government's knowledge of American, Islamic, and general international sypmathy with its 
cause, has made it much less amenable to Bosnian Serb demands. Thus although international 
support for parties to the conflict has had a negative effect on the cooperativeness of all parties, 
its most pronounced impact is on the Bosnian Serbs. Their sponsorship by major members of the 
coalition has allowed them to manipulate and weaken the United Nations' position, while 
confidently defending their own interests. 
4.4.7: Cohesion 
One of the greatest impediments to the mediators in Bosnia has been the lack of 
cohesion in the United Nations behind anyone preferred solution or strategy. The numerous 
unanimous Security Council Resolutions supporting the mediators' efforts324 cannot hide the 
genuine divisions between strongly-held positions both within and outside of the Security 
Council. These divisions are only exacerbated by each development in the fighting. 325 
International disagreements over Bosnia actually predate the conflict, having stemmed from the 
December 1994. See John Pomfret, "Belgrade Suspected of Breaking Its Embargo", International Herald Tribune, 
10-11 December 1994. 
322 Snjezana Vukic, "Battle Over Bosnia "Safe" Zones", The Independent, 16 November 1994. 
323 See "Bosnian Serbs Seek Map Change and Further Talks", International Herald Tribune, 22 July 1994. 
324 See for example Security Council Resolutions 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992 and 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994. 
325 Heightened tensions within the Contact Group have been noticeable on many occasions during changes in the 
tempo of the war; the most recent have occurred during the Muslim offensive and the Serb counter-offensive 
around the Bihac pocket in October, November and December 1994. See Michael Sheridan, "U.N. Takes Stock of 
Muslim Offensive", The Independent, 8 November 1994. 
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disputes over the recognition of the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia.326 The 
underlying affiliations and agendas that drove this dispute between sovereignty and self-
determination have endured to suffuse the positions of the Member-States of the United Nations 
over subsequent issues in Bosnia. At one level, some States support the various parties due to 
ethnic, cultural or religious ties: the Russians and the Greeks support the Serbs, the Turks and 
Islamic countries the Muslims, and the Germans and central Europeans the Croats. On the 
political level disagreements have arisen from clashes over the way in which States view the 
war: the United States sees it as a case of external aggression by a large against a small State, 
whereas the Europeans view it as a civil war driven by intractable ethnic antagonism. To date 
the European view has dictated the response: mediation, containment of the conflict, 
maintenance of the arms embargo, and a large peacekeeping presence. The lack of success of 
this policy has only served to heighten the dissent and frustration of supporters of the United 
States' strategy of withdrawing the peacekeepers and lifting the embargo.327 The Non-Aligned 
Movement has advocated launching a conventional multilateral intervention on behalf of the 
Bosnian government,328 while the Islamic Conference Organisation has repeatedly supported 
the Muslim popUlation, held the West responsible for Serb military aggression, and threatened to 
unilaterally break the embargo and begin supplying the Muslims with arms.329 These deep and 
enduring divisions within the United Nations membership have hampered the ability of the 
mediators to find a solution in Bosnia. 
As the United Nations, the ICFY and the Contact Group have had to increasingly devote 
their energy to diplomatically preserve their own fragile unity, their directives and support for 
the mediators have become both vaguer and weaker. Their inability to agree on the form of 
326 Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia", op. cit., 1994, p. 37. 
327 The United States' position has earned it some unlikely supporters at the United Nations, such as Iran, Libya, 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, see Richard Bernstein, "U.N. Council 
Blocks Arms For Bosnians", New York Times, 30 June 1993. 
328 This proposal was circulated in the Security Council in April 1993 and subsequently. See DPI, "Political 
Information Bulletin #3", 19 April 1993. 
329 See "Communique of the OIC Special Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers Enlarged to the Members of the Contact Group and States Contributing Troops to the 
UNPROFOR", Islamabad, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 13 July 1993, AJ47/977 and S/26112, 19 July 1993. 
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military action needed to give the mediators leverage or to back up their own threats and 
warnings in the name of their own unity330 has deprived the mediators of the crucial tool of 
being able to offer side-payments or threaten punishments in order to induce the parties to 
cooperate. The combination of the embargo and the peacekeepers has placed an inertia on the 
mediators' position, with the peacekeeping presence giving the Serbs and the Europeans a veto 
over any change in international strategy to try to find a solution.331 The lack of cohesion within 
the United Nations membership has also meant that none of the peace plans offered have been 
able to attract the strong international support that the mediators have needed so badly due to 
their differences in objectives with the Serbs.332 It has also meant that attempts to induce 
cooperativeness by emulating the Salvadoran precedent of convening the peace talks at United 
Nations headquarters in New York have been unsuccessful.333 Unfortunately for the mediators, 
this lack of cohesion has been well appreciated by the Bosnian Serbs, who have cleverly stalled 
and manipulated the negotiations in order to derive the greatest benefits from international 
d· .. 334 IVlslons. These divisions have made it possible for the Serbs to not cooperate with the 
mediators while escaping any serious consequences. 
The Bosnian Serbs' own intractability is partly inspired by their likely inability to 
maintain their own cohesion behind any concessions or cooperation with the mediators that was 
not justified by military realities. The bitterness of the Balkan conflict has equated cooperation 
with betrayal: " ... the expression of willingness to negotiate, the notion of compromise, and the 
330 See Dan Williams, "Biding Time, Big Powers to Seek New Sanctions on Serbs", International Herald 
Tribune, 1 August 1994. 
331 Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia", op. cit., 1994, p. 38. 
332 This point was bitterly noted by Vance and Owen in their report to the Security Council after the downfall of 
the Vance-Owen plan. See "Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/26260, 6 August 1993, p. 2. 
333 The most concerted attempt to use the New York locale was from 1-11 March 1993, chaired by Vance and 
Owen. 
334 For example, Stoltenberg and Owen made the bitter observation in May 1993 that during American, Russian, 
British, French and Spanish meetings with the Bosnian parties in that month, "Unfortunately, the conception was 
conveyed ... that the roll-back of the Bosnian Serbs was no longer a priority position on the international agenda," an 
impression diametrically opposed by that that the mediators had been assuring the parties was the case. See "Report 
of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S126066, 8 July 1993, p. 3. 
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very idea of dialogue were often taken as treason. ,,335 The Bosnian Serb leadership itself is beset 
by serious factionalism, a factor that has led to the paranoia, militarism and uncompromising 
position of the Serbs during negotiations.336 Any concessions, particularly over the surrender of 
captured territory, are vociferously opposed by hardline politicians, local Serb warlords, and the 
Bosnian Serb military led by General Mladic.337 The Bosnian Serb cadre and supporters are so 
internally divided that orders from the leadership are often ignored, without having "any 
consistent and tangible impact on the ground. ,,338 These severe divisions among the Bosnian 
Serbs have led to a paranoid leadership making use of the "parliament" at Pale and referenda to 
make important decisions regarding the peace talks. Ultimately however, this lack of cohesion 
contributes to an uncompromising Serb position, and thereby impacts on the failure of the 
negotiations. 
The extent of the dysfunction of the mediation interaction between the United Nations 
and ICFY mediators and the Bosnian Serbs corresponds strongly to the extent of divergence of 
their approaches to the mediation. The deep confusion and paralysis of United Nations attempts 
to end the conflict stem from the obsession with consensual action between its fundamentally 
disagreeing Member-States. These diverging positions arise from a number of impulses: 
different perceptions of the conflict, internal demands from public opinion, perceived 
responsibilities, and a variety of historical, ethnic, or religious ties. This chorus of dissent 
clashes directly with the other impulse of United Nations Member-States: to preserve new found 
Post-Cold War Security Council consensus and to further develop fledgling mechanisms of 
cooperation, such as the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe, while dealing with the dangers of the wars of 
the former Yugoslavia. The obsession with preserving consensus among such a large and 
discordant group of Member-States has imbued United Nations mediation with an inflexibility 
and an incoherence that is compounded by its Organisational obligation to uphold the 
335 Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution", in Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 153. 
336 See Yigal Chazan, "Paranoia and Apathy Grip Pale", The Guardian, 8 November 1994. 
337 Malcolm, op. cit., 1994, p. 250. 
338 Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution", in Charters, op. cit., 1994, p. 154. 
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sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of its Member-States, and protect the 
rights of its citizens. These considerations have rendered the United Nations an inappropriate 
and partial mediator to the conflict. 
The approach of the Bosnian Serbs to the mediation interaction conflicts so 
fundamentally to the United Nations' as to guarantee the failure of the interaction. Emotively 
inspired by nationalist, pan-Serb dreams, and determined to avoid being dominated by another 
ethnic group, the Bosnian Serbs' fear of domination and self-perception as fighting the whole 
world makes them unable to compromise. The strength of their military position, and their 
support from powerful, sympathetic States, reinforces their convictions and further strengthens 
their determination not to accede to United Nations demands to surrender their gains in a general 
peace agreement. Within sight of military victory; they see no need to compromise. The Bosnian 
Serbs' military and diplomatic tactics demonstrate a talented realism in their ability to play to 
their military and diplomatic strengths and attack the weaknesses of their opponents. They have 
repeatedly exploited the confusion of the United Nations and the divisions between its Member-
States, profiting from the Organisation's impotence. Hence, the deepest disagreement between 
the Bosnian Serbs and the United Nations occurs over the basic objectives of the peace talks, 
with United Nations advocacy of Bosnian sovereignty and Serb rollback at odds with Serb 
irredentism and military position. It is from this basic division that the other disagreements 
follow: the Serb's military position makes them indisposed to the mediation mechanism and the 
presence of the United Nations, and suspicious of its impartiality. The United Nations, on the 
other hand, lacks the conducive military circumstances, the support, or the cohesion to advocate 
such a rigorous solution against a belligerent as implacable and powerful as the Bosnian Serbs. 
The framework and its hypothesis would therefore suggest that United Nations mediation has 
been inappropriate for the Bosnian conflict at this time. 
4.5: Conclusion 
The analysis of the mediation interactions between the United Nations and these 
insurgent movements can be seen to generally support the hypothesis that concurring approaches 
produce more optimal interactions than divergent approaches. During mediation, the closer the 
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compatibility of approaches as determined by the indices selected - objectives, interaction 
mechanisms, instrumentality, impartiality, timing, support and isolation, and cohesion - is seen 
to produce more optimal interactions. These indices operate in different ways and with different 
levels of impact during the mediation, however. A comparison of the effect of each of the cases 
in this mediation study illuminates some of these trends. 
Compatibility of objectives emerges as the most important component for the viability of 
a mediation interaction and the tenability of its solution. Because of the low cost of participating 
in mediation, and the variety of negotiating gambits available, objectives remain the truest 
indicator of the interlocutors' approaches, by emphasising intentions over actual behaviour. 
Furthermore, the tenability of a mediated agreement rests on the disputants' commitment to 
honouring it; hence the satisfaction of fundamental interests and objectives is important. The 
substantial agreement between United Nations mediators and the FMLN stemmed from a 
number of factors. The United Nations was much more prepared to listen to the FMLN's 
interests and negotiate solutions to its concerns. The FMLN, on the other hand, was ultimately 
committed to ending its insurgency, and was prepared to be flexible over the peace terms. This 
substantial agreement and mutual understanding of objectives provided a strong foundation that 
guaranteed both the appropriateness of United Nations-FMLN mediation and the viability of the 
peace agreement. In comparison, the United Nations grew impatient with the Khmer Rouge and 
the other Cambodian disputants, and resolved to bypass further consensual negotiations in 
favour of finding a formula for a solution, and pressuring the parties into agreement. This 
objective contradicted the Khmer Rouge's approach, a problem that consigned the agreement to 
eventual defaulting by the Khmer Rouge. Its eventual cosmetic agreement was belied by its 
objective of seizing sole power, and its intention of exploiting and subverting the Paris 
Agreements. In Bosnia, the divided and paralysed United Nations has advanced a series of 
mediation formulas that conform to its own internal requirements and problems while rejecting 
the demands of the Bosnian Serbs. While they are prepared to negotiate, the Bosnian Serbs' 
objectives are so diametrically opposed to United Nations demands that a functional mediation 
on these terms is inconceivable. In both the Cambodian and Bosnian situations, such diverging 
approaches suggest that United Nations mediation was not appropriate at that time. Thus with 
regard to mediation, a coincidence of objectives between the parties and the mediator appears to 
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be the essential foundation of any successful agreement. Without this basic agreement, any 
mediation risks failing or producing a short-lived agreement. 
While agreement to mediation carries such low risks that most belligerents will enter 
talks, actual commitment to the mediation mechanism to resolve the conflict correlates strongly 
with the viability of the interaction. Such commitment is contingent on the insurgent 
movement's satisfaction with the achievement of its objectives in the mediation relationship. 
Commitment is not a guarantor of success, however; much also depends on the appropriateness 
of the mediation procedure and formulas. The FMLN, committed to ending the war, readily 
agreed to United Nations mediation which it saw as aiding it and protecting its interests in its 
transition to a peaceful quest for power. The United Nations mediators, confronted by serious 
disagreements between the parties, and an FMLN determined to preserve its military potency, 
devised a creative mediation formula and deadline which was ultimately to lead to a viable 
agreement. The Khmer Rouge's commitment to mediation had to be forced because of its 
disagreement with the United Nations' objectives in the negotiations. Its eventual acquiescence 
was tactical, and the agreement was to have no power in guaranteeing its fidelity to the peace 
plan. The United Nations selected an inappropriate strategy for dealing with such an insurgent: 
by forgoing consulting mechanisms, it made it easy for the Khmer Rouge to revert to tactical 
submission. The Bosnian Serbs' negotiating position is clear, showing that its commitment to 
mediation is contingent on the talks reflecting their military position and irredentist objectives, 
rather than those advanced by the United Nations. The United Nations has been hampered by its 
rigidity and internal divisions from responding creatively to this Bosnian Serb position. Genuine 
agreement to mediation is thus highly important, and contingent on the prior coincidence of 
objectives. 
A basic mediation interaction depends on each of the parties and the mediators accepting 
that the others are instrumental to the talks. As such, it is an indicator of little distinguishing 
power. However, when it is taken to denote the receptiveness of the mediating parties to each 
other's concerns, then its predictive power increases. In the EI Salvador negotiations, the genuine 
efforts made to satisfy the concerns of the parties by the United Nations mediators, and the 
FMLN's fidelity to the timetable of the mediators, contributed strongly to the optimality of the 
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interaction. This was further strengthened by the abilities and prestige of Perez de Cuellar. In 
Cambodia, the United Nations mediators made only half-hearted attempts to inform their 
planning of a solution by consulting the wishes of the parties. Their concentration on pressuring 
the agreement onto all four parties reflected a belief in the instrumentality of their presence in a 
solution, but paid less attention to satisfying their concerns in the resolution plan. Nevertheless, 
it is not at all certain whether any amount of consultation would have induced the Khmer Rouge 
to comply with a compromise peace proposal. In the Bosnia talks, the irredentist interests of the 
Bosnian Serbs were rejected almost completely by the United Nations mediators. Thus while 
their presence was considered important in peace talks, and their acquiescence vital to the 
various peace plans, their basic demands were denied. Instrumentality, in terms of right of input, 
affects the viability of a mediation interaction. 
Impartiality shows a correlation with the viability of the mediation interaction, but 
follows from objectives, mediation mechanisms, and instrumentality. In all three cases, the 
extent of impartiality of the insurgents' mediation behaviour tended to reflect how seriously they 
were negotiating an end to the conflict. The FMLN, concurring with the United Nations on the 
objectives of the peace process, the choice of the mediation mechanism, and the instrumentality 
of the mediators and their techniques, showed a basic behavioural commitment to the peace 
talks, even suspending military operations after a time. In this situation, the parties found the 
United Nations mediators to be impartial. The Khmer Rouge, which had different objectives and 
a different perception of the mediation process from the United Nations, adopted various 
gambits and techniques designed to show false acquiescence while covering its intentions to 
alter and exploit the agreement with force on the ground. The United Nations, with its strong 
advocation of a plan with which it had reservations, incurred the suspicion of the Khmer Rouge. 
The Bosnian Serbs were convinced by United Nations advocacy of plans detrimental to their 
interests that a genuine cooperative mediation relationship with the mediators was unlikely. 
They duly used a number of techniques to reject the plans and manipulate the divisions within 
the international community. In this situation, the United Nations often seemed to be advocating 
the interests of the Bosnian Serbs' enemies. 
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Timing emerged as an inconsistent indicator for measuring the extent of an insurgent 
movement's commitment to peace and mediation. All three insurgent movements participated in 
peace talks despite divergent military fortunes. The FMLN's decision to enter mediation 
coincides with a stagnant and worsening political-military situation, and thus appears to have 
been a rational choice. The Khmer Rouge, similarly stalemated, however, showed no intention 
of negotiating with an intent to abide by the solution arrived at. It is likely that its radical 
ideology and rigid discipline modified its impulse towards giving up the stalemated struggle. 
The Bosnian Serbs' strong military position corresponds to their unwillingness to countenance 
adverse or compromise solutions. However, the strength of Serb nationalism and fear, and their 
David-against-Goliath self-perception, questions whether successive military reverses would 
actually translate into a receptiveness to a compromise peace. 
Support and isolation, along with cohesion, form a group of factors that can be used by 
mediators to support or compensate for disagreements in objectives and the utility of mediation. 
With the FMLN, these three factors were used creatively by mediators to maintain a peace 
momentum that already existed due to coinciding objectives and agreement to mediation. With 
the Khmer Rouge, they were used by a zealous international community to force cooperation 
when these basic agreements did not exist. However, with the Cambodian negotiations, the 
strength of support and cohesion among interested United Nations Member-States, particularly 
the Permanent Five, led to a deluded belief that an agreement could be pressured onto unwilling 
parties. This was to usher in a solution that was still not to include the cooperation of the Khmer 
Rouge. With the Bosnian Serbs, deficiencies in these three factors have merely reinforced their 
ability to defy mediation initiatives. Their defiance has been encouraged by support from 
significant interested powers, while they have exploited the divisions among Member-States to 
their own advantage. Support and isolation and cohesion are thus important facilitating factors 
for mediators. 
In mediation, then, coinciding objectives are the basic indicator of the viability of the 
interaction. Coincidence here leads to agreement to the mediation mechanism, and can be 
supported and partly compensated for by isolation and support and cohesion of the parties and 
mediators. Instrumentality, impartiality, and timing have a subtler role that is more dependent on 
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the agreement of these other framework factors. This suggests that the mediation relationship is 
indeed subject to the forces governing United Nations relations with contemporary insurgent 
groups. In situations where an insurgent movement shows an interest in a compromise peace 
that is concurrent with the United Nations', mediation is seen to be an appropriate intervention. 
When such complementarity does not exist, however, the United Nations lacks the ability to 
compel an agreement and then ensure that the insurgent movement honours it. Having thus 
examined mediation relationships, it is to other aspects of this relationship that the next chapters 
turn. 
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5: PEACEKEEPING 
With peacekeeping, the United Nations enters the insurgents' conflict environment. As a 
distinct phase of their relationship, peacekeeping is an interaction that is affected by the dynamic 
between the United Nations and insurgent movements described in Chapter Three. This chapter 
examines how this dynamic has influenced the interaction between United Nations 
peacekeeping forces and various insurgent movements since the end of the Cold War. Its 
objective is to test the main hypothesis of this thesis as it pertains to peacekeeping: that between 
the United Nations and insurgent movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal 
interactions than divergent approaches. These indices of the compatibility of their approaches, 
developed and arranged into a framework in Chapter Three, are first adapted to determine how 
they will operate in a peacekeeping interaction. The peacekeeping framework is then applied to 
interactions with five insurgent movements: Renamo, the USC-SNA, the Bosnian Serbs, the 
Contras, and the Khmer Rouge. Each of these cases has been selected to examine the sources of 
varying levels of effectiveness in three major areas of post-Cold War peacekeeping: monitoring 
ceasefires, maintaining aid flows, and disarmament and demobilisation. 
5.1: United Nations Peacekeeping: A Framework for Analysis 
Peacekeeping has conventionally been conceived as "the prevention, containment, 
moderation and termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of 
peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational 
forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace." I As international 
confrontations become rarer, United Nations peacekeeping operations have had to adapt to the 
requirements of internal conflicts. Finding that "[r]estoring the peace inside a country wracked 
by conflict is a more treacherous undertaking than monitoring international borders, ,,2 the 
United Nations has realised that its peacekeeping operations have to supervise a greater number 
of more complex tasks. To secure a permanent end to the conflict, they have to ultimately 
I International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook, (New York: Pergammon Press, 1984), p. 22. 
2 Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping, Worldwatch Paper 14, (Washington, D.C.: 
Worldwatch Institute, 1993), p. 37. 
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rehabilitate the collapsed State's political administrative, security, judicial, economic and 
infrastructure systems. After 1988, the United Nations began to dispatch multicomponent 
peacekeeping operations, charged with ceasefrre monitoring and pacification; protecting aid 
flows; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former belligerents; de-mining; 
repatriation of refugees; rehabilitation of the security and juridical apparatus; ensuring the 
respect of human rights; monitoring elections; building popular political participation; and 
rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure. While peacekeeping forces experience varying levels of 
success and failure in achieving these different tasks, this chapter isolates and examines one 
aspect of their operations: the effectiveness of their interactions with insurgent movements. 
United Nations peacekeeping forces are charged with implementing these immensely 
complex mandates in a more difficult civil war environment. They must operate among a 
frightened and demoralised popUlation; in a volatile conflict zone; over damaged infrastructure; 
and interact with untrustworthy belligerents. Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations have 
exhibited a continuum of interactions with insurgent movements, ranging from cooperation to 
confrontation and combat actions. The nature of United Nations peacekeeping shows, however, 
that greater use of force does not automatically convert into a proportionately greater level of 
influence over insurgent behaviour. This suggests that, as hypothesised and developed in the 
framework, it is the compatibility of approaches and cooperation that yields a viable 
peacekeeping interaction, rather than the use of coercion. This means that, while insurgent 
movements do make extensive use of coercive force, and while peacekeepers sometimes cross 
into peace enforcement, an interaction yielding optimal results will be one in which the 
participants have compatible interests and interact cooperatively. It is necessary therefore to 
apply the framework to peacekeeping before using it to analyse peacekeeping interactions with 
insurgent groups. This section will demonstrate how each of the framework indices - objectives, 
interaction mechanisms, instrumentality, impartiality, timing, isolation and support, and 
cohesion - determines approaches to peacekeeping interactions. 
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5.1.1: Objectives 
A peacekeeping interaction is at base a confrontation between two armed forces. The 
viability of the interaction, however, is contingent on a peaceful, cooperative relationship 
between these forces. The peacekeepers, by intervening, and the insurgent movement, due to its 
belligerency, both seek to advance certain, internally-defined interests through their interaction. 
As the two armed forces meet, therefore, the extent of peaceful cooperation in their relationship 
depends on whether the objectives advanced by the United Nations and the insurgent movement 
are mutually compatible. Without this complementarity of objectives with the insurgent 
movement and other conflicting parties, the intervening peacekeeping force becomes part of the 
conflict environment, another armed party working towards different objectives. When 
objectives are diametrically opposed, one or both sides will need to resort to force and impose its 
will on the other to advance its goals. When this happens, the peacekeeping operation becomes 
an obstacle to the peace process it was intended to advance, and the peacekeeping interaction 
becomes dysfunctional. Complete concurrence on all objectives in a conflict situation, however, 
is almost impossible to achieve. An optimal interaction between peacekeepers and insurgents is 
contingent not on complete agreement, but rather on whether there is concurrence on objectives 
which are common to both the peacekeepers and the insurgents, and which are of overriding 
importance to both. The most basic common and overriding objective should be that both want 
to end the war. Other compelling objectives include the form of the solution, visions of the post-
bellum society, ideological and nationalist considerations, and the place of the belligerents in the 
new society. The extent of agreement, between overriding and secondary objectives, and 
between short term interests and long term goals, should determine the extent of effectiveness of 
the peacekeeping interaction and the viability of the conflict resolution. Often the longevity of 
the resolution is limited by divergent long term or ideological objectives finally asserting 
themselves over compatible, but transitory interests. This suggests, then, that an optimal 
peacekeeping interaction will be based on an essential concurrence of objectives between the 
peacekeepers and the insurgent movement. 
As a multilateral force, a peacekeeping operation's objectives are closely defined by the 
interests of the sponsoring coalition. The interested powers' decision to respond to the less 
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compelling threats of civil wars multilaterally is motivated by a desire to secure legitimacy while 
spreading costs and responsibility. As the creations of interested Member-States' residual 
collective interest, peacekeeping forces are essentially "flexible instruments of policy,,3 for 
securing their sponsoring coalitions' objectives. These objectives arise from a combination of 
interests of the sponsoring coalition, based on conceptions of national interest, international 
order, and domestic requirements. The clarity and ambition of the peacekeepers' mandate is a 
function of the level of agreement between the sponsoring powers: the presence in the coalition 
of dissenters will produce a watering down of objectives aimed less at resolving the conflict as 
securing other, less controversial goals. The Member-States maintain this close control of the 
operation, as they continue to review its progress and control its resourcing and strategic 
direction. The peacekeeping mandate also needs to be consistent with the normative principles 
and assumptions of the Organisation. Seeing war as an illegitimate method of gaining political 
power, the United Nations' objectives are predominantly based around the desire to stop or 
contain the hostilities and substitute alternative methods of adjudicating the dispute at the base 
of the conflict. Among more cohesive coalitions, the desire to restore single, legitimised 
government control over a unified, centralised and territorially whole State can lead to vast and 
complex mandates. 
The insurgent movement's objectives, to be compatible with the peacekeeping force's, 
must be based on a commitment to abandon the war. While discarding its violent means, 
however, it retains its desire to promote its ends: the advancement of its interests and the 
preservation of its security. This change of means results from either a rational calculation that 
cooperation in a peace process will more efficiently secure its ends, or from an internal 
reordering of the movements' interests, prioritising those that are better achieved peacefully. 
Insurgent objectives can range from seizing control of the State to just ending the insurgency 
and safely rejoining society. As it enters a peacekeeping interaction, then, the insurgent 
movement's approach is informed by a rational costing that its participation offers more 
opportunities and less dangers than its non-participation. Generally, the group's objectives will 
include the opportunity to promote the interests for which it formerly fought, as well as offering 
3 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations, 
1990), p. 5. 
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it security from revenge as it abandons war: "Any agreement must eliminate the insecurity of all 
significant local factions ... members of all factions must be assured of their safety regardless of 
who wins the political contest. If any of the competing groups .. .faces physical elimination, it 
will obviously prolong the bloody struggle rather than meekly accept its doomed fate. ,,4 The 
viability of the peacekeeping interaction between the United Nations and the insurgent 
movement, then, is contingent on essential compatibility between their objectives in the 
interaction. 
5.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
Sponsoring coalitions within the United Nations choose peacekeeping forces as the 
policy instrument giving them the most control, at the appropriate occasion, over advancing their 
interests in the conflict, while securing legitimacy and spreading the costs of the intervention. 
The nature of the operation, and its objectives, means that the peacekeeping force, although 
armed, relies on the cooperation of the parties to achieve its objectives rather than anticipating 
and overcoming their resistance. The United Nations sees peacekeepers as impartial actors 
neutralising important aspects of the conflict in order to allow a particular arbitration or 
resolution mechanism to determine the outcome of the peace process. The peacekeeping 
operation's light force posture is an essential element in gaining the insurgents' acceptance of its 
presence, because "the parties to a conflict are more likely to accept a UN peacekeeping 
operation if the latter has no offensive intent and capability and will in no conceivable 
circumstances become a threat to them."s The peacekeeping response should be geared towards 
preventing rather than overcoming returns to violence.6 Peacekeepers "are almost by definition 
outgunned by the disputants they are sent to monitor, [and] any recourse to force must be 
4 Ramesh Thakur, "From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping", in Hugh Smith (ed), 
Australia and Peacekeeping, (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1990), p. 8. 
5 F. T. Liu. United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 
p.l1. 
6 Michael Harbottle, "The Strategy of Third Party Interventions in Conflict Resolution", International Journal, 
Vol. 35, No.1, Winter 1979-80, p. 119. 
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calibrated to localise and defuse, rather than escalate, violence." 7 The United Nations, through 
the peacekeeping mechanism, aims to advance the coalition's objectives with the cooperation of 
the insurgents. 
A peacekeeping intervention represents the introduction of an armed military force into a 
conflict zone; in order for the operation to avoid being seen by the belligerents as a possible 
adversary, both must agree on this interaction mechanism and the process it advocates. 
Insurgents' "consent is required not only for the operation's establishment but also, in broad 
terms, for the way in which it will carry out its mandate."s A commitment to peaceful 
promotion of objectives is basic to the insurgent movement's agreement to the peacekeeping 
mechanism: "a readiness to accept supervision can generally be taken as an indication that the 
parties are moving towards an agreement in good faith, and are not thinking of anything but the 
execution of its terms. ,,9 Insurgent movements will cooperate with the peacekeeping mechanism 
if they calculate that the intervention offers new opportunities and minimises the dangers of 
cooperating to promote their interests. Insurgents will cooperate if they see the peacekeeping 
mechanism as having a positive impact on their position; if they see it as giving them a 
reasonable chance of attaining their objectives and protecting them if they don't succeed. A 
peacekeeping force, if it is seen to be effective, provides a guarantee mechanism that the peace 
process is mutual and that all parties remain committed to their obligations. As a consensual 
presence, a peacekeeping force is less a pacifier than a mechanism for reinforcing the parties' 
self-deterrence. 1o Thus for an insurgent movement, a peacekeeping operation can be a force for 
protecting itself from revenge or attack while peacefully pursuing its goals. 
7 William 1. Durch, "Introduction", in William 1. Durch (ed), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 4. 
8 United Nations, op. cit., 1990, pp. 5-6. 
9 Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 93. 
10 Maureen Boerma, ""The United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon: Peacekeeping in a Domestic Conflict", 
Millenium, Vol. 8, No.1, Spring 1979, p. 58. 
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5.1.3: Instrumentality 
Basic to the viability of a peacekeeping interaction is the inclusion of all major 
belligerents in the peace process. A peacekeeping force with a mandate that excludes a major 
party, and whose presence is not accepted by a major party, will incur its non-cooperation or 
opposition. Essentially an insurgent movement exercises a veto over the presence and actions of 
a peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force relies on the insurgents to provide it with the means 
to oversee the peace process; and their consent provides the peacekeepers with leverage: "in a 
peace force deployment where the mandate and the political agreements it is derived from fail to 
recognise or consult all the local forces ... [it] is unlikely to provide the peacekeeping force with 
the necessary sanctions to encourage their good behaviour. II 11 Crucial to the insurgents' 
cooperation is that they do not see the peacekeeping operation as an obstacle to the attainment of 
their objectives, or an unwelcome intervention trying to cajole them into a disadvantageous 
peace. 
The insurgent movement's consensual participation in a viable interaction will partly be 
based on its acceptance of the peacekeeping operation as a legitimate and instrumental 
interlocutor. This perception will depend on whether the peacekeeping force should be seen as 
an essential element to the de-escalation of hostilities and the securement of conditions for 
further resolution of the conflict. It is thereby instrumental to the peace process in that the 
peacekeepers " ... essentially ... overcome a coordination problem between two adversaries: the 
peacekeeper seeks to ensure that both parties to a conflict understand the agreed-upon rules of 
the game and that compliance with or deviation from these rules is made transparent." 12 
Peacekeepers often offer the insurgent movement a means of security from attack while 
peacefully promoting their objectives. Peacekeeping is more a political than a military activity; it 
is a mechanism to navigate mutually suspicious adversaries towards a resolution. Often the 
legitimacy of the peacekeeper's presence derives from a peace agreement which requests the 
presence of the peacekeeping force to oversee its implementation. In order to preserve its 
11 MacKinlay,op. cit., 1989, pp. 222-3. 
12 John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.5, NovemberlDecember 1993, p. 
29. 
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instrumentality, the peacekeeping force must maintain its credibility in the eyes of the disputants 
by efficiently discharging its mandate: "If the peacekeeper's conduct is impeccable, his 
observation thorough, his reporting accurate and timely and his patrolling continuous, he is 
likely to gain the confidence of local adversaries." 13 It is also desirable that the force deploys 
quickly and authoritatively in order to forestall any of the belligerents attempting to gain an 
advantage from the unsupervised period of the peace agreement. 
5.1.4: Impartiality 
The consensual nature of the peacekeeping interaction, and its operation in a belligerent 
environment, makes the United Nations force's and the insurgent movement's impartiality of 
behaviour an important element to the viability of the interaction. The belligerents' acceptance of 
the peacekeeping force's presence is partly determined by whether or not they believe its 
behaviour is prejudiced against them. Impartiality means that none of the parties sees the United 
Nations presence as benefiting its opponents more than itself. A biased peacekeeping force 
becomes a party to the conflict and violates its terms of acceptance by the parties. 14 By losing 
the cooperation of one or more of the belligerents, the force loses its ability to influence and 
control events around the peace process,15 and effectiveness of the interaction will suffer. The 
acceptable behaviour for both the belligerents and the peacekeeping force is most clearly defined 
in the peace agreement, if a peace agreement is the basis for the presence of the United Nations. 
The limits of the peacekeepers' behaviour is also defined in their mandate and instructions from 
the Security Council and the United Nations. In civil war situations, which are particularly 
difficult for the United Nations to handle, peacekeepers' impartiality can be measured by 
comparing their actions with their instructions in the peace agreement and mandate. 16 
Impartiality does not, however, mean overlooking or appeasing the unacceptable behaviour of 
13 Rod Paschall, "Tactical Exercises: The Impartial Buffer", MHQ, Vol. 5, No.1, Autumn 1992, p. 52. 
14 Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", International Affairs, Vol. 69, No.3, 
1993, pp. 454-455. 
15 Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping", Survival, Vol. 36, No.3, Autumn 1994, p. 
130. 
16 James, "Problems oflntemal Peacekeeping", op. cit., 1994, p. 30. 
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the disputants. 17 Impartiality should be a measure of ftrm, unbiased objectivity in the 
performance of a peacekeeping force's functions. 
The peacekeepers' reliance on the insurgent movement's cooperation, and the delicacy of 
its mission, makes the effectiveness of their interaction depend on the insurgent movement 
refraining from trying to unfairly bias the interaction to its beneftt. The complex nature of civil 
wars, and the totality of their stakes, makes it a standing temptation for the belligerents to 
manipulate the United Nations presence: " ... peacekeepers are likely to be viewed instrumentally 
rather than as actors whose independence should be respected. ,,18 While the insurgent movement 
will inevitably try to influence or manipulate the peacekeeping operation into creating conditions 
that give it an advantage over its opponents, the viability of the interaction will be damaged by 
the deliberate manipulation of the force for ulterior motives. The impartiality of insurgent 
movements' behaviour needs to continue past their initial consent to its presence, and they must 
not seek to drag the force or other States into a renewal of hostilities. 19 Impartiality also includes 
refraining from taking action to prejudice the peacekeepers' impartiality, and granting the force 
the freedom of movement and basic level of cooperation it needs to carry out its mandate: " ... the 
parties to the conflict are expected to provide continuing support to the operation by allowing it 
the freedom of movement and other facilities which it needs to carry its task. ,,20 
5.1.5: Timing 
The conduciveness of the insurgents' approach to the peacekeeping interaction is often 
determined by the timing of the intervention. Often a willingness to enter a peace process 
originates in a stagnant military situation and a calculation that the peace process offers an 
17 Kjell Skjelsbaek, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes by the United Nations and Other Intergovernmental 
Bodies", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 21, No.3, 1986, p. 141. 
18 Alan James, "Peacekeeping and Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Evidence", Unpublished Paper, October 1993. 
19 Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace", Political Science 'Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 
3, Fall 1988, p. 499. 
20 United Nations, op. cit., 1990, p. 6. 
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opportunity to limit losses and realise objectives. A peacekeeping force is unlikely to gain the 
cooperation of a disputant whose military impetus and objectives are hindered by the 
introduction of the peacekeeping force. The propitious timing of an operation can build support 
for its presence: "Consent will be further promoted if the parties to a conflict can be endowed 
with vested interests in resolving their own disputes. If the belligerents can somehow be made 
shareholders of the peace process, then their motivation to cooperate will be greatly 
increased.,,2l Hence the insurgent movement's military position at the time of the peacekeeping 
intervention can provide a measure of the extent of its commitment to peace and thus the 
concurrence of its approach with the United Nations' to the peacekeeping interaction. 
5.1.6: Support and Isolation 
A peacekeeping operation can adjust some differences in approach in its favour by 
exerting influence on the insurgent movement through United Nations' Member-States' 
connections with the movements. Parallel actions of Member-States can provide the 
peacekeeping operation with influence over the insurgents. In this way, Member-State support 
of the peacekeeping operation acts as a mitigating factor with less cooperative insurgent 
movements. Member-States' support for the operation needs to go beyond registering their 
support for unanimous resolutions: support is measured by whether Member-States are prepared 
to use whatever individual or collective influence they have over the belligerents to ensure their 
cooperation with the peacekeeping operation. This also means that any involvement in the 
conflict or its resolution by a third-party State should not endeavour to advance any goals other 
than those advocated by the peacekeeping mission. Belligerents are quick to detect a decline in 
Member-State support for the operation and their pressure for its success: " .. .if that pressure 
abates or if the local situation changes, so could the calculus of the contending parties for whom 
the peacekeeping force then would become an obstacle to their preferred course of action. ,,22 
21 Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping", op. cit., 1994, p. 133. 
22 Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations", Survival, Vol. 32, No.3, May/June 1990, p. 267. 
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The conduciveness of the insurgents' approach to the United Nations' is also influenced 
by their capacity to fight on; this calculation is affected by existence or absence of sponsoring 
States and the extent of their assistance. External support or encouragement of any of the 
disputants will proportionally increase their intransigence and inflate their demands; while 
isolation or desertion by an important sponsor will sap a belligerent's resources and 
determination. The end of the Cold War has deprived many insurgents of their sponsors: 
... contestants in internal or regional conflicts can no longer assume that they will 
be able to find a backer in the more ideologically sympathetic of the two 
superpowers ... The collapse of these assumptions has drastically diminished not 
just the resources, but also the confidence of many internal disputants.23 
Such measurements of isolation or support also need to take into account the extent of 
dependence of the belligerents on their supporters; the more self-reliant a party, the less it will be 
influenced by such changes in the international environment. 
5.1.7: Cohesion 
The capabilities and confidence of the peacekeeping operation, and the assurance with 
which it promotes the sponsoring coalition's interests, partly depends on the extent of cohesion 
among United Nations' Member-States on its purposes and approach. The resolve of United 
Nations operations is contingent on the accord between its members on the issue at hand at any 
given time: "Peacekeeping is an expression of international political consensus and will. If that 
consensus or will is weak, uncertain, divided or indecisive, peacekeeping operations will be 
correspondingly weakened.,,24 Despite acknowledging the importance of cohesive support for 
peacekeeping operations,25 disputes within the Security Council on the force's mandate, tactics, 
or expense can deprive a peacekeeping operation of its political support. The multilateral 
23 James, "Problems ofInternal Peacekeeping", op. cit., 1994, p. 27. 
24 Javier Perez de Cuellar, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 1984, (New York: 
United Nations, 1984), p. 8. 
25 See Statement by the President of the Security Council, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", S/21323, 
30 May 1990, which states "The members of the Security Council also emphasise the importance of political 
support by all Member States ... for United Nations peacekeeping ... " 
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peacekeeping force also needs to maintain its own cohesion: "Success in peacekeeping depends 
on the identity of the force as a single entity. If individual contingents were to operate 
independently and see their responsibility as being to their national government and not to the 
United Nations, operational efficiency would be jeopardised.,,26 Force cohesion, a difficult ideal 
to maintain among the centrifugal forces operating on a peacekeeping operation,27 is therefore a 
factor affecting the force's credibility and acceptability in acting as a coherent, dependable actor. 
An insurgent movement's ability to cooperate with the peacekeepers and the peace 
process is affected by its cohesion and the control it is able to exert over its cadres. A 
peacekeeping interaction with a belligerent whose leadership is cooperative, but which is so 
faction-ridden or lacks such authority, that it faces resistance from forces divorced and 
unaccountable to their leadership, will be less effective. Extremist factions or undisciplined 
militias that disagree with the peace process can launch attacks against the peacekeepers and the 
delicate structures of trust they are overseeing in the peace process in order to destroy 
compromise and provoke reactions to continue the war, thereby subverting the peace process. 
Prominent contemporary examples of this are the attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas militias and 
right-wing Israeli settlers on the peace process in the Gaza and Jericho, which have to date 
de stabilised the progress of the Israeli-PLO accord over Palestinian self-rule;28 and the attacks 
by extremist Afrikaner groups such as the A WB, against the Codesa talks and reconciliation 
process in South Africa?9 A viable interaction should include an insurgent movement with the 
capacity for unified and disciplined compliance with the peace process. 
This peacekeeping framework will be used to reveal levels of compatibility between the 
approaches of United Nations peacekeeping operations and insurgent movements to their 
interaction. It compares these indicators and approaches with the effectiveness of the interactions 
26 International Peace Academy, op. cit., 1984, p.34. 
27 See Gustav Haaglund, "Peacekeeping in a Modem War Zone", Survival, Vol. 32, No.3, May/June 1990, p. 
236. 
28 "Palestinians: Divided", The Economist, 13 May 1995. 
29 David Welsh, "Right-Wing Terrorism in South Africa", Terrorism alld Political Violence, Vol. 7, No. I, 
Spring 1995, pp. 252-262. 
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between peacekeeping forces and five insurgent movements in the post-Cold War era. These 
analyses explore the three major aspects of post-Cold War peacekeeping: monitoring ceasefires, 
maintaining aid flows, and disarmament and demobilisation. The peacekeeping forces' relations 
with Renamo and the USC-SNA have been selected to analyse the sources of effectiveness in 
monitoring ceasefrres; their relations with the Bosnian Serbs to explore the difficulties of 
maintaining aid flows; and their interaction with the contras and the Khmer Rouge to compare 
the influence of compatibility of approaches on the viability of disarmament and demobilisation 
processes. Through analysis and comparison using the peacekeeping framework, this chapter 
will test whether, as hypothesised, between the United Nations and insurgent movements, 
concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions than divergent approaches, and 
whether this logic applies to peacekeeping operations. 
5.2: Monitoring Ceasefires 
The monitoring of ceasefires concluded between formerly warring parties is a customary 
role of United Nations peacekeepers. Originating during the Cold War, it has continued as a 
basic condition for the fulfilment of other tasks given to operations undertaking extended 
peacekeeping in collapsed States. In "classical" peacekeeping operations, the monitoring of 
ceasefires between two disengaging national armies formed the core of the mandate,30 while 
other tasks for the peacekeepers, such as clearing mines, rebuilding roads, and guarding relief 
convoys, were looked upon as "auxiliary taskS,,?l Peacekeepers in contemporary civil wars are 
assigned more complex mandates, however. While monitoring ceasefires and disengagements 
form but one part of these mandates, this function is basic to the performance of the other, more 
complex tasks of securing aid flows, organising elections, or national rebuilding. As the case 
study on Somalia will show, none of these reconciliation tasks are possible without a basic 
cessation in hostilities. The complexity and intensity of contemporary civil wars makes the 
30 See for example the mandates of UNEF I and II in the Middle East, and UNFICYP in Cyprus. See Rosalyn 
Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 Documents and Commentary, Volume 1 The Middle East, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1979 Documents and 
Commentary, Volume IV Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
31 A particularly good discussion of this distinction is provided by Roslyn Higgins, "The New United Nations 
and the Former Yugoslavia", International Affairs, Vol. 69, No.3, 1993, pp. 465-483. 
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ceasefire agreements that the peacekeepers are introduced to monitor less stable, and exercise 
less binding power over the belligerents.32 States concluding agreements are more likely to 
remain faithful to their commitments than insurgent movements because of considerations of 
prestige, reputation, intemationallaw, and fear of sanctions.33 Furthennore, chains of command 
and systems of discipline are often less rigid in insurgent militias than national armies, and 
agreements can be disobeyed, ignored, or be concluded with the wrong leadership.34 
Consequently, ceasefire agreements with insurgent movements tend to be violated more often, 
or agreed to only to be ignored by the militias and cadre on the ground. Often the ceasefires 
monitored by the peacekeepers have had to be negotiated by the peacekeepers themselves, 
among the various factions and militias in the field. These factors make this aspect of the 
peacekeeping interaction considerably more difficult with insurgents than with national armies. 
5.2.1: Renamo: Purchasing Peace 
The United Nations was obliged to oversee an end to the war in Mozambique, a 
Member-State that had been reduced to the poorest in the world by a brutal civil war instigated 
and fomented by neighbouring States. Since 1976, the Marxist Mozambican government 
established from the fonner Frelimo national liberation movement, had been fighting the anti-
communist Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) insurgent movement, established 
from disaffected groups opposed to Frelimo's Marxism, and funded first by the Rhodesian 
32 No greater testament to this is the hundreds of ceasefrre agreements that have been negotiated and broken in 
Bosnia. So pervasive is the culture of not honouring agreements in Bosnia now that William Pfaff, "Really, the Only 
Bosnia Plan on the Table", International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994, quotes even a Bosnian government 
official as saying "We'll sign and then ignore the [Western contact group peace plan] agreement. That's what 
everyone in this war has done so far." 
33 Political Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Alvaro de Soto, quoted on BBC News and 
Current Affairs, The Thin Blue Line: Revolution on the 37th Floor, BBC Radio 4,8 pm, 22 April 1993. 
34 For example, UNPROFOR II peacekeepers in Bosnia have openly admitted that agreements with the Bosnian 
Serb political leadership in Pale are worthless in the field, and that each agreement must be negotiated with either 
General Mladic or the local sector commanders. See Marcus Tanner and Peter Pringle, "Chaos Over Policy Adds to 
UN Gloom", The Independent, 19 February 1993, who report, "Larry Hollingsworth, leader of the failed UN 
convoy to Cerska, found verbal permission from Mr Karadzic to cross [Bosnian] Serb-held territory was worthless. 
Serbian [sic] commanders told him they only took orders from the Serbian [sic] military Chief, Ratko Mladic." 
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Central Intelligence Organisation, and then after 1980 by South African Military Intelligence.35 
Both Rhodesia and South Africa used Renamo as a destabilisation tool against the frontline 
States - Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia - which were supporting the Zimbabwean and 
South African liberation movements against white minority rule.36 Based and supplied in the 
remote Gongorosa Mountains, Renamo developed into an almost completely military 
organisation, rigidly controlled by its flamboyant leader, Afonso Dhlakama, but dependent on its 
external sponsors for direction and supply.37 The organisation made no attempt to explain its 
political program, mobilise supporters, or provide services to the population in the 70% of 
Mozambique that it eventually controlled.38 Renamo's military strategy was to isolate the 
government in Maputo, and destabilise it using economic sabotage.39 Tactically, Renamo's 
20,000-strong army, organised into 200-300-strong battalions, attacked transport corridors, 
pipelines, electrical grids, health centres, schools, government offices, and development projects, 
and made no attempt to create and defend a "liberated zone" like other insurgencies.4o Renamo 
also utilised a scorched earth policy,41 as well as widespread genocide, rape, and terror against 
the population, for recruitment and contro1.42 By the end of the 1980s, Renamo's campaign had 
35 See for further accounts of the wars in Mozambique and Angola, Paul L. Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War 
and Revolution in Southern Africa, (London: Brassey's, 1994); and Abiodun Alao, Brothers at War, (London: 
British Academic Press, 1994). 
36 Renamo was used not only to cripple the Mozambican government, but also to disrupt traffic on the vital 
transport corridors linking Zimbabwe and Zambia to the Indian Ocean, thereby making them more dependent on 
South Africa for ports for their exports and imports. 
37 Robert Jasper, "Mozambique: Whose Interests do Saboteurs Serve?", International Herald Tribune, 20 June 
1985. 
38 See Victoria Brittain, "Rebels Without a Cause", The Guardian, 22 April 1991. 
39 In this, Renamo was very successful, making the government spend 45% of its budget on the war effort, and 
driving Mozambicans' average national income down to $80, the lowest in the world. 
40 Emily MacFarquhar, "The Killing Fields of Mozambique", us. News and World Report, 2 May 1988. 
41 Robert Gersony, in a report on Renamo commissioned by the United States Sate Department, reported that 
Renamo classified its areas of control into three regions: (1) "tax areas", of relative security from which supplies, 
recruits, porters, and concubines are extracted regularly; (2) "control areas", in proximity to a base, in which the 
inhabitants are forced into slave labour to erect defences and grow food; and (3) "destruction areas", which are 
designated for violent, wholesale, and thorough devastation. Quoted in Glenda Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique: 
Towards an Understanding of Renamo", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No.4, 1990, p. 608. 
42 E.A. Wayne, "Mozambique Rebels Deny Charges of Civilian Abuses", Christian Science Monitor, 25 April 
1988. 
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not toppled the government, but had turned Mozambique into the poorest State on earth, caused 
1 million deaths, and created 4.5 million refugees.43 The war in Mozambique had become a 
running sore that needed to be resolved. 
After sustained negotiations, Renamo and the Mozambican government signed a peace 
agreement in Rome in August 1992, requesting a United Nations peacekeeping force oversee the 
settlement.44 In December 1992 the Security Council unanimously approved the creation of 
ONUMOZ, a 7,SOO-strong peacekeeping force to monitor the government-Renamo ceasefire, 
organise elections, disarm and demobilise the two sides, create a new, unified army, and guard 
the transport corridors through Mozambique to its landlocked neighbours.45 Basic to the whole 
peace settlement was ONUMOZ's ability to oversee the general ceasefire. All involved in the 
Mozambican peace process were aware of the recent failure of a similar operation in Angola. 
However, by October 1994, multiparty elections were held and won by the incumbent 
government.46 ONUMOZ withdrew in December having registered a much-needed success 
among the peacekeeping failures of 1994. Its wider success in resolving the Mozambican 
conflict was based on the effectiveness of the ONUMOZ-Renamo interaction in ensuring that 
the often-tenuous ceasefire held. 
5.2.1.1: Objectives 
The objectives of the ONUMOZ force were determined largely by the request for 
peacekeepers in the Rome agreement, and largely unmodified by diverging Member-State 
interests. While there was a general unity of position on Mozambique among ONUMOZ's 
sponsoring coalition, there was also a general agreement on the non-compelling nature of the 
requirements in Mozambique. During the civil war, neither superpower had adjudged the 
43 Peter G. Hemsch, "How Mozambique's Guns Were Silenced", Christian Science Monitor, 7 October 1992. 
44 See General Peace Agreementfor Mozambique, Rome, 4 October 1992, S/24635 Annex, 8 October 1992. 
45 Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. 
46 The incumbent Frelimo party eventually won 2.6 million votes, or 53.3% of the poll, while Renamo won 1.66 
million votes, or 33.73% of the poll. See David Beresford, "Frelimo Hails Win", The Guardian, 21 November 1994. 
226 
conflict important enough to consider sponsoring either side heavily; the Frelimo government 
received small scale anns transfers from the Soviet bloc and China,47 but Renamo was not able 
to gain Western States' sponsorship, even during the heyday of the Reagan doctrine, despite the 
advocacy of its cause by conservative groups and Senators in the United States.48 The response 
in Mozambique was prompted by humanitarian and general regional stabilisation motives than 
any compelling strategic interest. The resolution of the conflict in Mozambique was seen to offer 
a positive impulse to the other more compelling facets of the southern African peace process: the 
dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, the independence of Namibia, and the attempts to 
resolve the Angolan civil war. Within the region, the main participants in the South African 
Codesa talks were keen to disassociate themselves with the legacies of their struggle in the 
region. Other neighbouring States were keen to end the festering war that was costing them so 
much: Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Malawi all suffered from disruptions in the traffic on the 
transport corridors through Mozambique that connected them to the Indian Ocean. Zimbabwe in 
particular also wanted to end its long and costly defence of these corridors; the combination of 
this defence and lost revenue from Renamo's attacks on the corridors was estimated to have cost 
Zimbabwe $350 million per year.49 Western European States, particularly Italy, were prompted 
by humanitarian concerns to help end a conflict that had made Mozambique the poorest State in 
the world. The dissociation of major powers from the conflict left the field open for a minor 
power such as Italy, to take the lead within the United Nations in initiating and sustaining United 
Nations initiatives in support of the resolution of the Mozambican civil war. These factors, as 
well as a feeling of obligation arising from the request in the Rome agreement, prompted the 
Security Council to authorise the creation of the ONUMOZ force. 
47 The Soviet and Chinese relationship with the Frelimo government was kept at arm's length, and any military 
assistance was at best deSUltory. Chissano's government consistently denied Soviet requests to build a military base 
on Mozambican territory, while Mozambique's application to join Comecon was denied in 1981. 
48 The Reagan administration resisted pressure from various right-wing organisations, and from Republican 
Senators Robert Dole and Jesse Helms, to begin aiding Renamo in the same way as the United States was arming 
Unita, the Contras, and the Mujahadin. This resistance was exemplified by the visit to the White House of then 
Mozambican President Samora Machel in 1985. 
49 "How Mozambique's Guns Were Silenced", The Christian Science Monitor, 7 October 1992. 
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The objectives of the ONUMOZ force, as developed through the United Nations, were to 
implement the peace and rehabilitation settlement contained in the Rome Agreement, even 
though it had played almost no role in its mediation. so The Security Council expressed its desire 
to see a process of peace, democracy, and national unity take place,S! and supported the 
provision of immediate aid to distressed areas, the disarmament of the marauding armies, and 
the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. 52 It attached a "vital importance" to the holding of 
free elections as a mechanism of legitimation, re-integration, and democratisation. 5 3 The 
Security Council recognised that all of these tasks needed to be based on a stable and enduring 
ceasefire, urging the parties to " ... respect scrupulously the ceasefire ... , a necessary condition for 
the fulfilment by the Operation ofits mandate."s4 Consequently, when it established ONUMOZ, 
the Security Council stressed the primary importance it placed on the operation's responsibility 
of overseeing the ceasefire.55 Anxious to secure Renamo's participation in the elections and its 
respect of the results, the United Nations pre-negotiated an informal power-sharing agreement 
between Renamo and Frelimo before the elections were held, thereby securing Renamo's 
participation in the elections and its respect of their results.56 Broad agreement thus existed 
between the objectives of Renamo and ONUMOZ. 
As domestic and international changes deprived it of a raison d'etre and emphasised the 
poverty of its ideological base, Renamo was forced to moderate its objectives. Its 1981 
Manifesto's vague political goals, advocating anti-communism, democratic elections, social 
50 Security Council Resolution 782 (1992) of 13 October 1992. 
51 See Security Council Resolutions 797 (1992) of 16 December 1993,818 (1993) of 13 April 1993, and 850 
(1993) of 9 July 1993. 
52 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/24892, 3 December 
1992, p. 6. 
53 Security Council Resolution 882 (1993) of 5 November 1993. 
54 Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. 
55 See "Statement of the President of the Security Council", 27 October 1992, and Security Council Resolution 
797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. 
56 See Christina Lamb, "£390m UN Bill for Mozambique Poll", The Sunday Times, 30 October 1994, and David 
Beresford, "Mozambique Finds It Voted For Bourgeois Democracy", The Guardian, 31 October 1994. 
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refonns and a mixed economy, were an attempt to gain domestic political legitimacy and 
broader international support for a movement supported and directed by South Africa. 57 The 
negativity of its political stance was reflected in its use of terrorism to gain supporters and 
"paralyse the country through destruction of the communication and transportation infrastructure 
and elimination or mutilation of Frelimo leaders. ,,58 It was deprived of its justification for 
continuing the war by the government's liberalising refonns, admitting that "Frelimo has started 
using all our lines - democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of worship. ,,59 As its unsavoury 
tactics, connections with South Africa, and ideological poverty threatened to marginalise it. As 
Frelimo instituted its own program of perestroika, Renamo realised it was unprepared to 
compete in the pluralist system it had long advocated.60 By 1989, it had changed its demands to 
power-sharing with a guarantee of major portfolios, irrespective of the outcome of elections,61 
and a chance to debate the 1990 liberal constitution adopted by Frelimo.62 
Renamo was also a money-making enterprise. In the poorest State in the world, crippled 
by civil war and drought, the "plundering and attacking of settlements and convoys [became] 
designed as much for replenishment of supplies and generation of booty as a reward for 
[Renamo's] combatants as for economic disruption for political ends. ,,63 Renamo leaders saw 
that they would have to end the war to stop and reverse the process of its marginalisation, but 
were reluctant to lose its wealth-creating potential. Consequently, the Rome Agreement 
" ... guarantee[ d] the distribution to all parties competing in the elections ... of subsidies and 
logistic support for the election campaign apportioned on the basis of the number of each party's 
57 Tom Young, "The MNRIRenamo: External and Internal Dynamics", African Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 357, 
October 1990, p. 501. 
58 Mario Azeredo, Historical Dictionary of Mozambique, (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1991), p. 110. 
59 Quoted in Chris Alden and Mark Simpson, "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace", The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 31, No.1, 1993, p. 122. 
60 Peter G. Hemsch, "How Mozambique's Guns Were Silenced", Christian Science Monitor, 7 October 1992. 
61 Alex Vines, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 131. 
62 M. Hall and T. Young, "Recent Constitutional Developments in Mozambique", Journal of African Law, Vol. 
35, Nos. 1-2, 1991, p. 107. 
63 Vines, op. cit., 1991, p. 132. 
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candidates. ,,64 By the time the ONUMOZ force deployed, this provision translated into a blatant 
demand for financial incentives from the international community for its cooperation with the 
peace process.65 Renamo also sought a settlement that would guarantee the security of the 
movement, after it had abandoned the war and begun to reintegrate into Mozambican society. It 
duly insisted on the inclusion of security provisions and international observation of the peace 
process in the Rome Agreement. 66 
5.2.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations was committed to the use of the peacekeeping mechanism to 
safeguard the peace process in Mozambique. However, overstretch of United Nations 
resources
67 
meant that ONUMOZ deployed sluggishly,68 also failing to negotiate a Status of 
Forces Agreement until May 1993.69 Renamo refused to begin demobilising until ONUMOZ 
was fully deployed and operational. 70 Both sides took advantage of the slow arrival of the 
peacekeepers to seize territory before the peace process could begin.7! These delays and 
complications highlighted that the Agreement's timetables were unrealistic. 72 Once ONUMOZ 
64 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Rome, 4 October 1992, S!24635 Annex, 8 October 1992, p. 17 
65 See Chris McGreal, "Renamo Puts £66m Price of Keeping Peace", The Guardian, 10 June 1993, and Barnaby 
Phillips, "Mozambique Rebel Leader Lifts Threat to Boycott Poll", Daily Telegraph, 21 September 1994. 
66 Rome Peace Agreement, 8 October 1992, pp. 26-27. 
67 The United Nations in late-1992-early-1993 was sponsoring its three largest operations of all time - the 
20,500-strong UNTAC force in Cambodia, the 39,000-strong UNPROFOR forces in the former Yugoslavia, and 
was preparing to launch the 30,800-strong UNOSOM II force into Somalia, as well as maintaining an 
unprecedented number of smaller operations around the world. 
68 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S!26034, 30 June 1993, p. 
1. 
69 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S!25518, 2 April 1993, p. 
3. 
70 ibid, p. 2. 
71 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S!26666, 1 November 
1993, pp. 7-8. 
72 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S!25518, 2 April 1993, p. 
10. 
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was fully operational, it re-negotiated a more realistic timetable73 and an effective agreement for 
the movement of troops to counter ceasefire violations.74 The parties' compliance was ensured 
through their participation in the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), a dispute 
resolution and coordinating body overseeing the settlement process.75 ONUMOZ succeeded in 
tying both parties, through a number of agreements, bodies, and timetables, to a unidirectional 
process of de-escalation of the conflict, by linking Renamo's financial assistance to its 
cooperativeness,76 and by channelling its access to humanitarian relief and other reintegration 
aids through ONUMOZ-monitored assembly areas. 77 
For Renamo, a United Nations peacekeeping presence represented an insurance policy 
for the movement as it pursued its objectives of political integration while avoiding revenge and 
annihilation. In agreeing to the peacekeeping mechanism, it undertook to "refrain from armed 
combat and instead to conduct its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force, within 
the framework of the existing State institutions and in accordance with the conditions and 
guarantees established in the General Peace Agreement." 78 Renamo further agreed to the 
cessation of armed conflict (CAC) and Ceasefire Commission (CCF) mechanisms, which were 
to guarantee a fast, balanced and irreversible process of implementation of the ceasefire, and the 
separation, concentration, and demobilisation of forces. 79 ONUMOZ also provided a 
verification mechanism to oversee the withdrawal of pro-Frelimo Zimbabwean and Malawian 
troops from Mozambican soi1.8o For Renamo, ONUMOZ represented, in addition to security 
73 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26666, 1 November 
1993, p. 5. 
74 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/1994/89, 28 January 
1994, p. 6. 
75 Rome General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 8 October 1992, pp. 34-35. 
76 Security Council Resolution 818 (1993) of 14 April 1993. 
77 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), S/24892, 3 
December 1992, pp. 4 and 7. 
78 Rome General Peace Agreement, 4 October 1992, p. 6. 
79 ibid.,pp.39-41. 
80 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26034, 30 June 1993, p. 
2. 
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during the ceasefire and demobilisation, access to an international conference of donor countries 
organised by Italy to finance the activities of the Mozambican political parties. The 
peacekeepers were thus the guarantors of security as well as the conduits of the financial benefits 
of peace desired by Renamo.81 
5.2.1.3: Instrumentality 
Renamo saw a United Nations peacekeeping presence as a guarantee, providing security 
during the ceasefire and demobilisation, and access to the donor's conference. ONUMOZ's 
instrumentality was established in the Rome Agreement, which requested it "to start its functions 
of verifying and monitoring the ceasefire on the day of entry into force of the General Peace 
Agreement.,,82 Its presence was vital to all stages of the peace process: monitoring the ceasefire, 
conducting troop concentrations and disarmament,83 and chairing the CAC, CCF and the 
Committee for the Reintegration of Demobilised Personnel (CORE).84 ONUMOZ's protection 
of the transport corridors85 stabilised the region while the peace process developed within 
Mozambique.86 Once deployed, ONUMOZ became demonstrably a "stabilising factor" in the 
ceasefire between the belligerents.87 Learning the lessons of Angola, ONUMOZ was 
determined to provide a comprehensive armed presence.88 It was so instrumental to the process 
that Renamo saw its "presence in certain Renamo areas as a guarantee that another party could 
81 ibid., p. 47. 
82 Rome General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 4 October 1992, p. 2. 
83 Rome General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 8 October 1992, p. 42. 
84 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/24642, 9 October 1992, 
p.3. 
85 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S11994/89, 28 January 
1994, p. 5. 
86 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/24892, 3 December 
1992, pp. 5,7. 
87 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26034, 30 June 1993, p. 
2. 
88 Andrew Meldrum, "Peace At Last", Africa Report, Vol. 38, No.2, MarchiApril1993, p. 49. 
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not take advantage of the demobilisation of Renamo forces." 89 ONUMOZ also held access to 
the donor community; its Special Representative of the Secretary-General repeatedly appealed to 
the international donor community on behalf of Renamo for more funds.90 
Both the United Nations and Frelimo recognised that Renamo had to be an integral and 
voluntary part of any peace agreement. As one of two sides in a destructive civil war that had 
raged for over a decade, Renamo's agreement and participation in the peace process was 
essential to any lasting peace. Renamo's use of terrorist tactics, its cadre's penchant for the 
abduction and rape of young giris,91 and " .. .its all too obvious links with the South African 
armed forces and certain disgruntled colonialist circles in Portugal and South Africa"92 had 
certainly isolated the movement and attracted criticism from quarters that often advocated a 
policy of not dealing with Renamo. Realists domestically and internationally, however, pointed 
out that Renamo could not be defeated by military means alone, and that as a brutally efficient 
military force in its own right, had the ability to disrupt indefinitely any peace and reconstruction 
process from which it was excluded.93 Renamo's repeated declarations indicate that it was 
determined not to be left out of the peace process and would oppose any peace agreement that 
overlooked the movement's wishes.94 Hard political realities thus overcame ethical 
considerations and dictated that Renamo's agreement was instrumental to the success of the 
peacekeeping process. 
89 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/255I8, 2 April 1993, p. 
2. 
90 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26666, 1 November 
1993, p. 11. 
91 Chris McGreal, "Renamo Hides Child 'Brides' of Boy Soldiers", The Guardian, 11 June 1993. 
92 Tom Young, "The MNRIRenamo: External and Internal Dynamics", op. cit., 1990, p. 503. 
93 Vines,op. cit., I99I,p.131. 
94 See Ruth Ansah Ayisi, "And Now Peace", Africa Report, Vol. 37, No.6, p. 32, and Andrew Meldrum, 
"Lessons From Angola", Africa Report, Vol. 38, No.1, January-February 1993, p. 24. 
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5.2.1.4: Impartiality 
Both parties' substantive cooperation with ONUMOZ was based on their perceptions 
that ONUMOZ was acting impartially in brokering the peace process. It was careful to maintain 
the impression of impartiality and objectivity. Special Representative Ajello stressed the 
importance of cooperation of both sides; that the United Nations could not "promote and 
establish peace without the cooperation of the parties [and that] the political will of the parties to 
achieve a peaceful settlement must be demonstrated not only with public statements but with 
concrete action. ,,95 ONUMOZ took pains to be equally rigorous in investigating both sides' 
cease fire violations and complaints.96 The Security Council was also careful to commend both 
sides equally for their fidelity to the peace process and their cooperation with ONUMOZ.97 
ONUMOZ maintained its impartiality by complying strictly with the conditions of the Rome 
Agreement and rejecting the appeals of either party to alter its provisions, stressing " ... the 
unacceptability of attempts to gain more time or further concessions, or to attach new conditions 
to the peace process."98 The United Nations' image of an honest broker, carefully nurtured by 
both the Security Council and ONUMOZ, thereby served to maintain the parties' cooperation 
with the Operation and protected the progress of the peace process. 
Renamo's cooperation with the peacekeepers and its impartiality of behaviour in 
complying with the Rome Agreement was predicated on its acceptance of the peace process and 
the ONUMOZ force as a part of that process. At the outset of the ONUMOZ deployment, 
Renamo remained suspicious of a foreign military presence, and displayed an initial 
" ... reluctance to allow timely investigation of alleged ceasefire violations and insistence on 
95 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26666, 1 November 
1993, p. 11. 
96 See "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26385, 30 August 
1993, p. 3; and "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26666, 1 
November 1993, pp. 7-8. 
97 Security Council Resolution 898 (1994) of23 February 1994. 
98 Security Council Resolution 882 (1993) of5 November 1993. 
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keeping certain areas under its control. ,,99 Both Renamo and the government also continued to 
manoeuvre to increase the size of the territory they controlled in the early aftermath of 
ONUMOZ's deployment. loo Renamo further refused to cooperate until ONUMOZ was 
substantially deployed and operational. 101 Many of these problems arose as a result of the 
sluggish mounting and deployment of ONUMOZ, and Renamo's cooperation was secured soon 
after through the CAC and CCF and the negotiated agreement on troop movements. I02 
Renamo's underlying acceptance of the peace process indicated that it would eventually conform 
to the peace process. At the end of the disarmament process, Renamo's declaration of the 
numbers of troops and weapons that had failed to comply with the disarmament schedule 
testified to its good faith and impartiality of its behaviour. lo3 
5.2.1.5: Timing 
Renamo's signature of the Rome Agreement, and its ultimate cooperation with 
ONUMOZ was based on its realist appraisal of its military situation. It calculated that a 
favourable peace agreement would allow it to escape a stalemated civil war and achieve its 
modified objectives through negotiation and political re-integration. By the mid-1980s, both 
Renamo and Frelimo had recognised that neither had the ability to win the war outright, but that 
their opponents had an indefinite ability to deny them victory.104 Both realised, however, that 
the war was destroying Mozambique and alienating the majority of the population as it became 
increasingly difficult to mobilise supporters or raise recruits for the war effort. lOS As Frelimo 
99 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/25518, 2 April 1993, p. 
11. 
100 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/26385, 30 August 
1993, p. 3. 
101 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/25518, 2 April 1993, 
pp. 10-11. 
102 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/1994/89, 28 January 
1994, p. 6. 
103 David Beresford, "Mozambican Rebels Make Peace Pledge", The Guardian, 27 October 1994. 
104 Hemsch, "How Mozambique's Guns Were Silenced", op. cit., 1992. 
105 Vines,op. cit., 1991, p. 130. 
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began to introduce democratic reforms and Renamo realised that to counteract its 
marginalisation it would eventually have to compete in free elections, both parties recognised 
the loss of popular support continued warfare would entail. Renamo thus calculated that 
persevering with its military campaign would further marginalise the movement, while agreeing 
to and advocating peace would generate support among a war-weary populace. Thus the timing 
of the Rome Agreement and the introduction of ONUMOZ was propitious based on the military 
calculus of Renamo. 
5.2.1.6: Support and Isolation 
Former Renamo sponsors, as well as other influential States, were highly supportive of 
the United Nations' efforts to maintain Renamo's cooperation with the peace process. South 
Africa, which had for so long supplied and directed Renamo, was instrumental in delivering 
Renamo to Rome during the mediation of the agreement,106 and during the peace process, both 
the de Klerk and Mandela administrations maintained the pressure on Renamo to cooperate with 
the United Nations. 107 Regional and wider African leaders meeting in Harare in October 1994 
warned both sides that they were prepared to intervene in Mozambique if either party defaulted 
on the peace process and returned to war after the elections. 108 An influential non-governmental 
supporter of ONUMOZ was Lonhro Corporation President Tiny Rowland, who maintained 
constant pressure on Renamo first to enter and agree to the peace process, and then to comply 
fully with its provisions. 109 In support of ONUMOZ's efforts to tie the parties to the peace 
process and the outcome of the elections, the United States and Portugal jointly conducted all-
party talks in the lead up to the elections to try to persuade them to agree to a power-sharing 
transitional administration in the aftermath of the elections. 110 Finally, many States were 
106 United Nations Department of Public Infonnation, "Mozambique: Out of the Ruins of War", Africa Recovery 
Briefing Paper No.8, May 1993, (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 13. 
107 Barnaby Phillips, "Mozambique Rebel Leader Lifts Threat to Boycott Poll", Daily Telegraph, 21 September 
1994. 
108 David Beresford, "Mozambican Rebels Make Peace Pledge", The Guardian, 27 October 1994. 
109 Interview with Joan T. Seymour, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political 
Affairs, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 11 March 1994. 
110 Martin Walker, "UN to Remain After Election", The Guardian, 15 October 1994. 
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supportive of the United Nations' efforts to raise money for the parties through the Trust Fund 
and the Donor's Conference, used by ONUMOZ to maintain Renamo's cooperation with the 
O . III peratlOn. 
A factor in Renamo's military calculus to abandon the war was its desertion by most of 
its major external sponsors. As a creation of external interests, Renamo remained throughout its 
existence heavily dependent on the training, support and direction of first Rhodesia and then 
South Africa. I 12 Renamo also gained support from embittered Portuguese ex-colonists, and its 
anti-communist orientation gained it the support of religious fundamentalist groups in the United 
States. l13 By the end of the 1980s, reports of its waging of a systematic war of terror, rape and 
genocide against civilians, I 14 began to dry up its support. The Southern African peace 
dynamic,115 began to isolate Renamo militarily and diplomatically.116 South Africa's new de 
Klerk government, keen to protect its own delicate reform process from external de stabilisation, 
halted all official assistance to Renamo, and committed the government to preventing the aid 
intended for Renamo from right-wing South African and Portuguese groups and from groups 
within the South African Defence Forces from reaching the movement. 117 The slow starving of 
Renamo of the external assistance and direction on which it had formerly relied so heavily 
figured strongly in its military calculations to abandon the war and pursue a peaceful settlement. 
III The biggest contributors to the Trust Fund were Italy, the United States, Demark, and Norway. 
112 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening, London: Bloomsbury, 1992), pp. 65-
66. 
113 Karl Maier, "Between Washington and Pretoria", Africa Report, Vol. 33, No.6, November-December 1988, 
p.44. 
114 The event with the greatest impact was the news of Renamo's July 1991 massacre of up to 1000 civilians in 
Nampula. 
115 Comprised of the 1988 Angola-Namibia Accords, Namibian independence in 1989, the dismantling of 
apartheid, and the 1991 Angolan peace treaty. 
116 Hemsch, "How Mozambique's Guns Were Silenced", op. cit., 1992. 
117 ibid. 
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5.2.1.7: Cohesion 
The ONUMOZ Operation was not so much hindered by its sponsoring coalition's lack of 
cohesion but rather by its lack of interest. The overstretch of United Nations peacekeeping and 
security machinery at the time of the mounting of the ONUMOZ Operation meant that the 
Security Council members' attention was diverted to higher-profile operations and more pressing 
security concerns. Throughout the Operation the Security Council was obsessed by limiting the 
duration of the peace process and cutting its Operational costs, repeatedly "Stressing the 
necessity ... to continue to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of increasing 
demands on peacekeeping resources." 118 The United Nations further struck difficulties in 
mounting the Operation when willing troop contributors at first were difficult to find, and then 
were tardy in dispatching those contingents they had pledged to take part in ONUMOZ. 119 
These problems were largely circumvented by the cooperation of the parties on the ground, and 
the subsequent ability of ONUMOZ to implement the peace process in accordance with the 
revised timetable. 
Cohesion proved to have little effect on Renamo's approach or ability to deliver on its 
commitments in Mozambique. Renamo began and remained a decentralised movement, with the 
levers of power and control in the hands of its leaders, and dependent on external direction rather 
than its central leadership for strategic direction. 12o Renamo leader Dhlakhama remained unsure 
of his position and unable to assert strong control over the movement. His initial inability to tie 
all of the Renamo factions to the peace process was evident in the continued Renamo attacks on 
the transport corridors. 121 ONUMOZ was aware of this difficulty as it deployed,122 and was 
careful to link material and humanitarian incentives to all ranks during the ceasefire and 
disarmament process to ensure general Renamo compliance with the peace process. Also, its 
118 Security Council Resolution 898 (1994) of23 February 1994. 
119 Security Council Resolution 818 (1993) of 14 April 1993. 
120 Vines,op. cit., 1991, p. 132. 
121 Quoted in ibid. 
122 Interview with Jose M. da Silva Campino, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, United Nations 
Headquarters, New York City, 11 March 1994. 
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comprehensive troop levels and patrolling procedures were able to control low-level defiance of 
the ceasefire by small factions and bandits. 123 In this way, Renamo's lack of cohesion was 
overcome and not permitted to be an obstacle to the peace process. 
The success of ONUMOZ in implementing the Rome Agreement in Mozambique 
correlates strongly with a basic complementarity between its approach to the operation, and that 
of the parties, particularly Renamo. The poverty of Renamo's independent ideological or 
nationalist rationale, and its dependence on external direction and resourcing, gave the 
movement a malleability rare among insurgent movements. Once deprived of its South African 
backing, it lost all direction, and its overriding aims became the safe ending of the insurgency, 
with access to power and substantial side payments. Once it had secured a peace agreement with 
which it was satisfied in Rome, it was convinced of the importance of a United Nations 
peacekeeping force to ensure the fair and safe implementation of this agreement. The smooth 
functioning of the ONUMOZ force in carrying out its mandate was helped by the fact that there 
were no compelling Great Power interests in Mozambique. This allowed minor powers, such as 
Italy, to playa leading role, without any major interference or disagreements among other 
Member-States. The only interested State was South Africa, which strongly advocated peace, 
and the peace process was bolstered by a regional peace momentum. ONUMOZ became for 
Renamo a guarantor of money and security in the peace process. Of great use to ONUMOZ was 
the recent failure of UNA VEM II in Angola: many of the shortcomings of that operation were 
learnt from and guarded against. These concurrent approaches to the peacekeeping interaction 
were not sufficient to guarantee the success of the process, however. ONUMOZ's (eventual) 
comprehensive deployment, its negotiation and fidelity to an agreed timetable, its use of the 
CAC, CCF and CORE mechanisms, and its rigid objectivity and impartiality enabled it to secure 
the parties' cooperation and implement the Peace Agreement. ONUMOZ experienced problems 
arising from the unrealistic timetable of the non-United Nations mediated Rome agreement, 
which were compounded by its sluggish deployment. It overcame these difficulties creatively by 
renegotiating aspects of the agreement, and was aided by the fact that it was the access point for 
Renamo to the large sums of money donated by the international community. In these ways, 
123 See "Operational Plan for United Nations Observation of the Military Aspects of the Agreement", in "Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique", S/24892, 3 December 1992, pp. 6-8. 
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basic compatibility between Renamo's and ONUMOZ's approaches to the peace process can be 
seen to have contributed strongly to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping interaction. 
5.2.2: Handling the USC-SNA Scorpion 
By late 1992, Somalia had descended into the chaos that Boutros-Ghali had warned of in 
Agenda/or Peace: brutal clan warfare had destroyed all central governing authority, mortgaging 
Somalia's future to a vicious cycle of hunger, insecurity and lawlessness. 124 The Somali civil 
war had begun when the coalition to overthrow dictator Mohammed Said Barre dissolved into 
anarchy as the clans12S fell on each other in a ferocious struggle to inherit the reins of State. 126 
The war polarised between two factions of the Hawiye clan's United Somali Congress: the 
Abgal sub-clan of Ali Mahdi Mohammed, installed as interim President; and the Habr Gedir 
sub-clan of Mohammed Farah Aideed, which formed the United Somali Congress-Somali 
National Alliance (USC-SNA) to challenge Ali Mahdi's claim to the Presidency.127 Banditry 
proliferated in a countryside awash with weapons left over from the Cold War, resulting in a 
murderous anarchy fuelled by clan opportunism, brigandry, and an indigenous narcotic plant 
called qat. 128 Before long, it was the belligerent USC-SNA that emerged as the most 
problematical interlocutor for the United Nations' tentative involvement in the form of 
UNOSOM I during 1992. 
124 See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 6. 
125 Somalis all belong to the same ethnic group, have a common religion, and speak the same language. Somali 
society is therefore organisaed around various territorially based clans or sub-clans, between whom there has been a 
history of incessant feuding and warfare. Featuring all of the closeness and often chauvinism of lager national or 
ethnic groups, inter-clan warfare in Somalia can be as desperate and bloody as any ethnic conflict. See Abdi Ismael 
Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention", Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 30, No.4, 1992, pp. 625-641. 
126 The main political clan groups that attended the January 1992 peace conference in Addis Ababa were the 
Somali Africans Muki Organisation (SAMO), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), the Somali Democratic 
Movement (SDM), the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali 
National Movement (SNM) the Somali National Union (SNU), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), the United Somali Front 
(US F), the United Somali Party (USP) and the United Somali Congress (USC). 
127 For a further account of the war in Somalia, see Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth (eds), Conflict and 
Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and Its Alternatives, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994). 
128 Kenneth Freed, "Chewing the Fat, With a Side of Qat", Los Angeles Times, 26 December 1992. 
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Heading a core SOO-strong clan-based militia, but able to call on thousands more armed 
Habr Gedir and other sympathetic sub-clans, Aideed sought to use the anarchy in Somalia for 
his own ends. Formerly Chief of Police in Mogadishu and Armed Forces Chief of Staff to Siad 
Barre, Aideed had defected to the anti-Siad Barre insurgents in 1989.129 A talented, Soviet-
trained officer, he soon imposed a relatively stricter discipline, training and weapons regime on 
his militia. 130 He soon exhibited a political talent as well, mobilising his sub-clan in a struggle 
to seize the advantages that would accrue to any clan that ruled Somalia, as Siad Barre's 
Maheran clan had done throughout his dictatorship. 131 Aideed was also able to identify with and 
personify the wider Somali identity,132 using emotive appeals to nationalism, anti-imperialism, 
and threats of external danger to mobilise and control the fissiparous, independently-armed clans 
and allies of the USC-SNA 133 Cognisant of the 30% literacy of Somalis, and the strong oral 
tradition of Somali society, he was able to use the Radio Mogadishu station, captured by the 
USC-SNA, as his primary means of disseminating propaganda and tactically mobilising the 
clans. 134 The USC-SNA was using its military strength to benefit from the anarchy in Somalia; 
by fostering the warfare, banditry and starvation, it would destroy the political base of its Ali 
Mahdi opponents, and seize power from amongst the confusion. 
Under pressure to end the anarchy and brutal warfare between the USC-SNA and the 
other clans, the United Nations sent UNOSOM II to Somalia in May 1993, charged with 
129 Mark Yost, "A Short History of Somalia", Wall Street Journal, 19 October 1993. 
130 Reports into USC-SNA attacks on UNOSOM II revealed sophisticated ambush techniques to establish killing 
zones, well-thought-out flank protection, extreme fIring discipline by Aideed militias, and advanced crossfire tactics 
to maximise casualties among peacekeepers. See "Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II P(!rsonnel Which Led to 
Casualties Among Them", S/1994/653 Annex, 1 June 1994. 
131 Keith B. Richburg, "Somali Militias Return As Foreign Troops Leave", Washington Post, 4 December 1994. 
132 Bernard Morris, "Somali Mercy Mission Turns Into Bloodbath", Sunday Times, 28 February 1993. 
133 Robert M. Press, "UN Pursues Talks With Somali Clans", The Christian Science Monitor, 22 September 
1993. 
134 "Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to 
Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them", S/1994/653, 1 June 
1994,p.41. 
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pacification, protecting aid flows, disarming the militias, repatriating refugees, and promoting 
reconciliation. Within six months the force was embattled in Mogadishu, and the focus of bitter 
recriminations and sagging commitment in New York; UNOSOM II entered the vocabulary of 
debate as a metaphor for the crisis in United Nations peacekeeping. By March 1995, the force 
had withdrawn, having spent $3 billion and thousands of lives over nearly two years, leaving 
Somalia in much the same State of anarchy as it found it. The peacekeeping framework, when 
applied to UNOSOM II's relations with the USC-SNA, reveals the sources of this spectacular 
failure. 
5.2.2.1: Objectives 
The international coalition supporting UNOSOM II's intervention into Somalia was 
motivated predominantly by humanitarian motives. By August 1992, the United Nations 
reported that over 300,000 Somalis had died as a direct result of the civil war and famine. Press 
photographs of emaciated and dying women and children mobilised enormous public empathy, 
especially in Western and Islamic societies. Much of the pressure to "do something" was 
directed at the Bush administration in the United States, which had coined the "new world 
order" rhetoric in the aftermath of the successes of the Gulf War and operation to protect the 
Kurds in northern Iraq.135 The United States responded, beginning aid drops in August 1992 and 
mobilising the UNIT AF operation in December 1992. Meanwhile, pressure was mounting for 
the United Nations to respond. The Organisation was embarrassed by its initial withdrawal from 
Somalia in January 1991, and the lack of impact of its first UNOSOM operation on the crisis. 
The European Union called on the United Nations to respond in August 1992, Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali publicly castigated the Security Council for its preoccupation with the "rich man's 
war" in Bosnia while ignoring Somalia, and the United Nations Special Representative 
Mohammed Sahnoun resigned over the poverty of the United Nations response. By early 1993, 
the new Clinton administration was applying pressure on the Organisation for a United Nations 
operation to relieve the UNIT AF force. 136 Thereafter it was the United States, keenly supported 
135 See George Bush's address to the American people, "Conditions in Somalia", 4 December 1992, Vital 
Speeches a/the Day, Vol. 65, No.6, 1 January 1993, pp. 162-3. 
136 New United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali on 1 February 1993 to press for a United Nations operation to relieve UNITAF. 
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by Boutros-Ghali, that initiated action for a United Nations force, and thereafter proposed the 
composition, structure, capabilities, and responsibilities of the operation. Finally, the pressures 
caused a sponsoring coalition to form around the United States to send a more UNIT AF -like 
United Nations force into Somalia. The United States was supported by the Western Europeans, 
particUlarly Italy, the former colonial power, the moderate Islamic world: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Pakistan, the OIC, and the League of Arab States, and concerned regional States: Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Djibouti. Yet the sources of the motivation to respond were hardly compelling, and 
the fragility of the commitment of the members of the sponsoring coalition were to have a great 
effect on the viability ofUNOSOM 11. 137 
The objectives defined by the United Nations for UNOSOM II were to secure aid flows, 
internal stabilisation, and to impose order and political reintegration. Rather than just facilitating 
aid delivery, the UNOSOM II was required to terminate the war and resurrect the collapsed 
State. The mission's mandate included the tasks of "Assisting .. .in the ongoing political process 
in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected 
government," 138 which could ultimately maintain order and rebuild the country.139 The United 
Nations was aware that the conflict could potentially threaten regional security,140 and thus 
placed the pacification and termination of the fighting as its first priority. UNOSOM II was 
inserted into Somalia to help implement the framework 1 4 1 of the March 1993 Addis Ababa 
Agreement, in which the factions agreed to a peace process in which a ceasefire and 
disarmament would precede a transitional period of reconstruction and reconciliation, and the 
setting up of a Transitional National Council (TNC) to administer Somalia until elections could 
137 For an example of the ephemeral and unclear nature of the motives for intervening in Somalia, see Bill 
Clinton's address to the American People, "Somalia: Why Our troops will leave by March 31 1994", 7 October 
1993, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 70, No.2, 1 November 1993, pp. 34-6. 
138 Security Council Resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994. 
139 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 
(1992)" S/25354, 3 March 1993, p. 9. 
140 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23693, 11 March 1992, p. 4. 
141 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 4 of Resolution 886 (1993)", 
S11994112, 6 January 1994, p. 12. 
243 
take place. 142 The cease fire was also seen as essential to the delivery of aid and the protection of 
the aid agencies. 143 UNOSOM II's primary task, then, was "to assume responsibility for the 
consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia,,,144 in 
order for the successful subsequent implementation of the " ... other aspects of UNOSOM [Ill's 
mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction.,,145 
The medieval nature of the Somali power struggle placed the objectives of the USC-
SNA at odds with those of UNOSOM II, which were dedicated to contemporary internationalist 
concerns of stability and legitimacy. The war between the USC-SNA and the Ali Mahdi alliance 
was "a raw power struggle, devoid of ideological or ethnic motivation, with both ... claiming to be 
the rightful successor to ousted President Mohammed Said Barre." 146 The struggle for control of 
the State, the gatekeeper of security, wealth, cultural survival and prestige, had generated an 
escalating sub-clan security dilemma: "As the conflict continues, subclan loyalty - even sub-clan 
security - is increasingly at stake, with the fear that the future [seizure of power by the rival sub-
clan] may bring murderous retaliation against the losers.,,147 The USC-SNA was for this reason 
bitterly opposed to the instalment of Ali Mahdi as interim President by the Djibouti Accords, 
and viewed the struggle for power in zero-sum terms. 148 The USC-SNA's objectives centred on 
the seizure of power and preventing Ali Mahdi from consolidating power. It adopted the basic 
strategy of military destabilisation: "Aideed ... did not create domestic anarchy in Somalia absent-
142 "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 
March 1993", Penn anent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations, 28 December 1993, pp. 2-5. 
143 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, pp. 7, 11, 13. 
144 Security Council 814 (1993) of26 March 1993. 
145 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993)", 
S/26317, 17 August 1993, p. 17. 
146 New York Times, 23 January 1992. 
147 Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: At War With Itself', Current History, Vol. 91, No. 565, May 1992, p. 233; for the 
concept of the Security Dilemma in ethnic conflicts, see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic 
Conflict", Survival, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47. 
148 The Djibouti Accords, brokered by Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled Aptidon in June 1991, agreed to 
install Ali Mahdi as interim President for the duration of a united fmal push against Said Barre forces in southern 
Somalia. Although the USC was a signatory to the Accords, and Aideed was later elected chairman of the USC, the 
USC-SNA fiercely contested Ali Mahdi's position. 
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mindedly. The insecurity of the Somali population was their very objective, the basis of their 
149 power and revenues." 
Within the first few months of its deployment, the USC-SNA "decided that the United 
Nations, in its efforts to restore representative government...represented some kind of 
threat. .. and decided to ... obstruct in every way the mandate that [UNOSOM II was] carrying 
OUt.,,150 UNOSOM II's presence and objectives were a threat: "Simply by being ... the dominant 
military force in the country, UNOSOM reduced the influence of those political leaders, General 
Aideed eminent among them, who had hitherto disposed of substantial forces. While UNOSOM 
remained in place, guns would no longer trump all other sources of influence. "lSI The USC-
SNA's propaganda alleged that the UNOSOM II had a secret agenda of operating as an invasion 
force to tum Somalia into a United Nations protectorate. 152 The USC-SNA was also opposed to 
UNOSOM II's protection of humanitarian relief. In that famine-stricken environment, food had 
become a valuable commodity;153 the control of food and its distribution was an important 
political-military instrument. 154 Before the arrival of UNOSOM II, Aideed had repeatedly 
asserted that the USC-SNA could distribute aid. ISS This was rejected by the Security Council, 
and the introduction of UNOSOM II to control aid distribution deprived the USC-SNA of a 
powerful military tool, threatening to marginalise it as a force in the struggle for power in 
Somalia. 156 Hence the approaches ofUNOSOM II and the USC-SNA can be seen to have been 
not just divergent, but diametrically clashing. 
149 Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void", op. cit., 1993, p. 29. 
150 Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia, Admiral Jonathon T. Howe, quoted in United 
Nations World Chronicle, No. 517, 23 September 1993. 
151 Tom Farer, "Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation 
Into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General", 
S/26351, 24 August 1993, p. 6. 
152 New York Times, 3 January 1993. 
153 Peter Biles, "Anarchy Rules", Africa Report, Vol. 37, No.4, July/August 1992, p. 32. 
154 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia, Addendum", S/23829/Add.l, 21 April 1992, p. 
11. 
155 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, p. 4. 
156 Michael Elliott, "The Making of a Fiasco", Newsweek, 18 October 1993, pp. 9-10. 
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5.2.2.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
In early 1993, the Secretary-General and his Department of Peacekeeping Operations at 
United Nations headquarters were not convinced that a peacekeeping response was appropriate 
without significant consent or a viable ceasefire in place. 157 Within the Security Council, the 
United States had begun to insist that the United Nations relieve the burden and expense of the 
overwhelmingly American-run UNIT AF operation. The relevant Departments within the United 
Nations contended that until UNITAF disarmed the Somali militias and established a peace 
process, a peacekeeping force would be inappropriate. 15s Bowing to American pressure, the 
Security Council finally overrode Secretariat opposition and endorsed the dispatch ofUNOSOM 
II. From the beginning there was confusion about the roles and methods of the force. When 
finally deployed, UNOSOM II was the culmination of escalating commitments and force levels, 
as each additional task was thought to hold the key to the pacification and rehabilitation of 
Somalia. The factions' resistance to UNOSOM II resulted in "growing impatience,,159 over "the 
lawlessness and lack of security that prevail throughout Somalia.,,160 The Security Council 
"doubted whether the methods employed by the United Nations to date could bring the situation 
under control. Strong support was expressed for [the] view that the time had come when it was 
necessary to move inJo Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.,,161 
Following this logic, and feeling "that the situation in Somalia [had] deteriorated beyond 
the point at which it [was] susceptible to peacekeeping treatment,,,162 the Security Council 
157 See Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Forces Should Go to Somalia", International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1992. 
158 The Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Somalia was quoted as saying as late as February 1993, "It's not a 
secure environment. [US marines] can't leave yet." See Keith Richburg, "Marines 'Ready' for UN Handover", The 
Guardian, 5 February 1993. 
159 "Letter Dated 24 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24859, 27 November 1992, p. 2. 
160 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/24480, 24 August 1992, p. 3. 
161 "Letter Dated 29 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24868, 30 November 1992, p. 1. 
162 ibid., p. 2. 
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authorised UNOSOM II to take "appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens 
to violate the cessation of hostilities.,,163 The Security Council mandated the "use of force ... to 
ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was 
brought to an end ... this action would help de facto to bring about a ceasefire between warring 
factions and that this would be a positive factor in the context of national reconciliation." 164 The 
Security Council had quite consciously decided to embark on its first experiment in peace-
enforcement, a concept which it had approved along with the other components of Agenda for 
Peace nine months previously.165 UNOSOM II's approach differed radically from that of 
traditional peacekeeping operations. In determining to override consent and impose peace and 
stability, the force became an arbiter rather than a facilitator; a military rather than a diplomatic 
instrument. Heavily armed to enforce United Nations directives, UNOSOM II became a military 
threat to the belligerents, rather than an impartial guarantor and buffer. In embracing 
enforcement, the United Nations had adopted an approach for which it had no doctrine; the 
ensuing confusion and mistakes were to lead to serious acrimony between force contingents166 
and within the United Nations. To make UNOSOM II's task even more difficult, the Security 
Council had entrusted a vast, complex expanded peacekeeping and nation-building assignment 
on the peacekeepers, in a situation where there was no viable peace agreement and no peace to 
keep. 
The USC-SNA never gave its complete approval to the presence of a large United 
Nations force. In negotiations between March and August 1992, Aideed rejected United Nations 
monitoring of the ceasefire between the USC-SNA and the Ali-Mahdi alliance, at first insisting 
on neutral monitors from the Hawiye clan,167 but finally agreeing to a small force,168 unarmed 
163 Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council 
Resolution 794 (1992), "The Situation in Somalia", S/24992, 19 December 1992, p. 10. 
164 'b'd 3 I I ., p. . 
165 See Statement by the President of the Security Council, SIPV.3089, 30 June 1992. 
166 See Mark Huband, "Italians 'Failed to Help Fellow UN Troops''', The Guardian, 6 September 1993. 
167 Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: At War With Itself', Current History, Vol. 91, No. 565, May 1992, p. 234. 
168 United Nations Department of Public Infonnation, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, (New 
York: United Nations, 1993), p. 2. 
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and wearing United Nations insignia clearly. 169 Further commitment was not forthcoming: "The 
agreement of "the parties" could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations 
forces ... when agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in 
Mogadishu was agreed was not large enough to control the increasingly violent and lawless 
situation in that city.,,170 The heavily-armed, 30,800-strong UNOSOM II force was fmally 
deployed on the basis of the vague and precarious Addis Ababa Agreement to a ceasefire and an 
international monitoring mechanism. l71 Before long, the USC-SNA "declared 
that...peacekeeping patrols would no longer be tolerated in the streets of Mogadishu," 172 and 
warned that weapons inspections and cantonments "must not be performed and that, if they 
were, it would lead to "war"." 173 
After a USC-SNA attack on UNOSOM II that left 23 Pakistani peacekeepers dead, the 
Security Council duly expanded UNOSOM II's mandate " ... to take all necessary measures 
against all those responsible for ... armed attacks .. .including against those responsible for publicly 
inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout 
Somalia.,,174 UNOSOM II turned on the USC-SNA, demonising the movement as the prime 
cause of the anarchy in Somalia, and issuing a $25,000 bounty on Aideed. Thereafter UNOSOM 
II launched a series of attacks against USC-SNA equipment, ordnance and its radio station, as 
well as the highly-publicised manhunt for Aideed, judged responsible for the attacks against 
UNOSOM II.175 The attacks escalated in scale as the United States Rangers repeatedly failed to 
169 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23693, 11 March 1992, p. 10. 
170 Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Security Council 
Resolution 794 (1992), "The Situation in Somalia", S/24992, 19 December 1992, p. 7. 
171 Progress Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/25168, 26 January 1993, Annex II, 
pp. 11, 14. 
172 "Letter Dated 24 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24859, 27 November 1992, p. 1. 
173 Mohammed Hassan Awale Qaibdid, quoted in Tom Farer, "Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security 
Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation Into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in 
Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General", S/26351, 24 August 1993, p. 5. 
174 Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) of6 June 1993. 
175 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993)", 
S/26022, 1 July 1993, p. 5 .. 
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capture Aideed, and the expanding levels of collateral damage against Somali civilians, 176 
hospitals,177 and even United Nations personnel by mistake,178 UNOSOM II began to incur the 
hostility of Somalis and international opposition. The USC-SNA's attacks on UNOSOM II, and 
the ill-conceived peace-enforcement response, successfully reimposed the conditions of 
instability that were so favourable to the USC-SNA 179 The hostilities between UNOSOM II 
and the USC-SNA escalated over the next months, and culminated in a IS-hour battle in the 
Bokhara Market in Mogadishu on 3-4 October, which left 12 United States Rangers dead, 70 
injured and one captured, and thousands of Somalis dead and injured. The ramifications of the 
United Nations' first attempt at peace enforcement are still being felt. Much of the resulting 
criticism was directed at the poverty of the peace-enforcement concept, and the 
inappropriateness of the American approach to peacekeeping, which relied too strongly on 
overwhelming force and firepower. 180 The Security Council responded by suspending the arrest 
and enforcement tasks ofUNOSOM II.181 This resolution was the beginning of a retreat leading 
to the failure and withdrawal ofUNOSOM II in March 1995 and beyond. 
5.2.2.3: Instrumentality 
The United Nations was convinced it that the USC-SNA was the most problematic 
faction and "the single biggest obstacle to peace" in Somalia. 182 It made repeated attempts to 
176 In one incident in the aftennath of the June 1993 ambush which killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, Pakistani 
troops reacted by firing into a rioting crowd, killing 14 Somali civilians. See Nicholas Hinton, "UN's Humanitarian 
Goal Lost in Smoke of Battle", The Guardian, 14 June 1993. 
177 Mark Huband, "UN Troops Threaten Mogadishu Hospital in Hunt for Warlord", The Guardian, 9 September 
1993. 
178 In a dawn raid on what was thought to be a USC-SNA safe house on 30 August 1993, 400 United States 
Rangers and its elite Delta Force siezed personnel from the United Nations Development Project, and French 
volunteers serving with Action Against Hunger. See Martin Walker, "Mogadishu Raid 'Not a Mistake"', The 
Guardian, 31 August 1993. 
179 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 19 of Resolution 814 (1993) 
and Paragraph A5 of Resolution 865 (1993)", S/26738, 12 November 1993, pp. 14, 16. 
180 See for example Mats Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping", Survival, Vol. 
36, No.1, Spring 1994, pp. 30-50. 
181 Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) of 16 November 1993. 
182 Under-Secretary General for African Affairs James Jonah, quoted in Facts on File, 23 January 1992. 
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gain Aideed's consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, but was continually thwarted 
by his manoeuvring. 183 Frustrated in its attempts to secure the USC-SNA's cooperation with the 
resolution process, and following its attacks against UNOSOM II, the United Nations decided 
that Aideed needed to be removed from the equation; "to eliminate [Aideed's] means for doing 
those kinds of acts and frankly get him under arrest...the intimidation and the terrorism won't 
stop until he is arrested.,,184 Aideed and the USC-SNA were criminalised and blamed for the 
failure of the peace process and the continuing crisis in Somalia; according to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General: "[Aideed] bears a large portion of the responsibility for 
the thousands and thousands of deaths by civil strife and starvation that occurred in the years 
before, which caused the United Nations to come to the rescue of the Somalis.,,185 By attacking 
the USC-SNA and excluding it from the peace process, UNOSOM II automatically made it an 
opponent of the peace process. In the case of Somalia, the opposition of such a powerful 
belligerent made any project of pacification and rehabilitation an almost impossible task 186 
The United Nations presence was not equally instrumental to all the Somalia 
belligerents. The Ali Mahdi alliance requested an international monitoring of the peace process, 
asserting that "a ceasefire agreement without international monitoring and supervision would not 
hold.,,187 The USC-SNA voiced opposition to any international presence monitoring the 
ceasefire, with Aideed reiterating "the reservation of his faction to the stationing of a 
peacekeeping force in Mogadishu or to any identifiable United Nations military presence." 188 
Many clan leaders saw UNOSOM II, not as an impartial peace broker, but as another armed 
183 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23693, II March 1992, p. 3. 
184 Special Representative of the Secretary-General Admiral Jonathon T. Howe, quoted in Mark Huband, "The 
Politics of Violence", Africa Report, Vol. 38, No.5, September/October 1993, p. 18. 
185 Admiral Jonathon T. Howe, quoted in "United Nations World Chronicle", No. 517,23 September 1993. 
186 The United Nations and its peacekeeping forces have at other times been capable of dealing with recalcitrant 
insurgents, such as in the Congo, and more recently in Cambodia. 
187 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23693, 11 March 1992, p. 6; and Report of the 
Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, p. 5. 
188 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, p. 4. 
250 
group to be incorporated into the calculus of interclan relationships.189 In comparison with the 
UNITAF operation, UNOSOM II was seen as ineffectual. When UNOSOM II responded 
forcefully to attacks against it to try to reassert its authority, it provoked a general anti-foreigner 
response and a heightened hostility to the United Nations. 190 As UNOSOM II came under 
increased attacks and was forced increasingly into a defensive posture, it became increasingly 
irrelevant to the pacification and relief effort as hostilities continued and armed banditry 
increased, "making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and 
international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous." 191 
Much of UNOSOM Irs shortcomings were due to the political-military inadequacies in 
its response to the USC-SNA's attacks. UNOSOM II was doctrinally ill-equipped to deal with 
these attacks. As it switched to enforcement and pacification, it was confronted by one of the 
toughest military problems: dealing with an urban insurgency in a third world city.192 
UNOSOM II's personnel were faced with tens of thousands of potential belligerents, heavily-
armed,193 largely unresponsive to any higher or central command, and extremely familiar with 
Mogadishu's warren of narrow, winding streets and mud houses. For its pacification task, it was 
inappropriately equipped: its high-calibre weaponry could not be used without significant 
collateral damage and civilian casualties in such a heavily-populated area, and it was not initially 
189 Captain Johnson of the United States contingent of the UNIT AF Force, quoted in Geoffrey York, "Somalia's 
Bloody Web of Clans hip", Scotland on Sunday, 21 February 1993. 
190 See Mark Huband, "UN Troops Kill Protesters", The Guardian, 14 June 1993; hostility reached such a level 
in Mogadishu that a group calling itself Muslim Voice was distributing leaflets urging Somalis to "kill all 
foreigners", and Somalis working for the United Nations in Mogadishu were ritually executed, see Peter Hillmore, 
"UN Succumbs to the Curse of Somalia", The Observer, 18 July 1993. 
191 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 4 of Resolution 886 (1993)", 
S11994/12, 6 January 1994, p. 8. 
192 For the problems of unrban counter-insurgency, see Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, The 
Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to u.s. Army Operations, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994). 
193 The Somali militias and bandit gangs were all heavily armed as a result of the large volume of Cold War 
weapons transfers to the region, and the wide distribution of armes to the population by the anti-Siad Barre 
insurgency. The range of weaponry ran from the ubiquitous AK-47 to sophisticated rocket-propelled grenades and 
"technicals, or all-terrain vehicles mounted with heavy-calibre machine guns, rocket launchers, or anti-tank guns. 
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issued with riot control gear. 194 UNOSOM II was a foreign force, which made it insensitive to 
the requirements of the Somali population, and vulnerable to charges of imperialism. The USC-
SNA's propaganda made full use of this, and its use of rioting civilians as shields, which 
attracted fire from UNOSOM II troops,195 widened the popular resentment and resistance to 
UNOSOM II and its mission. The mission was hampered by a lack of quality intelligence: much 
of its human intelligence proved inaccurate or was deliberately misleading; and the American 
signals intelligence technologies were often inappropriate for the low-tech militias and the maze-
like nature of Mogadishu. 196 Aideed exploited the factionalism within the force by treating 
different UNOSOM II contingents in different ways, hoping thereby to destroy its cohesion, by 
splitting first the United States and then the Muslim contingents from the force. 197 Finally, 
doctrinal shortcomings compounded all of UNOSOM II's difficulties; a subsequent United 
Nations enquiry found that a lack of coordination between its political and military components 
produced the inopportune uses of military force, and that a lack of seasoned peacekeeping 
experience within UNOSOM II's command structure led to ofetn heavy-handed and incompetent 
. . I I . h f d . . 198 actlOns, partlCU ar y m t e areas 0 weapons cantonment an mspectlOns. 
5.2.2.4: Impartiality 
Unsurprisingly, UNOSOM II's moves towards peace-enforcement severely impaired its 
impartiality in the eyes of the parties, especially the USC-SNA. The intervention of the muscular 
194 "Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to 
Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them", S/1994/653 Annex, 
I June 1994, p. 41. 
195 "UN Troops Open Fire on Women and Children", The Scotsman, 10 September 1993. 
196 Caleb Baker, "Manhunt for Aideed: Why the Rangers Came Up Empty-Handed", Armed Forces Journal, 
December 1993, p. 18. 
197 See Richard Dowden, "UN Troops Died 'Trying to Take Somali Radio Station''', The Independent, 8 June 
1993; and Richard Ellis, "Can 'Delta Farce' Now Get It Right?", Sunday Times, 5 September 1993. 
198 For a detailed report on the military shortcomings of UNOSOM II, see the report prepared by the Honorable 
Matthew M. S. W. Ngulube, Lieutenent-General Gustav Hagglund, and Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Emmanuel A. 
Erskine, "Report of the Commission ofInquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to 
Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to Casualties Among Them", S/1994/653, I June 
1994. 
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UNOSOM II force, against the wishes of some of the parties, led to a "widespread perception 
among Somalis that the United Nations [had] decided to abandon its policy of cooperation and 
[was] planning to "invade" the country.,,199 Aideed's propaganda stirred up popular antipathy 
against Boutros-Ghali?OO He also capitalised on the Secretary-General's former position as 
Foreign Minister to Egypt's Mubarak regime, which had diplomatically and militarily supported 
ousted dictator Siad Barre?OI As the war polarised between the USC-SNA and the Ali Mahdi 
alliance, which by this stage consisted of 12 of the 14 major Somali factions calling itself 
''Manifesto'',202 and as its relations with the USC-SNA became more and more conflictual, 
UNOSOM II inevitably started to identify with, and receive encouragement from the anti-USC-
SNA Manifesto alliance.203 The contacts between some UNOSOM II contingents, particularly 
the Italians and the Belgians, and the Somali factions, began to develop into ties of patronage 
and political support in Mogadishu and Kismayu?04 With its impartiality irrevocably 
compromised, UNOSOM II became part of the conflict it was expected to terminate. From that 
time, peacekeeping and techniques of working cooperatively with the parties to resolve the 
conflict ceased to be options available to the force; either successful peace-enforcement and 
pacification, or defence and extraction became its only realistic options. 
The USC-SNA, disagreeing with the peace process advanced by UNOSOM II, was 
unprepared to allow it to implement its mandate free from interference: "the objective conflict 
between the [USC-SNA's] interests and UNOSOM's mandate" led Aideed to calculate that "by 
199 "Letter Dated 24 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24859, 27 November 1992, p. 1. 
200 During a four-hour trip to Mogadishu on 3 January 1993, Boutros-Ghali was forced to cancel a visitr to the 
United Nations compound by an Aideed-inspired riot, which showered his entourage with rocks and held signs 
calling him "the father offamine and death." See Facts on File, 21 January 1993, p. 31. 
201 See Thomas W. Lippman, "Ex-UN Official Blames Boutros-Ghali for Failure in Somalia", International 
Herald Tribune, 30 August 1994; and Jonathon Stevenson, "Hope Restored in Somalia?", Foreign Policy, No. 91, 
Summer 1993, p. 149. 
202 Mark Huband, "When Yankee Goes Home", Africa Report, Vol. 38, No.2, MarchiApril1993, p. 23. 
203 Ali Mahdi Mohammed openly encouraged the UNOSOM II attacks against Aideed, repeatedly claiming that 
Aideed's arrest was the only realistic avenue to peace in Somalia, see Robert Block, "Former Envoy Criticises UN 
Actions in Somalia", The Independent, 16 June 1993; see also Facts on File, 4 November 1993. 
204 Brigadier M. B. Page, ""Somalia: Background and Prospects", RUSI Journal, October 1993, p. 11. 
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demonstrating his ability to tum Mogadishu into a zone of grave insecurity, he could force 
UNOSOM to alter its programs so that they were compatible with his bid to playa, and probably 
the, leading political role in a reconstituted Somalia. ,,205 The Ali Mahdi forces, seeing 
international involvement as a way of legitimating their interim Presidency, also tried to 
manipulate UNOSOM II?06 When UNOSOM II began to carry out its mandate faithfully, the 
USC-SNA launched a "calculated, premeditated series of major ceasefrre violations meant to 
challenge and intimidate UNOSOM II,,,207 and to "increase the costs of the United Nations 
operation particularly for certain key national contingents as to trigger the operation's 
tennination. ,,208 Thus the USC-SNA's use of propaganda against the peacekeepers, its attacks on 
the operation, and its resistance to all attempts to pacify the environment and move relief 
supplies were designed to prevent UNOSOM II from implementing its mandate. 
5.2.2.5: Timing 
The opposition of the USC-SNA to UNOSOM II was inevitable given the inopportune 
timing of the insertion of the force. It intervened in a civil war in which the major belligerents 
were well-armed and committed to war, in which the fighting had not stabilised, between parties 
whose military calculus had not yet begun to be affected by a protracted campaign. The USC-
SNA, was progressing in the military struggle for power by taking advantage of the anarchy. It 
had begun to expand its objectives towards the seizure of power by eventually achieving the 
ability to take control of the State and impose its own order on the chaos?09 It was inevitable 
that it would view a large UNOSOM II force, charged with pacifying the situation and 
205 Tom Farer, "Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation 
Into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General", 
S/26351, 24 August 1993, pp. 6-7. 
206 Omaar, "Somalia: At War With Itself', op. cit., 1992, p. 234. 
207 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993)", 
S/26022, 1 July 1993, p. 3. 
208 Tom Farer, "Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation 
Into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General", 
S/26351, 24 August 1993, p. 7. 
209 Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Destruction of the State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention", 
Journal o/Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No.4, 1992, p. 638. 
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alleviating the humanitarian crisis, as inimical to its objectives and at variance with its military 
impetus; characterising it as an enemy to be defeated. The bad timing of the United Nations 
intervention was acknowledged by staff and diplomats at United Nations Headquarters,210 but 
was pressured by the need to relieve the UNIT AF force and by humanitarian organisations and 
public opinion demanding that the United Nations assume responsibility for alleviating the crisis 
in Somalia?!! As a result, UNOSOM II was faced with a situation in which it had little chance 
of fulfilling a conventional peacekeeping role, and was mentally and doctrinally unprepared to 
undertake a war fighting mission. 
5.2.2.6: Support and Isolation 
The United Nations' efforts in resolving the Somali conflict attracted little international 
interest at first, and international support for the operation waned as it became involved in the 
war and casualties and costs of the operation began to rise. Much of the international support for 
the United Nations' efforts came from regional organisations: the League of Arab States, the 
Organisation of African Unity, the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Standing Committee of 
the Countries of the Hom, and the Non-Aligned Movement all lent their assistance to the 
mediation efforts of the United Nations.2!2 Apart from these inter-governmental organisations, 
little international pressure was applied to the parties on behalf of the United Nations, in large 
measure because of the lack of significant contacts between the parties and third-party States. 
The largely media-generated international commitment to alleviate the humanitarian crisis 
crumbled as soon as UNOSOM II ran into trouble, as the United Nations saw "unmistakable 
signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend 
such assistance through the United Nations. This was reflected in the increasing delays in 
obtaining personnel from Member-States and even longer delays in obtaining their financial 
210 Interview With Lamine Sise, Somalia Desk, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Headquarters, 
New York City, 19 April 1994. 
211 A Senior Political Officer to Special Envoy to Somalia Ismet Kittani, quoted in Keith Richburg, "Marines 
'Ready' For UN Handover", The Guardian, 5 February 1993. 
212 United Nations Department of Public Information, Press Release, No. 5147, 18 October 1993, p. 2. 
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contributions. 11213 As early as October 1993, the United States had pledged to reduce and 
withdraw its contingent, as had Italy; France, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway withdrew their 
troops soon after. Appeals from the United Nations to Western countries for more troops for 
Somalia were firmly rejected, resulting in a growing proportion ofUNOSOM II being fumished 
by poorly-equipped troops from third world States: Egypt, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates?14 These reactions were to be symptomatic of 
UNOSOM II's inability to muster any determined Member-State contacts or pressure to exert a 
moderating influence over the uncooperative USC-SNA. 
At the beginning of the civil war, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo around 
Somalia in an attempt to isolate all of the warring factions?15 Reports suggested that the 
embargo was not airtight, however, and that arms continued to trickle into Somalia from the 
region,2l6 from Iran,2l7 and from South Africa?18 None of the parties had any significant 
support from an international sponsor; the Somali conflict seemed isolated more by a diplomatic 
lack of interest in a region of declining importance than by the United Nations-imposed 
embargo. These factors were deprived of much of their conflict-resolution impact, however, by 
the general self-sufficiency of the Somali factions. The USC-SNA and its rivals were amply 
supplied by enormous caches of weapons and materiel that had been pumped into Somalia by 
the competing superpowers during the Cold War. Their looting of international relief operations 
supplied them with food and medical supplies, a factor that only increased their determination to 
exercise ultimate control over the relief effort. Furthermore, especially for the USC-SNA, the 
anti-foreigner thrust of its propaganda made its self-reliance and isolation a point of pride and a 
213 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 4 of Resolution 886 (1993)" 
S11994112, 6 January 1994, p. 12. 
214 Frances Harris and Bruce Johnston, "Italians Join the Rush to Pull Out of UN Forces", The Daily Telegraph, 
14 October 1993. 
215 Security Council Resolution 733 (1992) of23 January 1992. 
216 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, p. 11. 
217 Elliot, "The Making of a Fiasco", op. cit., 1993, p. 11. 
218 Caleb Baker, "Manhunt for Aideed: Why the Rangers Came Up Empty-Handed", Armed Forces Journal, 
December 1993, p. 18. 
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source of strength. As a result, UNOSOM II derived little benefit from the international isolation 
of the USC-SNA. 
5.2.2.7: Cohesion 
The fragile political base of the UNOSOM II operation fell apart as soon as UNOSOM II 
began to be attacked in Mogadishu and criticised by the world's media. United Nations Member-
States were at first content to ignore the Somali civil war until the situation attracted appeals for 
help from international humanitarian agencies and criticism from Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali for ignoring African crises while being obsessed with the "rich man's war" in the former 
Yugoslavia.219 During UNOSOM II's deployment, the Security Council made its ephemeral 
commitment to the Operation clear by reminding "all parties in Somalia ... that continued United 
Nations involvement in Somalia depends on their active cooperation and tangible progress 
towards political settlement.,,22o Once UNOSOM II came under attack and was authorised to 
respond, the cohesion both in New York and within the force itself dissolved: "Owing perhaps to 
the particularly complex and dangerous conditions under which UNOSOM found itself 
operating, the actions of some contingent commanders had the effect of weakening the integrity 
of UNOSOM's military command structure. ,,221 The loss of cohesion resulted in a lack of 
concerted direction,222 the withdrawal of contingents,223 and degenerated further into 
recriminations between contingents?24 Faced with crumbling support for the UNOSOM II 
219 New York Times, 23 July 1992. 
220 Security Council Resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993. 
221 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993)", 
S/26317, 17 August 1993, pp. 18-19. 
222 In particular, the Italian contingent under General Bruno Loi, later relieved of his command by the United 
Nations, refused to take part in offensive operations. See David Willey, "Rome Bestows Laurels on the General 
Who Won't Hit Back", The Observer, 18 July 1993. 
223 Italy, France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Germany all withdrew or threatened to withdraw their 
contingents, while following the battle of Bakhara Market, the United States pledged to withdraw its contingent by 
March 1994; see Peter Hillmore, "UN Succumbs to the Curse of Somalia", The Observer, 18 July 1993. 
224 In September 1993, the Nigerian contingent accused the Italian contingent of failing to provide assistance 
when it was ambushed by USC-SNA forces, see Mark Huband, "Italians 'Failed to Help Fellow UN Troops"', The 
Guardian, 6 September 1993. 
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operation, the United Nations issued a warning to the Somali parties that "Unless they show 
evidence almost immediately of significant movement towards reconciliation and the formation 
of a broad-based government, the Security Council will have no alternative but to bring 
[UNOSOM II's] presence in Somalia to an end.,,225 No such agreement was forthcoming, and 
UNOSOM II was withdrawn in March 1995. 
UNOSOM II's task was made more difficult by the multiplicity of loosely-organised 
factions it had to deal with. The huge Cold War weapons stockpiles had been widely distributed 
during the civil war; these armed elements were only loosely controlled by the factions through 
propaganda, shifting alliances, and vague ties of clan and sub-clan relationships. This meant that 
often "[t]he central figures of the USC were powerless to control the very people they had 
supplied with weapons. ,,226 There was also a large number of armed bandit gangs controlled by 
no faction.227 This situation was encouraged and exploited by the USC-SNA for its own 
political-military purposes, and its vague mechanisms of control were radio propaganda and clan 
ties. This anarchical situation made it extremely difficult for the UNOSOM II force to establish 
the conventional peacekeeping requirement of local consent. The lack of any cohesive command 
structure among the belligerents meant that faction leaders could not realistically be held 
accountable for the actions of the armed elements. Agreements negotiated with the parties' 
leaderships became meaningless on the ground, where "Even when they have agreed, [the 
parties'] subsequent cooperation with UNOSOM [was] at best spasmodic, [because], by their 
own admission, they [did] not exercise authority over all the armed elements in the areas which 
they claim[ ed] to control. ,,228 
The application of the framework reveals clearly the sources of the unviability of the 
UNOSOM II operation in Somalia. Its goals of imposing peace and political reconciliation, and 
225 Scott Peterson, "UN Draws Up Deadline to Quit Somalia", Daily Telegraph, 27 September 1994. 
226 Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia", op. cit., 1992, p. 637. 
227 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Somalia", S/23829, 21 April 1992, p. 15. 
228 "Letter Dated 29 November 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24868, 30 November 1992, p. 2. 
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relieving the humanitarian crisis conflicted directly with the tactics and military impetus of one 
of the most powerful, independent and recalcitrant insurgent movements, the USC-SNA. 
UNOSOM II's mandate was the result of an overestimation among the United Nations' interested 
Member-States of the abilities of United Nations peacekeeping forces, combined with a desire to 
experiment with the new concept of peace-enforcement. These States, encouraged by the success 
of the Gulf War and the UNIT AF experiment, decided to pledge the difficult project of nation-
building in an anarchic society to a massive, heavily-armed force. The USC-SNA, benefiting 
from the anarchy in Somalia, was unprepared to tolerate a large, potent international armed force 
imposing peace, distributing relief, and introducing an alien system of political reintegration. 
This basic clash of objectives was compounded by antagonistic approaches to the intervention. 
In its frustration with the lack of progress with nation-building, the Security Council turned to 
the concept of enforcing local compliance. UNOSOM II became an arbiter rather than a 
mediator. In doing so, the United Nations underestimated the potency of the Somali militias, 
particularly the USC-SNA, which turned on UNOSOM II as an obstacle and as an enemy. 
The USC-SNA was engaged in a desperate struggle for ethnic survival and 
predominance. Such an overriding driving force meant that it had no respect for United Nations 
personnel or aims, factoring UNOSOM II into the inter-clan struggle. It was prepared to use 
naked and lethal force against the force. UNOSOM II's transition to peace enforcement, and its 
criminalisation of Aideed, compromised its impartiality, and it became a factor in the war it was 
intended to resolve. The timing of UNOSOM II's intervention was inappropriate, and divorced 
from the conventional prerequisites of United Nations peacekeeping: consent and an operational 
ceasefire. Neither could UNOSOM II be confident of its sponsoring coalition underwriting its 
efforts. What began as reluctant and forced sponsoring of the operation fell apart in the face of 
resistance and casualties, and led to the eventual retraction of the force. This lack of cohesion 
was reflected in the divisions within UNOSOM II, which Aideed did his utmost to exploit. The 
experiment in peace-enforcement failed: UNOSOM II at no time had the ability to create the 
conditions for its own success or to compel the cooperation of such a powerful and recalcitrant 
belligerent. Neither was the project of nation-building appropriate while the clan war was at its 
brutal height. A huge force, heavy armament, vast resources, and a mandate to enforce 
compliance can not compensate for a lack of objective prerequisites for success. The absence of 
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conditions for the viability of their interaction that existed before UNOSOM II's arrival in 
Somalia in May 1993 existed in equal measure after its departure in March 1995. 
5.3: Maintaining Aid Flows 
Humanitarian peacekeeping is an offspring of the end of the Cold War. The retreat of 
identifiable security threats has given rise to a growing concern for humanitarian security: "The 
United Nations' new involvements are for the most part in massive civil and ethnic conflicts 
where human, not international, security is involved. ,,229 The media and certain non-
governmental organisations have provided much of the publicity impetus for the international 
concern for human rights, and the growth of the global human rights regime230 has been largely 
stimulated by the political capital to be made from advocating human rights. Because 
humanitarian emergencies are not pressing security threats, however, States are more keen to act 
multilaterally to spread the potential costs, responsibility and blame for these actions. The 
United Nations, with its commitments to uphold human rights,231 emerged as the logical 
mechanism for collective action. Peacekeeping forces have been used by the United Nations to 
protect this humanitarian relief. Humanitarian tasks, formerly seen as ancillary to a 
peacekeeping operation, have begun to occupy the centre of contemporary mandates. 
Humanitarian peacekeeping is often centred on protecting populations and aid flows, but 
necessarily includes pacification, some weapons control, demining, refugee repatriation, and 
rebuilding infrastructure. 
229 Brian Urquhart, "Comment", The Guardian, 18 February 1995. 
230 See Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis", International Organization, Vol. 40, 
No.3, Summer 1986, pp. 605-8. 
231 The preamble to the United Nations Charter commits the Organisation "to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person [and] ... to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom "; while Article 55 pledges that the United Nations will "promote ... universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all"; while the United Nations also sponsored the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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5.3.1: Shadow Boxing With the Bosnian Serbs 
Apart from its mediation efforts, the United Nations mounted a large humanitarian 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Dispatched in June 1992, UNPROFOR II departed from 
conventional peacekeeping doctrine in that it was "required to engage in tasks that have 
sometimes been ancillary to peacekeeping proper, but never demanded of a UN force in the 
absence of peacekeeping,,,232 having been introduced with no ceasefire to police and no 
agreement to implement. It was originally deployed to "ensure the safe movement of 
humanitarian aid and related personnel,,,233 and protect the "provision of basic human needs 
[which was] significantly hindered by the continued fighting, the great number of roadblocks, 
and the hijacking of vehicles, ,,234 while the ICFY worked on mediating a permanent solution. 
UNPROFOR II's mandate expanded to demilitarise and protect besieged enclaves of Bosnian 
Muslims235 in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac which were declared safe 
areas.
236 As UNPROFOR II endeavoured to carry out these tasks, and as it encountered sporadic 
but growing resistance from the Bosnian Serbs,237 the peacekeeping force found itself 
increasingly trapped by the conflict, hostage to the military strategies of the parties, and an 
obstruction to the mediation process it was originally intended to assist. 
232 Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and the Fonner Yugoslavia", International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 
3, 1993, p. 468. 
233 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 757 (1992)", S/24075, 6 June 1992, 
p.2. 
234 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)", S/23836, 24 April 
1992, p. 4. 
235 Security Council Resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993. 
236 Security Council Resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993. 
237 For further accounts of the dynamics of the Bosnian conflict, see Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: 
Understanding Bosnia's War, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Mihailo Cmobmja, The Yugoslav Drama, 
(Toronto: McGill Press, 1994); and F. Stephen Larrabee (ed), The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the 
Cold War, (Washington: American University Press, 1994). 
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5.3.1.1: Objectives 
The same divergent interests and centrifugal pressures were present among the same 
members of the sponsoring coalition of UNPROFOR II as that sponsoring the mediation 
initiatives in Bosnia. If anything, the tension has been greater between those States contributing 
peacekeepers to UNPROFOR II, who advocate the present containment, relief and mediation 
effort, and those not contributing ground forces, who advocate enforcement measures. These 
disagreements have led to a peacekeeping mandate resulting from a delicate diplomatic balance, 
which concentrates on a minimalist task, containing the conflict and protecting' humanitarian 
interests. These minimalist tasks have largely coincided with the views of Britain and France, 
the main sponsors of United Nations action, on the requirements for containing and resolving the 
conflict in Bosnia. Consequently, the coalition and the United Nations has determined that 
"humanitarian issues are at the core of the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia and should be 
given the utmost priority.,,238 The crisis questions its commitment to uphold international 
humanitarian law,239 while the flow of refugees seeking "safety and assistance in the already-
overburdened adjacent States,,240 threatens regional security. The provision of humanitarian 
relief, and the security of the aid convoys, is therefore "a major concern for the international 
community,,,241 which duly gave UNPROFOR n242 responsibility for "the safe movement of 
humanitarian aid and related personnel," and its distribution "in a non-discriminatory marmer 
and on a sole basis of need.,,243 The United Nations' conviction of "the unacceptability of the 
acquisition of territory by force or by 'ethnic cleansing",,244 made the protection of the safe areas 
238 "Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/24795, 11 
November 1992, pp. 24, 31. 
239 Security Council Resolution 941 (1994) of23 September 1994. 
240 'b'd 24 I I "p. . 
241 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", 
S/25050, 6 January 1993, p. 10. 
242 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/24540, 10 September 1992, 
p.2. 
243 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 757 (1992)", S/24075, 6 June 1992, 
p.6. 
244 Security Council Resolution 859 (1993) of24 August 1993. 
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an essential part of its humanitarian mandate. Diplomatically, its protection of the safe areas was 
intended to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of a territorial/aU accompli in the ICFY negotiations, and 
to secure a military freeze which could be built upon to secure a broad peace agreement. 245 
The Bosnian Serbs are fighting because they feef46 they were "forced by the 
international community to live within Bosnia and Herzegovina against [their] wishes.,,247 They 
contend that "the independent State of Bosnia and Herzegovina has never existed and does not 
. ,,248 d th· b' . 249 . . d d . d thni 11 eXIst, an elr 0 ~ectlve IS to create an m epen ent, contIguous, an e ca y 
h . 250 H' . d 70°/ fB' . 251 h .. S b omogeneous temtory. avmg seIze over /0 0 osman temtory, t e remalmng er 
goals are to secure the contiguity of their gains and to eliminate the enclaves of Bosnian 
Muslims trapped within their territory?52 Within the enclaves, the Muslims were totally 
dependent on the international relief effort: "Unlike Bosnia's Serbs and Croats, they have no 
independent supply lines and are hemmed in on all sides.,,253 Humanitarian aid and its supply 
245 Security Council Resolution 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994. Although stating "the establishment of Security 
Council safe areas in no way undermines ... proposed settlement details" of peace agreements, the ICFY were used 
them to provide the basis for the territorial provisions of various peace proposals. See "Report of the Co-Chairmen 
of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/26260 
Annex, 6 August 1993, p. 8. 
246 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: 
Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, p. 2. 
247 ibid, p. 4. 
248 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: 
Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, p. 4. 
249 Sabrin~ Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans", Foreign AjJairs, Vol. 71, No.4, p. 81. 
250 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing", Foreign AjJairs, Vol. 72, No.3, Summer 1993, 
p.11O. 
251 The Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly stated that the enclaves, particularly Gorazde, Srebrenica and Bihac were 
objectives for Serb occupation and cleansing. See Keesing's Record of World Events, News Digest for April 1994, 
p. 39966; "For Sarajevo, a Fateful Squeeze", International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1994; and Snjezana 
Vukic, "Battle Over Bosnia 'Safe' Zones", The Independent, 16 November 1994. 
252 Note by the Secretary-General, "The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia", 
AJ48/92 and S/25341, 26 February 1993, p. 9. 
253 "The Bosnian Burden", The Economist, 29 January 1994, p. 19. 
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routes have become military objectives for the besieging Serbs254 as "[t]he warring factions in 
Bosnia deliberately began to manipulate aid, denying it to the other ethnic group whenever 
possible,,,255 and attacking aid flows,z56 The Bosnian Serbs also use human rights violations as 
a military tactic: "Massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
are ... being used deliberately to achieve ethnically homogeneous areas.,,257 These are important 
objectives and tactics for the Bosnian Serbs, who are unlikely to yield "when they feel their vital 
interests are concerned. ,,258 It can be seen that UNPROFOR II's protection of these safe areas 
and "the provision of the necessary humanitarian assistance to the Muslim-controlled areas" was 
interpreted by the Serbs "as against their military and political interests.,,259 
5.3.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations was initially wary of introducing a peacekeeping force into a conflict 
lacking an agreement or ceasefire,z60 However, it was eventually pressured into sending 
peacekeepers into Bosnia as the most effective way of promoting its humanitarian goals. This 
initiative arose primarily from French and British instigation, embarrassed at the failure of 
attempts to stop the conflict, and reacting to popular horror at the humanitarian disaster and 
accusations of incompetence. The Security Council adopted resolution 770 (1992) authorising 
254 "Report of the Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference for the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066 Annex, 8 July 1993, p. 6. 
255 Colonel Alistair Duncan, "Operating in Bosnia", RUSI Journal, June 1994, p. 15. 
256 Aid agencies reported that "[t]he use of the "Red Cross" symbol is now widely regarded by medical and aid 
workers as a disadvantage as it seems to attract attacks instead of helping to protect these humanitarian and medical 
activities." See "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by 
Mr. Tadeusz Mazowieki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Commission 
Resolution 1992/S-111 of 14 August 1992", Al48/92 and S/25341, 26 February 1993, p. 24. 
257 ibid, p. 7. 
258 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia", S/26260, Annex, 6 August 1993, p. 2. 
259 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Office of the Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia, 
"Information Notes on Former Yugoslavia", No. 1/94, January 1994, p. i. 
260 Both Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the-Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs 
Marrack Goulding opposed the introduction of a peacekeeping force into Bosnia. See "Further Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)", S/23900, 1992. 
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States or regional bodies to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. Upon further discussions, and on the recommendations of 
Britain and France, the Security Council decided to entrust this task to an expanded 
UNPROFOR, which had already deployed in Croatia, and units of which had deployed around 
Mostar and Sarajevo airport?61 Soon after their deployment, the United Nations found its 
peacekeepers in the middle of a difficult paradox.262 Bosnian Serb resistance prompted the 
expansion of "self-defence .. .to include situations in which armed persons attempt by force to 
prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate.,,263 Attacks on the safe areas 
provoked the invocation of a Chapter VII authorisation "to take the necessary measures, 
including the use of force [and air power], in reply to bombardments against the safe areas ... or to 
armed incursion into them or in the event of any obstruction in or around those areas.,,264 
UNPROFOR II's mandate was also broadened to include the cantonment of heavy weapons,265 
d .. . . B . S b h ld 266 an momtonng sanctIOns agamst osman er - e areas. 
Against Bosnian Serb resistance, UNPROFOR II found that it was unable to respond 
meaningfully. Its experiments with returning fire and responding to attacks with surgical NATO 
airstrikes were out-escalated by the Bosnian Serbs, who attacked peacekeepers267 and took them 
261 This became official with the establishment ofUNPROFOR II by Security Council Resolution 776 (1992) of 
14 September 1992. 
262 UNPROFOR II has negotiated hundreds of ceaseftres between the parties in Bosnia; these ceaseftres have, 
however, been famously ephemera\. It has, in many theatres in Bosnia, been left with liaison officers and contacts 
with the parties, in the absence of a ceaseftre; these liaison officers have been useful in negotiating agreements and 
understandings with the various militias below the level of an official ceaseftre, and certainly not binding on any 
party other than the militia or personnel with whom it was negotiated. See "Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 757 (1992)", S/24075, 6 June 1992, p. 5. 
263 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/24540, 10 September 1992, 
p.2. 
264 Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. 
265 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: 
Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, p. 36. 
266 Security Council Resolution 942 (1994) 23 September 1994. 
267 Group Captain B. A. Sweetman, "Close Air Support Over Bosnia-Herzegovina", RUSJ Journal, August 1994, 
p.35. 
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hostage against further actions?68 Such threats to their peacekeepers paralysed governments 
against responding with greater force to this defiance. Thus by being vulnerable to Serb threats 
of retaliation, UNPROFOR II and the international community had become a hostage against 
further international action. It soon became clear that existing peacekeeping methodologies left 
UNPROFOR II ill-equipped to deal with the Bosnian Serbs' flexible, and creative resistance to 
their implementation of their mandate?69 Some contingents responded creatively, such as 
British units' use of their Northern Ireland experience to "sweep" a corridor prior to the passage 
of humanitarian convoys,270 but most have been helpless in the face of Bosnian Serb actions. 
UNPROFOR II further suffered from inadequate and inaccurate intelligence on Bosnian Serb 
positions, movements, and initiatives. This weakness was been magnified by the rifts between 
the interested powers, with the United States reluctant to share its intelligence on the Bosnian 
Serbs with its traditional NATO allies.271 UNPROFOR II's resulting hostage mentality created 
an incentive for the Bosnian Serbs to defy UNPROFOR II to an ever greater extent, further 
blocking the United Nations from addressing "the cause of the suffering, the fact of which 
encourages Serbian resistance even to those palliative measures. ,,272 UNPROFOR II's 
humanitarian function273 thus clashed with the broader resolution of the conflict, a paradox that 
the Secretary-General was to eventually realise?74 
268 The Bosnian Serbs have taken large numbers of UNPROFOR II hostages on the two occasions when they 
have been most threatened by NATO airstrikes: in November 1994 around the Bihac and Krajina enclaves (See 
Carol 1. Williams, "Bosnia Peacekeeping Role Makes UN Forces Pawns", Los Angeles Times, 27 November, 1994); 
and when an airstrike was launched against an anns dump close to the Bosnian Serb "capital" at Pale in May 1995 
(See Joel Brand and James Bone, "Serbs Take 33 British Troops Hostage", The Times, 29 May, 1995). 
269 See Bob Stewart, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, (London: Harpercollins, 1993). 
270 Lawrence Donegan, "Anny's Ulster Expertise 'Can Be Used to Help UN''', The Guardian, 20 September 
1994. 
271 John Palmer, "US Refuses to Let London See Spy Reports on Serbs", The Guardian, 20 December 1994. 
272 Higgins, "The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia", op. cit., 1993, p. 469. 
273 By the United Nations' own admission: see "Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 819 (1993)", 125700, 30 April 1993, pp. 6, 8,9. 
274 "Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993)", S/25700, 30 April 
1993, pp. 11-12. 
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The Bosnian Serbs reject UNPROFOR II as the mechanism upholding the principles and 
goals they oppose. The United Nations concept of demilitarised safe areas and cantonment of 
heavy weapons275 challenges the Serbs' superiority in heavy armaments,276 the source of their 
military advantage; logically "they will never take the risk of undoing this strategic balance. ,,277 
The safe areas also pose a direct military threat to the Bosnian Serbs: having been demilitarised 
"of military and paramilitary units other than those of the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,,,278 they became sanctuaries for Muslim forces, and were repeatedly used to 
launch attacks against the Serbs.279 The Bosnian Serbs repeatedly attacked safe areas in 
violation of UNPROFOR II and its mandate;280 in each case, "they halted on the fringe of the 
enclave and then secured a UN-brokered deal to disarm the enemy and neutralise the enclave's 
military value to the government. ,,28\ This enabled them to control the enclaves and marginalise 
the peacekeepers intended to protect them?82 The Bosnian Serbs' low-level defiance of 
UNPROFOR II manipulates the thresholds of international tolerance283 by threatening to 
escalate the conflict if they are subject to any retaliation?84 UNPROFOR II's Rules of 
275 "Concept for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Yugoslavia, as Discussed With Yugoslav Leaders 
by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and Marrack Goulding, Under-
Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs", S/23280, 1991, pp. 16-17. 
276 The Bosnian Serbs' annament superiority derives from their original inheritance of 300 tanks, 100 armoured 
personnel carriers, 900 guns, and 80,000 tonnes of ammunition from the departing JNA in early 1992, see Edward 
Cowan, "Eye ofthe Balkan Storm", Sunday Times, 20 February 1994. 
277 Philippe Morillon, "UN Operations in Bosnia: Lessons and Realities", RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No.6, 
December 1993, p. 33. 
278 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836 (1993)", S/25939, 14 June 
1993, p. 2. 
279 "Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993)", p. 5. Perhaps the 
best example of a Bosnian government offensive from a safe area is the breakout from the Bihac enclave in 
October-November 1994. 
280 Srebrenica (April 1993), Gorazde (April 1994) and Bihac (November 1994) were subject to coordinated 
offensives by Bosnian Serb forces. 
281 Ian Traynor, "Bloodbath in Muslim Enclaves Could Follow Retreat", The Guardian, 29 November 1994. 
282 Ian Traynor, "Bihac Sides Jostle Over Truce Terms", The Guardian, 26 November 1994. 
283 James Gow, "Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension", The World Today, Vol. 50, No.5, 
May 1994, p. 98. 
284 William Pfaff, "Really, the Only Bosnia Plan on the Table", International Herald Tribune, 9-10 July 1994. 
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Engagement285 have placed the initiative with the Bosnian Serbs, who continue to reject and 
defy the peacekeeping force at will. 
5.3.1.3: Instrumentality 
The United Nations was conscious of the need to secure Bosnian Serb acceptance of 
UNPROFOR II if the peacekeepers are to have a chance of implementing their mandate,286 
being originally prepared to deal with all sides on an equal basis.287 As ethnic cleansing and 
attacks on safe areas288 aroused greater levels of horror and condemnation,289 as aid convoys 
came under attack, as Serbia was expelled from the General Assembly, and as UNPROFOR II's 
mandate leaned increasingly against Bosnian Serb interests, the Bosnian Serbs' agreement to 
UNPROFOR II objectives and functions became decreasingly sought after. The protection of the 
humanitarian relief operation by United Nations peracekeepers in Bosnia became something that 
was carried out despite Bosnian Serb objections, rather than with their agreement as a party that 
was instrumental to the success of the mission. As UNPROFOR II became for the international 
community "a source of objective and independent information on events" in Bosnia,29o the 
Bosnian Serbs began to prevent UNPROFOR II access to significant areas to prevent it carrying 
out this and its other functions?91 The United Nations lost confidence in their ability "to 
negotiate in good faith and to uphold their commitments made to representatives of the United 
285 See Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Rules of Engagement for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia", Orbis, fall 1994, p. 
636. 
286 See for example appeals contained in Security Resolutions such as 913 (1994) of22 April 1994. 
287 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)", S/23836, 24 April 
1992, p. 2, confessed the United Nations had "no consensus on the origins of the fighting, [or] on whom the 
responsibility lay." 
288 Security Council Resolution 913 (1994) of22 April 1994. 
289 See Security Council Resolutions 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992; 757 (1992 of30 May 1992; 779 (1992) of6 
October 1992; 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993; and 941 (1994) of23 September 1994. 
290 Gow, "European Security and the Yugoslav Wars", op. cit., 1993, p. 209. 
291 "The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia", Al48/92 and S/25341, of 26 
February 1993, p. 27. 
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Nations.,,292 This breakdown in the processes of consultation, so vital to an operation of this 
type, has contributed to UNPROFOR II's difficulties. 
Although UNPROFOR II has been moderately effective in ensuring the supply of 
palliative humanitarian relief, its activities have become obstructive, rather than instrumental to 
resolving the underlying causes of the crisis. The inadequacy of "light force option" for 
defending the aid convoys and safe areas293 for the tasks set, and the fear of Bosnian Serb 
retaliation against peacekeepers in the case of enforcement actions, transformed UNPROFOR II 
from a protector of the Muslims into a protector of the Bosnian Serbs from action by the 
international community. This has emboldened the Bosnian Serbs to make escalating attacks and 
demands on the other parties and the international community with minimal risk of being held 
accountable or punished for their actions.294 UNPROFOR II itself is very aware of the 
"Mogadishu Line",295 and reluctant to respond forcefully to Bosnian Serb provocations.296 This 
record, as well as highly-publicised wrangling within the United Nations over the use of force 
has, "stripped diplomatic efforts of one of their key instruments: the threat of the use of force in 
circumstances where other means proved inadequate or unpersuasive.,,297 Neither can 
UNPROFOR II be easily withdrawn: this would entail the end of the relief effort, the 
intensification of the war, and incur the opposition of the beleaguered Bosnian govemment.298 
Paradoxically, the Serbs are also happy for UNPROFOR II in its emasculated role to remain in 
292 Security Council Resolution 913 (1994) of22 April 1994. 
293 Because of differences within the Security Council and a shortage of resources, it opted for equipping 
UNPROFOR II with the minimum number of troops thought necessary for its mandate. See "Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836 (1993)", S/25939, 14 June 1993, p. 3. 
294 David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.4, July/August 1994, p. 39. 
295 This term was coined by the former UNPROFOR II Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Michael 
Rose, upon coming under criticism, particularly from the United States, of being too soft on the Serbs. See Ian 
Traynor, "Rose Rejects US Call for More Force", The Guardian, 30 September 1994. 
296 UNPROFOR II's attempts at retaliation have nearly always been in the form of NATO air strikes against 
empty or deserted tanks or artillery pieces or air strips, and calculated to cause the minimum level of discomfort to 
the Bosnian Serbs. See "NATO Jets Bomb Bosnian Serb Tank in Retaliatory Raid", International Herald Tribune, 
23 September 1994. 
297 Gow, "European Security and the Yugoslav Wars", op. cit., 1993, p. 212. 
298 "Rose Hails U-Turn on Embargo", Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1994. 
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Bosnia, thereby providing a block against any forceful international intervention. Thus 
UNPROFOR II, has become an impediment rather than being instrumental to peace in Bosnia. 
5.3.1.4: Impartiality 
The United Nations has attempted through assurances of neutrality299 and tinkering with 
the ethnic and religious balance of the force30o to demonstrate UNPROFOR II's impartiality 
among the belligerents in Bosnia. However, its mandate, often detrimental to Bosnian Serb 
interests, has led it to be seen as biased, as "an occupying power, siding with [their] enemy.,,301 
Requested by the Bosnian government, it is seen to have "protected the Muslims from total 
defeat. ,,302 The safe areas, created and defended with extremely limited success303 against 
Bosnian Serb conquest,304 allowed to shelter Bosnian government troops,305 and supplied by 
UNPROFOR II-protected aid flows have become a symbol ofUNPROFOR II's bias against the 
Bosnian Serbs. Discoveries of some UNPROFOR II contingents smuggling weapons to the 
Muslims have reinforced Bosnian Serb distrust.306 The United Nations was actively involved in 
building and consolidating the Muslim-Croat alliance against the Bosnian Serbs, and backing 
299 "Concept for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Yugoslavia, as Discussed With Yugoslav Leaders 
by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, and Marrack Goulding, Under-
Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs", S/23280 Annex III, 1991, p. 1. 
300 For example, at on stage the UNPROFOR contingent stationed in Sarajevo is made up of Egyptians (Muslim), 
Ukrainians (Orthodox for the Serbs), and French (Catholic for the Croats); see Christopher Bellamy, "US Troops 
Will Boost Peace Plan", The Independent, 13 February 1993. 
301 Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, quoted in Robert Fox, "Peace Mission Hangs in Balance as Sarajevo 
Battles for Its Sanity", Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1994. 
302 Radovan Karadzic, quoted in "Karadzic Threatens to Oust UN", The Guardian, 12 October 1994. 
303 The "safe areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa were fmally taken by the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995 despite the 
presence of garrisons of UNPROFOR II troops, who were unable to prevent the invasion or the following 
deportation and slaughter of the inhabitants of these pockets. See "Victims of Bosnian Realpolitik", The Economist, 
22 July 1995, pp. 37-38. 
304 Security Council Resolutions 824 (1993) of6 May 1993 and 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993. 
305 Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993 and "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Security Council 836 (1993)" S/25939, 14 June 1993, p. 2. 
306 See "A World More Scared Than Scaring", The Economist, 17 April 1993. 
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the alliance's rights and claims during negotiations?07 The bitterness of the war, causing "the 
parties [to] hold conflicting and contradictory views on almost all aspects of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,,,308 makes the belligerents suspicious ofUNPROFOR II's contacts with all 
'd h nfl' 309 Sl es to t e co lCt. 
Without Bosnian Serb agreement on the objectives and presence on UNPROFOR II, 
there could be little hope of their impartiality in allowing the force to perform its mandate 
unimpeded. Since its insertion into Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs have staged attacks against 
UNPROFOR II and its mandate as a way of reinforcing the international community's 
timidity,310 to widen policy rifts among the Member-States,311 to undermine the United 
Nations' credibility as an authoritative conflict terminator,312 and to destroy the cohesion of the 
force. 313 Their threats of retaliation against UNPROFOR II, their seizing of peacekeepers as 
hostages,314 and their use of the promise of a breakthrough at the peace talks to defer any more 
forceful actions, have cleverly turned it into a force paralysing international action.315 Neither 
have they allowed UNPROFOR II to perform the mandate entrusted to it unhindered. The 
307 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066 Annex, 8 July 1993, p. 2. 
308 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)", S/23836, 24 April 
1992, p. 5. 
309 Edith S. Klein, "Obstacles to Conflict Resolution in the Territories of the Former Yugoslavia", in David A. 
Charters, Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution, (New Brunswick: Centre for Conflict 
Studies, 1992), p. 153. 
310 Roger Cohen, "Embargo on Serbia Frays in Macedonia", International Herald Tribune, 1 August 1994. 
311 Christopher Lockwood, "America and Europe Clash Over Arms Ban", Daily Telegraph, 12 September 1994. 
312 Gow, "European Security and the Yugoslav Wars", op. cit., 1993, p. 214. 
313 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S/26066, 8 July 1993, p. 7. 
314 The best publicised instances of the Bosnian Serbs taking hostages occurred in November 1994, and May-
June 1995, when they seized British, Dutch, and French UNPROFOR II troops as a deterrent to further air strikes 
around the Bihac, Sarajevo, and other enclaves; see Ian Traynor, "West Admits Impotence to Save Bihac", The 
Guardian, 28 November 1994. 
315 Gow, "Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension", op. cit., 1994, p. 98. 
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Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly violated ceasefires they have signed,316 banned peacekeepers 
from territory they control/ 17 stopped aid flows to besieged cities and regions,318 attacked safe 
areas, and closed blue routes in defiance ofUNPROFOR 11.319 Furthermore, the Bosnian Serbs, 
as well as the other belligerents, have tried to take tactical advantage of UNPROFOR II 
deployments in the prosecution of the war, and to attack their opponents in an attempt to draw in 
wider international involvement.32o At no stage of its deployment has UNPROFOR II been 
permitted to discharge its mandate without provocations and constant attempts to exploit it, on 
the part of the Bosnian Serbs and the other factions. 
5.3.1.5: Timing 
The intervention ofUNPROFOR II was at odds with the military impetus of the Bosnian 
Serbs. The Bosnian Serb army, in control of over 70% of Bosnian territory, and preponderant in 
heavy weapons, training and organisation, is defending a long, unusually-shaped front line, 
which it appears able to defend indefinitely against military and diplomatic attempts to roll it 
back.321 This military strength has been translated into a hardening of its position in the 
mediation process.322 The intractability of the Bosnian Serb position, the ruthlessness of its 
advance, and the bitterness of the conflict, led early United Nations missions to Bosnia to 
conclude that "in the light of all the factors bearing on the current situation in Bosnia-
316 "Report of the Co-Chainnen of the Steering Committee on the Activities of the International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia", S/26260 Annex, 6 August 1993, p. 2. 
317 See "Bosnian Serbs Repeat Threat to UN Forces", The Guardian, 26 September 1994; and "Karadzic 
Threatens to Oust UN", The Guardian, 12 October 1994. 
318 See Ian Black, "Clinton Hints at Tough Line in Bosnia", The Guardian, 27 September 1994. 
319 See "UN Envoy Seeks Serb Concessions", International Herald Tribune, 30-31 July 1994. 
320 The biggest culprits here are the Bosnian government forces, but they are by no means the only forces to 
make such tactical use of the UNPROFOR II presence. See "Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992), 758 (1992) and 761 (1992)" S/24263, 10 July 1992. 
321 Gow, "Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension", op. cit., 1994, p. 97. 
322 The Bosnian Serbs have been consistent in their insistence on the formation of the "Republika Srpska" at all 
stages of the conflict and the talks. See "Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina", S/25479, 26 March 1993, pp. 4-5. 
272 
Herzegovina, the deployment of a peacekeeping force there was not feasible .. .in view of the 
widespread violence, .. .it [is] impossible to define a workable concept for a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation.,,323 The United Nations' hand was forced by the widespread horror at 
the ferocity of the fighting and the magnitude of the suffering and ethnic cleansing. 
UNPROFOR II thus found itself as a peacekeeping force in a situation where there was no peace 
to be kept, and where the parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, had no military incentive to 
cooperate with it. Charged with implementing a humanitarian mandate, but without an 
underpinning political objective, UNPROFOR II was trapped by the timing of its deployment 
into the quagmire of maintaining an unsatisfactory status quo while preventing any movement 
towards a resolution. 
5.3.1.6: Support and Isolation 
Those States with ties to the Bosnian Serbs have been unwilling to use their contacts to 
apply concerted pressure in support of UNPROFOR II's efforts. Serbia, expelled from the 
General Assembly, and increasingly beleaguered by United Nations-mandated sanctions, has 
made highly-publicised appeals for Bosnian Serb cooperation,324 and has claimed to have 
imposed its own United Nations-monitored sanctions against them/25 but has been unwilling to 
exert any real leverage that would affect their behaviour. Russia and Greece, as co-religionist 
sympathisers of the Bosnian Serbs, have been unwilling or vacillating in their support for 
UNPROFOR II's objectives due to their disagreements with the other members of the 
sponsoring coalition over general policy on Bosnia, and the status of the embargo in 
particular.326 Neither have any other members of the international community, significantly 
among the United States and the proximate European powers, been willing to intervene in 
323 "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)", S/23836, 24 April 
1992, p. 6. 
324 The Serbian government has issued warnings to the Bosnian Serbs threatening to sever relations, and appealed 
to them to be cognisant to the fate of other Serbs being starved by the sanctions. See "Accept Plan, Bosnian Serbs 
are Warned by Belgrade", International Herald Tribune, 3 August 1994. 
325 "Yugoslavia Approves Monitors", International Herald Tribune, 15 September 1994. 
326 Stephen Robinson, "Summit Hugs Fail to Hide Rift Over Bosnia", Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1994. 
273 
Bosnia with the military force necessary to prevent further Bosnian Serb defiance of 
UNPROFOR II's discharge of its mandate.327 Attempts to provide military muscle in support for 
UNPROFOR II through NATO have caused rifts within that alliance over the extent and nature 
of the use of air power against the Bosnian Serbs.328 The absence of any significant support for 
UNPROFOR II has not been lost on the Bosnian Serbs, who have factored this into their 
sanguine defiance of the peacekeepers. 
Although the United Nations has attempted to induce Bosnian Serb cooperation by 
isolating them from external supporters, it has not made their behaviour any more conducive to 
UNPROFOR II's discharge of its mandate. Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council 
has imposed an embargo around the former Yugoslavia,329 applied sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro,330 and applied sanctions against the Serb-held regions of Bosnia,33\ in an attempt 
to starve the Bosnian Serbs and sap their military strength. The embargoes have frayed over 
time, and the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs has been imperfect.332 Serbia, the Bosnian Serb's 
biggest sponsor, although it has assured the United Nations that it has stopped military 
shipments into Bosnia, has been long been suspected smuggling military equipment and non-
lethal aid to the Bosnian Serbs.333 The Bosnian Serbs' position is materially and psychologically 
strengthened against the United Nations through their knowledge and confidence in Serbian, 
Russian, and Greek sympathy with their position. The Bosnian Serbs are also well aware that 
Russian opposition within the Security Council, and Greek opposition within NATO, restrains a 
frustrated international community from carrying out extensive airstrikes or other punitive 
327 Daniel Williams, "West Seems Unable to Deter the Serbs", International Herald Tribune, 2 August 1994. 
328 The United States has generally advocated extensive use of air power against the Serbs, while Britain and 
France have insisted on limiting its use to avoid provoking Serb retaliation against their peacekeepers. See John 
Palmer, "NATO Chief Walks Into Early Row With UN Over Bosnia", The Guardian, 18 October 1994. 
329 Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) of25 September 1991. 
330 Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) of30 May 1992. 
331 Security Council Resolution 942 (1994) of23 September 1994. 
332 Emma Daly, "Fierce Fighting Marks Turn in Bosnian Tide", The Independent on Sunday, 6 November 1994. 
333 John Pomfret, "Belgrade Suspected of Breaking Its Embargo", International Herald Tribune, 10-11 
December 1994. 
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military action against them to try to induce their cooperation. Despite all of these factors, it is 
unclear whether the extent of isolation of the Bosnian Serbs is a significant factor in their 
military calculations in any case. Similar to the USC-SNA, the Bosnian Serbs' military 
advantage is not heavily dependent on external sponsors and therefore not immediately affected 
by changes in levels of support.334 Nevertheless, the support of the Bosnian Serbs by influential 
outside powers has had a negative effect on their cooperativeness, and consequently on the 
viability of their interaction with UNPROFOR II. 
5.3.1.7: Cohesion 
The ability of UNPROFOR II to take decisive action in the face of Bosnian Serb 
defiance is severely undermined by a lack of cohesion among its sponsors within the United 
Nations, and within the force itself. The fragmentation of the international community's 
cohesion over Bosnia has been extensive, and largely a product of widely diverging views of the 
Bosnian crisis and emotional commitments to the various parties or aspects of the conflict. 
While general agreement has been reached over the need for a comprehensive solution, the 
protection of safe areas and the provision ofrelief,335 opinions have diverged on how to respond 
to Bosnian Serb non-cooperation with UNPROFOR II. The United States,336 the Islamic 
community337 and the Non-Aligned338 have advocated redressing the military balance in favour 
of the Bosnian Muslims and mounting significant air strikes against Bosnian Serb ordnance, 
334 Gow, "Towards a Settlement in Bosnia: The Military Dimension", op. cit., 1994, p. 98. 
335 Security Council, "Joint Action Program", S/25829, 24 May 1993, p. 2; and "Communique of the OlC Special 
Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Enlarged to the Members of the 
Contact Group and States Contributing to the UNPROFOR", A147/977 and S/26112, 19 July 1993, p. 8. 
336 Daniel Williams, "West Seems Unable to Deter the Serbs", International Herald Tribune, 2 August 1994; 
"Downsides Seen if Bosnia Arms Embargo is Ended", International Herald Tribune, 20-21 August 1994. 
337 "Communique of the OlC Special Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of Islamic conference of Foreign 
Ministers Enlarged to the Members of the Contact Group and States Contributing Troops to UNPROFOR", 
A147/977 and S/26112, 19 July 1993, p. 7; see also Jane M.O. Sharp, "Intervention in Bosnia - the Case For", The 
World Today, Vol. 49, No.2, p. 31. 
338 In April 1993, the Non-Aligned members of the security Council circulated a proposed resolution authorising 
member-states to form a Desert Storm type coalition to help the Bosnian Government reverse Serb gains under 
Article 51 of the Charter authorising individual or collective self-defence against a member; see United Nations 
Department of Public Information Political Information Bulletin #3, 19 April 1993. 
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positions and supply lines.339 The United Kingdom, France and their European Union partners 
have opposed any forceful action by or on behalf of UNPROFOR II, out of fear of provoking 
retaliation against their peacekeeping troopS.340 Russia and Greece have voiced vehement 
opposition to lifting the arms embargo and launching air strikes, and the spectre of a Russian 
veto hangs over the Security Counci1.341 
These divisions are reflected in the lack of cohesion of the UNPROFOR II force. 
Various contingents, particularly the Russian, Ukrainian, and Muslim troops, have been 
observed to pursue independent and openly partial relations with the belligerents they 
support.342 The strain of operating such a force over the friction among the contingents and 
within the United Nations has given UNPROFOR II a burn-out rate among its force 
commanders that is unmatched by any other peacekeeping operation.343 The financing 
innovation introduced for UNPROFOR II, whereby force contributors meet their expenses, has 
been detrimental to force cohesion, as the contributing States have felt more justified in 
nationally-directing their contingents in the field.344 Unity of command problems developed as 
339 Divisions have grown over Bosnia within Washington, between the Presidency and the Congress, and within 
the Congress. See Hella Pick, "PM Fails to Budge Dole on Bosnia", The Guardian, 1 December 1994; and Michael 
Gordon, "NATO Quarrels Left Bihac in the Lurch", The Guardian, 5 December 1994. 
340 See Christopher Lockwood, "America and Europe Clash Over Arms Ban", Daily Telegraph, 12 September 
1994; "EU Backs Bosnia Embargo", International Herald Tribune, 12 September 1994; "UK Peacekeepers Fight in 
2 Battles in Bosnia", International Herald Tribune, 16 September 1994; and Ian Black, "Britain Still Firm on 
Bosnia After Talks With UN Leader", The Guardian, 26 October 1994. 
341 The Russian parliament voted in April 1993 to force Russia to cast its veto in the event of a Security Council 
vote lifting the embargo or advocating greater force, which it regarded as being "one-sided ultimatums against 
Serbs". Greece has been vocal in its opposition to NATO action and changes in the United Nations stance, 
particularly during its stints holding the presidency of the European Union. See "Why Russia Backs Serbia", The 
Independent, 15 February 1994; and Tony Barber, "Serb Arms Hand-Over 'Negligible"', The Independent, 15 
February 1994. 
342 Particularly the Russian contingents have been reported to enjoy very close relations with surrounding Serb 
forces. See for example "UN Condemns Serb Attack as Grave War Crime", The Scotsman, 14 September 1993. 
343 The frrst UNPROFOR II Commander, General Lewis MacKenzie of Canada, lasted a matter of months, and 
left embittered under accusations of being pro-Serb; he was followed by General Philippe Morillon who also spent 
much of his time arguing UNPROFOR II doctrine with the international community; and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Michael Rose, who completed a full tour, was vilified on both sides of the Atlantic as an "appeaser of Serb 
aggression". See Ian Traynor, "Bosnia's Whipping Boy Stands Firm", The Guardian, 30 September 1994; and Yigal 
Chazan, "Sarajevo MPs Unite in Call for 'Appeaser' Rose to Go", The Guardian, 26 October 1994. 
344 "Report of the Secretary-General 0.1 the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina", S/25264, 10 February 1993. 
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UNPROFOR II and the NATO air patrols tried to coordinate their actions, as NATO tried to 
provide close air support for peacekeepers under attack, and as UNPROFOR II commanders 
ordered in limited strikes against selected targets to warn the parties.345 These divisions have 
broadened into disagreements over the policing of the air exclusion zone: the agency for 
enforcing it, and the limit of the arena to be policed.346 As UNPROFOR II was subjected to 
failure after failure, cohesion among contributors began to wane, translating into a drying up of 
offers of troops and resources for the peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.347 
The lack of a cohesive command structure among the Bosnian Serb forces means that 
even if agreement to cooperation with UNPROFOR II was secured among the leadership, 
opposition to UNPROFOR II's objectives on the ground would perpetuate resistance to the 
peacekeepers in defiance of the leadership. Bitter experience has taught UNPROFOR II and the 
aid agencies that agreements with the Pale leadership are worthless when they are attempted to 
be used as the basis for action in the field. 348 Much of the Bosnian Serb army is made up of 
loosely-organised and controlled militias, or paramilitaries activated by the ethnic motivations of 
the war, and often acting according to their own understanding of the requirements of the war 
effort rather than on orders originating from the army high command.349 Neither is there a 
compelling command structure among the Bosnian Serb regular army: mutinies caused by 
disagreements and insufficient pay have been common during the confiict.35o The United 
345 The levels of decision-making that need to be negotiated when ordering an air strike include the contingent 
commander on the ground, the force commander in Bosnia, the force commander in the former Yugoslavia, the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Secretary-General, and the Commander of NATO Forces in 
Southern Europe. See Peter Pringle, "Allies Weigh Politics of Air Strikes", The Independent, 16 February 1994. 
346 The French, who favour WEU policing of the exclusion zone, are at odds with the British and the Americans, 
who insist that NATO undertakes this task. The Americans want to expand the theatre of operations into Serbia and 
Montenegro, while the Europeans want to limit operations to Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Gow, "European 
Security and the Yugoslav Wars", op. cit., 1993, p. 212. 
347 "Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia", S126066, 8 July 1993, pp. 5-6. 
348 See Marcus Tanner and Peter Pringle, "Chaos Over Policy Adds to UN Gloom", The Independent, 19 
February 1993. 
349 Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing", op. cit., 1993, p. 119. 
350 For example, Bosnian Serb elite units staged a 8-day revolt near Banja Luka in September 1993 over pay and 
living conditions. See Facts on File, 21 October 1993. 
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Nations and the other parties are well aware of the difficulties to progress posed by this 
incohesion, calling on all sides to "bring under effective command and control all armed 
units ... and to eliminate all paramilitary groups" in Bosnia.3S1 These problems with cohesion are 
exacerbated by the slow movement of orders in the former Communist command structure of 
the Bosnian Serb Anny, in which the "soldier only obeys his direct chief; if he has no orders 
from him, he sticks to the previous ones. This [gives] the Serb machine an extraordinary inertia, 
which most of the time accounted for the difficulty of having agreements respected on the 
ground.,,352 This lack of cohesion makes it difficult for the Bosnian Serb leadership to advocate 
any cooperation with UNPROFOR II, knowing that the antagonism of UNPROFOR II's 
mandate yields a significant chance of their directives being ignored in the field. 353 
The peacekeeping framework, when applied to UNPROFOR II's relations with the 
Bosnian Serbs, reveals that a direct clash of approaches led to severe limitations in the 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping interaction. That there was no basis of agreement on the 
objectives or processes of resolving the conflict has been demonstrated by the gridlock of the 
ICFY mediation. The origin of the humanitarian mandate among UNPROFOR II's sponsoring 
States lay in their reluctance to become deeply involved on the ground and corresponding 
embarrassment over their inaction, as well as the product of a fragile diplomatic consensus that 
could only agree on the lowest common denominator response. Different perceptions of the war 
and contending loyalties to the parties in conflict has led to further acrimony and deadlock in the 
United Nations, and inertia and timidity in the peacekeeping operation. Ignoring the timing of 
the insertion, UNPROFOR II was forced by extraneous concerns to be introduced to the conflict 
in spite of a void at the centre of its peacekeeping concept: the fact that there was no peace to 
keep. The absence of any agreed central concept of conflict resolution has left the operation 
implementing auxiliary tasks in an extremely unconducive environment. 
351 "Report of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia", S/24795, 11 
November 1992, p. 42. 
352 Philippe Morillon, "UN Operations in Bosnia: Lessons and Realities", RUSI Journal, Vol. 138, No.6, 
December 1993, pp. 31-35. 
353 See Kemal Kurspahic, "Stop Dickering With the Serbs and Help Bosnia Survive", International Herald 
Tribune, 29 August 1994. 
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The Bosnian Serbs are engaged in an irridentist war, a project which has incurred . 
substantial local and international opposition. Their single-minded nationalism, and the high 
stakes of their struggle, makes them impervious to any impulses other than the advancement and 
securement of their objectives. Agreements hampering these objectives are ignored. Their 
reliance on forcibly conquering territory and ethnically cleansing unwanted populations reflects 
the strength of these convictions and the single-mindedness of their methods. It follows that they 
disagreed fundamentally with the United Nations on the form of the basic resolution of the 
conflict, and opposed the objectives of humanitarian relief and enclave protection, which 
presented an obstacle to their war aims. Their strong military position coincided with their 
posture of not acquiescing to a disadvantageous intervention. These basic disagreements 
guaranteed the inevitable slide into an adversarial relationship, with instrumentality and 
impartiality compromised. The concept of a peace force was alien to the Bosnian Serbs, 
accustomed to the logic of force and overwhelming strength. However, the Bosnian Serbs 
proved reluctant to concertedly attack UNPROFOR II, apart from isolated incidents and 
hostage-takings. This was partly due to a desire not to incur greater international opposition, but 
mostly to the instrumental way they came to see the peacekeepers: as actual or potential 
hostages, and as a way to forestall greater international involvement. UNPROFOR II became for 
them an instrumental presence, but for objectives opposed to the United Nations'. UNPROFOR 
II was also hampered by deep confusion among its conflicting roles and capabilities: protective 
humanitarian peacekeeping and enforcement using NATO bombardment and other forms of 
authorised pressure. 
The deep divisions and disagreements within the international community only 
compounded UNPRClfOR II's powerlessness and predicament. Before long, the peacekeepers 
themselves became the focus of even greater acrimony among the international community. This 
confusion was compounded by the confusion of roles and responsibilities between the United 
Nations, NATO, and the WEU. These severe divisions and resulting paralysis were all exploited 
by the Bosnian Serbs. The extent of international inertia suggests that collective action through 
the United Nations is an inappropriate response to a conflict over which Member-States are so 
divided such as Bosnia. In such a situation, attempts at consensual multilateralism lead to 
279 
impotence and acrimony. Furthennore, UNPROFOR II's experience shows the folly of 
introducing a peacekeeping force to carry out auxiliary tasks when none of the prerequisites for 
peacekeeping exist: consent, a viable ceasefire, a concept for resolution, broad international 
support, and a tangible peace to keep. The peacekeeping framework thereby indicates the 
inappropriateness of peacekeeping to the Bosnia conflict, and further suggests the inadequacy of 
implementing an auxiliary humanitarian mandate without an agreed underlying resolution 
objective, and the necessary political will and cohesion of the pennanent members of the 
Security Council. 
5.4: Disarmament and Demobilisation 
The expanded peacekeeping undertaken by United Nations forces in the post-Cold War 
era often charges them with overseeing agreements to transfonn civil war situations into 
politically-integrated States committed to rebuilding and economic viability. Whereas 
conventional peacekeeping was required to oversee the separation and withdrawal of forces, 
contemporary peacekeepers are often required to disarm and demobilise the belligerents, most 
commonly the insurgent militias. This peacekeeping function is fraught with difficulties. The 
logic of insurgent behaviour reveals that weapons are the key to insurgent movements' two most 
basic motivations: they provide the means for the promotion of their interests and their 
mechanism for self-defence. Consequently, insurgents will only surrender their arms and re-
enter society if they are assured of a reasonable chance of peacefully gaining power and of 
protection from retaliation if they fail to gain power. These conditions make the peacekeeping 
framework especially appropriate to disarmament and demobilisation. The framework's 
concentration on prior agreement of approaches between the insurgents and the United Nations 
during the disarmament and demobilisation interaction, emphasises the importance of satisfying 
the insurgents' power and security concerns before the other factors can begin to impact on the 
success or failure of this stage of the peacekeeping process. 
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5.4.1: Defusing the Contras 
The United Nations' dispatch of a peacekeeping force into Nicaragua after the end of its 
civil war played a vital role in defusing the possibility of further violence in that traumatised 
State. By the end of the 1980s, the Nicaraguan civil war had developed into a bitter struggle 
domestically, and the international stand-off between the United States and the Sandanista 
government was poisoning regional reiations.354 The Sandanistas had overthrown dictator 
Antonio Samoza in July 1979, and set about restructuring Nicaraguan society along Marxist 
lines. By November 1980, however, they found their revolution under siege by bands of anti-
Marxist insurgents which they dubbed contrarevo/ucionarios, or Contras. The Contras emerged 
from a number of interests: former allies of the Sandanistas who felt the revolution had been 
"betrayed" by turning Marxist,355 loyal members of the Somozist National Guard who had 
reformed in exile/56 Miskito Indians of the Atlantic Coast who had been relocated by the 
Sandanistas,357 and peasants who had borne the brunt of the socioeconomic restructuring.358 
Coinciding with the coming to power of the Reagan administration in the United States, which 
conceived of the Reagan doctrine and Low Intensity Conflict (UC) strategy in order to roll back 
Marxist regimes, the Contras soon found themselves being organised, armed, trained, and 
directed by the CIA in camps across the Honduran and Costa Rican borders.359 
354 The Reagan administration had by early 1982, established and trained a guerrilla fighting force from the 
Somoza supporters and other opponents of the Sandanista regime, and based and supplied them along the Honduran 
border. The Sandanistas took the case of externally-sponsored aggression against the United States before the 
United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The ICJ ruled against the United States in 1986, a ruling 
ignored by the United States. 
355 Alan Riding, "Paper Hated by Somoza Now Enrages Sandanistas", New York Times, 26 November 1981. 
356 Edward Cody, "Exiles Opposing Managua Seek Wider Support", Washington Post, 8 December 1982. 
357 Loren Jenkins, "Nicaraguan Amnesty for Dissident Miskito Indians Frees 300", Washington Post, 2 
December 1983. 
358 Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods, 
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), p. 72. 
359 Juan O. Tamayo, "U.S. Bankrolling Sandanistas' Foes", Miami Herald, 19 December 1982. 
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Soon the Contras were operating as a loose coalition of nine fronts, organised around the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) operating out of Honduras, the Democratic Revolutionary 
Alliance (ARDE) operating out of Costa Rica, and the Y AT AMAfront of the Miskito 
Indians,360 and headed by a seven-member directorate drawn from these groups. The 
requirement of having to weld together such disparate interests made the Contras unable to 
enunciate a coherent ideological platform, and strategic and ideological direction was largely 
ceded to their American sponsors.36I Nevertheless, the 10,000 Contras in Honduras and the 
4,000-5,000 within Nicaragua, were able to launch an effective campaign of strikes against 
economic targets and symbols of the Sandanista regime deep inside Nicaragua.362 They used 
classical guerrilla tactics, avoiding pitched battles with the huge, Soviet-supplied Sandanista 
army, and concentrated on destabilising and discrediting the regime.363 By the end of the 1980s, 
the war had plunged Nicaragua into a severe economic crisis,364 forced the Sandanistas to 
liberalise and negotiate with the opposition, and declare internationally-observed, multi-party 
elections in February 1990. The shock defeat of the Sandanistas by the opposition UNO 
coalition deprived the Contras of their raison d'etre. The United Nations was called on to help 
manage the transition process. Originally the ONUCA force was established pursuant to the 
Esquipulas II accord365 to monitor the Central American borders and verify the cessation of 
external support for the various insurgent movements in the region. The singular circumstances 
in Nicaragua, and the need to defuse the war potential of the Contras to safeguard the transition, 
however, forced the Security Council to expand ONUCA's mandate to include its first 
experiment in disarming and demobilising an insurgent movement. 
360 Michael Radu, "The Origins and Evolution of the Nicaraguan Insurgencies, 1979-1985", Orbis, Vol. 28, No. 
4, Winter 1985, p. 823. 
361 Doyle McManus and Robert C. Toth, "The Contras: How U.S. Got Enwngled", Los Angeles Times, 4 March 
1985. 
362 Juan Tamayo, "Nicaragua Softens Claims of War", Miami Herald, 25 March 1983. 
363 Radu and Tismaneanu, op. cit., 1990, p. 73. 
364 William Branigin, "Inflation Leaps, Output Falls in Nicaragua", Washington Post, 18 August 1987. 
365 Signed on 7 August 1987 in Guatemala City by the Presidents of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala, Esquipulas II called for simultaneous ceaseftres in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, and a 90-day democratisation period to promote national reconciliation, overseen by international 
monitors. 
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5.4.1.1: Objectives 
The international community was taken by surprise by the UNO election victory, and 
galvanised by the possibility of a swift and peaceful transition of power from the Sandanistas. 
The United States, in particular, was keen to assist in the replacement of a regime that it had so 
implacably opposed for over a decade. The Reagan administration, seeing Central America as 
within its sphere of influence, had originally opposed and United Nations involvement in the 
region and found fault with regional peace plans.366 The embarrassment of the Iran-Contra 
scandal, and the more conciliatory Bush administration, had brought a new pragmatism and 
willingness to cooperate in American policy towards the region. This change in United States 
policy coincided with the thaw in superpower relations, and the complete commitment by 
President Gorbachev in the Soviet Union to his program of "new thinking", which entailed 
putting an end to regional rivalries involving the Soviet Union. This great power consensus on 
the peace process in Central America was shared by the regional States of the Contadora367 and 
Esquipulas368 Groups, which had long been advocating regional peace and cooperation for 
greater prosperity. When the UNO victory presented them with a chance to help end the 
Nicaraguan civil war quickly, peacefully, and cheaply by disarming the Contras, the States of 
the sponsoring coalition, taking the lead from Costa Rican, Venezuelan, and Mexican initiation, 
responded quickly through the United Nations, adding this component to the existing ONUCA 
force. 
These interests combined through the United Nations into a general objective to 
guarantee the peaceful transition, thereby fostering the growth of stability and "national 
reconciliation ... on the basis of democratisation and a ceasefire in the country.,,369 In the 
366 See Ronald Reagan's speech to the American people, "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras", 16 March 1986, Vital 
Speeches o/the Day, Vol. 52, No. 13,15 April 1986, pp. 386-9. 
367 Comprised of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama. 
368 Comprised of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
369 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security and Peace Initiatives", Al44/344/Add.1 and S/20699/Add.l, 26 June 1989, p. 4. 
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aftennath of the elections, it was convinced that "[t]he voluntary demobilisation of the 
Nicaraguan resistance is an essential element in the Central American peace process,,370 and was 
necessary to guarantee the election results.371 ONUCA's mandate was thus to support the 
consolidation of an elected government with a monopoly over the use of force: "to create a 
climate of national reconciliation .. .it is necessary to ensure that weapons and combat equipment 
is solely in the hands of the armed institutions of the Republic.,,372 The United Nations was well 
aware that "demobilization of the resistance forces ... [was] essential for creating a climate of 
peace, stability and tranquillity in which the transfer of power must take place.,,373 It was further 
committed to ensuring the security of the demobilised Contras and their reintegration into 
N· . 374 Icaraguan SOCIety. 
The Contras lacked any compelling independent objectives. The diversity of the Contra 
coalition rendered it unable to articulate a coherent program of government,375 other than 
toppling the Sandanistas. They adopted the standard anti-Marxist insurgent demands for free 
elections and the restoration of democracy, the end of totalitarian control, and the establishment 
of a market economy.376 The Sandanistas' introduction of liberalising refonns drove the Contras 
to cling ever more obdurately to a narrow anti-Sandanista position?77 The defeat of the 
370 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21194, 15 March 
1990, p. 5. 
371 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security and Peace Initiatives", Al451706 and S/21931, 8 November 1990, p. 2. 
372 Note by the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security 
and Peace Initiatives", Al44/927, 30 March 1990, p. 24. 
373 Note by the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security 
and Peace Initiatives", Al44/921 Annex III, 22 February 1990, p. 23. 
374 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21341, 4 June 
1990, pp. 4-5. 
375 Forrest D. Colburn, "Embattled Nicaragua", Current History, Vol. 86, No. 524, December 1987, p. 406. 
376 For Contra demands, see Ivan Molloy, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Sandanista Defeat in Context", 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No.1, May 1992, pp. 111-112, are mirrored in President 
Reagan's objectives for the insurgency in Nicaragua, see Ronald Reagan, "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras", Vital 
Speeches of the Day, Vol. 52, No. 13, 15 April 1986, pp. 386-389. 
377 The Sandanistas declared a unilateral ceasefrre in September 1987, opened a national dialogue open to all 
opposition groups in October 1987, freed 985 political prisoners and declared a general amnesty for political crimes 
in November 1987, agreed to free municipal elections in November 1987, freed 1,894 imprisoned ex-National 
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Sandanistas at the polls deprived the Contras of even this rationale, as all Contra groups 
accepted the legitimacy of the UNO victory,378 and as President-elect Violetta Barrios 
Chamorro called on them to disarm.379 The Contrast remaining objective was to return to 
normalcy in security. The Contras realised that they had become a threat to the transition, by 
offering the Sandanistas an excuse to retain power against internal security threats. Therefore, 
they wanted to demobilise in order to guarantee the results of the elections which had de lived the 
Sandanista fall from power for which they had fought unsuccessfully for over a decade. They 
were, however, were concerned about the possibility of retaliation after they had disarmed. 38o 
They had insisted that any peace agreement and disarmament had to include international 
guarantees of their security, and an end to Sandanista control of the army and police.381 Nor did 
they want to disarm outside Nicaragua.382 The Contras signed the Managua Protocol on 30 May 
1990, agreeing to disarm and demobilise in ONUCA-monitored cantonment sites in return for 
the reduction of the armed forces and the guarantee of resettlement for ex-Contras.383 There was 
thus a strong coincidence between the objectives of the Contras and ONUCA, both of whom 
wanted to guarantee the UNO election victory by disarming and demobilising the insurgents in 
security. 
Guardsmen in April 1989, deregulated the media in April 1989, introduced a new, free market-based economic plan 
in May 1989, ended conscription in August 1989, and planned free, internationally-observed elections for February 
1990. 
378 "Tocontin Agreement", Al44/931 and S/21206 Annex, 26 March 1990, p. 2. 
379 "Nicaragua's Hard Road to a New Day", New York Times, 24 April 1990. 
380 The Contras fIrst expressed this concern in August 1987 at a meeting in San Salvador with Salvadoran 
President Jose Napoleon Duarte, discussing the Esquipulas II Peace Plan. 
381 This proposal was most forcefully tendered by Contra negotiator Enrique Bermudez at the third round of 
peace talks held in Managua in May 1988. 
382 Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", in William J. Durch (ed.), 
The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative AnalYSiS, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 445. 
383 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations, 
1990), p. 399. 
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5.4.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations had originally intended that ONUCA playa role restricted to 
observing the closure of borders to external sponsorship of insurgents. The Tela Declaration 
envisaged an International Support and Yerification Commission (ClAY) would oversee the 
Contras' disarmament and demobilisation.384 The failure of CIAy385 brought home that 
disarmament and demobilisation was "not a task which can be taken on by civilian 
personneL.this task should be entrusted to military units with defensive weapons. ,,386 ONUCA's 
mandate was expanded387 and "the addition of armed personnel [added] to its strength in order 
to enable it to play a part in the voluntary demobilisation of the members of the Nicaraguan 
resistance.,,388 ONUCA would only undertake this role with the "assurance that the resistance 
was indeed determined to agree to being demobilised.,,389 ONUCA was required to protect the 
security zones and take "delivery of weapons, materiel, and military equipment, including 
military uniforms, of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance ... [and], through constant 
patrolling, [maintain] a sense of security in those areas of Nicaragua to which the demobilised 
members of the Nicaraguan resistance will return,,,390 and to destroy the weapons thereafter in 
sitU.391 It publicised the disarmament plan to the Contra rank and file,392 acting to dispel the 
384 "Tela Declaration", Al44/451 and S/20778, 9 August 1989, pp. 7,9. 
385 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security and Peace Initiatives", Al44/886 and S/21029, 21 December 1989, p. 3. 
386 "Letter Dated 28 August 1989 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of Security Council", 
S/20856, 21 September 1989, p. 1. 
387 Security Council Resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990. 
388 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21194, 15 March 
1990, p. 1. 
389 "Letter Dated 28 August 1989 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/20856, 21 September 1989, p. 2. 
390 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21194, 15 March 
1990, pp. 2-3. 
391 "Montelimar Declaration", Al44/936 and S/21235 Annex, 9 April 1990, p. 3. 
392 Report of the Secretary-Genera!, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21274, 27 April 
1990, p. 5. 
286 
concerns of the leadership and the rank and file, thereby gaining their full cooperation and 
. d' 393 genume Isarmament. 
For the Contras, international supervision of their disarmament and demobilisation 
provided access to the most secure means of guaranteeing their security from retaliation. United 
Nations peacekeepers, and the ONUCA force in particular, offered just such a mechanism. 
ONUCA became an inducement used by the UNO government to gain the Contras' agreement to 
the Managua Protocols to "an irreversible process" of disarmament and demobilisation,394 
whereby "all combatants of the Nicaraguan resistance present in Nicaragua shall proceed 
without delay to the "security zones" to carry out the various stages of the demobilisation 
process. ,,395 The ONUCA-patrolled security zones, each surrounded by 20 kilometre-wide 
demilitarised zones, provided the Contras with the additional security of physical separation 
from the Nicaraguan armed forces while they disarmed and demobilised.396 The land guarantees 
secured by the Managua Protocols brought increased Contra commitment to the disarmament 
process, as cadres were assured that demobilisation provided access to grants of secure farm 
land.397 The Contras agreed to disarm as a way of abandoning a now-pointless civil war, and in 
order to safeguard the transition to remove the Sandanistas from power from any excuse to delay 
it. Their agreement to disarm was facilitated by ONUCA's comprehensive and safe disarmament 
process, as well as the material and security inducements offered by the new Nicaraguan 
government. Ultimately, ONUCA was able to declare in June 1990 that "demobilisation had 
been completed at all locations, ... that all combatants ... [had] been demobilised; that all arms, 
ammunition and military equipment [had] been handed over to ONUCA. .. ; and that either the 
393 ibid., p. 8. 
394 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21349, 8 June 
1990, p. 2. 
395 Note Verba Ie Dated 23 April 1990 From the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security 
and Peace Initiatives", Al44/941 and S/21272, 25 April 1990, p. 7. 
396 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21274/Add.1, 2 
May 1990, p. 2. 
397 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21341, 4 June 
1990, pp. 2-3. 
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military structure of the front. .. [had] been dissolved ... or the front [had] definitively abandoned 
the armed struggle ... or it [had] converted itself into a political force. ,,398 
5.4.1.3: Instrumentality 
The Contras, who had destabilised the Sandanista government for nearly a decade, were 
clearly an obstacle to the peaceful administration of Nicaragua as an armed and active military 
force. The five regional Presidents recognised the need to tie the Contras to the peace process, 
and thereby neutralise the armed threat they posed to domestic and regional stability and 
progress.399 The Sandanistas had long accepted that the armed threat posed by the Contras could 
only be neutralised through a negotiated, internationally sanctioned peace agreement including 
both regional and international aspects of the conflict.4oO The newly-elected UNO government 
recognised that its own accession to power was dependent on securing the Contras' agreement to 
disarm and demobilise, and began negotiations with the Contras to that effect almost 
immediately after being elected. The United Nations, also, saw clearly that "demobilisation of 
the resistance forces ... [was] essential for creating the climate of peace, stability and tranquillity 
in which the transfer of power must take place.,,4ol The Contras, therefore, were seen by all of 
the parties in the peace process, and the United Nations and ONUCA, as being instrumental 
participants in the demobilisation and broader peace process in Nicaragua. 
A United Nations peacekeeping force had long been thought of as vital to the success of 
the Nicaraguan peace process. The five Central American presidents had repeatedly requested a 
United Nations force as "security verification machinery" for the regional conflict resolution 
398 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21379, 29 June 
1990,p.1. 
399 This was particularly stated in the Esquipulas II Agreement in August 1987, the Tesoro Beach Accords in 
February 1989, and the San Jose agreement in December 1989. 
400 Paul Berman, "Why the Sandanistas Lost", Dissent, Vol. 37, No.3, Summer 1990, pp. 308-309. 
401 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and 
Security and Peace Initiatives", Al44/921 Appendix VIII, 22 February 1990, p. 23. 
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process.402 Once their reason for fighting had evaporated, and the power transition depended on 
their demobilisation, the Contras were concerned to fmd a mechanism that would allow them to 
disarm in security. They requested the extension of ONUCA's mandate and force posture to 
'd h .. . al I' 403 Th proVl e t e appropnate mternatlOn presence on severa occaslOns. e Contras were 
dependent on ONUCA "to ensure the security of temporary assembly points in Nicaragua as 
long as demobilised members of the Nicaraguan resistance remain at them awaiting 
resettlement. .. [and to] maintain a sense of confidence and security to those areas of Nicaragua to 
which the demobilised members of the Nicaraguan resistance will return.,,404 The Contras also 
made use of ONUCA in ensuring that the other parties to the peace process were keeping to the 
agreements, by charging the peacekeepers with investigating suspected violations of the 
Managua Protocols by the Nicaraguan Army.405 
5.4.1.4: Impartiality 
The Contrast perception of ONUCA's impartiality was an important factor in their 
cooperation in the demobilisation process. At no stage did ONUCA or ONUVEN (United 
Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua) appear to favour the 
Sandanistas, and ONUVEN's verification of the Sandanista's defeat in the elections enhanced 
ONUCA's status in Contra eyes.406 ONUCA retained this impartial image by rigorously 
enforcing the security zones and the integrity of the demilitarised zones against army or police 
402 See especially the texts of the Tela Accord in Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central 
America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives", A/44/344/Add.l and S/20699/Add.l, 9 
October 1989, p. 2; and the Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado, in "Letter Dated 12 December 1989 From the 
Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, "The Situation 
in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives", Al44/872 and S/210 19 
Annex, 12 December 1989, p. 3. 
403 "Toncontin Agreement", Al44/931 and S/21206, 26 March 1990, p. 2; and "Statement by the Secretary-
General in Informal Consultations of the Security Council Held on 19 April 1990", S/21259, 20 April 1990, p. 3. 
404 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21194, 15 March 
1990, pp. 2-3. 
405 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21341, 4 June 
1990,p.1. 
406 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", op. cit., 1994, pp. 445-6. 
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infiltration during the demobilisation process. It was also careful to investigate the complaints 
and violations of each side with equal vigour, and to report its findings accurately and 
extensively.407 ONUCA ensured its impartiality by implementing its mandate and the Managua 
Protocols to the letter, thereby disqualifying any possible claims of bias against it.408 Thus 
ONUCA's impartiality was an important factor in the cooperative demobilisation interaction 
between itself and the Contras. 
The Contras, not a party to the Tela Accords which called for the initial ONUCA 
deployment, were initially opposed to the peacekeeping force, harassing it and preventing it 
fr . h . f 1 409 . ." b' d' d . th" ,,410 om entenng t elr zones 0 contro, seemg It as emg 1recte agamst elf mterests. 
After election, but prior to the Managua Protocols, the Contras dragged their feet on 
demobilisation, hoping to wring the greatest possible concessions from the government, and 
watchful of the continuing Sandanista control of the army.411 This led to frustrated Secretary-
General Perez de Cuellar criticising the Contras for stalling over demobilisation, commenting 
that ONUCA's role is "not to assist them in establishing armed camps.,,412 ONUCA stated that it 
required, in order to fulfil its mandate, the parties to grant it "the freedom of movement and 
communications and other facilities needed to carry out its duties.,,413 Once the Contras had 
secured the assurances and concessions they required from the UNO government in the 
Managua Protocols, and from external States, they became dependent on ONUCA to ensure the 
faithful implementation of the Protocols, as well as the security of the demobilising Contras. 
407 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21341, 4 June 
1990, p. 1. 
408 Interview with Michel Pelletier, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations 
Headquarters, New York City, 30 March 1994. 
409 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", op. cit., 1994, p. 443. 
410 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21274, 27 April 
1990, p. 5. 
411 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S121274/Add.l, 2 
May 1990, p. 3. 
412 New York Times, 3 May 1990. 
413 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21274, 27 April 
1990, p. 8. 
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From that point onwards, the Contras demobilised according to the agreed daily quOtas,414 
largely completing demobilisation by 28 June.41 5 Their commitment to demobilisation 
continued past the withdrawal of the force, when "between 29 June and 6 July 1990, an 
additional 510 members of the Nicaraguan resistarIce were demobilised and 282 additional 
weapons handed over for destruction. ,,416 
5.4.1.5: Timing 
ONUCA's efforts were facilitated by the extremely auspicious timing of the 
demobilisation process. Immediately prior to the elections, the Contrast military position was 
stalemated, and they were being forced to continue a war with a declining rationale. By the end 
of the 1980s, all prospect of violently toppling the government had vanished: they were 
outnumbered 16: 1 by Sandanista forces,417 and their desperate guerrilla war waged from within 
Guatemala and Honduras had failed to bring down the Sandanista regime. They were, however, 
safe from defeat by the Sandanistas in their safe havens in Guatemala and Honduras. The 
Contrast external support was slowly drying up with the progress of the regional peace process, 
and their attraction of supporters and recruits was waning.418 Following the elections, the 
Contras had been deprived of their rationale for existence and continuing the war. Thus, 
ONUCA was privileged to deal with an insurgent movement that had no incentive to continue 
the war, and in fact was looking to the peacekeepers for a safe way to stop fighting. The timing 
of the demobilisation operation was, therefore, ideal for gaining the cooperation of the Contras. 
414 The Managua Protocol mand,lted that at least 100 Contras demobilised each day in each of the security zones; 
a target that was being met by early June. See Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in 
Central America", S/21341, 4 June 1990, pp. 2-3. 
415 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21379, 29 June 
1990, p. 1. 
416 Report of the Secretary-General, "United Nations Observer Group in Central America", S/21909, 26 October 
1990, p. 4. 
417 Brogan, op. cit., 1992, p. 487. 
418 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", op. cit., 1994, p. 454. 
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5.4.1.6: Support and Isolation 
ONUCA's demobilisation task was made easier by the pressure external actors were 
prepared to put on the Contras in support of ONUCA's mandate. The United States supported 
the UNO election victory, and to urge the timely demobilisation of the Contras.419 At the 
request of United Nations, it diverted the $67 million it had earmarked for humanitarian aid to 
the Contras to ClAV,42o a measure which tied the Contras to the demobilisation process, by 
making their access to the vital United States humanitarian aid contingent on their cooperation 
with ONUCA and ClAY. The United States provided an indirect guarantee of the UNO victory, 
when in December 1989 it invaded Panama to restore a stolen election to its winners; thereby 
sending a warning to the Sandanistas of the sanctity of democratic election results in Central 
America.421 The regional Presidents also used whatever leverage they had, calling for the 
Contras' disbandment in the February 1989 Tesoro Beach Accord.422 This agreement put further 
pressure on the Contras by committing Honduras to close their bases on its territory, thereby 
depriving them of sanctuaries to escape to if they decided to withdraw cooperation with the 
peace process.423 These pressures further reinforced Contra cooperation with ONUCA and the 
demobilisation process. 
The regional peace process and the end of Cold War rivalry in Central America 
combined to deprive the Contras of their external supporters in the Nicaraguan civil war. 
Growing United States-Soviet rapprochement brought the cessation of Soviet support for the 
Sandanista regime.424 The Contras were heavily dependent on American supply, training, and 
military and political direction, having been created, fostered and controlled by the United 
419 Washington Post, 27 February 1990. 
420 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", op. cit., 1994, p. 443. 
421 ibid., p. 444. 
422 "Joint Declaration of the Central American Presidents", AJ441140 and S/20491 Annex, 27 February 1989, p. 
3. 
423 Richard L. Millett, "Nicaragua: A Glimmer of Hope?", Current History, January 1990, Vol. 89, No. 543, p. 
22. 
424 Ambler H. Moss Jr., "Peace in Central America?", Survival, Vol. 32, No.5, September/October 1990, p. 422. 
292 
States. The political fall-out of the Iran-Contra scandal, and the election of the more moderate 
Bush administration, was to arrest this heavy sponsorship after 1988.425 The burgeoning 
regional peace process had begun to isolate the Contras from their regional supporters. The 
accession to power of President Arias, who was detenruned to secure regional peace, ended all 
Costa Rican assistance to the Contras by 1986. Arias' pursuit of peace talks between the 
Salvadoran, Honduran, Guatemalan, Nicaraguan and Costa Rican Presidents, which resulted in a 
series of regional accords pledging, among other things, to end external sponsorship of 
insurgencies in Central America, began to restrict aid and sanctuary to the Contras formerly 
supplied by EI Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.426 Honduras, in particular, "was anxious not 
to be left with a hungry, heavily-armed refugee population on its hands, and all five Central 
American countries wanted the Contras demobilised peacefully but effectively, as an example to 
the contending parties in EI Salvador. ,,427 The Contras growing isolation thus deprived them of 
the ability to fight on, and this military calculus combined with the end of Sandanista rule to 
influence their cooperation with ONUCA. 
5.4.1.7: Cohesion 
The cohesion within the United Nations was a product of the growing cooperation 
between the members of the Security Council in the early aftermath of the Cold War. This 
cohesion was to reach its highest level starting two months after the end of ONUCA's 
demobilisation mandate with the authorisation and assembly of the coalition to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait. The Central American conflicts were for the superpowers an obstacle to their closer 
relations that needed to be resolved as quickly as possible. To this end, ONUCA was for the 
Security Council a peacekeeping force that was helping to achieve impressive political results at 
marginal cost. It was not difficult, therefore, to maintain 3trong cohesion behind the objectives 
and operation of the peacekeeping force, especially once it had begun to support the outcome of 
a democratic election ending a long-running civil war. The Security Council was nevertheless 
425 Brogan,op. cit., 1992, p. 490. 
426 See for example the Esquipulas II agreement, A/42/521-SII 9085, 31 August 1987; the San Jose Declaration, 
A/42/911-S/l9447, 22 January 1988; and the Costa del Sol Declaration, A/441I40-S/2049I ,22 February 1989. 
427 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America", op. cit., 1994, p. 454. 
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eager to minimise the costs of the operation, expressing frustration at the delays in the 
demobilization process, and calling on "all those directly involved in the demobilization process 
to take all necessary measures to maintain and, if possible, increase the rate of 
demobilisation.,,428 The Security Council was, however, quick to provide ONUCA with the 800 
additional Venezualan armed troops to implement the demobilisation, and was willing to extend 
its mandate to allow the demobilisation process to conclude under ONUCA supervision.429 
The Contras, which had been externally set up and supported, never attained a centrally-
directed cohesion, and remained a loose collection of resistance bands, whose "tactics, 
leadership and political programs ... were ... subjects of constant internal conflictS.,,430 The only 
cohesion within the Contra movement was provided by their basic anti-Sandanista rationale and 
their American direction.431 The splits between moderates and radicals in the Contra leadership 
led to difficulties in securing Contra cooperation before the elections.432 By 1988, as its 
American direction began to dry up, the Contra movement had begun to break up, with mutinies 
of militias becoming increasingly common.433 So bad was the loss of cohesion that it had begun 
to affect the Contras' viability as a fighting force. With the elections depriving the Contras of 
their remaining motivation, the movement became even more a collection of armed groups. 
ONUCA dealt with disarming a disparate and dispersed movement by extensively publicising 
the demobilising plan to all levels of the Contra movement.434 By the time they assembled in 
each of the security zones, each Contra fighter knew that in exchange for demobilisation, he or 
428 Security Council Resolution 656 (1990), 8 June 1990. 
429 Security Council Resolutions 654 (1990), and 4 May 1990; 656 (1990). 
430 Richard L. Millett, "Nicaragua's Frustrated Revolution", Current History, Vol. 85, No. 507, January 1986, p. 
6. 
431 Michael Radu, "The Origins and Evolution of the Nicaraguan Insurgencies, 1979-1985", Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 
4, Winter 1986, p. 829. 
432 The split became most obvious at the April 1988 Sapoa talks between the Contras and the Sandanistas, when 
Walter Calderon Lopez and Diogenes Hernandez Membreno were expelled from the negotiations and the resistance 
for supporting a negotiated settlement to the war. This was read by observers as evidence of a deep split and the 
ascendancy of the Bermudez faction. 
433 Brogan, op. cit., 1992, p. 492. 
434 "Letter Dated 28 August 1989 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/20802, 28 August 1989. 
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she would be given a demobilisation certificate, a shirt, "designer jeans", a food ration, and the 
right to a piece of farming land.435 In this way, ONUCA dealt creatively with the lack of 
cohesion and central direction of the insurgent movement it was mandated to demobilise. 
The first United Nations experiment in using peacekeepers to disarm and demobilise an 
insurgent movement was a stunning success. ONUCA was required to demobilise a relatively 
cooperative insurgent movement which ultimately wished to end the war, and which viewed the 
peacekeepers as guarantors of a favourable election result and vital to the Contras' own security 
as they abandoned the war. Similarly to Renamo, the Contras were dependent on external 
support and direction. Once their American support vanished, and the Sandanistas lost power, 
they had lost all reason to continue fighting. Furthermore, their continued armed presence 
threatened the transition process that had swept their enemies, the Sandanistas, from power. By 
the time ONUCA assumed the demobilisation mandate, the war-weary Contras saw it as an 
opportunity to be capitalised upon for security and to ensure the election results were honoured. 
The United Nations, unanimously endorsing the free elections, was also keen to safeguard their 
results from military interference. Free from any Member-State antagonism, encouraged by the 
regional peace momentum, and given the opportunity to harvest impressive results for a 
relatively small outlay, the Organisation duly expanded the mandate of an already-existing 
peacekeeping force. Thus, broad concurrence existed between the Contras and ONUCA on the 
objectives and mechanism of the disarmament process. Faced with an unfamiliar task, ONUCA 
planned and implemented the demobilisation process imaginatively and intelligently. The 
Contras showed some resistance to surrendering their weapons that was instinctive to a decade-
long insurgency, but this was soon overcome by ONUCA, in coalition with the new UNO 
government. The consensual Contra involvement in the demobilisation that ONUCA and the 
United Nations had insisted upon, was guaranteed by the Contras' political calculations and the 
military dynamics of the conflict. The success of the demobilisation process and the justification 
of its mechanisms of cantonment sites or security zones, presented the United Nations with a 
template for demobilisation to be applied to other conflicts. Successes in election monitoring, 
demobilisation, and other complex tasks in Namibia and Nicaragua were to develop into the 
435 Smith and Durch, "UN Observer Gr0up in Central America", op. cit., 1994, p. 454. 
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concept of expanded peacekeeping. Yet Nicaragua exhibited some unique conditions, resulting 
from the ending of the Cold War, which made the fraught task of demobilising insurgents a 
success. Such conditions were not likely to be present in other situations. The United Nations 
was soon to realise through bitter experience that not all insurgent movements were as amenable 
to demobilisation by peacekeepers as it had thought. 
5.4.2: Corralling the Khmer Rouge 
The UNTAC Force was inserted into Cambodia in March 1992 to oversee the 
implementation of the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement. The Khmer Rouge, the foremost 
insurgent movement in Cambodia, had been pressured into the agreement, only signing it when 
it believed the terms of the Agreement could be altered in its favour on the ground. UNTAC 
soon found itself trying to implement an agreement which one of the major belligerents never 
fully intended to honour. The complexity of this mandate merely added to the difficulty of the 
peacekeepers' position. The origin of UNT AC's problems with the Khmer Rouge was the 
disarmament and demobilisation provisions of the Agreement, which formed the basis ofthe rest 
of the resolution process. The Khmer Rouge, committed to the revolutionary seizure of power 
and the authoritarian transformation of Cambodian society, never sincerely agreed to surrender 
its potential to the military conquest of the State. After imperfectly complying with Phase One 
of the peace process,436 the ceasefire, the Khmer Rouge formally withdrew from Phase Two, the 
disarmament and demobilisation stage, in June 1992. Following the failure of attempts to 
negotiate the Khmer Rouge's compliance with Phase Two, UNT AC was forced to persevere 
with the peace process while dealing with an armed and belligerent Khmer Rouge force in the 
field. The UNT AC mission was adjudged a success,437 but the failure of the disarmament and 
demobilisation stage has left the new Cambodian government faced with the same Khmer 
Rouge threat as its predecessor. 
436 The Khmer Rouge's and SoC's ceasefrre violations during Phase One are reported in the "Third Progress 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", S/25124, 25 January 
1993, pp. 2, 8. 
437 For a comprehensive account of the UNTAC operation, see Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and 
Lessons ojUNTAC, SIPRl Peacekeeping Series No.1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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5.4.2.1: Objectives 
The extraordinary cohesion of the sponsoring coalition was preserved between the 
signing of the Paris Agreements and the mounting of the UNT AC force, and remained for the 
duration of the operation. France and Indonesia retained their roles as initiators and mobilisers of 
United Nations initiatives, and were closely supported by other members of the Permanent Five 
and other interested powers. The high coincidence among the sponsoring States' interests was 
reflected in the then unprecedented size and resourcing of the force and the complexity of its 
mandate. The United Nations' ultimate objective in Cambodia was to end the civil war and 
install a stable, legitimate, and internationally recognised government in place of the four 
contending claims that had existed since 1978.438 It had long realised that in order to achieve 
this, the international community would have to "create a neutral environment in which free and 
fair elections could take place,,,439 and that "[t]he regroupment, cantonment, disarming and 
demobilisation of the military forces of the Cambodian parties are essential elements both for the 
cease-fire and for the achievement of the other objectives of UNTAC.,,44o The factions' "retum 
to civilian life [was] essential in order to minimise the risk of return to warfare, stabilise the 
security situation, and build confidence among the parties, thus to ensure the best possible 
prospects of the durability of the settlement.,,441 The Permanent Five affirmed that "[s]uch an 
arrangement remain[ed] their fundamental commitment,,,442 and that demobilisation would 
allow UNT AC to scale back its size, and "carry out its mandate in an effective and cost-efficient 
marmer. ,,443 
438 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
439 "Statement on Cambodia: The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council", Paris, 13 March 1990. 
440 "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia", S/23613, 19 February 1992, p. 14. 
441 "Proposed Structure for the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict", 
Al46161 and S/22059, Annex 11,11 January 1991, p. 37. 
442 "Communique Issued on 30 August 1991 by the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the 
Five Permanent Members of the Security Council", Al46/418 and S/230 11 Annex, 4 September 1991, p. 3. 
443 "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia", S/23613, 19 February 1992, p. 14. 
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The Khmer Rouge expected to be able to use its military strength to influence the peace 
process in its favour, and consequently never intended to surrender its military advantage by 
disarming. Years of struggle for power had convinced the Khmer Rouge that it operated in an 
anarchic environment "in which guarantees were usually underwritten by force and were at best 
a vehicle for discussion when the factors of power projection altered. ,,444 It was convinced that 
the erosion of the control of the State of Cambodia (SoC) by UNTAC, the Supreme National 
Council (SNC) in which the Khmer Rouge could dominate the other resistance factions, and the 
peace process would provide it with the opportunity to infiltrate the structures of power to a 
point from which it could launch its military seizure of power.445 It tried to use its refusal to 
disarm to modify the agreement on the transitional administration of Cambodia, replacing the 
SNC with quadripartite control of key fields of administration,446 thereby infiltrating the 
government's core.447 Pol Pot calculated that any elected government, "whatever its 
composition ... [would] be a collection of unmixables ... [and that] the Khmer Rouge [would] 
triumph from this disarray by maintaining their political discipline, preserving the strongest 
military force and appealing to Khmer chauvinism. ,,448 He is reported also to have ordered the 
delay of elections until the Khmer Rouge forces controlled enough of Cambodia to be able to 
intimidate voters to elect it to power.449 The Khmer Rouge's authoritarian hold over its cadre 
and "supporters", the source of its political discipline and military dominance, was threatened by 
demobilisation and exposure to UNTAC.450 Of all of the Khmer Rouge's multiplicity of 
444 Jarat Chopra, John MacKin lay and Larry Minear, Report on the Cambodian Peace Process, (Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993), p. 16. 
445 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Damien Healey, Chairman, UNTAC Mixed Military Working Group, 14 
December 1993. 
446 The Khmer Rouge identified the five key fields as foreign affairs, defence, fmance, public security and 
infonnation. 
447 "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24286, 14 July 1992, p. 3. 
448 Gary Klintworth, Cambodia's Past, Present and Future, Working Paper No. 268, (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, 1993), p. 16. 
449 Trisha Thomas, "Into the Unknown: Can the United Nations Bring Peace to Cambodia?", Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. I, Spring 1990, pp. 507-7. 
450 ibid., pp. 511-2. 
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objectives and strategies for the peace process, none was based on the process and conclusion it 
had agreed to in the Paris Agreement. When UNT AC arrived determined to implement the 
disarmament mandate to the letter, the Khmer Rouge, fearful of the consequences of the 
disarmament process, and unable to manipUlate UNT AC to its advantage, inevitably withdrew 
its cooperation at Phase Two of the peace process and refused to disarm. Hence opposed goals 
produced competing rather than complementary approaches, ultimately leading to the 
unviability of the UNTAC-Khmer Rouge peacekeeping interaction. 
5.4.2.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
UNTAC was committed to disarmament "in such a way as to stabilise the security 
situation and build confidence among the parties ... so as to reinforce the objectives of a 
comprehensive political settlement and minimise the risks of a return to warfare. ,,451 The whole 
process 452 was to be completed in four weeks, and be irreversible.453 UNTAC was to maintain 
control of all stages of the process, and to keep all surrendered weapons in its custody.454 The 
Phase Two operation was massive: assembling 200,000 soldiers in 95 regroupment and 52 
cantonment areas;455 disarming 450,000 troops; and taking custody of 300,000 weapons and 80 
million rounds of ammunition.456 UNTAC was dependent on "the full cooperation of all parties 
concerned, and their implementation in good faith of the obligations they have undertaken in the 
comprehensive settlement agreement. ,,457 When the Khnler Rouge withdrew from Phase Two, 
451 "Statement of the Five Penn anent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on Cambodia", 
AJ45/472 and S/21689, 31 August 1990, p. 10. 
452 "Proposed Structure for the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict", 
AJ46/61 and S/22059 Annex II, 11 January 1991, pp. 19-20. 
453 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Paris, 27 September 1991, 
Article II, pp. 25-6. 
454 "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia", S/23613, 19 February 1992, pp. 16-7. 
455 The cantonment areas were later increased to 55, and divided among the parties thus: 33 for the CPAF, 14 for 
the Khmer Rouge, 5 for the KPNLF, and 3 for the ANKI, see "First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", S/23870, 1 May 1992, p. 5. 
456 "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia", S/23613, 19 February 1992, pp. 14,21. 
457 "Proposed Structure for the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict", 
AJ46/61 and S/22059 Annex III "Explanatory Note", 11 January 1991, p. 37. 
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UNTAC took "a number of steps designed to meet the concerns of the PDK.,,458 The Khmer 
Rouge acknowledged UNTAC's efforts,459 but continued to reject appeals460 for cooperation.461 
The Khmer Rouge position was rejected as inconsistent with the Paris Agreements,462 while the 
Security Council463 imposed a fuel embargo and logging and gemstone moratorium on Khmer 
Rouge areas,464 and decided to press ahead with the implementation of the Paris Agreements, 
bypassing Phase Two. UNTAC duly redeployed, taking care to monitor the borders of Khmer 
Rouge territory, effectively sealing it off from the rest of Cambodia.465 Its concept of self-
defence was strengthened to include "defence of the process[es] which [are] fundamental [to] the 
Paris Agreements" in order to operate in an environment in which the belligerents had not been 
disarmed.466 Much of the resulting success in partially implementing the Paris Agreements was 
due to UNTAC's skill in coping with Khmer Rouge opposition while firmly stewarding the rest 
of the process to its conclusion. Its consultation with all parties, and its extensive use of human 
intelligence, allowed it to respond effectively to Khmer Rouge actions against the peace 
process.467 The strict discipline and cohesion of the force further allowed it to remain an 
impartial and effective buffer between the recalcitrant Khmer Rouge and the peace process. 
458 "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24286, 14 July 1992, p. 2. 
459 Khmer Rouge negotiators acknowledged satisfaction with UNT AC verification measures at a meeting with 
Thai and Japanese mediators in Bangkok on 17 July 1992; see "Report by the Governments of Japan and Thailand 
Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Co-Chairmen of the Paris International 
Conference on Cambodia", S/24800 Annex I, 15 November 1992, p. 10. 
460 On 3 June 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali addressed a personal appeal to Khieu Samphan, which was 
rejected in a reply received on 5 June. See "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia", S/24090, 12 June 1992, p. 3. 
461 See Security Council Resolutions 766 (1992) of 21 July 1992 and 783 (1992) of 13 October 1992 and 
"Statement by the President of the Security Council", 12 June 1992. 
462 "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia", S/24578, 21 September 1992, p. l. 
463 Security Council Resolution 783 (1992) of 13 October 1992. 
464 Security Council Resolution 792 (1992) of30 November 1992. 
465 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
466 ibid. 
467 Interview with Lieutenant-General Sanderson, 15 December 1993. 
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Its determination to implement the Paris Agreement to the letter made UNT AC an 
impediment to the Khmer Rouge's manipulation of the peace process. Cooperating with 
UNT AC would have been disastrous for a movement with no political existence independent of 
its military wing: "The Khmer Rouge is the NADK: if you demobilise the entire army, there is 
no Khmer Rouge. So [demobilisation] would have been an act of self-destruction, suicidal. ,,468 
UNTAC Force Commander General Sanderson commented in retrospect: "It would only have 
been suicidal if [the Khmer Rouge] hadn't been able to put the guys through the cantonment, get 
them away somewhere and reform the army in secret in the bush. I think [UNT AC] came in 
much greater strength and with much greater determination than they anticipated, and they 
couldn't do that. ,,469 The Khmer Rouge started immediately defying UNT AC's preparations for 
Phase Two, refusing it access to Khmer Rouge territory and denying it inventories of its forces 
and weapons.470 It justified this by alleging that UNTAC had not complied by the Paris 
Agreements, failing to rigorously verify the complete repatriation of Vietnamese forces and 
implement quadripartite control of the five key administrative fields through the SNC.471 At all 
stages, the Khmer Rouge protested "its unswerving commitment to the Paris Agreement. ,,472 It 
nevertheless demanded various measures before it would rejoin the peace process.473 After 
withdrawing from Phase Two and advancing its proposals, the Khmer Rouge avoided all 
attempts at negotiating a compromise over their demands, and refusing to seriously consider any 
468 Interview with Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, UNT AC Force Commander, Canberra, 15 December 
1993. Emphasis in original statement. 
469 ibid. 
470 "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24090, 12 June 1992, p. 4. 
471 "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia", S/24578, 21 September 1992, p. 1. 
472 "Proposal of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea on the Role of the Supreme National Council and the 
Implementation of Phase II", 22 August 1992, S/24800 Appendix II, 15 November 1992, p. 15. 
473 These included increased UNTAC patrolling of the border with Vietnam, the cessation of funds to the SoC 
government, the replacement of the SNC with a five-member body consisting of UNT AC and the four factions, the 
dismantling of the SoC administrative structure, and the disenfranchisement of all non-ethnic Cambodians. See 
Klintworth, op. cit., 1993, p. 6. 
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other proposals.474 The Khmer Rouge subsequently withdrew from the SNC and its Phnom 
Penh headquarters, making it even more difficult for UNTAC to seek its cooperation.475 As the 
peace process continued around it, the Khmer Rouge radio became increasingly hostile towards 
the United Nations presence,476 it began to fire on UNTAC helicopters and personnel,477 and it 
sought to expand the territory under its contro1.478 
5.4.2.3: Instrumentality 
As in the mediation process, the Khmer Rouge's disruptive military potential outweighed 
its unsavoury genocidal reputation in mandating its inclusion by the United Nations and the 
other factions in the peace process.479 The United Nations was convinced that the Khmer Rouge 
in particular would need to be disarmed to "stabilise the security situation ... so as to reinforce the 
objectives of the comprehensive political settlement and minimise the risks of a return to 
warfare.,,480 These convictions were vindicated by early 1993, when UNTAC reported that the 
"PDK's refusal to participate in the second phase of the ceasefire ... [and] the continuing existence 
of large and sometimes undisciplined armies, as well as attempts by some of them to improve 
their positions on the ground, has had an adverse effect on the security situation in the 
474 The Khmer Rouge resisted the concerted attempts of Thai and Japanese diplomats to negotiate them back into 
the peace process. See "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 
(1992)", S/24800, 15 November 1992, pp. 11-12. 
475 Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25719,3 May 1993, p. 4. 
476 "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia", S/24578, 21 September 1992, p. 14. 
477 See "Note by the President of the Security Council", S/25822, 22 May 1993, p. 1; and "Letter Dated 28 May 
1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council", S/25871, 1 June 1993, p. 1. 
478 "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25719,3 May 1993, p. 2. 
479 This calculation has been justified by the threat that the Khmer Rouge poses now to the completed peace 
process from which it withdrew. See Terry McCarthy, "Khmer Rouge Play on Old Fears in Cambodia", The 
Independent, 14 October 1992; "Once Beaten, Khmer Rouge Again Haunts Cambodia", International Herald 
Tribune, 24 August 1994; and Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, "Pol Pot Reverts to Terror", The Guardian, 6 February 
1995. 
480 "Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on Cambodia", 
Al45/472 and S/21689 Annex, 31 August 1990, p. 11. 
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country. ,,48 I Following the Khmer Rouge's refusal to re-enter the peace process, the Secretary-
General warned that it risked "international and internal isolation if it is seen to have attempted 
to disrupt the Cambodian elections.,,482 The Khmer Rouge saw Resolution 783 (1992) as a 
"clear attempt to exclude the Democratic Kampuchea Party, kill the Paris Agreement and 
maintain the Vietnamese installed regime" in Phnom Penh,483 and stepped up its resistance to 
UNT AC's mission. While working to protect the peace process from Khmer Rouge disruption, 
UNTAC recognised its instrumentality to a viable settlement, and at all stages maintained field 
contacts with the Khmer Rouge and was prepared at all stages to accept and facilitate its re-entry 
. -th 484 
mto e peace process. 
The Khmer Rouge had included the need for an international presence to monitor the 
peace process in its negotiating proposals since the second Jakarta Informal Meeting in 
November 1988.485 It was adamant that one of its major objectives, that "the Vietnamese 
aggressors ... [withdraw] all their forces from Cambodia" should take place "under effective 
control and verification by the United Nations.,,486 Upon the signature of the Paris Agreement, 
the Security Council sent the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia to plan the UNTAC 
mission; UNT AC was not subsequently fully deployed until March 1992, five months after the 
parties had signed the agreement. This time lag resulted in a loss of momentum of the peace 
process, and allowed the situation to change on the ground and the parties to re-evaluate the 
481 "Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25124, 25 January 1993, p. 23. 
482 "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25719,3 May 1993, p. 28. 
483 Quoted in Klintworth, op. cit., 1993, p. 9. 
484 Interview with General Sanderson, 15 December 1993. 
485 This was the fmal point of an II-point paper listing the Khmer Rouge's position on peace negotiations issued 
by Khieu Samphan on 22 November 1988. See Indochina Chronology, Vol. 7, No.4, October-December 1988, p. 
13. 
486 "Declaration by Mr Khieu Samphan, President of the Democratic Kampuchea Party and Vice-President of 
Cambodia in Charge of Foreign Affairs Condemning the Vietnamese Aggressors and Their Lackeys for Making an 
Attempt on the Life of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Cambodia", Al45/220 and 
S/21253 Annex, 14 April 1990, p. 3. 
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agreement in light of these changes.487 The Khmer Rouge was given five unmonitored months 
in which to begin manipulating the Peace Agreement.488 By June 1992, UNTAC, although seen 
by the other parties as instrumental to keeping the Khmer Rouge to the Peace Agreement, was 
seen by the Khmer Rouge as a threat to its military preparedness and its discipline over its 
cadres and supporters. To the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC was the body responsible for 
implementing the Paris Agreement the Khmer Rouge felt forced into signing against its will, and 
thus became an opponent rather than a monitoring mechanism to be cooperated with. 
5.4.2.4: Impartiality 
Given the volatility and complexity of the Cambodian civil war, UNTAC's commanders 
were aware of the need to adhere closely to the Paris Agreement to preserve their 
impartiality.489 It had intended to maintain the parties' confidence and cooperation with the 
peace process through participating in the mechanisms of the Mixed Military Working Group 490 
and the SNC.491 UNTAC undertook to investigate impartially and rigorously any complaints or 
cases of defaulting on the provisions of the Paris Agreements.492 Following the Khmer Rouge's 
withdrawal from Phase Two, UNTAC tried to make "every effort ... to ... persuade PDK to join 
phase II and to cooperate with UNTAC and the other three parties,,493 and for the remainder of 
its deployment, maintained contact with the Khmer Rouge, informing it of developments within 
the Mixed Military Working Group, the SNC, and of the results of its investigations of ceasefire 
487 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
488 Chopra, MacKinlay and Minear, op. cit., 1993, p. 20. 
489 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
490 "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia", S/23613, 19 February 1992, p. 12. 
491 "Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on Cambodia", 
AJ45/472 and S121689 Annex, 31 August 1990, p. 3. 
492 "Proposed Structure for the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict", 
Al46/61 and S/22059 Annex II, 11 January 1991, pp. 22-3. 
493 "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24286, 14 July 1992, p. 5. 
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violations.494 The Security Council decided to press on with implementing the Paris 
Agreements,495 because "[ n lot to proceed would mean ceding to unacceptable threats and giving 
the right of veto over the peace process to an anned group that has rejected its commitment 
under the Paris Agreements. ,,496 Following the abandonment of Phase Two, UNTAC was 
redeployed to "correspond to the borders of the Cambodian provinces ... [to] conform with the 
deployment of electoral teams and shorten the time taken to respond to potential threats to 
them.,,497 In the final analysis, however, UNTAC's maintenance of strict impartiality between 
the parties had no effect on persuading the Khmer Rouge to cooperate once it had disagreed with 
the objectives and mechanisms ofthe disannament process. 
Despite its protestations of fidelity to the Paris Agreement,498 the Khmer Rouge's 
withdrawal from Phase Two seriously compromised "the ability of UNT AC to adhere to the 
timetable set by the Security Council. ,,499 The other Cambodian factions began to canton and 
disann their forces, but UNTAC soon realised that the Khmer Rouge's failure to disann at a 
proportional rate would soon place them a severe military disadvantage to a fully operational 
Khmer Rouge.500 It duly stopped the disarmament process, "because of the need to ensure that 
[the disarmament] process [was] undertaken in such a way as to maintain the military balance 
between the four parties.,,501 Because uneven disarmament would leave the Khmer Rouge with 
494 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
495 Security Council Resolution 766 (1992) of 21 July 1992. 
496 "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25719,3 May 1993, p. 27. 
497 "Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/25124, 25 January 1993, p. 10. 
498 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992)", S/24800 
Appendix II, 15 November 1992, p. 15. 
499 "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24286, 14 July 1992, p. 4. 
500 At the apex of the disarmament process, on 10 September 1992, UNT AC had disarmed and cantoned 42,368 
CPAF troops, 3,445 ANKI troops, and 6,479 KPNLAF troops, but no Khmer Rouge troops. See "Second Progress 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", S!24578, 21 
September 1992, p. 5. 
501 "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24286, 14 July 1992, p. 3. 
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a massive military advantage, UNTAC was forced to suspend Phase Two and allow the factions 
to keep their weapons.502 The Khmer Rouge's refusal to cooperate thereby made UNTAC's task 
infinitely more difficult: "The election will take place while a substantial part of the forces of the 
Cambodian parties remain under arms ... [which] will add to UNTAC's difficulties both in 
organising the election and in ensuring, as best it can, the security of candidates, voters and 
electoral officials through the electoral process.,,503 Its attacks on UNTAC and the electoral 
process were driven by its conviction that the elections would by biased and serve only to 
legitimate the SoC-Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. 504 
5.4.2.5: Timing 
By the time UNTAC deployed to oversee the implementation of the Paris Agreements, 
the Khmer Rouge had established an unassailable military potential. The Cambodian civil war 
had settled into a stalemated cycle of wet and dry season offensives which neither side was 
capable of winning outright. Meantime, however, the Khmer Rouge had consolidated a tightly-
disciplined guerrilla army, well-supplied from hidden caches of weapons, and timber and gem 
smuggling, and safe from attacks on its bases in the Cardamom Mountains and across the Thai 
border, with the covert cooperation of the Thai Generals. From this position, the Khmer Rouge 
was secure in its potential to disrupt any form of settlement or administration with which it 
disagreed for a long time in the future. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia provided the 
Khmer Rouge with a rationale for fighting, a morale-sustaining threat, and international 
legitimacy as a resistance group.505 After the failure of the Khmer Rouge attempt at a military 
solution when the Vietnamese withdrew by the end of 1989,506 they retreated to guerrilla 
502 Phase Two, by the time it was abandoned, had disanned just 52,292 troops out of an estin: ated 450,000 active 
soldiers and militia in Cambodia, perpetuating the hostilities between especially the SoC and the Khmer Rouge. 
503 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992)", 
S/24800, 15 November 1992, p. 6. 
504 Khmer Rouge spokesman Mak Ben, quoted in Klintworth, op. cit., 1993, p. 12. 
505 John Pedler, "Cambodia: Danger and Opportunity for the West", World Today, Vol. 45, No.2, February 
1989, p. 19. 
506 Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard, (New York: Praeger, 
1991), p. 215. 
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warfare once more to wait until the objectives conditions were propitious for the military seizure 
of power. It was determined to maintain its military potential and political discipline until 
UNT AC's departure, whereupon it could launch an attack on the new government. These 
military calculations made the timing ofUNTAC's demobilisation attempt unsuitable. 
5.4.2.6: Support and Isolation 
The UNT AC operation enjoyed perhaps the highest level of international support of any 
post-Cold War peacekeeping operation. The Paris Agreements were universally acclaimed, and 
at the time of UNTAC's deployment, the United States,507 China/OS the ASEAN States,509 and 
India510 all expressed support for its mission. As UNTAC confronted Khmer Rouge non-
cooperation, the Chinese sought to use their leverage over the movement to induce the 
movement back into the peace process, making contacts as high as Pol Pot within the Khmer 
Rouge leadership.511 Chinese Foreign Minister Quian Qichen publicly warned that the Khmer 
Rouge that it would be "completely isolated" if it sabotaged the peace process.S12 However, 
"[p]rivately, Chinese officials claim that they can exert little real influence over the Khmer 
Rouge leadership,,,s13 and their appeals had little influence on modifying the Kluner Rouge 
position. Its withdrawal from Phase Two prompted the Secretary-General to appeal to the States 
at the Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and Development for support 
UNTAC's efforts to implement Phase Two and the whole peace process.S14 Meanwhile, 
507 Jennar, "UNTAC: International Triumph in Cambodia?", op. cit., 1994, p. 145. 
508 David Roberts, "Cambodia: Problems ofa UN-Brokered Peace", The World Today, Vol. 48, No.7, July 1992, 
p.30. 
509 Gerhard Will, "The Elections in Cambodia: Taking Stock of a UN Mission", Aussenpolitik, Vol. 44, No.4, 
1993, p. 394. 
510 Pedler, "Cambodia: Danger and Opportunity for the West", The World Today, Vol. 45, No.2, February 1989, 
p.21. 
511 The Australian, 15 August 1992. 
512 Klintworth, op. cit., 1993, p. 18. 
513 Nayan Chanda, "Civil War in Cambodia?", Foreign Policy, Vol. 76, Fall 1989, p. 38. 
514 "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia", 
S/24090, 12 June 1992, p. 3. 
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Thailand and Japan held a series of meetings with the Khmer Rouge to attempt to mediate its 
concerns on the role of the SNC and secure its re-entry into the peace process.SIS The Co-
Chairmen of the Paris Conference, France and Indonesia, convened a 10-State conference with 
the Khmer Rouge in Beijing, to urge its cooperation with Phase Two of the settlement 
process.Sl6 The Khmer Rouge's self-reliance, and its determination to disrupt a peace process 
with which it disagreed, ensured that none of these efforts on behalf of UNT AC were able to 
convince the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the international dynamic driving the Cambodian civil 
war had collapsed, as former sponsors of the factions became more interested in rapprochement 
and establishing links than thwarting each other in Cambodia. As the superpowers ended their 
involvement in the conflict, China, the Khmer Rouge's major supporter, found itself isolated in 
supporting a genocidal group, and deprived of its anti-Vietnamese justification for this 
support? 7 Chinese involvement in the Permanent Five resolution efforts, and its gradual 
withdrawal of support from the Khmer Rouge, had begun to isolate it from its major supporter. 
This factor was significant in the compelling the Khmer Rouge's signature of the Paris 
Agreement, but was insufficient to secure its cooperation with the provisions of the Agreement 
on the ground. The Khmer Rouge's military potential to disrupt the peace process, stockpiled 
and secure from attack in the north-west border regions, was not immediately affected by the 
end of Chinese assistance, particularly to masters of guerrilla warfare like the Khmer Rouge. 518 
Elements of the Thai military continue to provide the Khmer Rouge with military supplies in 
exchange for timber and gemstonesSI9 despite the Thai government's efforts to comply with the 
515 "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992)", 
S/24800, 15 November 1992, pp. 1,9-11. 
516 New York Times, 8 November 1992. 
517 William S. Turley, "The Khmer War: Cambodia After Paris", Survival, Vol. 32, No.5, September/October 
1990, pp. 488-9. 
518 Chopra, MacKinlay and Minear, op. cit., 1993, p. 9. 
519 Raoul M. Jennar, "UNTAC: International Triumph in Cambodia?", Security Dialogue, Vol. 25, No.2, 1994, 
p.150. 
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Paris Agreements and the logging and gemstone moratorium. 520 For an insurgent movement as 
fiercely independent and equipped as the Khmer Rouge, isolation from a major sponsor had little 
effect on its determination to pursue a patient campaign of guerrilla disruption of the peace 
process. 
5.4.2.7: Cohesion 
UNTAC was able to rely on strong cohesion within the United Nations generally, and 
the Security Council specifically, behind its efforts to implement the Paris Agreements. The 
Operation was careful to maintain strict neutrality and transparency in its relationship with the 
parties and to the Security Council, and meticulous in faithfully carrying out the wishes of the 
Security Council, in order to maintain this cohesion behind its actions.521 General Sanderson 
saw that maintaining force cohesion was a key goal, because "maintaining the unity of the force 
is the key to maintaining the base of your negotiating position and contention that you are 
representing the entire international community.,,522 At all stages of its deployment, UNTAC 
was able to rely on instantaneous contact with the ambassadors of the permanent five of the 
Security Council, as well as the Australian, Japanese, Thai, Vietnamese and Indonesian 
ambassadors, and could rely on their advice and endorsements for certain actions. 523 UNTAC 
assigned one of its personnel to act as a liaison presence at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York, and thereby minimising misunderstandings and maintaining cohesion behind the field 
operation.524 The unanimous support for Security Council Resolution 766 (1992)525 was 
intended "to communicate to the parties that UNTAC should implement its mandate vigorously 
520 "Position of the Royal Thai Government with Regard to Security Council Resolution 792 (1992) on 
Cambodia", S/24873 Annex, 30 November 1992, p. 2. 
521 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
522 Interview with General Sanderson, 15 December 1993. 
523 Interview with General Sanderson, 15 December 1993. 
524 ibid 
525 Security Council Resolution 766 (1992) of 21 July 1992 demanded Khmer Rouge (although unnamed in this 
resolution) cooperation with phase two, and reafflITtled its full support for UNTAC's efforts in carrying out its 
mandate fully. 
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and to the full.,,526 However, even the cohesive support of the Security Council behind its efforts 
was not sufficient to help UNT AC discharge its mandate over the opposition of the Khmer 
Rouge. 
The Khmer Rouge was able to maintain its strict non-cooperation with the peace process 
by maintaining rigid control over its cadre. Although it is loosely organised on regional 
commands,527 the Khmer Rouge combines terror, ideological indoctrination, and the use of 
political commissars to preserve discipline with the commands of its leadership.528 Following 
the unsatisfactory outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, it is reasonable to speCUlate that the 
moderate faction within the Khmer Rouge, led by Sonn Sen and Khieu Samphan, had begun to 
lose credibility; and that it adopted the policy of the hawks, led by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, of 
non-cooperation and planning for the military seizure of power. 529 Once this hard-line policy 
was adopted, it was strictly enforced among the Khmer Rouge militias, with general political 
directives passed on to regional commanders by mobile political commissars and the Khmer 
Rouge Radio station, "The Voice of the Greater Union Front of Cambodia".53o The regional 
commanders, in tum, used a variety of methods of command and terror to maintain discipline to 
the new line among the ranks. 531 In these ways, the Khmer Rouge was able to maintain a 
cohesive and disciplined resistance to the peace process that UNT AC was trying to implement. 
The May 1993 Cambodian elections yielded a popular government legitimated in the 
eyes of the international community, and endorsed by almost all Cambodian factions, including 
the Khmer Rouge. UNTAC withdrew in September 1993, hailed as a success story for at one 
time the biggest, most expensive and most ambitious United Nations peacekeeping operation. 
526 "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia", S/24578, 21 September 1992, p. 16. 
527 Craig Etcheson, "Civil War and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.1, January 1987, p. 200. 
528 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
529 Un attributable sources; based on a series of off-the-record discussions. 
530 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Healey, 14 December 1993. 
531 Interview with General Sanderson, 15 December 1993. 
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Yet the breakdown of the disarmament and demobilisation component of that mission has left 
Cambodians to fight on against a Khmer Rouge of undiminished strength and unmoderated 
ferocity. This failing was demonstrated by the peacekeeping framework to have originated in the 
Paris Agreements. Due to problematical mediation procedures, the Khmer Rouge interpreted the 
agreement differently to UNT AC. The Khmer Rouge wished to modify the provisions of the 
agreement, while UNT AC was determined to adhere rigidly to the resolution mechanisms 
contained in the Paris Agreement and the directives of the Security Council. Profound 
differences in the conception of agreements between an Organisation of States and an insurgent 
movement were compounded by contradicting interests in the peace process. These 
contradictions focussed over the issue of disarmament and demobilisation. The Khmer Rouge's 
ideology and past experience of taking power had convinced it of the primacy of military 
mechanisms for overthrowing government and siezing power. These tactics dictated the supreme 
importance of keeping its weapons, and preserving its organisation, discipline, and isolation of 
its supporters and cadres from outside influence. Thus the Phase Two demobilisation was 
exactly one of the provisions of the Paris Agreements that it wished to modify. The United 
Nations, encouraged by its internal consensus, was eager to sponsor a comprehensive solution to 
the Cambodian conflict. The disarmament and demobilisation of all of the parties was vital to 
this comprehensive solution. UNT AC's objective, to implement to the letter this aspect of the 
Paris Agreements, therefore directly contradicted the Khmer Rouge's. Oblivious to this, the 
interested States were more obsessed with solving the external problems of the conflict than 
paying attention to the internal difficulties of their project. 
Conceptions of the function of the peacekeeping force also differed: UNT AC complied 
strictly to the agreement, while the Khmer Rouge saw the force as either the enforcer of a new 
status quo, or a mechanism to be manipulated and exploited for its own ends. The Khmer 
Rouge's military strength meant that once it had refused to demobilise, the momentum and 
viability of the entire peace process came into question. The United Nations decided to press on 
with the peace process regardless, requiring UNT AC's redeployment and management of the 
process against Khmer Rouge opposition. This was a crucial decision. Much of the peace 
process was salvaged, but the Khmer Rouge still remains a threat. At this point, a significant 
difference of approach lies between UNT AC and other peacekeeping operations faced with 
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similar problems. UNT AC refused to try to enforce compliance on the Khmer Rouge, and at all 
stages tried to persuade the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process. It was careful to remain 
faithful to the letter of the Paris Agreements, to keep the Security Council informed of its 
actions, and to consult the Security Council on each problem it encountered. In this way, it 
maintained the endorsement and support of the Security Council, and ensured that its Members 
remained in agreement about the operation. While such cohesion and support was unable to 
pressure the Khmer Rouge to comply, it allowed a substantial portion of the peace process to be 
salvaged. As we have seen, peacekeeping forces faced with similar problems of insurgent non-
compliance in Somalia and Bosnia reacted differently, with adverse consequences for the entire 
peacekeeping interaction. In this way, skilful negotiation of a difficult process by UNTAC, and 
the maintenance of cohesive international support for the operation, compensated to some extent 
for the divergence of approaches to the peacekeeping interaction between the peacekeepers and 
the Khmer Rouge. 
5.5: Conclusion 
The application of the peacekeeping framework to tasks and movements as diverse as 
those described above confirms a main finding of the other analyses undertaken, and bears out 
the hypothesis of this thesis, that between the United Nations and insurgent movements, 
concurring approaches produce more optimal outcomes than divergent approaches. These basic 
indices of approaches, as applied to peacekeeping - objectives, interaction mechanisms, 
instrumentality, impartiality, timing, isolation and support and cohesion - each impact in a 
distinctive way on the outcome of the United Nations-insurgent relationship. These factors also 
vary in their effect across the different types of peacekeeping task: monitoring cease fires, 
maintaining aid flows, and disarmament and demobilisation. Comparing the way each of the 
indices operates across the range of insurgent movements and peacekeeping tasks to which the 
peacekeeping framework has been applied yields important conclusions as to their relative 
importance in the relationship between peacekeepers and insurgents. 
Peacekeeping involves higher levels of commitment and risk for the peacekeepers and 
insurgents involved in the interaction. As a consensual relationship, either an agreement on 
312 
purposes or a basic acquiescence to the other's presence must underlie a viable interaction. A 
clash of interests between two such armed forces will almost inevitably lead to a breakdown in 
the interaction, or hostilities. It emerges from the analysis that a complementarity of objectives 
forms the basis of the success of a peacekeeping mission, and therefore undergirds the viability 
of the entire peace process. Since the objectives of peacekeepers will always centre on ending 
the conflict, an effective relationship requires an insurgent group which is ultimately committed 
to ending its insurgency. Renamo had been deprived of external support and direction on which 
it was so dependent, and its loss of appetite for the war compelled it to end its insurgency. 
ONUMOZ concurred in helping to implement this conclusion of the Rome agreement. The 
Contras, similarly, were deprived of their external support and direction by the end of the Cold 
War, as well as their rationale by the electoral defeat of the Sandanistas. Once again, ONUCA 
was keen to help them disarm, thereby safeguarding the election results. Both interactions 
returned optimal results. The USC-SNA, motivated by a passion for clan survival and 
predominance, was unprepared to stop fighting until it had prevailed. It was therefore 
completely opposed to the nation-building project of UNOSOM II, which would leave General 
Aideed with one voice among eighteen in a new government. The USC-SNA-UNOSOM II 
interaction soon became dysfunctional, leading to hostilities and the eventual withdrawal of 
UNOSOM II. The Bosnian Serbs, similarly motivated by the need for ethnic self-determination, 
were unprepared to countenance UNPROFOR II proposals to preserve and return them to living 
in a polyglot State. These diverging objectives have consigned that peacekeeping interaction to 
extreme difficulties. The Khmer Rouge's objective of preserving its military capability and 
exploiting the Paris Agreements clashed directly with UNTAC's determination to implement 
them, and disarm and demobilise all of the groups. While the skill and even-handedness of 
UNT AC enabled a salvaging of the process despite Khmer Rouge attacks, this basic divergence 
of objectives guaranteed an ultimately sub-optimal outcome, where the Khmer Rouge fights on. 
The peacekeeping framework demonstrated strongly that agreement on objectives can form the 
foundation on which a successful relationship is based; whereas disagreement on objectives with 
a major insurgent movement will hamper a peace process despite the best efforts of the 
peacekeeping force. 
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The commonality of conceptions on the presence and purpose of the peacekeeping 
operation between the peacekeepers and the insurgent movement were shown to correspond 
closely to the viability of the interaction. Peacekeeping operations represent the introduction of 
an armed force into a conflict zone; therefore agreement between the participants to this 
presence will forestall hostilities and allow the smooth implementation of the purposes of the 
peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping forces are essentially instruments sent to implement an 
agreement or mandate by the United Nations. Insurgents' agreement or disagreement to their 
function follows from their agreement or disagreement on the objectives of the peace process 
that the peacekeeping force is sent to facilitate. Basically, a peacekeeping force is only 
appropriate when there is a peace to keep. This relationship was revealed clearly by the 
peacekeeping framework. Regardless of their tasks - monitoring ceasefires, maintaining aid 
flows or disarmament and demobilisation - peacekeepers obtained genuine agreement and 
cooperation of the major insurgents to their presence when the insurgents had already agreed 
with the United Nations on the objectives of the peace process. Renamo, committed to ending 
the war, was not threatened by ONUMOZ's presence, but rather saw it as a guarantee of the 
Rome agreement. The Contras, also, eventually accepted that the presence and disarmament 
function of ONUCA was important to the securement of their war aims. The USC-SNA, 
profiting from the anarchy and starvation in Somalia, was threatened by a large, powerful 
UNOSOM II presence dedicated to alleviating these conditions. Similarly the Bosnian Serbs, 
advancing irridentist objectives through force and ethnic cleansing, resented the arrival of 
UNPROFOR II, charged with arresting this advance. The Khmer Rouge's conception of 
UNTAC as a force to be manipulated to its own ends, clashed with UNTAC's self-perception as 
an instrument inserted to faithfully implement the Paris Agreements. The correlation is strong: 
where Renamo and the Contras agreed with ONUMOZ's and ONUCA's conceptions of 
peacekeeping, the interaction yielded optimal results; whereas when the USC-SNA, the Bosnian 
Serbs and the Khmer Rouge disagreed with the peacekeeping concepts of UNOSOM II, 
UNPROFOR II, and UNTAC, the interactions were either sub-optimal or dysfunctional. 
UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR II also demonstrated the importance of the appropriate 
preconditions for the intervention of a peacekeeping force, and the importance of a clear 
operational doctrine for those peacekeepers. 
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The insurgents' perception of the instrumentality of the peacekeeping forces' presence to 
their achievement of their objectives follows directly from their previous agreement on 
objectives and the peacekeeping mechanism. Such previous agreement or disagreement 
determines whether the peacekeeping force is seen as an opportunity or as a threat. Renamo, 
wanting to end the war in security and wealth, saw ONUMOZ as the gatekeeper to both. Its 
cooperation led to the effectiveness of the interaction. The Contras saw ONUCA as a guarantor 
of the Sandanista loss of power, as well as a shield against possible Sandanista revenge. Its 
willingness to disarm for ONUCA enabled the smooth functioning of a problematic task. The 
USC-SNA saw a large, powerful UNOSOM II working to different goals, as a threat, and 
immediately began to wage war against it, dooming the operation and its objectives to failure. 
The Bosnian Serbs, saw UNPROFOR II as a frustrating impediment to their war aims, and 
immediately set about impeding and circumventing the peacekeepers' efforts, ultimately 
paralysing and thwarting the operation. The Khmer Rouge came to view UNT AC as a force that 
couldn't be manipulated, and which therefore needed to be avoided. 
The United Nations' perception of the importance of each of these insurgent movements 
to the ultimate resolution of the conflict determined how each of the groups was treated by the 
peacekeeping forces. Renamo, the Bosnian Serbs, the Contras and the Khmer Rouge were all 
regarded by the United Nations as instrumental to settlements of their respective conflicts, and 
were accordingly treated carefully by peacekeeping forces careful not to antagonise them and 
trying to induce them to rejoin the peace process. UNTAC, especially, demonstrated that the 
selection of an appropriate peacekeeping strategy impacts strongly on the eventual effectiveness 
of the peacekeeping interaction. The USC-SNA, however, was seen by the United Nations as a 
frustrating faction among many, and thus able to be overcome before an agreement was reached. 
When UNOSOM II was consequently ordered by the Security Council to neutralise the USC-
SNA as a force, a mounting rate of hostilities led to disaster, making UNOSOM II arguably the 
biggest post-Cold War peacekeeping failure. Instrumentality, therefore, is dependent on the 
protagonists' perceptions, and in turn determines immediately the consensual or adversarial 
behaviour of the insurgents and peacekeepers towards each other, with important consequences 
for the effectiveness of the interaction. 
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Differing degrees of impartiality also have an effect on the success or failure of the 
peacekeeping relationship. The impartiality of the peacekeeping operations was affected by 
deeper agreements or disagreements on objectives and implementation mechanisms with the 
insurgents. ONUMOZ, implementing an agreement that Renamo also wanted implemented, 
experienced little difficulty in assuring the insurgents of its impartiality. ONUCA also was able 
to appear impartial to the Contras, which saw it as helping them to demobilise safely, thereby 
ensuring the transition of power away from the Sandanistas. The case of UNT AC emerged as 
the exception. It was able to maintain its image of impartiality despite Khmer Rouge opposition, 
although the Khmer Rouge made a number of half-hearted accusations of its bias towards the 
SoC. UNPROFOR II's advancement of objectives more amenable to the Bosnian Serbs' enemies 
has irretrievably damaged its impartiality in the eyes of the insurgents. UNOSOM II's open 
advocacy of the Ali Mahdi Manifesto group, as well as its offensive operations against the USC-
SNA, dispelled any facade of impartiality, and pulled it into the war it was supposed to remain 
above. The experience of UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR II also revealed the ease with which 
belligerents can manipulate peacekeeping operations that find themselves in difficult situations 
without having been based on secure foundations of consent and agreement. Impartiality, then, 
has a more contingent impact on the viability of the peacekeeping venture. 
The timing of the insertion of a peacekeeping force impacts in some cases on the 
insurgents' readiness to agree on the peacekeeping objectives and compromise on the 
mechanisms of peacekeeping. Renamo's and the Contras' military fortunes had declined to such 
an extent that they perceived ONUMOZ and ONUCA as ways to escape a hurting stalemate. 
The USC-SNA and the Bosnian Serbs were either militarily ascendant or strongly entrenched, 
and therefore viewed UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR II as political and military impediments 
with adversary goals, and forces to be resisted or attacked. Once again, the Khmer Rouge 
disturbs this pattern. Its entrenched but stagnant military position would suggest a greater 
amenability to cooperation with a peace process, rather than the resistance experienced by 
UNT AC. Its ideology and revolutionary belief, and its recognition that demobilisation entailed 
annihilation, acted to temper this relationship, dictating a different realist calculation. Timing 
thus has an effect on the fortunes of a peacekeeping relationship between the United Nations and 
an insurgent movement, but certainly not an automatic correlation. 
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Support and isolation emerged from the application of the peacekeeping framework to 
the above cases as factors at times impacted on the underlying conditions for the viability of a 
mission, and at other times had an acceleratory effect on effectiveness or problems once a 
mission had begun. Isolation and pressure on the USC-SNA could not temper its belligerence, 
born of fierce independence and clan nationalism. The Bosnian Serbs have been imperfectly 
isolated, and the few methods of pressure that the United Nations has been able to apply have 
not modified their belligerence at all. Furthermore, once UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR II had 
begun to incur their often violent opposition, the evaporating international support only served 
to compound the operations' difficulties. The isolation of Renamo and the Contras, however, 
prompted their initial decision to cooperate with the United Nations to resolve the conflict. The 
successes registered by ONUMOZ and ONUCA made it easier for them to maintain 
international support behind their actions. While isolation had little effect on the Khmer Rouge's 
decision not to cooperate, strong international support for UNT AC made little difference in its 
attempts to bring the movement back into the peace process. The correlation of levels of support 
and isolation to the viability of peacekeeping interactions, then, has an inconsistent impact. 
Cohesion also played a lesser, but acceleratory role in the levels of optimality of the 
peacekeeping interactions examined. As a factor influencing the insurgent movements' 
cooperativeness, it had marginal effects. Renamo, the Contras, the Bosnian Serbs, and the USC-
SNA all exhibited low levels of organisational cohesion, but demonstrated widely varying levels 
of cooperativeness with peacekeeping forces. The Khmer Rouge, possessing strong cohesion, 
was considerably less cooperative than the decentralised and fissiparous Renamo and Contra 
organisations. Cohesion of the peacekeeping forces, and behind them, of the Security Council, 
had greater impact on the failure of peacekeeping forces than it had on their successes. Cohesion 
within and behind ONUMOZ and ONUCA had little apparent effect on the success of these 
operations, while strong cohesion within and behind UNT AC had little effect on securing 
Khmer Rouge cooperation, although it contributed to the salvaging and partial success of the 
mission as a whole. The dissolution of cohesion within and behind UNOSOM II and 
UNPROFOR II served to compound the problems the peacekeeping forces had in implementing 
their already-contested mandates, while encouraging the USC-SNA's and Bosnian Serbs' 
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resistance to and attacks on them. Thus cohesion too, plays an important, but less significant role 
in the operation of the peacekeeping relationship. 
Concurrence in approaches, and most importantly in objectives and mechanisms, but 
also significantly in instrumentality and impartiality, were thus shown to correspond to the 
viability of interactions between United Nations peacekeepers and insurgent movements. The 
hypothesis was thereby generally borne out by the examination of peacekeeping interactions 
undertaken. Other, practical conclusions emerged as well, however. Close study demonstrated 
just how problematic peacekeeping is in contemporary civil wars. This chapter demonstrated 
that success came only on those rare occasions where extraordinary conditions of cooperation 
and consent existed among the insurgent movements. Due to the end of the Cold War, Renamo 
and the Contras exhibited almost interstate levels of constraint and fidelity to agreements they 
had made. Unfortunately, the Somali and Bosnian civil wars seem to be the wars of the future, 
with grave ramifications for the suitability of United Nations peacekeeping. Insurgents in these 
civil wars exhibit extreme realism, a preparedness to attack and exploit the international 
community, and have no qualms about repudiating or ignoring agreements they have signed. 
United Nations peacekeepers are therefore subject to this basic logic as well as United Nations 
mediators. Peace enforcement by United Nations peacekeepers is shown to be a flawed concept, 
because of the realism of insurgents, the lack of adequate doctrine or capabilities, and the 
fragility of United Nations coalitions. Bosnia and Somalia show that inappropriate peacekeeping 
methods entail failure while harming United Nations prestige and the consensus of its Member-
States. These operations will continue to impact on post-Cold War peacekeeping for some time. 
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6: ELECTION MONITORING 
Election monitoring marks the concluding phase of the United Nations' interaction with 
the insurgent movement. Elections mark the insurgents' reintegration into the States' political 
system: "UN-monitored elections should be regarded as a watershed event in a nation's 
emergence from civil insurrection ... following commitments by rebel groups to participate 
peacefully in a political process."l After the election, the group is not longer insurgent, but is a 
part of the State's political system. As it abandons its military mechanism of seizing power and 
defending itself, the insurgent movement is naturally a sceptical participant in the delicate run-
up to the elections that will mark the end of the civil war. Between the United Nations, charged 
with overseeing this process, and the insurgent movement, a wary participant, exists the same 
logic of interaction and lack of influence that was described in Chapter Three. This chapter 
analyses how this interaction applies to their relationship during internationally monitored 
elections. The first section adapts the framework to election monitoring to demonstrate how 
each of its indices operates during the holding of elections. The next two sections apply this 
election monitoring framework to two case studies: the Salvadoran elections of March 1994 
offer insights into the components of a successful election, while the Angolan elections of 
September 1992 are an opportunity to explore a failed election. Comparing these studies allows 
the testing, as it relates to election monitoring, of the hypothesis that between the United Nations 
and insurgent movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions than 
divergent approaches. 
6.1: Election Monitoring: A Framework for Analysis 
Election monitoring is the oversight of an election or plebiscite by an invited, 
international presence, in order to ensure the free and fair conduct of the election process. The 
United Nations sees election monitoring as an essential part of post-conflict peace-building, in 
which the Organisation takes "action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
I David Stoelting, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", Stanford Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 28, No.2, Spring 1992, pp. 417-8. 
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strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.,,2 United Nations' 
assistance in the holding of elections is a growing post-Cold War activity, as a desire to end civil 
conflicts combines with a "groundswell of popular support for greater participation in political 
processes ... , [b]roader individual involvement and greater government accountability. ,,3 
Elections are seen as a mechanism of conflict resolution and "a broadened concept of 
peacekeeping: peacekeepers become the guarantors not only of peace but of democratisation. ,,4 
Peacekeepers have evolved from serving as protector of the peace to "functioning as a guarantor 
of democratic rights."s Post-Cold War election monitoring is reinforced by the latent democratic 
assumptions of the United Nations Charter, and builds upon its experience of supervising 
plebiscites and elections in trusteeships and non-self governing territories.6 This section applies 
each of the framework indices - objectives, interaction mechanisms, instrumentality, 
impartiality, timing, support and isolation, and cohesion - to election monitoring. This 
framework will then be applied to the two cases to detennine how each factor detennines the 
compatibility of the United Nations' and insurgent movements' approaches, and their 
relationship to the optimality of the election monitoring interaction. 
6.1.1: Objectives 
Instructions given to a United Nations operation to monitor an election are usually part 
of a broader peacekeeping mandate detennined by an interested coalition of Member-States. As 
a central plank of peacebuilding and expanded peacekeeping, election monitoring mandates are 
usually attended by closer agreement between members of the sponsoring coalition on the fonn 
of the resolution process. When they fonn part of the resolution process, the United Nations' 
2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace, (New York, United Nations, 1992), p. 11. 
3 Report of the Secretary-General, "Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in 'An Agenda for 
Peace''', A!47/695 and S/25944, 15 June 1993, p. 8. 
4 Robin Hay, Civilian Aspects of Peacekeeping: A Summary of Workshop Proceedings. Ottawa 9-10 July 1991, 
(Working Paper 36), (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1991), p. 21. 
5 Allan D. Cooper, "UN-Supervised Elections in Namibia: A Critical Analysis", Without Prejudice, Vol. 3, No.1, 
1990, p. 67. 
6 Plebiscites. Referenda and Elections Held Under the Supervision or Observation o/the United Nations in Trust 
and Non-Self-Governing Territories, U.N. GAOR, 46th Session, Agenda Item 98(b), A/46!609, Annex, 1991. 
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objectives in its election monitoring tasks are ultimately to secure the resolution of the conflict 
by establishing and strengthening the democratic political system, and securing the belligerents' 
participation in this system. Equating democracy with peace and stability has acquired greater 
currency after the Cold War,7 and the United Nations attempts to cap its conflict termination 
efforts with a democracy-securing election.8 Elections held after civil wars are a "procedural 
solution", which "are neutral in appearance, for the conciliator is not opting for one type of 
outcome but merely for one way in which an outcome can be reached, substituting a peaceful for 
a violent means of conducting conflict. ,,9 The United Nations, through trying to implement an 
election, makes an attempt at "changing the values and goals of the actors [and in this way] 
dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict."IO Elections, therefore, become a method of 
ensuring internal resolution of the conflict and external stability. The viability of the 
democratisation depends on the fairness and authenticity of the elections, and in the suspicious 
aftermath of a civil war, requires neutral observers to ensure that pluralism, universal suffrage, a 
high level of participation, and a lack of intimidation prevails. United Nations monitors often are 
sought to reassure the participants, the population and the international community of the 
fairness of the elections. II 
There are a number of objectives that an insurgent movement can attempt to achieve 
through elections. The most obvious objective is the acquisition of power through winning the 
elections. However, there are other benefits that can be gained from participating in an 
internationally-observed election. The growing international belief in the legitimacy of 
popularly-elected governments reflects on the participants in the electoral process; an insurgent 
7 This is particularly prevalent in the "enlargement" doctrine of the Clinton administration; see National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement" Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. IX No. 1., 15 October 
1993, p. 16. 
8 Beginning with the operation in Namibia, the United Nations has implemented or attempted to implement 
elections or plebiscites in seven of the fifteen post-Cold War interventions; and advocated elections eventually in 
Bosnia and Somalia. 
9 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 279. 
10 Hay,op. cit., 1991, p. 19. 
11 Report of the Secretary-General, "Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in 'An Agenda for 
Peace"', A/47/965 and S/25944, 15 June 1993, pp. 8-9. 
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movement can thus gain both international and domestic legitimacy by submitting to the popular 
will.12 Elections further legitimate the system of government and all of the participants in the 
political community, \3 making that State more eligible in the increasing competition for aid and 
investment. 14 For an insurgent movement attempting to renOurIce warfare and move into the 
political system, elections are a method of securing a legal basis for itself and its goals, magnify 
its influence on the governance of the State, and provide an accepted legislative voice for its 
supporters. IS It needs international observers to ensure that this transition process is not 
manipulated to the advantage of its opponents. Genuine commitment to competing elections 
depends on the insurgent's acceptance of the concept of "contingent consent", whereby "those 
who lose ... agree to respect the contingent authority of the winners to make binding decisions, in 
exchange for being allowed to take office and make decisions in the future.'tl6 The ultimate 
commitment must be to a functioning democratic system and loyal government or opposition 
within that system. Competing in elections allows the insurgent movement to abandon the war 
without losing its influence as a political actor, and to pursue its objectives through, rather than 
in opposition to, the political system. 17 
6.1.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
In advocating elections as a resolution mechanism in the aftermath of civil wars, the 
United Nations confronts the problem of trying to impose a Western, legalistic method of 
apportioning political power on a society in which often few of the prerequisite conditions for 
12 Melinda N. Hodgson, "When to Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring", New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 25, No. I, Fall 1992, p. 149. 
13 Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987), p. 259. 
14 Barry Munslow, "Democratisation in Africa", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 46, No.4, October 1993, p. 480. 
15 Jennifer McCoy, Larry Garber and Robert Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 2, No.4, Fall 1991, p. 108. 
16 Guillenno O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
About Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 59. 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, "How Countries Democratize", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No.4, 1991-
1992, p. 587. 
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democracy exist. 18 Its peacekeepers are charged with ensuring the electorate contestarIts' 
commitment to a procedural solution that some of them are bound to lose.19 In helping to design 
the election process, the United Nations needs to ensure that "[t]he results of democratic 
elections cannot be predicted from the rules under which they are conducted. If they could, they 
would not be democratic. ,,20 A viable election mechanism needs to be accepted by not only the 
participants; "[d]emocratic values must be willingly accepted by the entire society;,,21 and 
consequently time must be devoted to comprehensive registration and education.22 The 
monitors need to launch programs fostering understarIding of the democratic process and 
confidence in the fairness and confidentiality of the election machinery.23 Often the United 
Nations participates in designing the rules of the election that it has agreed to oversee,24 and in 
negotiating an agreement with the participants on the nature and extent of the electorate.25 Much 
of the United Nations interaction with the former insurgents, during election monitoring, 
consists of helping them to form political parties, conduct a campaign, assuring their freedom 
from intimidation and access to the media, and reassuring them and maintaining their confidence 
in the process.26 To facilitate these tasks, the United Nations has established an Electoral 
Assistance Unit within its Department of Political Affairs to assemble the available international 
expertise and benefit from the lessons of each successive operation. 
18 W. J. M. MacKenzie and Kenneth Robinson (eds), Five Elections in Africa: A Group of Electoral Studies 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 462. 
19 Zartman, op. cit., 1989, pp. 278-80. 
20 O'Donnell and Schmitter, op. cit., 1986, p. 61. 
21 Report of the Secretary-General, "Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in 'An Agenda for 
Peace"', A!47/965 and S/25944, 15 June 1993, p. 8. 
22 Hay, op. cit., 1991, pp. 13-14. 
23 Hay,op. cit., 1991, p. 21. 
24 McCoy, Garber and Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", op. cit., 1991, p. 102. 
25 Stoetling, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in lndependentNations", op. cit., 1992, pp. 406-7. 
26 Cooper, "UN-Supervised Elections in Namibia: A Critical Analysis", op. cit., 1990, p. 66. 
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For the insurgents, genuinely agreeing to submit to popular elections in exchange for the 
use of military force represents a leap of faith. The basis of this agreement must be a transfer of 
allegiance away from opposition to the State to loyalty to the State and an agreement to work 
within its political system. The insurgent movement has also to accept that by participating in 
elections, it must surrender its ability to militarily seize power for itself, and submit to the 
electorate's choice. As the insurgent movements surrenders its military means of seizing power 
and protecting itself, it becomes vulnerable to being taken advantage of by its former opponents, 
and vice versa. International observers are their best guarantee, and United Nations election 
monitors often are crucial to the insurgents' agreement to submit to the resolution mechanism: 
"the major parties involved in an election must be motivated both to participate and to invite 
observers. This indicates that they are serious about the process and provides the observers with 
some leverage to ensure the election is free and fair. ,,27 The election organisers and observers 
often secure the insurgents' closer agreement by allowing them to participate in "the formulation 
of rules determining which groups are allowed into the contest, what boundaries constituencies 
will have, what criteria will be applied to determine winners, and so on. ,,28 This commitment is 
further strengthened by allowing "agents of the candidates to observe polling and the 
count. .. [which] gives them some corporate responsibility for making the election work. ,,29 
6.1.3: Instrumentality 
For a procedure as delicate as a post-civil war election between suspicious former 
belligerents, international observers are almost essential. By the number of requests it receives 
for observation, the United Nations has clearly been identified by former belligerents and 
peacemakers as the election monitoring mechanism of choice.3o Observers' instrumentality lies 
27 Hay, op. cit., 1991, p. 9. 
28 O'Donnell and Schmitter, op. cit., 1986, p. 59. 
29 MacKenzie and Robinson, op. cit., 1960, p. 475. 
30 Between 1 October 1991 and 16 October 1992, 31 requests for United Nations monitoring of elections were 
received by the Secretariat. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 46/137, 
"Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and General Elections", N4 7/668, 18 November 1992, p. 
4. 
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in alleviating the distrust on all sides: "[t]hey serve the government by helping to keep the 
opposition in the race, a prerequisite for a legitimate process, and they serve the opposition by 
ensuring that the election will either be fair or else be denounced as fraudulent. ,,31 The observers 
can help correct specific shortcomings or irregularities.32 When the United Nations, combines 
observation with peacekeeping, it also provides security for the process and its participants 
against disaffected groups who try to disrupt the process violently.33 The monitors are also 
instrumental to the electorate's participation by reassuring "a sceptical popUlation regarding the 
secrecy of the ballot, the efficacy of the process, and the safety of the voters. ,,34 An extensive 
and active presence best reassures the parties and electorate of the fairness and security of the 
process.35 The extent of observation is decided by the participants: at one level, the United 
Nations can fully administer and supervise the elections, or more commonly the monitors can 
observe the conduct of the elections by the State in accord with its constitution. While the parties 
benefit from the observers' presence, their own "[a]greement on the UN role increases the 
likelihood the elections will be regarded as legitimate and facilitates the execution of election 
observation. ,,36 
The legitimacy of the elections and their viability as a solution depends on the 
incumbents' and observers' inclusion of the insurgents and other opposition groups in the 
competition. In desiring peace, legitimacy and political influence, the parties thus become to 
some extent interdependent, "in that they can neither do without each other nor unilaterally 
impose their preferred solution on each other. ,,37 Those States desiring democratic validity need 
to include the former insurgent movement in the elections: "[i]f all parties are not represented, 
31 McCoy, Garber and Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", op. cit., 1991, p. 104. 
32 McCoy, Garber and Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", op. cit., p. 110-111. 
33 Stoetling, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", op. cit., 1992, p. 397. 
34 McCoy, Garber and Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", op. cit., 1991, p. 107. 
35 Hay,op. cit., 1991, p. 9. 
36 Stoetling, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", op. cit., 1991, p. 412. 
37 O'Donnell and Schmitter, op. cit., 1986, p. 38. 
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the party could lose international and domestic legitimacy. ,,38 Furthermore, for the incumbent, 
the only viable way to secure the end of the insurgents' opposition to the political system is to 
allow them to compete for power within that system. The United Nations observers must also, 
"in fulfilment of their terms of reference, ... keep campaigns open to all candidates while 
respecting a nation's sovereign control over its electoral process,,39 in order to ensure internal 
and external legitimacy. In this way, the observers attempt to maintain all parties' participation in 
the elections by allaying where possible all fears of fraud and danger during the process. 
6.1.4: Impartiality 
The United Nations' monitors' acceptability to the participants in the elections depends 
heavily on the impartiality and disinterestedness of their conduct and observation. This condition 
is heavily reliant on the parties' perceptions that their opponents are no more advantaged by the 
monitors' presence or actions than they are themselves. The observers often establish a close 
relationship with the national electoral body in order to ensure the impartiality of the election's 
administrators and process, "realising that the electoral commission is in many instances an arm 
of the government. ,,40 The monitors' reputation as impartial observers reinforces the parties' 
confidence that their presence will deter fraud and intimidation in campaigning, balloting and 
counting by publicising any irregularities, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the 
defrauders and the validity of the elections. The United Nations has developed the mechanism of 
the quick count or parallel count to detect large-scale fraud in balloting or counting by 
comparing sample trends with eventual results. In the atmosphere of distrust surrounding post-
civil war elections, the impartiality and efficiency of the observers are important components in 
convincing the participants of the fairness of the elections, and are thus vital to the parties 
acceptance of the results.41 
38 Stoetling, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", op. cit., 1992, p. 392. 
39 ibid., pp. 401-2. 
40 Stoetling, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", op. cit., 1992, p. 413. 
41 Munslow, "Democratisation in Africa", op. cit., 1993, p. 482. 
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The validity of the elections also depend on the fonner belligerents not trying to unfairly 
manipulate the process to their own advantage. The insurgent movement must confine its efforts 
to gain support and advantage to within the rules of the election, and "trust the voters to choose 
between a wide array of candidates who campaign for support. ,,42 Often their desire to gain 
power can tempt insurgents to try to gain any advantage they can. Their attempts to mobilise 
support can drive the insurgents towards catering to sectional interests and activating divisive 
chauvinisms; tendencies that can threaten the States' cohesion and the reintegration of the peace 
process. For greater fairness, the election participants and monitors are often careful to negotiate 
rules about the sanctity of the process; "fonnal devices designed to protect the rules of the game 
from manipulation by the players. ,,43 Through this process, the monitors can ensure the 
registration of the entire eligible electorate, the equal access of all participants to funds, expertise 
and the media, and the freedom of the campaigning and balloting from intimidation and 
violence.44 The parties' impartial behaviour should extend to granting them "unrestricted 
freedom of movement within all electoral districts, unrestricted access to all polling stations and 
unimpeded contacts with all political parties. ,,45 
6.1.5: Timing 
Although some insurgent movements try to simultaneously advance the options of war 
and electoral participation, most insurgent movements will usually only genuinely abandon their 
military potential and submit to popular elections if their military calculus detennines that its 
will gain more and lose less by participating in elections rather than continuing the war. Often 
this is dictated by a worsening military stalemate, a receding possibility of overthrowing the 
incumbent, and a growing marginalisation of influence over the political system. Elections offer 
the insurgent movement a chance to gain recognised power and to enhance its legitimate 
42 Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler (eds), Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political 
Consequences, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 29. 
43 MacKenzie and Robinson, op. cit., 1960, p. 479. 
44 Stoetiing, "The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations", op. cit., 1992, p. 412. 
45 "Letter Dated 5 July 1989 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the Permanent Representative of 
Nicaragua to the United Nations", AJ44/375 Annex 1,5 July 1989, p. 2. 
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influence within the State.46 Thus a willingness by the insurgent movement to genuinely 
participate in the elections must be based on a commitment to work within the political 
system.47 The insurgents' military position will in this way be used to measure their desire to 
abandon its declining military power in opposition to the State in favour of integration and 
influence within the State's political system. 
6.1.6: Support and Isolation 
Any divergence in the insurgent's approach to the delicate election process can to some 
extent be compensated for by the support of the international community for the monitors in 
ensuring a smooth and fair election. States can facilitate the electoral process by contributing 
resources and expertise to former belligerents who are inexperienced in party formation and 
campaigning. Regional powers can assure nervous or suspicious participants of the fairness and 
security of the process and its results.48 In particular, democracies can offer advice and expertise 
in the conduct of democratic elections in States where no democratic tradition or infrastructure 
exists. The project of establishing a functioning democracy in place of a civil war is often one 
that attracts a lot of support from particularly Western governments, non-governmental 
organisations, and interest groups. Their support and interest represents an important component 
in ensuring the accountability of the elections and thus the validity of their results. 
The actions of States external to the conflict are also important in securing the 
insurgents' genuine participation in the elections. Their calculation to abandon war in favour of 
submitting to the popular will are to some extent determined by the international system and the 
actions of their former sponsors. Insurgents subject to external sponsors' abandonment or 
pressure to seek peace are deprived of confidence and resources, and become much more 
compromising in their demands. Often this isolation leads to the insurgents being deprived of 
46 McCoy, Garber and Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking", op. cit., 1991, p. 109. 
47 Hodgson, "When to Accept, When to Abstain", op. cit., 1992, p. 161. 
48 A classic example of a tacit guarantee of the fairness of an election by a regional power was the United States' 
implicit guarantee of the results of the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections with its 19 December 1989 invasion of 
Panama in support of its elected government. 
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any other viable option other than electoral participation. This commitment to the electoral 
process is further reinforced if these erstwhile sponsors use their influence to support the 
elections. Often the only way for an increasingly isolated insurgent movement to regain support 
is by establishing its international legitimacy by participating in democratic elections. However, 
if an insurgent movement is guaranteed continuing support and supplies from an external 
sponsor, it will be much less willing to abandon its military abilities in favour of electoral 
participation. The effects of isolation on insurgent behaviour are necessarily dependent on the 
extent of the movement's reliance on external support: a more self-reliant group will be less 
affected by such changes in the international system. 
6.1.7: Cohesion 
A United Nations election monitoring mission is necessarily affected in its assurance and 
conduct by the extent of cohesive support behind its activities within the United Nations. Often 
cohesion among Member-States is threatened by a lack of consensus on the virtues of 
democracy and the appropriateness of the United Nations in helping impose it on sovereign 
States. There is no universal agreement on what constitutes a democracy or what are the 
conditions for a free and fair election.49 Particularly the developing world and Non-Aligned 
Movement States are concerned to uphold State sovereignty and are suspicious of the legality of 
United Nations influence over domestic political processes. 50 Many of these problems are 
overcome, however, by the status of the elections as part of the conflict resolution process, and 
thus a part of the United Nations' principle mandate. The problems with Article 2(7) and 
sovereignty can only be overcome by introducing election monitors on the specific request of 
the State holding the elections, and often of the opposition parties as well. 
49 Hodgson, "When to Accept, When to Abstain", op. cit., 1992, p. 146. 
50 The Cuban government has been especially vociferous in its denunciation of election monitoring, arguing that 
"National elections had always been and should continue to be recognised as coming under the domestic 
jurisdiction of states ... enshrined in the Charter ... so that elections were in no way a legitimate matter for intervention 
or participation by other states, whether bilaterally or multilaterally." See U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 
3rd Committee, 45th Session, 42nd Meeting, AJC.3/45/SR.42, 1990. 
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The requirement of respecting the neutrality of the election process, and the difficulties 
involved with transforming from an insurgent movement into a political party, makes cohesion 
and discipline within the insurgent movement a contributing factor to the viability of the 
elections. Inevitably, in such a momentous decision as abandoning the war, the insurgent 
movement will be divided between its opportunistic elements that advocate democratic 
competition and influence within the political system, and the suspicious elements who wish to 
fight on. 51 These disagreements are more easily resolved and controlled within a cohesive 
movement. In a decentralised movement, the hawkish elements may split from those advocating 
election participation, and use violence to disrupt the delicate election process. Too much 
cohesion can also be harmful to the development of democracy. A movement dependent on rigid 
discipline and hierarchy can be at odds with the democratic values of freedom of choice and 
association; and can introduce divisive forces into the political system. 
The framework indices operate in these ways to determine the approaches of the United 
Nations and the insurgent movement to the election monitoring interaction. As the final stage in 
their interaction, the framework hypothesises that the viability of elections are no less governed 
by the extent of the compatibility of their approaches than during mediation and peacekeeping. 
The validity of this hypothesis will be tested in the next two sections by applying the election 
monitoring framework to the first Salvadoran elections including the FMLN and then to the 
Angolan elections between the government and Unita. The cases were selected in such a way as 
to compare a successful election with a failure in order to better determine how each of the 
factors contributed to the different outcomes. 
6.2: The FMLN: Navigating to Closure 
The United Nations was closely involved in almost all stages of the resolution of the 
civil war in El Salvador. Chapter Four explored the factors leading to its successful mediation of 
a peace agreement between the government and the Frente Faribundo Marti para fa Liberacion 
Nacionaf (FMLN). The Chapultepec Agreement, however, acknowledged that close United 
51 O'Donnell and Schmitter, op. cit., 1986, p. 71. 
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Nations supervision of the peace process would be needed to make the Agreement viable and 
durable.52 The United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador (ONUSAL), originally 
introduced to ensure human rights and oversee the demobilisation of the FMLN and purification 
of the Salvadoran security forces, had its mandate "enlarged ... to include the observation of the 
electoral process due to conclude with the general elections in March 1994",53 at the request of 
the Salvadoran government. The United Nations noted that although the FMLN, "which 
negotiated and signed the Peace Accords as an anned movement is now a fully legal political 
party," it remained a signatory to the Accords and thus retained its insurgent relationship with 
ONUSAL until the successful conclusion of the elections. 54 The FMLN participated as a 
political party as part of an opposition coalition in the March 1994 general elections. Despite 
losing to the incumbent ARENA party, it accepted the results and continues to function as part 
of the loyal opposition within the Salvadoran political system. This section uses the election 
monitoring framework to explore the successful conclusion of these elections and the 
Salvadoran peace process. 
6.2.1: Objectives 
The sponsoring coalition behind ONUSAL's extended election monitoring mandate 
remained largely unchanged from that which had supported the entire Salvadoran peace process. 
After seeing the successful advancement of the peace process, ONUSAL's sponsoring States, 
again led by regional States, were eager to cap their efforts of the past five years with a 
successful election. The ultimate objective of the United Nations' involvement in EI Salvador 
was to resolve the conflict, and it saw "the general elections of March 1994 [as] constitut[ing] 
the logical culmination of the entire peace process in EI Salvador.,,55 It saw elections as the 
appropriate way in which the "political, economic and social arguments will be settled through 
52 See especially Chapters VI, and VII of the "Peace Accord for El Salvador", S/23501 Annex, 16 January 1992, 
pp.51-8. 
53 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) of 27 May 1993. 
54 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)", 
S/25006, 23 December 1992, p. 3. 
55 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) of27 May 1993. 
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the processes of democracy and not by war.,,56 They were a method of "end[ing] the conflict by 
political means as speedily as possible ... [by] ... reintegrating the ... FMLN, within a framework of 
full legality, into the civil, institutional and political life of the country.,,57 Elections would 
allow the United Nations to leave, having "re-establish[ed] peace and promote[d] reconciliation 
in EI Salvador. ,,58 The United Nations saw the establishment of democracy in EI Salvador as 
promising a durable solution by "restoring peace and creating the conditions necessary for 
democratic coexistence. ,,59 Assisting in the establishment of stability and democracy in EI 
Salvador, in tum, offered the United Nations an opportunity to contribute to the securement of 
stability and security in the Central American region.6o In order to properly secure all of these 
objectives, the United Nations stressed that "the elections held in March 1994 be free and fair" 
and part of a process of protecting human rights, demilitarisation, reintegration and 
'1" 61 reconcl latlOn. 
During its decade-long insurgency, the FMLN had gradually moved from demanding 
participation in a power-sharing government to advocating democratic elections in El Salvador 
as a way of ending the civil war.62 The peace agreements were thus a basic bargain: "in 
exchange for serious reforms, the rebels agreed to contest power through elections instead of by 
demanding a share of power. ,,63 Its involvement in the peace process reflected its commitment 
56 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)", 
S/25006, 23 December 1992, p. 1. 
57 "Geneva Agreement", in United Nations, EI Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, (New York: United 
Nations, 1992), p. 1. 
58 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) of27 May 1993. 
59 "First Report of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", Al45/l055 and S/23037 Annex, 16 
September 1991, p. 5. 
60 Report of the Secretary-General, "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace", S/22031, 21 December 1990, p. 
2, asserts the conviction that the peace processes in the Central American states were intertwined, and that stability 
and reintegration in one would have a positive impact on the others. 
61 Security Council Resolution 888 (1993) 30 November 1993. 
62 The FMLN had advocated a power-sharing agreement since the La Palma talks in October 1984, but surprised 
observers by dropping this demand in a January 1989 communique proposing its participation in the 19 March 
presidential elections in exchange for security guarantees and a six-month postponement of the elections. 
63 Linda Robinson, "Why Central America is StiIl Not Democratic", SAIS Review, Vol. 12, No.2, Summer-FaIl 
1992, p. 89. 
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to pursue its socialist objectives within the political system, by "achieving, through political 
struggle, the establishment of a regime that guarantees, for all Salvadorans, economic 
development with democracy and social justice. ,,64 The peace process granted the FMLN 
security, an amnesty on political crimes,65 and offered its cadres and supporters economic, 
social and political reintegration.66 Ending the war and securing democratic legitimacy through 
elections also offered the FMLN the opportunity to end what it saw as imperialistic United 
States sponsorship of the incumbent government.67 It had long advocated "a solution among 
Salvadorans," 68 and elections offered just such a solution. By entering the peace process, 
demobilising, and transforming into a political party, the "FMLN ... demonstrated will and 
determination to resolve [the] country's problems democratically through political means, 
abandoning armed confrontation and conflict. ,,69 The FMLN believed it would win the 
democratic elections 70 by reaping the benefits of popularity having laid down its weapons in 
response to the peoples' desire for peace.71 Long attentive to popularity, the FMLN had as early 
as 1987 "humanised the conditions of war [to] reduce its economic, social and political 
impact."n 
64 "FMLN Communique", S/26371, 30 August 1993 Annex II, p. 6. 
65 See "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 
May 1992, pp. 10-11. 
66 See "Transfer of Land Program" and "Reintegration Programs" in "Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 1993, pp. 14, 16, 17. 
67 Yvon Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN: A Glossar; of Five Words", Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.2, 
Spring 1991, p. 54. 
68 "Proposal of the FMLNIFDR", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 55, Vol. 14, No.4, FaJl1987, p. 486. 
69 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 24. 
70 Robinson, "Why Central America is Still Not Democratic", op. cit., 1992, p. 89. 
71 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 57. 
72 "Proposal of the FMLNIFDR", op. cit., 1987, p. 484. 
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6.2.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
The United Nations saw that the viability of the elections and the durability of the result 
depended on a fair and genuine electoral competition to which the contestants, especially the 
FMLN, agreed, and the establishment of a democratic tradition in Salvadoran society.73 Not 
long after the signing of the peace agreement, n[o]bstacles, including differences in the 
interpretation of the agreements," 74 appeared, threatening to stall the peace agreement. 
ONUMOZ began to work closely with the parties through the mechanism of COP AZ (Cornision 
Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz), on which the government and FMLN were 
represented,75 to amend the electoral code and laws,76 and secure consensus on the rules and 
conduct of the election.77 COP AZ also provided a mechanism through which the FMLN could 
observe the peace process and the conduct of the elections and air any problems it had with the 
process directly to the international observers and to the incumbent. 78 ONUSAL also worked 
closely with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the body responsible for conducting the elections, 
to ensure a comprehensive update of the electoral roll,79 and with the Board of Vigilance to 
ensure free and fair electoral participation. 80 
73 See "Statement of the Secretary-General at the Ceremony Marking the End of the Armed Conflict in El 
Salvador, San Salvador, 15 December 1992", S/25006 Annex I, 23 December 1992, p. 4. 
74 Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a 
Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development", 
Al471739 and S/24871 , 30 November 1992, p. 7. 
75 See "Act of New York I, Signed by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN", S/23402 Annex, 10 
January 1992. 
76 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992,p.13. 
77 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 19. 
78 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S11994/375, 31 
March 1994, p. 4. 
79 "Mexico Agreements" in El Salvador Agreements, op. cit., 1992, pp. 16, 19,24. 
80 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/26606, 20 
October 1993, p. 1. 
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Throughout the process, ONUSAL's Electoral Division maintained constant, active 
contact with these bodies, as well as "periodic meetings with political parties ... at the central and 
local levels in order to discuss ongoing problems and viable solutions ... with a view to solving 
any possible problem arising from the electoral process.,,8l ONUSAL's peacekeepers and police 
monitors moved to allay long-standing FMLN fears about vulnerability to death squads82 
closely monitoring the conduct of the security forces and acting vigorously to uphold human 
rights and investigate violations. 83 In the resulting "prevailing atmosphere of freedom of 
expression and respect for political rights, the political parties ... engaged in a lively public debate 
over issues, candidates and alliances. ,,84 As problems were encountered with the implementation 
of the broader peace agreements during the run-up to the elections, ONUSAL held a high-level 
meeting between the government and the FMLN, "at which it was agreed to 'sweep the table 
clean' with respect to outstanding agreements. ,,85 ONUSAL's Electoral Division maintained a 
close monitoring presence over all five stages of the electoral process: the establishment of 
offices; voter registration; campaigning; balloting and counting; and the Presidential run-off.86 
Its comprehensive monitoring of the process ensured a greater number of the electorate voted,87 
and that the results were accepted by all parties. 
81 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S1l994/304, 16 
March 1994, p. 2. 
82 Since at least 1986, the FDR, then the FMLN's political wing, claimed that it wished to contest elections but 
was unable to return to El Salvador because of the certainty of revenge by the Death Squads. See Thomas P. 
Anderson, "El Salvador's Dim Prospects", Current History, Vol. 85, No. 507, January 1986,.p. 36. 
83 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 6. 
84 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 3. 
8S "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/26790, 
23 November 1993, p. 2. 
86 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/26790, 
23 November 1993, p. 17. 
87 Some 1,500,000 voters participated, an increase of over 400,000 on the elections of 1989 and 1991. See 
"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S1l994/375, 31 March 
1994, p. 1. 
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The FMLN's acceptance of the electoral mechanism had been growing throughout its 
insurgency, first offering to participate in the March 1989 elections and then declaring a 
ceasefire during the March 1991 elections. As a rebel group engaged in a bitter civil war, 
however, the FMLN's agreement to participate depended on assurances that the elections would 
be fair and free from revenge or violence.88 The peace agreements, having established these 
guarantees, secured its assurance that "[a ]rrned conflict is a thing of the past; we have 
completely abandoned it and do not consider it a valid option in this new phase. ,,89 The 
agreements, in return for the "cessation of armed conflict [granted] ... the right [to] the FMLN to 
full political participation, without any restrictions. ,,90 The government insisted that the FMLN's 
status as a legal political party depended on its disarmament;91 after some false starts, the 
FMLN disarmed and launched itself as a political party on 23 May 1992.92 After being granted 
full legal status as a political party, the "FMLN ended its military structure and adopted that of a 
political organisation. ,,93 As a political party, the FMLN was granted access to a series oflegal 
radio and television frequencies,94 and assured security and access to finances and expertise for 
campaigning. The FMLN's vigorous campaigning soon convinced the government and the 
United Nations of its "impressive demonstration of the will...to consolidate peace in [the] 
country. ,,95 Its commitment to the elections led to its acceptance of its defeat,96 and its energetic 
88 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 62. 
89 "FMLN Communique", S/26371 Annex II, 30 August 1993, p. 6. 
90 Chapter VI, "El Salvador Agreements", op. cit., 1992, pp. 86-7. 
91 This insistence was based on Article 7 of the Constitution of El Salvador, which bans the existence of armed 
political groups. See "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", 
S/24833, 23 November 1992, p. 14. 
92 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 11. 
93 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993,p.17. 
94 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 18. 
95 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/24833, 23 
November 1992, p. 16. 
96 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S11994/375, 31 
March 1994, p. 7. 
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canvassing netted it enough seats in the National Assembly to give it a significant impact on the 
government.97 The fact that it gained - and was content to settle for - a significant voice in 
opposition must be factored in to the FMLN's cooperation with the elections, their results, and 
the aftermath. The FMLN's acknowledgment of the results and commitment to work for reform 
within the democratic system,98 marked the relinquishment of its status as an insurgent 
movement, and the end of the Salvadoran civil war. 
6.2.3: Instrumentality 
ONUSAL's Electoral Division was to prove essential to the smooth running of the 
electoral process and the final acceptance of the results. Both the Salvadoran government99 and 
COP AZIOO requested United Nations oversight of the elections; and the unacceptability of 
ONUCA to the FMLNlol meant that ONUSAL's role as the monitoring presence was inevitable 
and accepted by the major parties. A technical mission sent in April 1993 contended that proper 
observation "requires wide geographical and chronological coverage in order to monitor the 
conformity of electoral practice to patterns implicit in free and fair elections."lo2 The Security 
Council acquiesced, introducing 900 electoral observers, to cover the 355 polling stations, 
observe counting and monitor the campaign, some ten months before the elections. lo3 ONUSAL 
observed rather than conducted the elections, and retained a subordinate, advisory and 
monitoring relationship with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; the Electoral Division was to 
97 "EI Salvador: Hope", The Economist, 26 March 1994, p. 78. 
98 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/1994/536, 4 May 
1994, p. 2. 
99 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) 27 May 1993. 
100 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/24833, 23 
November 1992, p. 16. 
101 The FMLN distrusted ONUCA, which had been introduced to halt clandestine arms flows into El Salvador 
without the FMLN's agreement in November 1989. 
102 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 19. 
103 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/258121 Add.!, 24 
May 1993, p. l. 
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monitor campaigning, balloting and counting, to receive complaints and to "convey 
[irregularities], as appropriate, to [the] electoral authorities,,,104 ONUSAL maintained close 
contact with the electoral bodies and the parties/os continued to mediate and address 
disagreements or irregularities in the process,106 and renegotiated and kept the parties to the 
timetable for the peace process,I07 It maintained its pressure on the FMLN to disann fully, I 08 
while assuring its safety by closely monitoring the security forces,I09 ONUSAL monitored the 
" d 1 1 II' 110 th f:' f h 1" 1 d " III th 'f campmgmng an e ectora ra les; e mrness 0 t e po Itlca a vertlsmg; e secunty 0 
the balloting; and the fairness of the counting,I12 It is likely that without this constant, energetic 
observer presence, the Salvadoran elections would have run into serious problems and lost much 
of their domestic and international credibility, 
As the sole insurgent movement, the FMLN was an essential participant in the elections 
designed to bring an end to the civil war, It had not been consulted during the Esquipulas peace 
process, and had continued the insurgency despite the efforts of the regional peace process and 
104 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, pp. 21-2. 
105 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S119941l79, 16 
February 1994, p. 1. 
106 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 1. 
107 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/24833, 23 
November 1992, p. 2. 
108 "Letter Dated 29 January 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/25200, 29 January 1993, p. 1. 
109 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 7. 
110 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S1l9941179, 16 
February 1994, p. 7. 
III "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S11994/304, 16 
March 1994, p. 4. 
112 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S11994/375, 31 
March 1994, pp. 2-3. 
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the ONUCA peacekeeping force. l13 Its cooperation with the peace process had only been 
secured after it had negotiated directly with the government, and become a signatory to the 
Geneva, Mexico, New York and Chapultepec Agreements. It was also apparent that the 
elections that had been held in EI Salvador in 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1991, without the 
participation or agreement of the FMLN, had done little to stop the civil war. As long as it was 
excluded from the electoral process, the FMLN could claim that the elections were fraudulent 
and meaningless without the participation of the FMLN, the authentic leftist opposition in EI 
Salvador.114 The FMLN's position as a participant in the electoral process was justified by its 
signature of the peace agreement, and its acceptability as a political party enhanced by its 
observance of the ceasefire, its eventual disarmament, its evident commitment to peace, and its 
cooperation with the peace process. These factors made the FMLN a legitimate and important 
participant in the elections. 
6.2.4: Impartiality 
As a process of resolution of a long and bitter civil war for control of EI Salvador, the 
election process inevitably ran into difficulties "from efforts by each side to extract the 
maximum advantage from implementation of these accords."lls It was inevitable both sides 
would not only try to manipulate the ONUSAL observer presence, but also that they would be 
extremely watchful for any evidence of bias against them. From the outset, ONUSAL was aware 
of the need to adhere rigidly to the provisions of the Agreements, allowing neither side to 
default, and convinced "that one breach of the Agreements cannot be used to justify another." I 16 
Furthennore, it needed to ensure "that measures and decisions made by all electoral authorities 
113 H. P. Klepak, "Peacekeeping in Central America" in David A. Charters (ed), Peacekeeping and the Challenge 
o/Civil Conflict Resolution (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, 1994), p. 91. 
114 Grenier, "Understanding the FMLN", op. cit., 1991, p. 62. 
lIS "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S!25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 24. 
116 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S!23999, 26 May 
1992,p.14. 
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[were] impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections." I 17 Perceptions of the 
impartiality of the ONUSAL Electoral Division were assisted by the impartial operation of 
ONUSAL's other components,1\8 and its efforts to publicise its mandate and approach in the 
Salvadoran media. 119 ONUSAL was aware of its responsibility to impartially detect and deter 
fraud and intimidation against any of the participants in the elections,120 and more generally to 
uphold human rights standards, 12 I and guard against the resurgence of Death Squad or other 
violent activity.122 It was also required to ensure that no sections of the electorate were 
prevented from voting "so as to enable broad participation in the elections,,,123 and when 
difficulties arose registering voters from former conflict regions,124 ONUSAL negotiated an 
extension of the registration deadline and assisted with the logistics of registration until 85% of 
eligible voters were registered. 125 ONUSAL's comprehensive presence deterred most of the 
intimidation and fraud during balloting, and it conducted a quick count to guard against fraud in 
the tallying of the vote. 126 
117 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/1994/304, 16 
March 1994, p. 1. 
118 Report of the Secretary-General, "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace", S/22494, 16 April 1991, p. 2. 
119 Note by the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security 
and Peace Initiatives", A/46/658 and S/23222, 15 November 1991, p. 2. 
120 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993,p.21. 
121 "Letter Dated 3 November 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/26689, 3 November 1993, p. 2. 
122 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993), 27 May 1993. 
123 Security Council Resolution 888 (1993), 30 November 1993. 
124 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/26606, 20 
October 1993, p. 3. 
125 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/1994/179, 16 
February 1994, pp. 2-3. 
126 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/1994/375, 31 
March 1994, p. 1. 
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While being committed to participating in the election process, the FMLN was both 
wary of its fairness and eager to maximise its electoral advantage. The United Nations had 
emphasised that the success of the peace process depended on the parties' confinement of their 
actions within the limits required "to foster political stability and [a] climate of detente and 
reconciliation. ,,127 The FMLN had demonstrated its commitment to the process and its 
willingness to cooperate with ONUSAL in the earlier stages of the peace process. 128 The 
process ran into trouble, however, as delays in the later stages of the peace process began to 
"undennine each side's confidence in the other's good faith.,,129 Most significantly, the FMLN 
submitted what was discovered, after an explosion at a secret weapons dump in Managua, to be 
a "grossly inaccurate" weapons inventory,130 and failed to meet its deadline for disarmament. 131 
This discovery came as a stroke of luck for ONUSAL; whereas a sophisticated and coordinated 
intelligence system would have alerted it to covert FMLN arms dumps without the need to rely 
on luck or honesty. Nevertheless, the FMLN was held to account for these breaches by 
ONUSAL and explained that it had wished to retain some weapons as "a last negotiating card in 
order to guarantee peace and the conclusion of the agreements [because of] a profound mistrust 
of the armed forces." 132 These revelations galvanised the international community and domestic 
parties into action. The Security Council issued a stern demand for the FMLN's full compliance 
with the disarmament process, while the United States and Contadora Group began to apply 
diplomatic pressure to the FMLN leadership, and Honduras and Nicaragua pledged to support 
127 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)", 
S/25006, 23 December 1992, p. 3. 
128 Note by the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security 
and Peace Initiatives", Al45/1055 and S/23037, 16 September 1991, p. 5. 
129 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 13. 
130 At fIrst ONUSAL's suspicions were raised by the poor quality and few weapons surrendered (see "Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/24833, 23 November 1992, p. 4); 
and then discovered signifIcant arms caches that had been undeclared by the FMLN; see "Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/25901, 8 June 1993, p. 2. 
131 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 3. 
132 "Letter Dated 16 July 1993 From the Co-Ordinator-General of the Frente Farabundo Marti para fa 
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) Addressed to the Secretary-General", S/26005 Annex II (A), 29 June 1993, p. 6. 
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ONUSAL's efforts in tracking down the remaining weapons dumps.133 Perhaps the gravest 
warning to the FMLN came from the incumbent government, which warned that, according to 
Salvadoran law, the FMLN, as an armed group, could not be a legal political party. This 
violation of the peace agreements called into question the ability of the FMLN to participate in 
the elections and threatened to "affect the credibility of the entire peace process.,,134 ONUSAL, 
desperate "to avoid a disruption of the electoral process, in which it is essential that the FMLN 
have every opportunity to participate,,,135 through COPAZ, negotiated an agreement with the 
FMLN leadership in San Salvador on 16 August 1993 in which they pledged full 
disarmament. 136 After this, it had relatively little trouble in fmally securirIg and verifying the 
full disarmament of the FMLN, 137 apart from those members charged with ensuring the security 
of its leaders. 138 Thus although operations "in an atmosphere of deep distrust" attracted "threats 
against the security of [ONUSAL] and its personnel,,,139 the FMLN's genuine commitment to 
the integrity of the election process made it keep its actions within the limits required by the 
election process. 
6.2.5: Timing 
The FMLN's commitment to elections instead of insurgency reflected a conscIOUS 
decision based on its worsening military position. It "had no prospect of prevailing militarily or 
133 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 14. 
134 "Letter Dated 11 June 1993 From the President of the Republic of EI Salvador Addressed to the Secretary-
General", S/26005 Annex IV, 29 June 1993, p. 15. 
135 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/26005, 
29 June 1993, p. 4. 
136 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/26371, 
30 August 1993, Annex, p. 4. 
137 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/26371, 
30 August 1993, p. 4. 
138 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/26790, 
23 November 1993, p. 16. 
139 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S/23999, 26 May 
1992, p. 15. 
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of inspiring a civil uprising against the Salvadoran government," 140 and had watched the waning 
fortunes of Marxist regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Nicaragua. It had also 
watched its rural support base diminish as the civil war it waged sabotaged the economy and 
infrastructure and brought poverty or refugee status to especially less privileged Salvadorans. 141 
The desire for peace became the issue attracting greatest popular support,142 and the popularity 
of the pacifist, moderate centre had expanded at the expense of both the extreme left and 
right. 143 The FMLN's interest in previous elections, its attempts to disrupt their progress, and its 
increasingly vociferous rejections of their results suggested its growing fear of being 
marginalised by the burgeoning democratic process. Impressed by the strong showing of the 
leftist FDR in the 1991 elections, the FMLN realised that participating in elections were the only 
way to relieve its military predicament while electorally capitalising on its part in bringing peace 
to El Salvador. Its military position and resulting political calculations in these ways 
strengthened the FMLN's genuine commitment to participation in the elections. 
6.2.6: Support and Isolation 
In. sponsoring and monitoring a post-civil war election in El Salvador, the United 
Nations appealed to "all States, as well as .. .international institutions ... to contribute generously in 
support of the execution of the Peace Accords." 144 The New York Agreement itself urged that 
"COP AZ ... be endorsed by Governments which are in a position to support effectively the 
guarantee required under the agreements as well as the work of COP AZ. 145 In such a long and 
delicate conflict resolution process, when "action or inaction on the part of one of the 
140 Joseph G. Sullivan, "How Peace Came to EI Salvador", Orbis, Vol. 38, No.1, Winter 1994, p. 85. 
141 Department of Social Sciences Universidad de EI Salvador, "An Analysis of the Correlation of Forces in EI 
Salvador", Latin American Perspectives, Issue 55, Vol. 14, No.4, Fall 1987, p. 431. 
142 Jose Napoleon Duarte's 1984 election victory and Alfredo Christiani's 1986 victory were both won on pledges 
to seek an end to the civil war. 
143 Jose Z. Garcia, "Democratic Consolidation in EI Salvador", Current History, Vol 87, No. 533, December 
1988, p. 422. 
144 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) of27 May 1993. 
145 "New York Agreement", S/23402 Annex, 10 January 1992, p. 15. 
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parties ... put the process at serious risk," ONUSAL was reliant on "unstinting help 
from ... interested governments to get the process back on track.,r146 The United Nations found 
such strong support for ONUSAL's efforts forthcoming from "a number of governments 
that...lent assistance through their own channels of communication with the parties, as well as 
fmancially and logistically." 147 This helped it influence the FMLN back into the peace process 
at those times when its full cooperation was not forthcoming. 
The regional governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua had 
played a pivotal role in the peace process from the outset, and regularly pressured the FMLN to 
permit "the achievement of a firm and lasting peace in the region, [by] refrain[ing] from 
obstructing the elections, abandon [ing] the armed struggle and join[ing] the democratic 
process.,,148 In particular, Honduras and Nicaragua, which had FMLN bases on their territory, 
were able to threaten the FMLN with their closure and expulsion during times when it was not 
cooperating. 149 Sustained support also came from the "friends of the Secretary-General", 
Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela, all of whom exploited their contacts with the parties 
in support of ONUSAL's efforts, to facilitate communication between the FMLN, the United 
Nations and the United States, as well as contributing needed resources to the peace process. ISO 
The United States, eager for a new era of inter-American cooperation, lent financial support to 
the process while reassuring the FMLN of its moderating effect on the incumbent government 
which it had supported for so long. lSI ONUSAL was also able to rely on the expertise and 
support of other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, which mobilised some 
146 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/24833, 23 
November 1992, p. 17. 
147 Report of the Secretary-General, "Central America: Efforts Towards Peace", S/23402, 10 January 1992, p. 5. 
148 "Declaration on the Situation in EI Salvador", Al45/906 and S/22032 Appendix, 21 December 1990, p. 19. 
149 "Salvador Accord Aims at Quick End to Long Civil War", New York Times, 2 January 1992. 
150 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/24833, 23 
November 1992, p. 17. 
151 Especially during the latter stages of the peace process, State Department officials established regular contacts 
with the FMLN to assure it of its restraining influence on the government. See Pamela Constable, "At War's End in 
El Salvador", Current History, Vol. 92, No. 572, March 1993, p. 107. 
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2,000 independent observers to complement the Electoral Division's monitoring efforts. 152 Such 
an extent of international support for the peace process not only assembled the necessary 
resources for ONUSAL's election monitoring, but signalled to the participants the extent of 
international interest in the successful culmination of the peace process. 
Part of the FMLN's military calculus that it would lose less and gain more from 
abandoning the insurgency and competing in elections was influenced by its gradual 
abandonment by its previously steadfast external sponsors. As a Marxist insurgency against a 
United States-backed government in the Americas, the FMLN had since its inception been 
provided with generous support by the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba and the Nicaraguan 
Sandanistas. Soviet support began to wane as Gorbachev's "new thinking" sought to eliminate 
sources of tension in East-West relations and withdraw support from areas of confrontation with 
the United States. The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Warsaw pact suspended arms 
shipments from Eastern Europe to the FMLN. The Sandanista's February 1990 electoral defeat 
to the UNO coalition in Nicaragua ended official Nicaraguan support for the FMLN, although 
continuing Sandanista control of the Nicaraguan armed forces meant that covert unofficial 
shipment continued for some time. 153 After the failure of its November 1990 offensive, the 
FMLN lost the support of the increasingly beleaguered Cuba. 154 Its gradual starvation of 
support and resources left the FMLN, fighting an insurgency against strongly-supported, well 
trained government forces, in an increasingly bleak military situation. As it surveyed an 
international system in which the left was almost universally opting to compete in democratic 
elections, I 55 the FMLN concluded that entering the peace process and elections was the best 
way to relieve its military plight and thereby gain international legitimacy to offset its isolation. 
152 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador", S11994/304, 16 
March 1994, p. 3. 
153 General Humberto Ortega, brother of former Sandanista President Daniel Ortega, continued as Chief of the 
Nicaraguan armed forces, and in December 1990, following discoveries of arms flows during the FMLN's Fall 1990 
campaign by ONUCA, the Sandanistas admitted to having supplied the FMLN with weapons, but that the 
shipments had stopped. Newly-elected President Violetta Chamorro pledged to halt all supplies to the FMLN. 
154 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening, (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p. 447. 
155 Robinson, "Why Central America is Still Not Democratic", SAIS Review, Vol. 12, No.2, Summer-Fall 1992, 
p.82. 
345 
6.2.7: Cohesion 
The ONUSAL operation's ability to monitor the elections and the entire peace process 
was strengthened by cohesive international support for its existence and mandate within the 
United Nations. In comparison with other peacekeeping missions, ONUSAL's "degree of 
international support, both in terms of international resources and of attention, [was] one of the 
most important determinants of the peace in EI Salvador."lS6 The Security Council, despite 
"[s Jtressing the necessity ... to continue to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of 
increasing demands on peacekeeping resources," 157 committed itself to a large peacekeeping 
presence to oversee a protracted peace process in a region in which it had already established 
two other peacekeeping operations, ONUCA and ONUVEN. Member-State cohesion behind the 
ONUSAL operation was a product of several factors. El Salvador's civil war represented one of 
the obstacles to greater international cooperation in the hiatus period of the "new world order" 
after the conclusion of the Gulf War, and the newly invigorated Security Council was eager to 
remove it from the international agenda. The United Nations' close involvement in the regional 
peace process, and Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's intense personal dedication to the 
Salvadoran mediation increased the Organisation's determination to see the process to a 
successful conclusion. ls8 The peace process was supported by every major actor with an interest 
in the conflict,159 eliminating significant dissension within the international community. This 
cohesion enabled the Security Council to grant ONUSAL the necessary resources, mandate 
extensions and support required to oversee the peace process properly. 
156 ibid., p. 92. 
157 Security Council Resolution 832 (1993) of27 May 1993. 
158 Interview with Michel Pelletier, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Headquarters, New 
York City, 30 March 1994. 
159 Cuba's presence as a non-permanent Security Council member in 1991 created some minor debate early in 
ONUSAL's deployment. 
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The FMLN had always operated as a loose umbrella organisation of five guerrilla groups 
with close ideological agreement and a consultative, decision-making high command.160 It had 
also established close links with the FDR (Frente Democratico Revolucionario), a front uniting 
all of the exiled leftist opposition, led by former Christian Democrats Guillermo Ungo and 
Ruben Zamora. 161 As its military position worsened and democracy began to take hold in EI 
Salvador, these alliances came under increasing strain, as the FMLN held out for military 
adjustment of the correlation of forces, while the FDR leaders opted more and more for 
participating in elections, fmally competing in the 1991 elections as the Convergencia 
Democratica (CD) party.162 By the time it signed the Chapultepec Agreement, therefore, the 
FMLN had come to see ending the insurgency and competing in democratic elections as a way 
of forestalling this factionalism and regaining its former cohesion. The prospect of a concerted 
left challenging the right electorally proved a force for cooperation. A growing number of 
broadcasts from Radio Venceremos, the FMLN radio station, during 1991 and 1992 had begun 
to appeal for leftist solidarity during elections, in order to "win the elections, change the laws, 
and eventually change the country.',l63 The FMLN duly combined with the CD and other leftist 
parties to form a Coalition to contest the Presidential elections. At a National Convention, the 
FMLN elected a IS-member National Committee and debated its political organisation, as a 
method of retaining its cohesion after abandoning its military structure. 164 It was able to 
maintain the discipline, to the benefit of a peaceful election process and the durability of the 
results. 
The elections in El Salvador did eventuate as the culmination of the peace process that 
the international community had hoped for. Having expended so much time and effort on the 
resolving the wars in Central America, the United Nations had little hesitation in sustaining its 
160 Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left", Orb is, Vol. 28, No.4, Winter 1985, p. 677. 
161 Fransisco A. Alvarez, "Transition Before the Transition: The Case of EI Salvador", Latin American 
Perspectives, Issue 56, Vol. 15, No.1, Winter 1988, p. 83. 
162 Garcia, "Tragedy in EI Salvador", op. cit., 1990, p. 10. 
163 "Peace Finds Guerrillas Off Guard", Washington Post, 13 January 1992. 
164 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in EI Salvador", S/25812, 21 May 
1993, p. 17. 
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commitment to an extent necessary to ensure a smoothly-run, fair election. There was little 
disagreement within the United Nations that successful election would tie the incumbents and 
insurgents into the same political process, and thereby permanently end the civil war. But the 
elections' success was based primarily on the FMLN's acceptance of its electoral defeat and its 
decision to remain within the democratic system as part of the loyal opposition. After a long 
negotiations and peace process, the FMLN had come to accept that a transformation in the 
political system would eventually lead to the socio-economic transition that it had long fought 
for. This philosophy, and the FMLN's understanding of the democratic tradition and its concept 
of loyal opposition, which arose from the experience of many FMLN leaders in the Salvadoran 
political system before the insurgency, is rare among insurgent movements. The FMLN, during 
and after the insurgency, had always believed in the importance of popular endorsement and 
support, whether in a general insurrection or a general election. Hence, it was not difficult for the 
FMLN to embrace democracy. ONUSAL's and the FMLN's approaches to the elections process 
thus showed a high level of complementarity. 
The success of the elections, however, depended on the quality and acceptability of the 
electoral process. The FMLN's acceptance of the results was based on its recognition of the 
fairness of the process, which was largely due to ONUSAL's comprehensive monitoring. The 
elections process allowed the FMLN a significant voice in the conduct of the voting and 
counting, and its performance guaranteed it a significant political voice, safe from reprisals. The 
election monitoring framework reveals that the effectiveness of their interaction was to a large 
extent based on the further coincidence of their approaches to their interaction, and facilitated 
their cooperation in implementing the Agreements. Agreement on the objectives and 
mechanisms of the election built a strong base of cooperation: while the United Nations hoped to 
reintegrate Salvadoran society democratically, the FMLN was interested in safely rejoining the 
political system as much as winning political power. This agreement on reintegration convinced 
both of the other's instrumentality to the process. The size, expertise, and close involvement of 
ONUSAL's electoral component was particularly important in reassuring the FMLN as to the 
fairness of the elections. The delicacy of the electoral process made the FMLN's participation 
and acceptance of the results dependent on its belief in the impartiality of the ONUSAL 
monitors. Of particular importance to the viability of the election results was the FMLN's 
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complete disarmament and demobilisation. ONUSAL's insistence on full disarmament before 
the elections made it much more difficult for the FMLN to unfairly manipulate voters, or to 
repudiate the elections and resume its insurgency, if it had wanted to. The vigour and diligence 
with which the monitors observed the election ensured all parties' commitment to impartial 
behaviour. The FMLN's growing isolation, loss of popular support, increasing factionalism and 
worsening military situation made the timing of the election proposals propitious for its 
cooperation, while ONUSAL was able to rely on cohesive international support for its efforts. 
High levels of correlation on these components of the peace process contributed heavily to the 
success of the El Salvador's first post-civil war elections. 
6.3: Unita and the Angolan Elections: War By Other Means 
The Angolan civil war occupied from the outset a prominent position in international 
relations, as a flashpoint in the relations between the superpowers, one of the detonators of the 
second Cold War,165 and one of the nodes of the volatile southern African security complex. 
Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola had been riven by a destructive civil 
war 1 66 between the Marxist MPLAI67 government and the Uniao Nacional para a 
Independencia Total de Angola (Unita) insurgent movement. Unita was formed in 1966 when its 
leader, Jonas Savimbi, split from the FNLAI68 after a personality clash with FNLA leader 
Holden Roberto. Educated in Europe and militarily trained in China, Savimbi soon established a 
strong base among the Ovimbundu tribe, the largest in Angola. 169 Unita was rigidly controlled 
by a brutal internal discipline,170 and its command structure highly centralised around the 
165 See Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, (London: Verso, 1986). 
166 For a full account of the war, see Oliver Furley (ed), Conflict in Africa, (London: British Academic Press, 
1994). 
167 Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola, founded in 1956 by Agostinho Neto to struggle against 
Portuguese rule. 
168 Frente Nacional da Libertacao de Angola, formed in 1962 to fight the Portuguese. 
169 Peter Hawthorne, "Guerrillas Who Will Not Give Up", Time Magazine, 18 June 1979. 
170 Unita has been dogged by repeated revelations of internal purges against dissenters. The best known was the 
executions in 1989 of security chief Tito Chingunji and military aide Wilson dos Santos. 
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personality cult of Savimbi. 171 It soon based its 30,000-strong regular army around the base at 
Jamba in south-eastern Angola, where, under the protection of the South African air force, it 
carved out its Terras Libres de Angola, complete with hospitals, weapons factories, and training 
camps.l72 From this territory, it was able to generate funds for its war by exploiting the diamond 
mines and hunting elephants for ivory. Unita's defence and development of a proto-State in this 
"liberated zone", along with a burgeoning international diplomatic network,173 conferred some 
attributes of sovereignty on the organisation. While its regular army waged a conventional war 
for position in the south-east, Unita's 35,000-strong carried out economic attacks to destabilise 
the government in the rest of Angola. 174 Unita's military successes against the massive MPLA-
Cuban-Soviet war effort were dependent on the United Statesl75 for weapons,176 aid, and 
military intelligence from the Defence Intelligence Agency.177 South Africa provided vital 
logistical and materiel assistance, as well as deploying its own troops, artillery, and air force to 
fight alongside Unita. 178 The war in Angola had become not only a brutal conflict, but a 
permanent source of tension between the superpowers, South Africa, and Cuba. 
The late 1980s had seen progress in a long process of international disentanglement from 
Angola and Namibia,179 and the beginnings of negotiations between the Angolan government 
and Unita. These culminated in the signing in Portugal of the May 1991 Accordos da Paz, 
mediated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal, in which both sides agreed to 
171 Jacques Baumgartner, "Unita: The Imponderable in Angola", Swiss Review a/World Affairs, October 1988. 
172 Patrick E. Tyler, "The Rebels: Unita's State Within a State Thriving", Washington Post, 28 July 1986. 
173 Unita regularly sent delegates to the United Nations, and kept "embassies" in Washington D. C. and Lisbon. 
174 Allister Sparks, "Toll Rises in Angola's Civil War", Washington Post, 15 March 1987. 
175 US support for Unita has been estimated to have averaged at $15 million per year during the 1980s. 
176 Of particular use to Unita were shipments of Stinger anti-aircraft and TOW antitank missiles. 
177 David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, "Superpowers Raise Ante As Fighting Intensifies", Washington Post, 
27 July 1986. 
178 Patrick E. Tyler, "Rebel Success Turns on South African Aid", Washington Post, 30 July 1986. 
179 The Brazzaville Accord between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, mediated by the United States, was signed 
on 13 December 1988 linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to South African withdrawal and 
independence for Namibia. 
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stop fighting, disarm and fonn a new combined army, and contest general elections by 
November 1992. Following a request by the Angolan government and within the peace accords 
for United Nations verification of the peace process/ 80 the Security Council acquiesced by 
expanding and updating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNA VEM), already 
deployed to verify the Cuban withdrawal, to become UNAVEM H,181 which was duly mandated 
to observe the elections. 182 The elections, held in September 1992, and won by the incumbent 
government, were rejected on the basis of fraud and intimidation by Unita, which resumed its 
insurgency to great effect, rapidly seizing 70% of Angola and beginning the most brutal phase of 
Angola's 31-year civil war. This section will apply the election framework to the Angolan 
elections to analyse the sources of the shortcomings of the process that allowed Unita to 
withdraw and resume the war. 
6.3.1: Objectives 
As on of the biggest causes of tension during the second Cold War, the Angolan civil 
war became an issue of prime concern for resolution as relations between the superpowers 
thawed. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola became an important step towards closer superpower relations. 183 The 
wider international community was keen to further develop the southern African peace dynamic 
- the end of apartheid in South Africa, the independence of Namibia, and peace in Angola and 
Mozambique - and thereby eliminate an enduring source of tension and instability in 
international affairs. The interlinking of these conflicts caused the advancement of peace in one 
to impact ,positively on the others. 184 Angola's oil and diamond reserves also offered a rich 
180 "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, pp. 2-3. 
181 Security Council Resolution 696 (1991) of30 May 1991. 
182 Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) of24 March 1992. 
183 See Roger E. Kanet and Garth A. Katner, "From New Thinking to the Fragmentation of Consensus in Soviet 
Foreign Policy: The USSR and the Developing World" in Roger E. Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara J. 
Resler (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 129; and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, "International Affairs: Asia and the Pacific Region", Vladivostok, 28 July 1986, Vital Speeches 
of the Day, Vol. 52, No. 23,15 September 1986, p. 711. 
184 Much of the linking was a result of the operation of the ANC and the PAC from sanctuaries in the frontline 
States and South Africa's response, to destabilise those States harbouring these groups. 
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resource base to potential trading partners. ISS Maintaining the momentum of the peace dynamic 
after the successful Namibia operation, the United States, Soviet Union and Portugal mediated a 
peace agreement between the government and Unita, which requested United Nations oversight 
of the peace process. Support for the update of UNA VEM to fulfil this request fonned around 
the three mediating States. Zaire, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, and Ghana took an 
interest in the process, as did Western Europe and Canada, who eventually sent independent 
observers to verify the elections. Having secured the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the 
independence of Namibia in 1989, the United Nations found itself obliged to contribute to the 
completion of the peace process in Angola. UNA VEM II was thus a product of coinciding, but 
vague interests among its sponsoring coalition, who were keen to conclude a peace process from 
which their attention had moved on as cheaply as possible. 186 
Given these interests among the sponsoring coalition, the United Nations resolved to 
monitor the elections negotiated in the Accordos da Paz to conclude the peace process in 
Angola. The United Nations' ultimate objective in observing the Angolan elections was to help 
ensure their function as the culmination of the resolution process, with the scheduled "free and 
fair elections ... [concluding] the full implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola.,,187 
Ideally, the United Nations hoped to leave Angola a reunified, territorially-integrated State, with 
a functioning democratic political process and an accepted government beginning the process of 
reconstruction. 188 It expressed support for the objectives of the Peace Accords in resolving the 
confiict,189 and their use of elections rather than violence to settle the war. 190 As a method of 
adjudicating over the disputed location of power over the Angolan State, the United Nations 
185 So much so that even while it was supporting the Unita insurgents, the United States remained Angola's 
biggest trading partner for oil and related products. 
186 Thomas G Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping: The Superpowers and Conflict 
Management", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, No.3, July 19931. 
187 Statement by the President of the Security Council, 9 September 1992. 
188 Security Council Resolution 804 (1993) 29 January 1993. 
189 Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) of24 March 1992. 
190 For example, Security Council debate at its 3168th Meeting, 29 January 1993, S!PV.3168, features almost 
universal agreement on the legitimacy of the electoral process as a substitute for warfare, and condemnation of 
Unita's rejection of the election results and its return to war. 
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committed itself to the result of the elections/91 to the irreversibility of the process,192 and to 
their use as an example for resolving other similar conflicts. 193 It wished to see not only the end 
of the war, but a centralisation and unification of the Angolan State, with "the extension of the 
Central Administration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its 
authority." 194 It believed that the establishment of durable peace and stability in Angola would 
have a positive impact on the delicate processes of resolution in South Africa and Mozambique 
that were hoped to bring stability and peace to southern Africa. 195 
Unita's objective in the peace process was to seize power over the Angolan State. It had 
d d · I '1' . h' 196 d I' fi 197 b I" h a vocate natlOna reconcl latlOn, power-s anng, an e ectlOns or years, e levmg t at 
inevitable electoral victory over the vastly unpopular MPLA governmentl98 would secure what 
it had been fighting for since 1975. Elections would have the added advantage of giving its 
accession to power the international and domestic legitimacy that it had long craved. 199 The 
Accordos da Paz had secured for Unita what it had been fighting for: the holding of free and fair 
elections advocated, but never held, under the 1975 Alvor Agreement with Portuga1.200 
191 Security Council Resolution 785 {I 992) of 30 October 1992. 
192 Statement by the President of the Security Council, 3115th Meeting, 18 September 1992. 
193 Special Representative of the Secretary-General Margaret Anstee had planned to take the Angolan election 
monitoring team to oversee the Mozambican elections pending the successful conclusion of the Angolan process. 
As it turned out, the failure of the Angolan elections cast grave doubts over the similar process in Mozambique 18 
month afterwards. 
194 "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, p. 50. 
195 Security Council Resolutions 696 (1991) of30 May 1991 and 747 {I 992) of24 March 1992. 
196 Gillian Gunn, "Unfulfilled Expectations in Angola", Current History, Vol. 89, No. 547, May 1990, pp. 216-
234. 
197 See "Unita Calls Off Offensive", New York Times, 10 March 1989. 
198 Unita calculated that the MPLA had become very unpopular because of the continuing war, the harshness of 
its rule, the failure of Marxist economics, and the growing number of revelations of embezzlement, corruption and 
fraud among Ministers. 
199 Keith Somerville, "Angola: An End to the Misery in Sight?", The World Today, Vol. 47, No.5, May 1991, p. 
73. 
200 James Hamill, "Angola's Road From Under the Rubble", The World Today, Vol. 50, No.1, January 1994, p. 
7. 
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Democratic co-existence and loyal opposition were concepts that did not fit Unita's zero-sum 
perception of the struggle: the ethnic basis of the conflict/o l the urban-rural rivalry,202 and the 
intensity of the personal hostility between Unita's leadership and the government,203 meant that 
power was seen as the exclusive preserve of the victor, and a means of protection from the rival 
group?04 
The Accordos da Paz reflected this in the way that it structured the electoral process as a 
once-off, "winner-take-all" contest, by ignoring questions of representation, national 
reconciliation, or minority guarantees for the post-election period, and in effect leaving the shape 
of the future Angolan State to be decided by the winner of the elections?05 Elections became a 
test of Unit a's claim to have the support of the majority of Angolans, rather than the collection of 
apartheid-backed foreign mercenaries and thugs that the government portrayed it as?06 So sure 
was Unita of victory, that leader Jonas Savimbi declared at election rallies that the only way 
Unita could lose was by rigging the elections?07 Having failed to prevail through the electoral 
contest for power, then, Unita reverted to the military mechanism, rejecting the electoral results 
as fraudulent. Hence the objectives ofUNAVEM II and Unita diverged: UNAVEM II wanted to 
establish a unified government and functioning democratic process, while Unita wanted power. 
Denied power, Unita rejected the interaction and its outcomes. 
201 Unita based its support and objectives on promoting the goals of the Ovimbundu, Chokwe, Ganguela and 
Ovambo tribes of the central Angolan highlands in their rivalry against coastal, white, and mixed-race Angolans. 
See Linda M. Heywood, "Unita and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
27, No.1, 1989, pp. 47-66. 
202 Unita exploited the widespread rural resentment that the MPLA government had failed to deliver even 
minimal assistance to rural Angolans (over three-quarters of the population) and their desires for an alternative 
government. See Gerald J. Bender, "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Luanda-Pretoria Tug-of-War", Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.2, April 1989, p. 17. 
203 Hamill, "Angola's Road From Under the Rubble", op. cit., 1994, p. 7. 
204 For an excellent analysis of the nature of ethnic conflict and competition in a democracy, see Donald L. 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
205 Hamill, "Angola's Role From Under the Rubble", op. cit., 1994, p. 7. 
206 James D. Sidaway and David Simon, "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: the Changing Political 
Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 19, No.1, March 
1993, pp. 13-14. 
207 Patrick Smith, "Angola: Free and Fair Elections!", Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 55, November 
1992, p. 104. 
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6.3.2: Interaction Mechanisms 
In agreeing to monitor the elections, the United Nations gave its tacit support208 to the 
structure and organisation of the electoral process outlined in the Accordos da Paz.209 The 
failure of the Angolan elections has given rise to a body of opinion within the United Nations 
that it should not implement or oversee Agreements which it has not mediated or contributed to; 
that outside mediators are more interested in securing an agreement than in the modalities of its 
implementation?1O At the time, however, the United Nations was committed to the Accords' 
election mechanisms, and to "entrusting the main tasks to the parties themselves, [so that] the 
arrangements proposed would have the advantage of reducing the costs to the international 
community at a time when there is an ever-growing demand for funds for peacekeeping. ,,211 As 
a result, the election mechanism "depended critically on the parties' good will, rather than on a 
stringent inspection regime.,,212 The peace process and elections were to be administered by the 
government of Angola and the government-Unita controlled mechanisms of the CCPM 
(Commissao Conjunta Politico-Militar), and the CMVF (Joint Verification and Monitoring 
Commission), to which UNAVEM II would report and violations or irregularities.213 The 
administration of the ceasefire and demobilisation was left to the parties, the CCPM, and the 
CCFA (Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces)?14 The belligerents consistently 
208 Security Council Resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991. 
209 Security Council Resolution 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and other Security Council calls afterwards 
expressed unreserved support for the Peace Accords and their results. 
210 This opinion was most explicitly stated by Joan T. Seymour, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General 
for Political Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Headquarters, New York City, 11 March 1994. 
211 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission", S/22627, 20 May 
1991, p. 6. 
212 Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II", in William J. Durch (ed) The 
Evolution a/United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 
399. 
'13 
- "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, pp. 4, 6, 9. 
214 Appendix 4, "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, pp. 28-30. 
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failed to disarm, blocked the functioning of the CCPM and CMVF,215 while UNAVEM II could 
only observe, patrol and report on their progress,216 and the United Nations was left to urge 
cooperation, restraint and tolerance?17 Had the United Nations possessed a research and conflict 
analysis unit to which these disturbing reports were passed, the international community could 
have been long forwamed of the danger to the elections. The continuing military potential of the 
opponents and their unallayed suspicions of each other and the process prevented the conduct of 
the elections in a neutral environment, and ultimately doomed the results,218 despite calls from 
the United Nations to accept the results,219 and warnings of action and isolation if Unita 
220 
returned to war. 
For Unita, elections were not a method of adjudication so much as the continuation of its 
struggle for power by other means. It believed that so certain was its victory and so great its 
support, that the elections were a formality and any result except a Unita victory was fraudulent 
and inadmissible?21 Unita formed a political party after the signing of the Accordos da Paz in 
May 1991, and Savimbi began an energetic and populist campaign advocating an end to foreign 
presences and often playing on ethnic rivalries.222 Its campaign and approach to the elections 
reflected "a reliance on conflict rather than conciliation and compromise as the form of political 
discourse.,,223 Unita pressed for elections to be held within 12 months of the signing of the 
215 Interview with Jose M. da Silva Campino, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Headquarters, New 
York City, 11 March 1994. 
216 United Nations Angola Verification Mission, "Notes for the Guidance of Military/Police Observers on 
Assignment", UNST.ADMIGS/FOD (02), Field Operations Division, June 1991, pp. 5-6. 
217 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PV.3115, 18 September 1992. 
218 "Further Report of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", S/24858, 25 November 
1992, pp. 2-3. 
219 Security Council Resolution 793 (1992), 30 November 1992. 
220 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PV.3126, 27 October 1992. 
221 In an interview withjoumalist Karl Maier on 20 September 1992, Jonas Savirnbi stated "IfUnita does not win 
the elections, it has to be rigged", see "Urgent Talks Seek to Avoid War in Angola", The Independent, 7 October 
1992. 
222 See Facts on File, 17 October 1991 and 8 October 1992. 
223 Somerville, "Angola: An End to the Misery in Sight?", op. cit., 1991, p. 73. 
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Accords so that it could capitalise on its military and political advances and the support - forced 
or voluntary - of the areas it controlled?24 With misgivings about such a short pre-election 
period - the government had advocated three years - the American, Soviet and Portuguese 
mediators negotiated a compromise period of 18 months?25 Unita had no intention of 
surrendering its military potency during the election run-up; responsible for its own 
demobilisation, F ALA (Unita's military wing) made sure that "a much lower proportion of ex-
F ALA troops were demobilised and even then they did not leave their assembly areas. Almost 
all seem[ed] since to have been remobilised,,,226 and that its forces remained highly disciplined 
and equipped?27 With these resources in place, Savirnbi was able to denounce the National 
Electoral Council as "an MPLA puppet,,,228 complain of "widespread, massive and systematic 
irregularities and fraud,,,229 and resume its insurgency, seizing its areas of support and 70% of 
Angolan territory rapidly and brutally?30 The incompatibility of UNA VEM II's and Unita's 
conceptions of the election process severely restricted the viability of the interaction and its 
results. 
6.3.3: Instrumentality 
While the parties were responsible for the implementation of the Accordos da Paz and 
the administration of the elections, they invited the United Nations "to send monitors to support 
224 Inge Tvedten, "U.S. Policy Towards Angola Since 1975", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, No.1, 
1992, p. 49. 
225 "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, p. 47. 
226 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", 
S/24858, 22 November 1992, p. 13. 
227 Vicki R. Finkel, "Brothers in Anns", Africa Report, Vol. 37, No.2, March-April 1992, p. 62. 
228 Facts on File, 8 October 1992. 
229 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", 
S/24858, 25 November 1992, p. 4. 
230 "Letter Dated 18 December 1992 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/24996, 21 December 1992, p. 2. 
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the Angolan parties,,231 to execute the Accords. Before agreeing to its dispatch, the Security 
Council explicitly required "the United Nations electoral mission to have the explicit agreement 
of the two parties to the Peace Accords for Angola.,,232 Both parties agreed to a United Nations 
presence, but only on the condition that it played a detached, strictly observer role: 
These verification teams would work closely with, but remain separate from, the 
monitoring groups composed of the representatives of the two parties. They 
would observe closely the manner in which those groups were carrying out their 
functions in order to verify that the joint monitoring machinery was working 
ffi . I 233 e ectlve y. 
The United Nations' participation in the CCPM was explicitly allowed, "in the capacity of an 
invited guest.,,234 Thus, although "UNAVEM electoral observers ... would monitor and evaluate 
the operations and impartiality of the electoral authorities at all levels,,,235 the United Nations 
had no substantive control over the conduct of the process, since it was subordinate to the likely 
transgressors. To compound this powerlessness, the United Nations team was much too small 
for an election of that size: 400 observers were required to observe the polling of 4.83 million 
voters at 6,000 polling stations in a State the size of Western Europe.236 Thus the lack of a 
significant or effectual observer presence made it much easier for Unita to claim fraud and return 
to war. 
The United Nations, the American, Soviet, and Portuguese mediators, and MPLA 
acknowledged that "genuine ... national reconciliation ... cannot be achieved without the full 
participation of UNITA, the second largest party ... , whose legitimate concerns must be 
231 "Concepts for Resolving the Issues Still Pending Between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola 
and UNITA", "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Attachment III, 17 May 1991, p. 45. 
232 Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) of24 March 1992. 
233 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission", S/22627 , 20 May 
1991, p. 5. 
234 
"Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, p. 48. 
235 "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II", PSIDPII5IRev.2, March 1992, p. 2. 
236 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", 
S/24858, 25 November 1992, pp. 2-4. 
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addressed. ,,237 Much of this was based on the realist calculation that as one of the two 
participants in the war, Unita was essential to any settlement aimed to resolve the conflict. 
Unita's participation was also needed to give the elections internal legitimacy, to allow it, as one 
of the three major post-colonial insurgent groups, to represent its supporters in the elections and 
the ensuing political system. International legitimacy also required participation by Unita, 
especially in States such as the United States, where Unita was seen as the legitimate democratic 
opposition to the Marxist MPLA government. 238 The desire to establish a functioning 
democracy meant that the Accordos da Paz emphasised that not only Unita, but "[a]ll political 
parties and interested persons will have the opportunity to organise and to participate in the 
elections process on an equal footing, regardless of their political positions. ,,239 Unita's 
participation was also vital in the post-election political system; its withdrawal and return to 
insurgency doomed the resolution process and plunged Angola back into the misery of war. 
6.3.4: Impartiality 
The UNAVEM II presence, contingent on the agreement and good will of the parties, 
was unable to impact significantly on the conduct of the peace process, and was unable to make 
a lasting impression of its impartiality. The Accordos da Paz declared that "[t]he security of the 
monitoring groups and all United Nations personnel shall be the responsibility of the party that 
controls the zone where they are present.,,240 Given its lack of authority and the thinness of its 
presence, UNA VEM II nevertheless attempted to report all irregularities with objectivity and 
impartiality. It noted the problems with the disarmament and demobilisation process,241 the 
difficulties with the extension of government administration into Unita-controlled areas,242 the 
237 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", 
S/24858, 25 November 1992, p. 16. 
238 Heywood, "Unita and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola", op. cit., 1989, p. 64. 
239 "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, p. 47. 
240 "Peace Accords for Angola", S/22609 Enclosure, 17 May 1991, p. 10. 
241 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)", 
S/24858, 22 November 1992, p. 13. 
242 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission", S/22627, 20 May 
1991, p. 5. 
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registration of voters, and criticised the partiality of, and lack of access to the Governrnent-
controlled media.243 None of these complaints had any impact on the peace process, and the 
United Nations was too concerned about "Angola being a sovereign independent country, 
[making] the organization and supervision of all tasks under the Accords ... the responsibility of 
the Angolan parties themselves,,244 to agitate for a greater influence on the process. Its attempt 
to ultimately affect the peace process by attesting to the integrity of the elections, however, 
incurred the suspicion of Unita. UNA VEM II carried out its own quick count of the results,245 
and when these tallied with the results, declared the results and the elections "to have been 
generally free and fair," after it had investigated Unita's allegations of fraud?46 On this basis, 
Unita rejected the impartiality and credibility of UNA VEM II, rejected the elections, and 
returned to warfare. 
Unita's obsession with taking power compromised the impartiality of its behaviour 
towards the electoral process or the commitment to democracy that was needed from the 
insurgents to make the resolution process work. At the start of the process, the Security Council 
urged a commitment to the electoral process and called on the "parties to finalise political, legal, 
organisational and budgetary preparations for free and fair multiparty elections. ,,247 Although 
Unita organised as a party and began campaigning, its failure to demobilise belied any genuine 
commitment to working and competing for power peacefully within the democratic system.248 
The peace process made no provision for the welfare or reintegration of the demobilised 
soldiers, and had no mechanism for inducing the parties to demobilise genuinely. While over 
80% of the government's troops demobilised, Unita disanned less than 10% of its own troops, 
243 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNA VEM II)", 
S/24858, 25 November 1992, p. 2. 
244 "Statement ofthe President of the Security Council", SIPV.3092, 7 July 1992. 
245 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNA VEM II)", 
S/24858, 25 November 1992, p. 4. 
246 Special Representative of the Secretary-General Margaret Anstee, Press Statement, SG/1966, 19 October 
1992, p. 3. 
247 Security Council Resolution 747 (1992) of24 March 1992. 
248 "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNA VEM II)", 
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and then remobilised large numbers of them in its own territory.249 It also refused access to its 
areas to government administration, electoral registration, and peacekeepers and monitors?50 In 
the run-up to the polling and in the aftermath of the polls, Unita turned against UNA VEM II and 
Special Representative Anstee, with its radio station Vorgan "impugning the integrity and 
impartiality" of the mission?51 Thus the lack of genuine commitment to the elections by one of 
its major participants destroyed the delicate progress of the peace process. 
6.3.5: Timing 
The timing of the elections was not conducive to Unita's cooperation, because its 
military fortunes had not declined far enough to force it to abandon the military option and opt 
genuinely for elections. Both sides tried to prevail in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal 
of Cuban and South African troops, but failed to deal each other the knock out blow?52 
Although by 1990 the war had stalemated, and neither side had the ability to militarily prevail 
over the other, Unita still possessed the resources and personnel to struggle on indefinitely.253 
The length of the insurgency and the bitterness of the war had left Unita convinced of its 
military potency and reluctant to abandon its weapons. Thus, when it agreed to elections as a 
method of retaining international support and legitimacy, and as a way to finally seize power, it 
preserved its discipline, military structure and weapons. Its conviction of its military prowess 
and lack of demobilisation made it uncommitted to the electoral process. Once it had rejected the 
election results, this military ability enabled it to seize and hold over 70% of Angolan territory 
extremely quickly. 
249 Chris Simpson, "The Undemocratic Game", Africa Report, Vo!' 38, No.4, July-August 1993, p. 51. 
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6.3.6: Support and Isolation 
The powerlessness of UNA VEM II over the conduct and viability of the elections was 
compounded by the lack of international interest in the Angolan peace process. By 1992, the 
international community seemed to be weary of the Angolan conflict, and had regarded the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence ofNarnibia to be a considerable success and a 
milestone in stabilising southern Africa and increasing international cooperation. The successful 
implementation of the Namibia settlement removed most of the international confrontation from 
the region, and the powers diverted their attention to other regional conflicts that were hindering 
their cooperation or threatening stability. In the implementation phase of the Bicesse Accords, 
therefore, "the international community showed a surprising complacency towards Angola in 
1992 which implied a belief that the hard work had been done actually reaching the agreement 
one year earlier.,,254 Within the United Nations, this was reflected in the Security Council's 
obsession with minimising the costs of the operation,255 and its eventual dispatch of a skeleton 
observation component for UNA VEM II?56 
Nevertheless, States with former links to the belligerents attempted to use their influence 
to induce the parties' cooperation. Both South Africa and the Russian Federation maintained 
contact with their former clients, urging their cooperation with the election process?57 African 
States, including Cote d'Ivoire, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Zambia and Zimbabwe, long concerned that the Angolan civil war had 
come to symbolise foreign intervention in Africa, collectively and individually applied pressure 
on the parties to settle the conflict peacefully?58 The United States used its contacts with Unita, 
254 Hamill, "Angola's Road From Under the Rubble", op. cit., 1994, p. 9. 
255 Statement by the President of the Security Council, SIPV.3092, 7 July 1992. 
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258 See Facts on File, 30 June 1993. 
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and its economic links with the government, to maintain a constant insistence on the aptness of 
elections for resolving the conflict, reacting angrily after Unita rejected the election results.259 In 
general, however, the lack of compelling interest in the peace process made these efforts 
sporadic and ineffectual, and did little to compensate for the existing shortcomings in the 
Agreements and its signatories. 
Unita's military prowess in large part determined its withdrawal from the peace process; 
this confidence was in part supplied by its continuing support from external sources. As the Cold 
War ended, the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to working together, with 
Portugal, to mediate an end to the Angolan civil war, agreed on the "zero-zero" option: to stop 
supplying their respective clients with lethal material once a ceasefire was reached?60 The 
United States, however, continued its support for Unita, to decreasing levels, until well into the 
peace process. The Reagan administration, as part of its "rollback" policy, obtained a repeal of 
the Clark Amendment in 1985, and supplied Unita with up to $20 million of military equipment 
in the later 1980s?61 Elements within the South African military also continued to supply Unita 
with military equipment and expertise, well after official South African support for Unita had 
ended.262 This American support, along with support from South Africa and Zaire, had a 
negative effect on Unita's cooperativeness, by convincing it of the strength of its position to 
sieze power in Angola, with or without the elections. Either these suppliers were unprepared to 
exercise influence over Unita, or those willing to pressure Unita were losing leverage over the 
group through cutting back their aid?63 Neither did the decreasing levels of external support 
drastically effect Unita's military calculus: its military leaders boasted its arms stockpiles could 
sustain a military campaign for at least two years,264 while its export of timber and diamonds 
259 Karl Maier, "Urgent Talks Seek to Avert War in Angola", The Independent, 7 October 1992. 
260 Fortna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission II", op. cit., 1992, p. 389. 
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enabled it to fund other covert sources of supply?65 Unita's insulation from the effects of 
external isolation thus emboldened its to return to warfare after an unsatisfactory election result. 
6.3.7: Cohesion 
The members of the United Nations showed cohesive support for the objectives of 
UNAVEM II, with the Security Council adopting its resolutions on the Angolan peace process 
by unanimous votes?66 The positive effect of this cohesion on the facilities of UNA VEM II, 
however, was tempered by their relative lack of interest in the peace process in the run-up to the 
elections. The Security Council remained determined to minimise the costs of the operation, 
providing UNA VEM II with one quarter of the budget of the UNTAG operation in Namibia to 
monitor an electorate ten times as large.267 Unita's rejection of what UNA VEM II had 
determined to be a "free and fair election,,,268 however, brought belated Security Council 
cohesion and interest. The prospect of all it had worked for being undone galvanised "the full 
and unequivocal support of the Security Council for the efforts of [the] Special Representative 
and UNAVEM 1I .. .in ... the implementation of the Peace Accords.,,269 It assembled an ad hoc 
Commission, of representatives from Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the 
United States, which travelled to Angola in support ofUNAVEM II and to try to persuade Unita 
to respect the election results and remain in the peace process. This cohesion and interest came 
too late and was unsuccessful; Unita had tested its electoral strength and once this had been 
found to be inadequate, it easily returned to its insurgency. 
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The United Nations, aware of the delicacy of the peace process and the smallness of its 
observer force, appealed to the Angolan parties to control their members from committing "any 
act that might heighten tension, impair the conduct of the electoral process, and threaten the 
territorial integrity of Angola. ,,270 By the time of the elections, Unita had developed into one of 
the most cohesive insurgent movements with which the United Nations had to deal. Its strict 
hierarchy and control is based on the personal power of Savimbi, the promotion of his 
personality cult, and the filling of key positions with his family members.271 This control had 
been intensified by power struggles and purges within Unita in the late 1980s.272 The strength of 
this cohesion within Unita, however, was to have a negative impact on the elections. Savimbi's 
exclusive contact with sycophants and his accustomisation to automatic obedience convinced 
him of his universal popularity and made him certain that Unita could only lose the elections 
through fraud?73 Furthermore, Unita's rigid discipline enabled it to maintain a potent military 
force during the conduct of the elections, and to make rapid military gains once it had rejected 
the election results. In these ways, Unita's strong internal cohesion accelerated the effects of a 
failing peace process, rather than strengthening a successful electoral process. 
The failure of the Angolan elections, and their ushering in of a new phase of 
unprecedented brutality in the Angolan civil war, rests on the basis of divergent approaches to 
the electoral process between the United Nations monitors and the Unita insurgents. By the time 
it came to implement the Bicesse Accords, the interested Member-States of the United Nations 
had become complacent due to the outstanding success of the other phases of the Angola-
Namibia peace process. The inadequate size and resourcing of UNAVEM II reflected their 
underestimation of the indigenous sources of the civil war. These shortcomings were 
compounded by the extremely poor quality of the Bicesse Accords: their unrealistic timetable, 
their lack of adequate compulsion and oversight mechanisms, and their trusting of crucial 
aspects of the peace process to the discretion of the belligerents. Unita was by no means an 
270 Statement of the President of the security Council, SIPV.3126, 27 October 1992. 
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insurgent movement that could be trusted to its own devices. It remained uncommitted to the 
election mechanism: its objective was power, not fair competition and entry into a democratic 
system. Fighting a bitter civil war, partially ethnically inspired, centred around the sycophantic 
personality cult of Jonas Savimbi, and with a zero-sum perception of possible outcomes, it was 
unable to contemplate process-related objectives designed to establish a functioning democracy, 
or the concept of a loyal opposition. Unita's continued military strength and belief in its own 
potency made submission in an electoral contest even more inconceivable. 
Compounding these incompatible objectives in the elections process was the inadequacy 
of the electoral mechanism. The elections, billed as a test of popular support and credibility, 
were structured in such a way as to be a "winner take all" contest, offering few benefits to the 
loser. Angola's vast size, and the inexperience of Angolans in conducting elections, resulted in a 
number of problems with their management. Many of these problems resulted from Angola's 
lack of any democratic tradition, and the disinterest of the international community in providing 
such expertise. Neither the fonnerly Marxist MPLA government, nor the highly-centralised 
Unita, had any concept of the democratic traditions of popular endorsement, compromise, and 
loyal opposition. UNAVEM II was too underresourced, and accorded too small a role in the 
peace agreement, to have any significant impact on observing or endorsing the elections. The 
control of the elections by the incumbent government, and the lack of an adequate independent 
monitoring mechanism, left the results open to charges of fraud by Unita once it had lost. The 
UNA VEM II electoral monitors, while committed to resolution, democracy and the electoral 
mechanism, were unable to have any significant impact on the achievement of their objectives 
because of the inadequacy of their presence and influence. Thus UNA VEM II's ability to play an 
instrumental and impartial role was hampered by its inability to become a comprehensive and 
influential presence, in turn because of the lack of support and interest of the international 
community. A factor of significant impact on the failure of the elections was that Unita barely 
disarmed before the elections. The inadequate lead time before the elections, and the lack of 
control of UNA VEM II over the disarmament process, allowed Unita to repudiate the election 
results and, with its well-armed, disciplined, and intact army, plunge Angola back into civil war. 
Thus in the Angolan elections, Unita's lack of commitment to the elections was magnified in its 
destructive effect on the peace process by the inadequacy of the UNA VEM II presence. 
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6.4: Conclusion 
Elections held to culminate peace processes in the aftermath of civil wars can be seen to 
be a fragile and problematical process. As ultimate allocators of influence between former 
belligerents, they can become perceived as judgements on the wisdom of participating in the 
whole peace process for the insurgents and the United Nations. The election results are the 
ultimate reckoning: they either usher in a permanent resolution or a return to civil war. Post-
Cold War election monitoring is an interaction engaged in between insurgents for which 
elections and democracy are often alien concepts, and the United Nations, which is as yet 
relatively inexperienced in election monitoring. Nevertheless, the operation of the framework 
factors during the United Nations' observation ofthe Salvadoran and Angolan elections was seen 
during the analysis to generally bear out the hypothesis of this thesis, that between the United 
Nations and insurgent movements, concurring approaches produce more optimal outcomes than 
divergent approaches. The comparison of the successful Salvadoran election with the failed 
Angolan election reveals some important insights. The two elections themselves show some 
interesting convergences and differences: while in both the elections were the culmination of a 
peace agreement and eventually lost by the insurgents, the democratic tradition was more 
familiar to Salvadorans, and the United Nations exhibited a much higher level of involvement 
and control in EI Salvador. It is not only these differences, but differences in the levels of 
agreement on the objectives of the electoral process, on the electoral mechanism, on the 
instrumentality of the United Nations and the insurgent movement, on their impartiality, the 
timing of the elections, the isolation and support of the insurgents and the United Nations, and 
their cohesion, that impacted in a distinctive way on the outcome of the electoral process. 
The analyses revealed that of importance to a successful and viable election is the 
agreement between the insurgents and the United Nations on their objectives during their 
interaction. The different nature of their objectives, however, makes compatibility a difficult 
goal. The United Nations' goals are process-related - it sees elections as not only a process of 
resolution, but aims to establish democracy and regular elections within States formerly divided 
by civil war. The insurgents' objectives, are more practical, usually centred around the 
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attainment of power or influence. In order to coincide with the United Nations' for a successful 
election, insurgents' objectives need to go beyond the simple seizure of power, to a commitment 
to democracy and reconciliation, and the exercise of power or opposition within the political 
system. It was just such a desire on the part of the FMLN to re-enter the political system that 
ensured the smooth operation of the elections, and its acceptance of its electoral loss to its 
former enemy, the ARENA party. Unita, however was committed only to the seizure of power. 
Once the electoral process did not bring this objective, it rejected the electoral process and 
reverted to war. Much of the difference of the insurgents' approach to the elections may be 
attributed to the existence of a democratic tradition in EI Salvador, a condition that was 
conspicuously lacking in Angola. The coincidence of objectives was thus shown to be the 
foundation of an election's success or failure: an insurgent movement committed to the 
establishment of a system will cooperate regardless of the electoral result, whereas a group 
obsessed by power will only cooperate if it wins. 
The analysis showed that the United Nations and the insurgent movement must further 
agree on elections as the appropriate mechanism to resolve the conflict and establish a 
functioning political system, in order for their interaction to be viable. Alternative mechanisms 
of resolution that could be advocated include transitional power-sharing, federalism, and 
partition. The nature of democratic elections - their reliance on the will of the people, the 
persuasion of opinion, and the sanctity of the democratic rules - makes their success contingent 
on the parties' and the observers' agreement on the election mechanism. Fair participation and 
competition cannot be compelled. The United Nations relies on the democratic experience and 
expertise of its Western members to formulate what it regards as a fair and acceptable electoral 
process. The extent of its participation in the design of the elections during the mediation of the 
peace process has an effect on the smooth functioning of the observation: in EI Salvador the 
United Nations mediated the agreement; while in Angola it was asked to observe from a distance 
a process, the design of which it had had little input. The difference in lead times and preparation 
intensity between EI Salvador and Angola also contributed to the smoother functioning of the 
former election. The insurgents, in order to participate in this system, must be prepared to accept 
the will of the people, to rely on persuasion of popular opinion instead of force, and be prepared 
to function as a loyal opposition. The FMLN proved committed to the electoral process and 
368 
these conditions, while Unita saw elections as an alternative to war, openly announcing its 
cooperation with the process and the results was contingent upon its victory. Thus agreement on 
the election mechanism enhances the cooperation and trust of the United Nations as an observer 
and the insurgents as participants, while a disagreement calls into question the viability of the 
process and the durability of its outcome, despite the best efforts of the observers. 
A genuinely democratic election should be open to all contestants for power. 
Furthermore, elections that are intended to resolve a civil war necessarily need to include the 
major belligerents, in order to ultimately tie them into the political system that the elections are 
intended to install. Consequently, the insurgent movement's right to participate in the elections 
must be accepted by the other parties and by the United Nations. On the other hand, the United 
Nations' observation presence must be accepted by the parties, and should be seen as necessary 
to the smooth and fair conduct of the elections. In both EI Salvador and Angola, the FMLN and 
Unita were seen as necessary participants in the peace process. The difference between the two 
operations, with a major impact on the affecting their differing levels of success, was the size of 
the United Nations presence. ONUSAL provided a comprehensive observer force which 
maintained close oversight over the whole process, thereby ensuring the fairness and credibility 
of the process. UNA VEM II was much too underresourced, and kept by the Bicesse Accords at 
too great a distance from the elections, to provide an effective coverage of the elections, thereby 
making it much easier for Unita to remain armed, denounce the results and return to its 
insurgency. The operation of instrumentality as a factor in the election monitoring process, then, 
has a greater impact on the United Nations' presence, and specifically the comprehensiveness of 
that presence. 
The delicacy of the election process, and its dependence on tmst and commitment 
between the parties, makes the parties' perceptions of the impartiality of the election monitors 
vital to their commitment to the election process and results. ONUSAL took great pains to 
convince both parties of its objectivity in observing the elections, and launched a number of 
public education programs about the elections and its role as an observer. UNA VEM II had little 
opportunity to impact on the process in this way: its lack of personnel and distance from the 
administration of the elections meant that its reporting of irregularities had little impact on 
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changing the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, the fragility of the structures of trust 
during post-civil war elections means that the insurgents must impartially confine their 
behaviour to within the limits required of parties in a democratic election. The FMLN 
demonstrated this willingness after an initial period of suspicion, and this contributed in a major 
way to the successful running of the election. ONUSAL's insistence on complete disarmament 
and demobilisation made it even more difficult to renounce the results and return to its 
insurgency. Unita, by contrast, at no time was faithful to the election process. Left to its own 
devices to disarm and cooperate, instead it maintained its military potential, impeded electoral 
registration and voting, and then rejected the results after it lost. This behaviour destroyed both 
the viability and durability of the elections. Impartiality, then has a major impact on the outcome 
of election observation. 
The timing of an election to end a civil war has a major impact on the insurgents' 
willingness to genuinely compete and cooperate in the elections. The FMLN's military fortunes 
had stagnated and were declining to such an extent that it realised that it would have to compete 
in elections sooner rather than later in order to avoid being further marginalised. It also wished 
to rejoin a reformed Salvadoran political system. Unita, on the other hand, wished to dominate, 
rather than participate in Angola's political system. Its military position was not conducive to 
compelling it to abandon its commitment to armed force. Rather, its military confidence 
influenced its political confidence that it would win the elections, and made its almost inevitable 
that it would revert to the military course once the political course had failed. In this way, timing 
has a direct impact on the insurgent's commitment to the elections, and thus on the viability of 
the monitoring interaction with the United Nations. 
International support for the efforts of the United Nations monitors has less of an impact 
on the success or failure of the operation. Support comes in the form of both expertise in 
administering elections and in applying pressure to the belligerents to remain in the process and 
accept its results. International expertise and guarantees strengthened the FMLN's existing 
commitment to the Salvadoran elections, and helped it to accept the results and its position 
within the opposition. The lack of international interest in the Angolan elections, on the other 
hand, allowed Unita to cheat on the peace process with relative impunity. For the insurgent 
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movements, isolation from external sponsors also plays a role, if a lesser role, in influencing 
their commitment to the elections. The FMLN's increasing desertion by the communist world 
led to a calculation that it would have to join the political system to regain international support, 
thereby reinforcing its decision to abandon the insurgency. Unita was less isolated, and less 
dependent on outside support. The desertion of its major sponsors had little effect on its tenuous 
commitment to the elections. Thus support and isolation playa lesser role in the effectiveness of 
election monitoring. 
The impact of cohesion within the insurgents and the United Nations on the conduct of 
an election process is slight and at times unclear. While Member-States' cohesion behind 
ONUSAL contributed to its comprehensive presence and its influence in keeping the parties and 
electoral authorities honest, it seemed to have a marginal effect on the FMLN's commitment to 
the process. In Angola, the Security Council's cohesive agreement on the mandate ofUNAVEM 
II could not make up for its lack of interest, and the monitoring team was drastically 
understaffed and underresourced. Unita's cohesion had, if anything, a negative effect on its 
commitment to the elections and their results, convincing Savimbi of his electoral invincibility, 
and facilitating Unita's return to war. Consequently, cohesion's influence on the election 
monitoring relationship is weak. 
This chapter's investigations show that the viability of the election monitoring 
relationship between the United Nations and insurgents is influenced by the extent of the 
compatibility of their approaches to the process. It shows that agreement is important, but 
difficult on the objectives of the electoral process and the pertinence of the election mechanism, 
while instrumentality, impartiality and timing are important contributing factors, particularly to 
the insurgents' commitment to the elections. Support and isolation and cohesion are less 
important to the success of the operation. Election monitoring thus joins mediation and 
peacekeeping in being subject to this basic logic of mutual consent and cooperation. This 
relationship thus operates across the spectrum of relationships between the United Nations and 
insurgent movements, and demonstrates the validity of the hypothesis. 
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7: CONCLUSION 
This study arose from a curiosity about why some United Nations involvements with 
insurgent movements are efficient and yield positive outcomes, while others are dysfunctional 
and entail failure. By invoking realist precepts against the evidence available, it found that a 
major detenninant of the nature of an encounter between the United Nations and an insurgent 
movement lies in the compatibility of their prior intentions and approaches. The analysis applied 
a framework of approach indicators to three different modes of United Nations-insurgent 
interactions, and found that the results generally supported the hypothesis of this study: that 
concurring approaches produce more optimal interactions that divergent approaches. Rather than 
refuting fifty years of experience with a revolutionary paradigm, this conclusion builds upon 
much of the conventional wisdom about the United Nations' interactions in conflict situations. In 
agreeing with previous notions of consensuality, this thesis plays a role in reinforcing the 
growing corpus of understanding of the roles and capabilities of the United Nations by 
increasing the explanatory and justificatory power of these concepts. The contribution this study 
makes is not so much in its general conclusion as in the interpreting power of its indices of 
approach. The indices give precision to general notions of consent by highlighting certain 
important factors in the approaches of the interacting units that should determine their 
compatibility, and thereby the consensuality and effectiveness of their interaction. In concluding 
this study, this chapter combines and compares the analysis of the previous three chapters to 
draw out more general conclusions about the nature of United Nations-insurgent interactions and 
the aspects of their approaches that most impact on their optimality. It makes use of the results to 
assess, first, the relative defining power of the indices on the approaches in each type of 
interaction, and second, to compare the impact of the indices on approaches and relations 
between the different types of interaction. It then makes brief observations on the practical utility 
of some of the conclusions, and suggests new directions for further research. 
7.1: INTERACTIONS AND THEIR DETERMINANTS 
In each of the interaction types examined - mediation, peacekeeping, and election 
monitoring - the different indices varied in direction, mode and strength of impact on the 
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approaches of the United Nations and insurgent movements, and affected the optimality of the 
interactions differently. Examining the varying levels of impact reveals important conclusions 
about similarities and differences between the different types of interactions of the United 
Nations and insurgent movements, and the origins of these links. 
Of all of the indices during mediation interactions between the United Nations and 
insurgent movements, objectives emerged as the most defining of approach and influential on its 
effectiveness. The compatibility between the objectives of the United Nations and the insurgent 
movement more than any other factor determined the viability of the mediation initiative. With 
mediation, an optimal outcome is defined in terms of the durability of the agreement reached, 
which in turn rests on the satisfaction of the negotiating parties with the agreement. So tenability 
derives directly from the satisfaction of objectives. It emerged from the three mediation 
interactions studied - the FMLN, the Khmer Rouge, and the Bosnian Serbs - that the objectives 
of these groups and the United Nations mediators are the only reliable indicators of the actors' 
approaches. Mediation, like all forms of negotiations, is replete with gambits and techniques that 
are used to disguise intentions or offer conciliatory behaviour to mislead or manipulate other 
parties. This fact emerged strongly in the examinations of the Khmer Rouge's and the Bosnian 
Serbs' mediation behaviour. All groups and their mediators were prepared to talk, but ultimately 
it was their objectives that determined the levels of optimality of the outcomes. In mediation, 
then, objectives emerged as the indicator with the most determining power. 
The mediators' and insurgents' concurrence on mediation as a mechanism of interaction 
IS an important, but more complicated indicator. The non-binding nature of the mediation 
interaction means that agreeing to talks carries very few dangers for the parties; both mediators 
and parties can abandon talks having suffered little damage from the experience. Thus a prima 
facie agreement to participate in peace talks impacts little on the ultimate effectiveness of the 
interaction, because it reveals little about the actual intentions and approach of the mediators and 
parties. Yet when the indicator is taken to measure actual commitment to reaching a negotiated 
solution, its determining power is greatly increased. The difficulty of measuring this level of 
agreement, however, makes this indicator problematical. It is only by extrapolating from the 
objectives of the parties, and combining this with their negotiating behaviour, that genuine 
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commitment to a negotiated solution can be measured. The FMLN's genuine commitment to 
reaching an agreement became clearer as the talks progressed, while the tactics of the Bosnian 
Serbs have made it clear that they were talking for appearance and victory, rather than 
resolution. The Khmer Rouge demonstrated the folly of trying to compel an uncommitted party 
to negotiate, and that an agreement on paper for an insurgent movement is very different from 
agreement on the ground. 
At the level of mediation, instrumentality was found to be an indicator of little 
determining power. In peace talks, the condition that the parties and the mediators accept each 
other's presence is somewhat a tautology: negotiations cannot proceed with a party that is not a 
participant. This indicator, however, when taken to denote how seriously the parties and the 
mediators treat each other's interests, gains much more explanatory ability. This emerged in the 
analysis particularly with respect to the Bosnian Serbs. Because the United Nations rejects out of 
normative convictions the Serbs' full demands, much of its efforts have been spent on trying to 
get them to agree to alternative peace plans. The lack of credence given to the Bosnian Serbs' 
demands has therefore had some input into the incompatibility of the United Nations' approach 
to the mediation with the Bosnian Serbs'. Like interaction mechanisms, then, at a deeper level, 
instrumentality plays an informative, if more complicated, determining role on approaches and 
interactions. 
Impartiality emerged also as a determining, but subordinate indicator of approach 
compatibility during mediation interactions. Because of the use of gambits and deceptive 
cooperation during negotiations, the impartiality of the insurgents' behaviour is bound to have an 
impact on the tenability of the outcomes of a mediation initiative. The honesty of the insurgents' 
behaviour during mediation was found to be derived from the extent of their commitment to the 
mediation and their satisfaction that the talks were progressing towards an acceptable 
conclusion. Again, this ultimately flowed from the compatibility of objectives between the 
mediators and the parties. The mediator's impartiality was also an important, if obvious factor. 
This particularly emerged with respect to the Bosnian Serbs, who, during the talks, have come to 
see the ICFY mediators as another set of interlocutors who must be negotiated down. 
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Timing emerged as a problematical indicator of the insurgent movement's commitment 
to talks. This again seems to be related to the non-binding nature of negotiations; that even 
militarily predominant parties will hold exploratory talks to explore all options for victory. Of 
the three insurgent movements studied, with widely varying military positions, all were willing 
to enter peace talks. The FMLN and the Khmer Rouge, both with stalemated military positions, 
did not show an equal commitment to a negotiated solution. The Khmer Rouge and the Bosnian 
Serbs, one stalemated and the other ascendant, showed equal lack of commitment to genuine 
peace negotiations. 
Support for the mediators by States with connections to the insurgent movements was 
shown to give the mediators a degree of influence over changing their levels of cooperativeness. 
This emerged particularly strongly during the mediation with the Khmer Rouge, who were 
pressured into signing the Paris Agreements, with which they had basic disagreements. 
However, when compared with levels of compatibility of objectives, this indicator proves to be 
problematical. This sort of pressure was shown to be unable to change the objectives of the 
insurgent movement, but will only bring a change in behaviour and an insincere 
cooperativeness. This has doomed the Paris Agreements to untenability, as the Khmer Rouge 
began to default on its commitments as soon as the United Nations tried to implement its peace 
plan. A lack of isolation of the insurgents was shown by the Bosnian Serbs to be extremely 
useful for the insurgents seeking to modify the United Nations' position. They used their 
connections with influential members of the international community to disrupt the already 
strained unity of the sponsoring coalition, and in this way weaken the resolve and negotiating 
position of the mediators. 
Cohesion emerged as having little determining effect on the approaches of either 
mediators or insurgents. The FMLN and the Bosnian Serbs, both decentralised organisations, 
showed different levels of commitment to negotiating peace agreements, while the effects of the 
Khmer Rouge's high level of internal discipline had an unclear effect on its negotiating 
behaviour. While the strong cohesion of the sponsoring coalition helped pressure an agreement 
with the Khmer Rouge, the value of this agreement was questionable. The low cohesion of the 
sponsoring coalition for the Bosnia talks was exploited by the Bosnian Serbs, but it is 
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questionable how much effect this had on the dysfunctional mediation interaction when 
compared with the effect of divergent objectives. 
With mediation, then, objectives emerge as the most important indicator of approach 
compatibility and interaction effectiveness. The other indicators - interaction mechanisms, 
instrumentality, impartiality - are only indicative when they reflect those aspects of approaches 
deriving directly from the compatibility of objectives and satisfaction with progress. The 
underlying information that each indicator aims to measure is the extent of commitment to a 
negotiated peace. A desire to pressure agreement or manipulate results contributes to a 
dysfunctional interaction or outcomes. 
Peacekeeping interactions differ from mediation to the extent that they involve higher 
stakes and levels of commitment from both the United Nations and insurgent movements. This 
makes objectives again an important factor in the interaction. When two military forces interact 
in a consensual manner, either a compatibility of interests or a toleration of presence must 
underlie the viability of the relationship. The danger posed to each other by the insurgents and 
the peacekeeping force means that a clash of interests will lead either to a breakdown of 
cooperation or some level of hostilities. This became obvious during interactions between the 
United Nations and the USC-SNA, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Khmer Rouge. As its interaction 
with Renamo and the Contras revealed, however, a compatibility of objectives, particularly 
relating to a commitment to peace, the satisfaction of security concerns, and the ability to 
promote interests, led to optimal interactions. The need for compatibility and cooperation for 
effective interactions between peacekeepers and insurgents necessarily stems from the inability 
of either side to militarily compel the other to submit to its interests. 
Consent to the peacekeeping mechanism was shown to be an indicator of crucial 
importance to the viability of the interaction. For insurgents, the intervention of a peacekeeping 
operation can be seen as a great threat: a large, foreign armed force, inclined to monitor the 
movement of its cadres and weapons supplies, and committed to the restriction of its military 
endeavours. In order for them to cooperate and not see the peacekeepers as an enemy to be 
repulsed, therefore, they must understand and accept the role of the peacekeepers. This 
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acceptance flows on from a prior compatibility of objectives with the United Nations during the 
peacekeeping interaction: if there is disagreement on the ends of the operation, disagreement 
with the means is sure to follow. This fact emerged most strongly in the United Nations' efforts 
in Somalia, which met with the violent disagreement of the USC-SNA. Even where consent to 
the peacekeeping mechanism does obtain, insurgent cooperation can still be hesitant at the start, 
stemming from basic security concerns. On the other hand, the United Nations must also consent 
to the peacekeeping mechanism. The Organisation was forced to launch both UNOSOM II and 
UNPROFOR II to situations that it had determined to be unsuitable for peacekeeping by an 
impatient sponsoring coalition. The dispatch of peacekeepers to situations for which the 
Organisation lacks operational doctrines was shown to lead to operations of limited 
effectiveness. 
The insurgent's acceptance of the instrumentality of the peacekeepers' presence is 
intimately linked to their acceptance of the peacekeeping mechanism. This indicator is important 
for the same reason, that peacekeepers represent an armed threat to security. It explicitly points 
out that insurgents' acceptance of the peacekeeping mechanism will be based on their underlying 
perceptions of the usefulness of the presence. Peacekeepers that are acceptable have to be seen 
as a help rather than a hindrance. This again flows from the compatibility of objectives. If 
insurgents are committed to these peaceful objectives, they often see a peacekeeping force as a 
guarantee of their security and ability to promote their interests while in pursuit of these 
objectives. If, however, they are committed to divergent or belligerent objectives, peacekeepers 
will be perceived as dangerous or irritating impediments. On the other hand, the peacekeepers' 
perceptions of the importance of the insurgent movements to the peace process was also a 
determining factor on the viability of the interaction. The juxtaposition of the behaviour of 
UNOSOM II and UNTAC illustrates this. UNOSOM II and its sponsoring coalition, by treating 
the USC-SNA as an impediment whose consent could be compelled or whose opposition could 
be eliminated, incurred its violent opposition which eventually led to the operation's demise. 
UNT AC, however, when confronted with an uncooperative Khmer Rouge, continued to consult 
it and encourage its re-entry into the peace process. While it was unsuccessful in this, this 
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behaviour forestalled extensive violent opposition from the Khmer Rouge, I and contributed to 
its successful stewardship of the remainder of the peace process to a conclusion. 
The impartiality of behaviour of both the peacekeepers and the insurgents also had a 
significant impact on their interaction. In Bosnia and Somalia, where the peacekeepers were 
perceived to be siding with the enemies of the Bosnian Serbs and the USC-SNA, they incurred 
the often violent opposition of these insurgent groups. Particularly in Somalia, UNOSOM II's 
partiality caused the USC-SNA to see the peacekeepers as just one more armed faction to be 
factored into the violent calculus of interclan relationships. The insurgents' behaviour also 
emerged as strongly affecting the viability of the peacekeeping interaction. The cooperation of 
Renamo and the Contras had a positive effect on the success of those operations, whereas the 
Bosnian Serbs' and the USC-SNA's often violent non-cooperation led to the shortcomings of 
those operations. 
Timing emerged as a more accurate indicator of the amenability of the insurgent 
movements to the peace process. The cases of cooperation were generally attended by stagnant 
military positions, while the cases of opposition came from insurgents with ascendant military 
positions. The influence of timing, however, was less clear with the uncooperative Khmer 
Rouge, whose military position was strong, but stalemated. The importance of timing appears to 
stem from perceptions of instrumentality of the peacekeepers: insurgents with a positive military 
momentum are bound to resent the intrusion of a conservative and peace-promoting armed 
United Nations presence. 
Support and isolation had little influence on behaviour during peacekeeping interactions. 
Whereas strong pressure on the Khmer Rouge yielded cooperation during mediation, equivalent 
pressure during peacekeeping was unable to modify its non-cooperation. Similarly, the Bosnian 
Serbs' attempts to manipulate UNPROFOR II through connections with members of the 
sponsoring coalition had little effect on the peacekeepers' mandate to protect the safe havens, 
although their manipulation of the peacekeepers has brought them other benefits. In Somalia, 
I The Khmer Rouge did stage a number of attacks against UNTAC peacekeepers, ranging from fIring on 
helicopters, and taking hostages, to killing Dutch and Japanese personnel. 
378 
UNOSOM II demonstrated the unviability of substituting military for diplomatic pressure to 
compel insurgents' cooperation. 
Levels of cohesion had little effect on insurgent movements' cooperativeness. Renamo, 
the Contras, the Bosnian Serbs, and the USC-SNA all showed similar low levels of cohesion, 
but exhibited widely varying levels of compliance with the peacekeepers. The analysis showed 
that this was in part accounted for by information, inducements, and other strategies by 
peacekeeping operations that showed prior agreement in objectives and interaction mechanisms. 
Cohesion, however, had a great effect on the abilities and determination of the peacekeepers. 
The analysis bore out the accepted wisdom that peacekeeping operations backed by higher levels 
of support perform with more assurance, as do operations with greater control of the diverse 
contingents on the ground. 
In peacekeeping interactions, then, the mechanisms and their instrumentality and 
impartiality emerge as the most important indicators of success. The UNTAC operation showed 
that even where the peacekeepers and insurgents disagree on the objectives of the operation, 
basic acceptance and respect for each other's presence can lead to at least a moderately 
successful outcome. Somalia and Bosnia showed that a lack of acceptance of the mechanisms 
can lead to violent opposition. Timing emerges as a clearer, but still problematical indicator, 
while support and isolation remain moderately useful. 
Elections in the aftermath of a civil war are an allocative interaction, a mechanism 
adjudicating the distribution of the disputed factors at the base of the conflict. In this way, they 
are often seen as a judgement on the wisdom of participating in the peace process for both the 
United Nations and the insurgent movement. The optimality of this interaction is easily 
measured: elections result either in an end of the insurgency or a return to warfare. The nature of 
elections has a number of ramifications for the framework. Because the United Nations' 
objectives are process-related - the establishment of a peaceful and functioning democracy - and 
the insurgents' objectives tend to be more practical - the attainment of power or influence -
measuring compatibility between them become difficult. It is particularly hard to quantify the 
insurgent movement's genuine commitment to these process-related objectives. This emerged 
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clearly when examining Unita, which had for years advocated the establishment of democracy in 
Angola, but which rejected results which denied it power. It is also hard to determine how much 
the FMLN's acceptance of its electoral defeat was due to its commitment to democracy and how 
much was due to its securement of a significant voice in the Salvadoran opposition. 
Agreement to the election mechanisms assumes greater importance, particularly for the 
insurgent movements. This indicator measures the amount of trust that each movement places in 
the election process to determine the movement's future and ability to promote its interests. A 
belief that the movement commands enough popular support to garner a significant voice 
through the elections secures the participation of the movement and its commitment to 
campaigning. The United Nations' level of participation in the election mechanism also emerges 
as a crucial factor. The experience of Angola demonstrated the dangers of an election in which 
the United Nations has only a minor oversight role. 
The instrumentality of the insurgent movement to a viable election is obvious. An 
election that genuinely ends the civil war has to be one that ties the insurgent movement to the 
system the elections are installing by allowing them to compete in a fair election. The variable 
instrumentality of the United Nations has a far greater impact on the elections' viability. The 
analyses in Chapter Six showed that higher levels of United Nations oversight, education, and 
protection against intimidation and fraud contributed greatly to the legitimacy of the elections 
and the authority of their results. 
The delicacy of the election process, and the wariness of its participants, makes 
impartiality an important approach indicator. The election monitors' impartiality is important 
because of the apprehensive parties' suspicion of any hint of unfairness in the process, including 
the election monitors. They rely on the monitors impartially maintaining the fairness of the 
whole process. The insurgents, on the other hand, contribute to the process by keeping their own 
campaigning behaviour above board. Both the FMLN and Unita were seen to threaten the 
election process by not completely disarming. This fact shows an incomplete commitment to the 
election process, and contributed to the problems of both those operations. 
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Again, the impact of timing as a measure of insurgents' commitment to mediation was 
indetenninate. Both the FMLN and Unita were at a stalemated situation, although Unita 
demonstrated a significant military predominance once it rejected the elections and returned to 
war. Support and isolation emerged as much more important indicators. The length and delicacy 
of the peace and election process made the use of parallel pressure to correct minor digressions 
from the process by its participants, such as the FMLN's incomplete disannament, an important 
factor in its effectiveness. Major digressions, such as Unita's refusal to disann, however, were 
not able to be corrected. The isolation of the insurgent movements was also shown to be 
important to the tenability and irreversibility of the results. The incomplete isolation of Unita to 
some extent enabled it to reject the Angolan elections and resume its insurgency to great effect. 
The effect of cohesion was unclear on the optimality of election monitoring. With the 
insurgent movements, its effect was reversed: it was the decentralised FMLN that cooperated 
more than Unita, the movement with strong'internal discipline. This factor ultimately led to 
Unita's ability to efficiently seize over 70% of Angola soon after rejecting the elections. The 
effect of cohesion of the United Nations was shown to have an indirect effect on the viability of 
the election monitoring, through detennining the levels of commitment and resourcing the 
Organisation was prepared to spend on the operation. Cohesion thus affected the instrumentality 
of the monitors. 
Election monitoring, then emerges as the most difficult to analyse using the framework 
indicators. The difficulty of measuring the compatibility of objectives is to some extent 
compensated for by the election mechanisms, instrumentality and impartiality, but without the 
precision of other stages of interactions between the United Nations and insurgent movements. 
Similarly, timing, support and isolation, and cohesion had a pronounced, but often inconsistent 
impact on the viability of the election monitoring interaction. 
The differential impacts of the framework indicators on the interactions reveals 
important insights into the nature of the interactions, and the broader underlying currents that 
detennine United Nations and insurgent behaviour in interaction of those sorts. These 
observations will be important to further analysis of these interactions. The framework used in 
381 
this thesis is by no means exhaustive of all possible approach indices, and new insights into 
these types of United Nations-insurgent interactions will emerge from additional analyses. The 
significance of the present observations to further studies is in generally characterising the nature 
of the interaction, and the types of approach indicators that will be more revealing for each 
interaction. 
The mediation analysis shows that in classes of interactions where participation carries 
no significant costs, the objectives and intentions of the participants assume overriding 
importance as approach indicators. Behaviour indicators, such as mediation mechanisms, 
instrumentality, and impartiality, are more problematical, and dependent for genuine 
determining power on their connections with the parties' intentions and satisfaction with the 
interaction's progress. The lack of accountability of behaviour in these types of interactions also 
makes influence indicators, such as isolation and support, less reliable in predicting the viability 
of the interaction. The peacekeeping analysis shows that in hl1 interaction where each participant 
poses a significant danger to the other, the behaviour indicators - peacekeeping mechanisms, 
instrumentality, impartiality - assume much greater clarity and importance. The importance of 
objectives and intentions is not decreased, however. The influence indicators are also important, 
as is the effect of timing in determining a belligerent's genuine cooperativeness. The election 
monitoring analysis reveals, first, that approach analysis is less effective for studying allocative 
relationships. When an interaction designed to adjudicate among the disputed bases of the 
conflict is at stake, the nature of the outcome will always complicate the results. Second, these 
interactions emphasise the importance of the insurgents' and other parties' approaches. While the 
monitors' approach is important in terms of adequacy of resourcing and performance, it is the 
parties whose behaviour and attitude towards the results will determine the optimality of the 
process. Third, the different conceptions of the monitors and parties over process and outcomes 
makes measurement of the indices, particularly objectives and interests, difficult. Hence, it can 
be seen that different forms of relationship and their dynamics emphasise the importance of 
different aspects of the United Nations' and insurgents' approaches to their interaction. 
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7.2: INDICATORS AND APPROACHES 
The influence of the framework indicators, when compared across the different types of 
interactions studied, reveal important conclusions about the indicators themselves. The 
importance of this observation lies in the further precision it gives to each of the indicators 
across a range of interactions. A comparison of the relative strengths of each of the indices in 
determining the approach and compatibility of interests in each interaction allows an assessment 
and prioritisation among the indices by defining the level and direction of their impact on the 
different types of interaction. 
Objectives as an approach compatibility indicator had a generally high level of utility for 
determining the effectiveness of all three types of interaction. Their utility was maximised in 
mediation as the truest indicator of approach and intentions. In peacekeeping, a more dangerous 
and binding interaction, objectives also remain an important indicator of approach compatibility. 
Similarly in election monitoring, objectives retain their basic utility. The difficulty of 
quantifying the genuine compatibility of objectives in election monitoring, however, makes it a 
more problematic indicator in the analysis of allocative interactions. Generally, however, 
objectives emerged from the three different interactions as the most consistent indicator of 
genuine compatibility of approaches, and demonstrated an impressive level of correlation to the 
level of viability of all interactions. The use of the rationality assumption in measuring the 
authenticity and compatibility of objectives was vindicated by empirical observations: the 
insurgents' and United Nations' interests and objectives in general tallied closely with a rational 
appraisal of the opportunities and obstacles before them. Objectives, then, emerge as the natural 
basis for any approach analysis, being generally linked to trends in other behaviour indicators, 
and determining the extent of influence and commitment indicators. 
The utility of interaction mechanisms, as the first of the behaviour indicators, in 
determining approach compatibility, is strongly conditioned by the type of interaction being 
examined. Comparing the mediation with the peacekeeping and election monitoring interactions 
shows that agreement on the mechanisms of interaction is an important approach indicator when 
the type of interaction carries serious implications for the United Nations and the insurgent 
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movement. Thus in mediation a dysfunctional interaction harms no party seriously, whereas a 
problematic peacekeeping or election monitoring relationship can have serious consequences for 
its participants. The acceptance of mediation is shown to have little determinative impact of the 
effectiveness of the peace talks, while in peacekeeping, mutual tolerance by the peacekeepers 
and insurgents does not necessarily lead to an optimal interaction. Interaction mechanisms 
emerge as most important in allocative interactions like election monitoring, where a party's 
genuine agreement to elections denotes acquiescence to a process, and increases the likelihood 
of the tenability of the election results. Interaction mechanisms' influence on approach therefore 
increases as the binding nature of the interaction increases. 
Instrumentality, as the second of the behaviour indicators, follows similar patterns of 
usefulness in measuring approach compatibility for the different types of interaction. It is 
deprived of its predictive power in mediation by the obviousness of its premise: negotiations can 
only occur between parties that accept each other's presence. In peacekeeping, however, the 
influence of instrumentality is maximised. In determining actual approaches, instrumentality 
provides the analysis with the link between the real intentions and the behaviour of the United 
Nations and insurgent movements. It does this by building on the rationality postulate: if a 
parties' perception that the other represents an opportunity for the advancement of its interests, it 
will accept the presence of, and cooperate with that party. Acceptance of the other party thus 
signifies a compatibility of interests. Instrumentality is also important for election monitoring-
type interactions. Allocative interactions of this sort are generally process-oriented, and the 
legitimacy and fairness of allocative processes in the aftermath of civil wars often depends on 
the genuine participation of both the United Nations and the insurgent movement. Again, 
instrumentality as an approach indicator increases in utility the more binding the interaction is. 
Impartiality as an behaviour indicator has different patterns of significance than 
interaction mechanisms or instrumentality. Like instrumentality, its importance lies in its ability 
to determine the genuineness of behaviour and its reflection of the underlying intentions of the 
actors. This gives it particular use in mediation, by being able to separate genuine negotiation of 
a compromise agreement of differences from various negotiating gambits being used to cover 
other motives. In peacekeeping, where the peacekeepers and the insurgent movements pose an 
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armed threat to each other, impartiality also takes on great importance. It stands as one of the 
traits that separates a viable, peaceful interaction, and a damaged relationship that slides towards 
war. Similarly, in election monitoring, impartial behaviour signifies actual commitment to the 
election. In this way, impartiality of behaviour by the United Nations and insurgent movement 
offers further clues to their actual motivations, and thereby gives the analysis a truer assessment 
of the compatibility of their approaches. 
Timing, an indicator adopted to measure the level of an insurgent movement's 
commitment to the peace process, proves to be of little utility on analysis. Its strongest influence 
seemed to be on influencing insurgents' disposition towards peacekeepers. It is most likely that 
its lack of influence arises from the large number of factors determining a belligerent's position 
besides military fortunes, and these factors can modify the impact of a poor military situation. 
Timing as an indicator also seems to be based on an inconsistent assumption: that a stagnant 
military situation produces a greater receptivity to peace overtures. Yet this need not be the only 
reaction to a worsening military situation: other options include a change in tactics, or a 
radicalisation of the movement. 
Support and isolation proved the importance of taking influence indicators into account 
in an approach analysis. The influence of these factors also recommend caution in the way they 
are used to analyse the optimality of the interaction. Particularly where insurgent cooperation is 
compelled over basic disagreements, this cooperation will not necessarily yield more viable 
interactions. This was particularly shown during mediation, where cooperation and agreement 
could be compelled without effecting any change in the insurgents' intentions. Influence 
indicators proved to modify the underlying logic of the study only on occasions of minor and 
temporary uncooperativeness in the more binding interactions. Isolation of insurgent movements 
had an inconsistent effect on their commitment and influence in disrupting the coalition's unity. 
This seemed to be confined to certain situations and insurgent groups. 
Cohesion, as well, had an uneven effect across interaction types, cases, and actors. It 
proved a more valuable measure of United Nations commitment and capabilities, and thereby 
the sustainability and conviction of its approach. This indicator had little definite effect on 
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insurgents' approach, when compared in each type of interaction to the other important 
determinants. Highly factionalised groups were not in any observable way more constrained by 
their lack of cohesion than unified and disciplined groups. 
The comparison of the importance of each indicator in determining the actual approach 
of the United Nations and the insurgent movement, their compatibility, and their effect on the 
optimality of the interaction, suggests certain important conclusions from the analysis. Building 
further on the characterisation of general interaction types undertaken in the previous section, it 
enables a prioritisation of the impact of indicator types for each interaction type. This is useful 
for approach analyses of other types of United Nations-insurgent interactions by signalling the 
general types of indicators that will impact most heavily on determining the nature of the 
relationship. Hence, objectives proved to be of worth in analysing all types of interactions. Of 
the behaviour indicators, only impartiality proved to be equally useful in all interactions. The 
value of the other two behaviour indicators, interaction mechanisms and instrumentality, is 
greater for more binding, allocative interactions. Timing was of limited importance in all but 
peacekeeping, the most military interaction studied. Influence indicators, support and isolation, 
proved important but problematical, by threatening to divorce behaviour even further from 
intentions. Cohesion emerged as significant only to the United Nations approach. Comparison of 
the results of this thesis has, in this way, enabled a general characterisation of the types of 
United Nations-insurgent interactions, and identified those aspects of their approaches that most 
impact on the interactions' optimality. 
7.3: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
This thesis has been written from a conviction that the United Nations is a valuable 
instrument for reducing war in world politics, and amid a growing debate on the utility of 
retaining the Organisation. It is hoped that some of its approaches and conclusions will influence 
the Organisation's future directions along side the growing amount of work from national 
defence establishments formulating peacekeeping doctrines. Implicit in the analysis has been an 
assumption that during its most optimal interactions with insurgent movements, the 
Organisation was operating to its full potential and fulfilling an invaluable role in international 
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politics; while its most dysfunctional interactions were a result of a misuse of the United Nations 
and a misunderstanding of the nature of the problems by its Member-States. A corollary of these 
assumptions is that analyses of this nature will be helpful in increasing the Organisation's strike 
rate of optimal interactions with insurgent movements and other interlocutors. Such an 
improvement will hopefully redress to some extent the Organisation's fmance and confidence 
crisis by recapturing Member-States' support for it. 
The conclusions of this thesis generally reinforce the convictions of conventional 
doctrine on the need for consent and cooperation between a United Nations presence and former 
belligerents. It agrees that with the current resourcing, capabilities, and high level of Member-
States control of the United Nations' activities, only certain types of responses are possible. 
These are the responses that rely on the cooperation of all of the parties to make use of the 
Organisation's unique conflict termination attributes. A corollary of this is that a change in role 
or capabilities needs to be preceded by a change in resourcing and capabilities for independent, 
concerted action.2 Conclusions like this explicitly caution against doctrine changes, like those 
advocated in Agenda for Peace, that are unaccompanied by consequent changes in the 
Organisation's resourcing or capabilities. 
The United Nations' repeated misuse for enforcement roles, and the recumng 
embarrassment of revealing its coercive impotence, will only damage the its ability to act in 
other, more appropriate roles. Less universalist, but more cohesive multilateral organs should be 
used for enforcement roles. The most appropriate organisations for this task appear to be 
regional organisations and defence pacts. The United Nations Charter acknowledges this need 
for burden-sharing in the maintenance of international peace and security, devoting Chapter VIn 
to Regional Arrangements' complementarity and functions vis-a-vis the United Nations. 
Boutros-Ghali was also aware of this possibility in Agenda for Peace, advocating greater 
delegation of United Nations tasks to regional arrangements because "Just as no two regions or 
situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adapt 
2 This point has been most recently made by Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went 
Wrong", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.3, May/June 1995, pp. 5-7. 
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to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity.,,3 For these reasons, this study urges 
the United Nations to take into account, in its assessment of the situation for a peace effort, its 
own capabilities. It argues that United Nations' roles in the post-Cold War world should be 
determined not by the responsibilities that need to be fulfilled, but on which of these tasks is 
achievable with its current abilities. If it is reluctant to expand the United Nations' capabilities to 
fit its enhanced responsibilities, the international community should be aware of its 
shortcomings and devise alternative means for achieving its more normative objectives. 
The approach of this study goes further than such cautions, however. By contending that 
many of the sources of the viability of an interaction pre-exist in the conflict situation and 
Organisational dynamics of the United Nations, it recommends the development of a conflict 
analysis capability within the Secretariat, with direct input into the decision-making procedures 
for the dispatch of United Nations initiatives. Although an embryonic Planning and 
Coordination cell and a Situation Monitoring centre have been established within the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, data collection, sophisticated research, and systematic 
result collation and analysis need to constantly coordinate the information of units in the field, 
and inform the United Nations' decision-making on when to intervene. As reports by Under-
Secretary Goulding and others before the Bosnia and Somalia involvements recommended 
against the dispatch of peacekeeping forces there attest, such an inclination already exists within 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but is easily overridden by other interests, 
particularly those of the interested Member-States. Such a capability, however, should be 
systematically developed, and carry a definite weight in decision-making. Furthermore, the 
United Nations needs to summon much more military and political expertise to interpret this 
information and utilise it appropriately in decision making.4 
A corollary of this need is the need for such information processing to rest on an efficient 
intelligence capability. Several of the missions examined in this thesis were hampered by 
ineffective intelligence support.5 There exists within traditional peacekeeping doctrine a shyness 
3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda/or Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 13. 
4 Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", Survival, Vol. 36, No.3, Autumn 1994, pp. 111-112. 
5 Notably UNOSOM II, ONUSAL, UNPROFOR II, and UNA VEM II. 
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of intelligence gathering, stemming from fears that this will impair the impartiality of the 
peacekeepers in the eyes of the disputants. However, the complexity of contemporary civil war 
peacekeeping makes the collection, analysis and secure distribution of sophisiticated intelligence 
on troop location, strength and movement more important. The United Nations can benefit 
greatly from developing its own, as well as making use of Member-States, sources of both 
human intelligence and signals intelligence.6 There remain, however, various practical problems 
involved with intelligence sharing in multilateral operations: operational security may disincline 
Member-States from sharing intelligence from fear of compromising their sources or revealing 
their techniques. However, notwithstanding these problems of access to classified and technical 
intelligence, the United Nations can significantly improve its collection and use of open source 
intelligence and reports from field operatives. 
7.4: FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This study, in using an analysis of the compatibility or otherwise of the approaches of 
the interacting units to examine the optimality of their relations, expresses a faith in realist 
factors and their explanatory power. Approach analysis asserts the need for a dynamic 
examination of an entire interaction, rather than an appraisal of the technique of one of the 
interacting units, as characterises much of the peacekeeping and insurgent movement literature. 
The inclusion of the whole interaction into the examination yields important insights, which 
agree with, but add precision to, the conclusions of other approaches. Similar explanatory 
richness could be gained by applying interaction analyses to other, similar interactions. Such 
interactions could include United Nations interactions with other interlocutors: incumbent 
governments, Member-States, non-governmental organisations. The study also highlights the 
importance of studying United Nations-insurgent interactions to understand more about each of 
these actors specifically, but also generally to expand and enrich the discipline of international 
relations. While using a realist analysis, however, it does not contend that this is the only 
relevant approach. Other methodologies would yield important insights missed by this study. 
6 See Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping", Survival, Vol. 36, No.3, Autumn 1994, pp. 174-192. 
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For example, a psychological-sociological analysis of the relationship between United Nations 
representatives and insurgent contacts would enrich the study of this field. 
This study has isolated and analysed one nexus in the United Nations' many 
involvements in civil war and post-civil war environments. Yet it has also highlighted a number 
of trends that have become more important after the Cold War: the prominence of the United 
Nations, its successes, its failures and its image in the eyes of its Member-States; the growing 
international impact of insurgent movements, and the concerns they confront the international 
community with; and the growing number of interactions in international politics between 
entities that are not States. The interaction examined here has risen to prominence due to its 
lethality, expense, and the dangers it poses to the future viability of the United Nations. No 
developments in the international system in the aftermath of the United Nations "failures" 
suggest that an alternative will be developed, or in fact that States will show any less inclination 
to resort to multilateral measures through the Organisation to advance their less compelling 
interests. Yet more failures will bring further degradation of the United Nations' ability to 
respond adequately. It is only through such analyses as this that events such as the battle of the 
Bakhara Market can be utilised as part of the learning curve of the Organisation as it emerges 
from its first fifty years of torpor into its second half-century. 
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